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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing international interest in informal payment for health care - a 
payment that patients give, typically to medical doctors, for formally free services. The 
phenomenon is widespread and persistent in post-communist countries, but also 
reported from other countries in Africa and Asia. 
This thesis focuses on informal payments in Hungary, aiming to establish their scale 
and the motivation for giving, issues whose understanding are crucial in assessing their 
policy importance. 
The theoretical literature can be summarised in two contrasting hypothesis for 
informal payments. One is that patients pay because they want better care, which 
implies that payments reflect, and may sustain, defects in service delivery. This thesis 
elaborates a new theoretical framework that builds on this 'fee-for-service' hypothesis 
and Hirschman's theory of 'exit, voice, loyalty', identifying informal payments as one 
manifestation of another response to a perceived decline in health services: 
informal/internal exit or 'inxit' for short. The opposing view, the 'donation' hypothesis, 
however, considers such payments as motivated by gratitude, with no adverse effect on 
performance of health care. Unfortunately, previously existing evidence is inconclusive 
regarding both the motivation and scale of informal payments. 
The empirical part of this thesis addresses both issues directly, and also indirectly 
addresses motivation exploring any impact on equity, using a household survey, in-
depth interviews with patients and doctors, secondary analysis of existing datasets, 
official statistics and documentary analysis. 
Findings suggest that informal payment is indeed a problem in Hungary. First, 
although it is not a substantial source of health care financing (less than 5% of total 
expenditures in 2001), its importance as an incentive comes from its extent and 
distribution (at least 60% of the net income of family doctors and specialists) rather than 
its overall magnitude. Second, although survey findings did not confinn infonnal 
payment as a barrier to utilization and they supported gratitude as the most important 
motive, a contradiction has been found between the reasons for giving cited in the 
household survey and the revelation of pressures on patients to pay from in-depth 
interviews. Taken together, these suggest that payments generally take place 111 a 
'coercive' context, so the case for the 'donation' hypothesis is weak. 
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"People oj the same trade seldom meet together, even Jor merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices. " 
(Adam Smith, 1776 [5; cited in 6]) 
"Everything depends on that whether the socialized medical doctor receives ill 
exchange Jor her work, what she is entitled to 011 the basis oj her education, social 
status and work related responsibility, according to the extent she is utilized. 
Sillce the socialized medical doctor usually does not get this, socialization 
virtually means expropriation [of medical work] below its real value ... 
The reason Jor this does not need to be explained in more detail, so I say only that 
the main reason can be Jound in the decreased ability oj our illness insurance to 
bear the financial burden oj care, coupled with its huge power, against which the 
llnorganised alld splintered Hungarian medical proJession has always proven to 
be weak.,,1 
(Keleti, 1942 [7; cited in 8,pp.l 0-11]) 
I "Minden att61 fligg, hogy a szocializalt orvos munkaja ellencrtckekent megkapja-e azt, amire 
tanultsaganal, tarsadalmi hclyzetenel, munkajaval jar6 fele16sscgcncl fogva az igcnybevetcle aranyaban 
jussa van. Minthogy rendszerint a szocializalt orvos nem kapja mcg czt, a szocializalas gyakorlatilag az 
crteken aluli kisajatitast jelenti ... 
Ennek okAt felesleges jobban rcszletezncm, ezert csak annyit mondok, hogy a IcgfObb ok a betegsegi 
biztositasunk cs6kkent tchervisel6kcpessegcben, de annal nagyobb hatalmi erejcben keresend6, mcllycl 
szemben a mcgszervezhetetlen es szctforgacsol6d6 magyar orvosi tarsadalom mindig gyengenek 
bizonyult. " 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Setting the scene 
Throughout its 1,000-year history the Hungarian state has been influenced by both its 
location in the Carpathian basin in Central Europe and the nature of its people, the 
Hungarians, who form part of the now widely dispersed Finno-Ugric linguistic group. 
The Hungarian Kingdom - established in 1000 AD when its first king, St. Istvan, who 
converted the country to Christianity, was crowned - was a powerful state in the 
medieval period. However it fared less well in the face of attack, and eventual 
conquest, first by the Mongols (Genghis Khan) and then, in 1526 by the Ottoman Turks, 
who occupied the middle part of the country for 150 years. After the expulsion of the 
Turks, the Habsburgs established authority over the territory of the entire country, 
preserving it by suppressing uprisings in 1711 and 1849. As part of the Austro-
Hungarian dual Monarchy, Hungary was on the loosing side in World War I, 
subsequently loosing two thirds of its territory. During World War II first the Germans 
and then the Russians occupied the country, and in 1948 a communist dictatorship, the 
People's Republic of Hungary, was established under the political and military 
domination of the Soviet Union. Although an anti-Soviet uprising in 1956 was put 
down by Soviet troops, after 1968 Hungary partially liberalized its command economy, 
creating a more liveable atmosphere; the 'most cheerful barrack' behind the 'iron 
curtain'. This special mixture of relaxed central economic and political control, termed 
'goulash communism', distinguished it from other communist countries in the region 
[9,p.82]. The country regained its independence in 1989 and embarked upon a political 
and economic transition to reintegrate itself into the 'Western World'. Hungary became 
a member of NATO in 1999, and it was one of the first of the former communist states 
to be accepted as a candidate for accession to the EU. [I 0,p.329; 11] 
The current territory of the country covers 93,000 knl (1 % of the size of Europe) 
with more than half the area being lowlands surrounded by mountain ridges and hills. 
The Duna (Danube) and Tisza rivers, and Lake Balaton, the biggest freshwater lake in 
central Europe, are the country's main sources of water. Its neighbours are Slovakia to 
the north, Ukraine and Romania to the east, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
Croatia to the south, and Slovenia and Austria to the west (Figure 1.1). [12,pp.22-23] 
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Hungary had 10,175,000 inhabitants in 2002 while, as a result of its stormy history, 
another approximately 5,000,000 ethnic Hungarians live outside the current borders of 
the country. The populat ion has been decreasing because births have outnumbered 
deaths since 1981; the population has aged as the share of the elderly, aged 65 or over, 
has steadily increased during the past decade, accompanied by a decrease in the share of 
children under 15 years old (Table 1.1 , Figure 1.2). The majority of the population are 
ethnic Hungarians and Catholic by religion. The largest ethnic minority group, the 
Roma or Gypsy community, is currently estimated to comprise 200-400,000 people [12 ; 
13]. 
Population indicators of Hungary, 1949-2000 (selected years) 
1949 1970 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Population (millions) 9.2 10.3 10.7 10.4 10.3 10.3 10.2 10.1 10.0 
Live births per 1,000 20.6 14. 7 13 .9 12.1 11.8 11.3 10.3 9.6 9.7 
Deaths per 1,000 11.4 11.6 13 .6 14. 1 14.4 14.3 14 .0 13 .9 13.5 
Population change per 1,000* 9.2 3.1 0.3 -2 .0 -2 .6 -3 .0 -3 .7 -4.3 -3 .8 
Total fertility rate (children/woman) 2.54 1.97 1.92 1. 87 1.77 1.64 1.46 1.33 1.33 
Induced abortions per 100 live births 0.9 126.7 54.4 71.9 71.5 64.4 72.8 70.9 60.7 
% of under 15 years (A) 24 .9 2 1.1 21.8 20.5 19.4 18.6 18.0 17.5 17. 1 
% of 65-year old and ove r (B) 7.5 11.5 13.5 13 .2 13.6 13 .9 14.2 14.4 14.6 
Aging index (BfA x 100) 30.2 54.4 61.9 64.4 70. 1 74 .7 78.9 82.3 85.4 
Note: "Excluding international migration. 
SOllrce: [1 2; 14·21j 
Since 1990, Hungary has been a constitutional democracy and has experienced 
political stability, with 4-6 main political parti es and coalition governments [22,2(2(1 )) ; 
23,31.2]. The 386 seats in the unicameral parliament (National Assembly) are fill ed 
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Figure 1.2. 
every four years by a mixed majority and proportional electoral system with single-
choice voting [24; 25]. Mayors and local government assemblies are also elected for 
four years, with the elections taking place a few months after the general elections [26; 
25]. The public administration system has three levels: central (national) government, 
counties and settlements (municipalities). The country is divided into 19 counties, each 
with a population of between 200,000 and 1,000,000, and the capital, Budapest, which 
has 1,700,000 inhabitants [23,2.9]. However Hungary is still, in many ways, a 
predominantly rural country with slightly more than 40% of the country's population 
living in communities ofless than 10,000 inhabitants [12,3.51]. 
Selected population indicators for Hungary 
30 ................... .. ... .... ....................... ........ .... .................. ---O-Live births per 1,000 inhabitants 
-e-Deaths per 1,000 inhabitants 
-Total fertility rate (children/woman) 
25 ..................................... ......................................... .....-% of under 15 years (A) 
---% of 65·year old and over (B) 
20 
15 
10 
5 ......... . 
• • • • • II • • • o ~----~----~----~------~----~----~------~----~----~ 
1949 1970 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Source: (12 ; 1-I·2 I) 
The establislmlent of democratic political institutions in Hungary was relatively 
smooth compared to some other countries of the region, such as the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia, where violence destabilized the transition period. The earlier 
liberalization of 'goulash communism' facilitated a gradual approach to economic and 
public sector reform, but the transition has proved to be challenging (Table 1.2, Figures 
1.3 ,1.4). 
In 1991 GOP dropped sharply, by nearly 12%, and did not begin to increase until 
1994 (Figure 1.4). Inflation peaked at 35% in 1991 , and reached 29% in 1995 (Figure 
1.3). Unemployment rose to 14% in 1993, while real wages fell continuously until 
1996, when they were only 76% of their 1989 level (Figures 1.3,1.4). In recent years, 
however, the trend has reversed. As a result of structural transformation and strict fiscal 
policy, by 1997 the country began to experience stable economic grov.1h, achieving a 
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Figure 1.3. 
growth rate of 5.2% in 2000 (Figure 1.4, Table 1.2). Both unemployment and inflation 
fell below 10%, the former in 1998 and the latter in 2000 (Figure 1.3). Real wages have 
been rising since 1997 (Figure 1.4). Nevertheless, the income gap between the poorest 
and the wealthiest 10% of the population rose from a 3.5 fold difference in 1970 to a 5.5 
fold difference in 1999 [27; 28]? 
Macro-economic indicators in Hungary 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
GOP per capita at 2,070 3,189 3, 197 3,534 3,745 4,046 4,367 4,433 4,504 4,651 4,769 4,621 
current prices (USS) 
GOP growth rate (%) 0.7 -3 .5 -11.9 -3 . 1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4 .9 4.2 5.2 
Public expenditure as % 64.6 61.3 66 .3 71.8 72.5 74.0 63 .8 57.0 56.8 49.9 47 .0 46 .3 
of GOp· 
Annual inflation (Con- 17.0 28 .9 35 .0 23 .0 22 .5 18.8 28 .2 23 .6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 
sumer Price Index) (%) 
Inflation in health care 26.3 23 .6 44 .0 54.4 23.3 20.3 31.4 25 .1 18.3 16.3 10.9 10.0 
(%) 
Annual changes of real 0 .9 -3.7 -7 .0 -1.4 -3.9 7.2 -12 .2 -5.0 4.9 3.6 2.5 1.5 
wages (%) 
Rate of registered 0.5 2.0 8.2 13.9 14.0 12.0 11.7 11.4 11.0 9.6 9.6 8.7 
unemployment (%) 
Notes: "including transfer paym~nts 
Source: [18; 30; 31; 16; 32; 15; 33; J.I ; 3./; 12; 35. 18.6; 23] 
Selected macro-economic indicators of Hungary l. 
60 ........ ... .... ........ .... ...... .. ..... ... ..... ............... .... . 
-B-Annual inflation (CPI) (%) 
-Inflation in health care (%) 
50 . .... ... .......... ........... .... ... . .. ............. ........... .. -o-Rate of registered unemployment (%) 
40 ... .... .. ... ........ .... .. ....... ........ .. ...... ................... ........... ... ... .. ... .. . .... ................. ... ..... .. -
30 
o 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
SOl/rce: [1 8; 30. 31 ; 16: 32; 15. 33. 14; 3-1; 12; 35.186} 
2 Chapter 2 provides an extended discussion of the context of the health care system and health sector 
reform, as well as an introduction to the current system in place. For a more detailed description of the 
economic, political and social context of health care reform see Gaal et al. [11) and Gaal: Health Care 
System in Transition: Hungary. Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems [29]. 
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Selected macro-economic indicators of Hungary II. 
120 .... .. .. ........... .... .... .. ... .. ..................................... . ............. ... . ..... ..... . .. .. .. .. .... ... ....... .... . 
60 .. ..... ........ .. ...................................... .... . ............... ....... ...... .. ............... .. . .... .... ... . 
40 .... .. .. .... .. .... ... ....... ........... ........ .... .. ..... . ........... ... ....... .... . . 
20 ...... . .. .. ..... .. ... .. ..... ...... .... .. .. .. ...... ... . -D-GDP change (1989=100) 
~Annual changes of real wages (1989=100) 
o +---~----~--~----~--~----~--~----~--~----~--~--~ 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
SOI/ree: [1 8; 30; 31; 16; 32; 15; 33; 14; 34; 12l 
1.2. Health care reforms and informal payment: A fly in the soup, 
but how big and how nasty? 
Against the background of economIC, political and social transition, succeSSIve 
Hungarian governments have embarked on major health care reforms [36-38]. The 
point of departure, the unifornl model of the centralized state-socialist health care 
system (Semashko system), was common to all countries of the Soviet Bloc. Refornl 
plans have sought to move the health care sector away from the exclusive dominance by 
central government of financing and delivery of health services and to address the 
legacy of the oversized, hospital centred system [39]. 
In Hungary the early reform plans were elaborated during the last years of the 
communist regime, the so-called 'refornl communist era' of the second half ofthe 1980s, 
when policy makers sought solutions for the crisis of the Semashko system, which was 
manifest in growing evidence of inefficiency, unequal access to care and declining 
health status, despite rising health care costs [40; 39]. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health established a unit, the so-called Reform Secretariat, which elaborated a 
blueprint for health care reform considering the earlier Bismarckian social insurance 
tradition of the country, as well as the experiences of Western Europe and the USA [36; 
41]. The implementation of structural changes also began in this period and continued 
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after the first free elections in 1990 [42; 43]. Not surprisingly, the main direction of 
these changes was decentralization, leading to replacement of the primarily tax-funded, 
integrated state-socialist health care system with a predominantly social insurance 
funded system, in which the single national monopsonistic purchaser (the National 
Health Insurance Fund Administration) and the chiefly local government owned 
providers were separated (purchaser-provider split model). Private providers have also 
been allowed to emerge, coupled with limited privatisation of state assets, but the 
system has remained primarily publicly financed and services publicly produced [44; 
45]. A key element of the reform was the introduction of new provider payment 
methods, including capitation in primary care, fee-for-service points (points for 
procedures) in outpatient specialist care, and DRGs and patient days to recompense 
acute and chronic inpatient care respectively [46; 47].3 [11; 29] 
Yet despite continuous reform efforts in the health sector, more than a decade after 
the political changes, the former communist countries are still struggling with the 
problems posed by the process of transition. In Hungary, the experiences of these years 
have shown that the health services do not yield easy successes for reformers. Indeed, 
the peculiarities of the health sector, coupled with the adverse legacy of the former 
regime, have created a difficult puzzle to solve, one element of which remains 
particularly obstinate. Informal payment, a well-recognised phenomenon in the 
Semashko system, has survived not just 40 years of communist dictatorship, but 15 
years of ongoing health care reform. A former minister of health, speaking in 200 I, 
provides a clear testimony to the problem in his answer to a question by an MP: 
''Andor Kiss (MIEP): Do you trust in Hungarian physicians, or what conclusions 
do you draw from the findings of an opinion survey? 
Some 'weeks ago a daily newspaper published the results of an opinion survey, 
carried out on the internet. One of the questions was: "Do you trust in the 
Hungarian physicians?" The resllltll'as shocking. .. 44% said no ... 
... Lately, the young aren't attracted by this profession, applications have 
decreased substantially, and the number of points required for admission [to 
medical schools] is 1011'. If the MinistlY of Health dOIl't do anything. lt'e can get 
into the sallie siluation as the NOl'lt'egians, lt'ho haven 'f got enough medical 
doctors and lIIl/sf imparl physicians from abroad, including some from HZlI1gm)'. .. 
Dr. Istvan Mikola, the minister of health ansll'ers: 
3 Chapter 2 provides a more detailed description of the evolution of the Hungarian health care system 
from the roots before World War II, through the Semashko system to the past 15 years of health care 
reform, 
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Honourable fellow Member of Parliament! I trust the Hungarian physicians. I 
myself am a medical doctor, I've worked in several sectors of the health care 
system, I know them. I think patients trust the Hungarian doctors, too. I lvouldn 't 
draw such a profound conclusion from an internet survey... which confused 
gratitude payment with corruption... I wouldn't like to say, however, that we like 
the institution of medical gratitude payment, but there is no way to abolish this 
unfortunate legacy from one year to the other ... 
I'd like to tell you that medical doctors work altruistically for pittance. Recently 
I've been addressed by 47 clinicians of the Institute of Traumatology. The letter 
was signed by a 60-year old colleague, whose gross monthly salmy is 98, 000 
forint/ ... when I see their salary I need to cry ... But we do act to change this 
situation - and this is the institution of gratitude payment, which infact sometimes 
generates distrust -, this is why we will submit the bill on ... free-lance medical 
practice, according to which... the medical doctor becomes an independent 
contractor, and cannot get into a situation, that s/he'd accept money from an 
insured patient, or to let patients to express their gratitude towards her/him." 
[48] 
This dialogue offers a good illustration of the ambiguities that surround this issue. 
Questions of whether informal payment is the product of lack of trust or represents real 
gratitude, whether it is corruption or not, whether it creates problems or is beneficial to 
the performance of the health care system, and whether it can (and should) be 
eliminated in the short or the long term only, have been asked ever since informal 
payment emerged in the health sector in Hungary. But what exactly is informal 
payment, and when did it became part of our history? 
Adam [49; 50] reports that the Icustom' of paying medical doctors and other health 
\vorkers, even though health services were officially free of charge at the point of 
utilization, is rooted in the establishment of the state-socialist health care system m 
Hungary.5 A 1959 meeting of the Party Council presented the problem as follows: 
"The principle, that workers are entitled to high quality health care free of 
charge ... must be put into practice. The abuse, which hits the working class who 
are entitled to free health care mllst be abolished. .. We must fight against tilt' 
'widespread system of tips' as well. We have to ensure, that health workers do 
not behal'e in ways that patients and their relatives would think that they would 
get distinguished services if they paid, made a tip or gave gifts. The main weapun 
4 €400. 1 EUR is equivalent about HUF 250. 
5 For a disclIssion of and more precise definition of informal payment, developed in the frame of this 
study, see chapter 3. 
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in thisfight, however, should not be administrative measures, but the continuation 
of persistent political indoctrination." [51; cited in 50] 
Adam [50] argued that this resolution of the communist party had laid down two key 
principles of the policy on informal payment, whose duality has been dominating policy 
making ever since. First, gratitude payment has to be separated from other, corrupt 
forms of informal payment, and second, that although both the corrupt and non-corrupt 
practices should be eliminated, 'administrative' measures (i.e. legal proceedings and 
sanctions) are inapplicable in the case of gratitude payment. It seems, however, that the 
policy of ''persistent political indoctrination" failed to result in the desired behavioural 
change throughout the following three decades of the regime. The defeat was explicitly 
acknowledged by the more pragmatic reform communist leadership, which introduced 
taxation of informal payment, as if tax evasion had been the only problem caused by 
informal payments [8]. Whilst post-transition freely-elected governments have 
acknowledged that informal payment has been undesirable, they have continued to rule 
out 'administrative' measures, hoping that the marketization reform of the health care 
system would create an environment in which the phenomenon will "gradually die out" 
[52; 37; 38]. The first eight years of democratic government passed without noticeable 
policy changes, but 1998 seemed to bring a change in policy. The newly appointed 
minister of health convened a committee of leading academics in this field to study the 
issue and propose a policy. While this move brought informal payment to the attention 
of the media for a while, it has not generated any policy change. Not surprisingly, 
informal payment has remained with us [12].6 
As well as the distinction between gratitude payment and corruption and the 
exemption from 'administrative' measures, one of the abiding features of government 
policies on informal payment is that any solution will take time. Twelve years after the 
first free general elections, one question seems to be particularly relevant: how much 
time? And if after twelve years there has not been a noticeable improvement in this 
area, should we push on with the fight against informal payment and should the goal be 
to abolish it at all? 
1.3. Why does informal payment matter? 
To examine how the relevance of informal payment to health sector reform can be 
established, this study draws on the analytical framework developed by Roberts et al. 
6 Chapter 2 introduces the history of informal payment in more details. 
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[53]. The distinctive feature of this model compared to the other similar frameworks 
available for health policy analysis [e.g.54; 55-60], is its integrated approach to problem 
definition, which does not just separate causes and problems, tools and objectives, but 
recognises the equal importance of the policy process and politics in policy decisions 
and points out the inherently subjective nature of goal setting. Its main limitation is the 
blurred conceptual differentiation between intermediate and ultimate objectives of 
health policy, and the potential of the relativist approach to paralyse scientific analysis, 
which will be discussed briefly along the introduction of the framework. 
1.3.1. WHAT MAKES A HEALTH POLICY PROBLEM? 
Applying a diagnostic-therapeutic approach to health policy analysis, Roberts et al. raise 
the question of "",hat makes a problem in health care reform? Using the model of 
Donabedian (input, structure, process, output and outcome), they argue that problems 
can be defined at the level of system outputs or outcomes, which are the result of causes 
at the level of inputs, structures and processes. To put it another way, a problem exists 
if the health car~ system does not achieve its 'ultimate' objectives, such as the 
improvement of health status of the population or enhancing consumer satisfaction. 
They argue that behind these ultimate objectives, or as they put it, 'performance 
criteria', there are complex causal chains of variables, which finally lead us to the 
causes of problems. The application of this frame"vork to the subject of this thesis 
suggests that informal payment in itself is not a problem, but a possible calise of 
problems by its impact on system performance, in terms of ultimate policy objectives. 
To establish its relevance to health policy and health sector reform, first we have to 
establish whether it has an undesirable impact on system performance, for instance poor 
health status or dissatisfied consumers. 
But what exactly are these objectives and how do we know which matter? Roberts et 
al. [53] follow a more complex approach in the definition of objectives, than do other 
theorists, such as LeGrand et al. [56], Aday et a1. [55] and Hurley et a1. [60], who 
essentially apply the efficiency and equity concepts of welfare economics [54] to health 
care. Roberts et al. distinguish two sets of objectives, intermediate and ultimate. They 
list four ultimate objectives, which include the reduction of inequalities in the health 
status of individuals and protection against the cost of ill-health, besides the 
aforementioned improvement of the health status of the population and consumer 
satisfaction. Within the group of intermediate objectives they assemble a somewhat 
extended list of efliciency and equity-related concepts, sllch as access to care, technical 
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efficiency, allocative efficiency, cost-effectiveness, sustainability and quality. Although 
they devote little discussion to the reason for this separation - and indeed it can be 
argued that efficiency is just an intermediate objective, since maximising any kind of 
popUlation level outputs take place in a resource constrained environment, whilst at the 
same time different equity concepts appear at both levels7 - they clearly argue two 
important points using these sets of objectives as illustrations. First, problem definition, 
which relates problems to policy objectives, is inherently a normative process. It entails 
value judgements, which depend on one's moral-philosophical standpoint. Second, 
what follows from this is that the definition of the same concepts, efficiency and equity, 
can be subject to different interpretations depending on the preferred moral and 
philosophical view. 
They distinguish three main groups of ethical schools of thought, consequentialism, 
liberalism (rights-based approaches) and communitariasm, within which further 
viewpoints are described. For instance consequentialists advocate the principle of 'the 
greatest good for the greatest number', but that good can differ whether individuals are 
thought to be the best to judge of their own happiness, which is the key tenet of 
"subjective lItilitarianism", or else ordinary people are thought to be ignorant, short-
sighted, careless and to make decisions that are not in their best interests and so experts 
have to determine what is good for them, which is the basic ide~: behind "objective 
utilitarianism ". 
Roberts et al. [53] argue that each of these 'intellectual traditions' has very different 
implications for the objectives that health care systems should achieve, and this applies 
not just to the choice between equity and efficiency, but to the interpretation of these 
concepts. For instance all utilitarians favour efficiency, which requires the 
maximisation of overall total benefits compared to costs, but efficiency has a different 
meaning for a subjective and an objective utilitarian. A subjective utilitarian would like 
to maximize consumer satisfaction on the basis that individuals are the best judges of 
their own welfare, a concept known as allocative efficiency in welfare economics. An 
objective utilitarian, however, \vould like to maximize well-being, measured as health 
status. This is a different concept of efficiency, called cost-effectiveness, which 
deviates from the original notion of allocative efficiency not just that it assumes that 
7 One can argue, that this separation makes sense inasmuch as ultimate objectives are to maximise what 
one would like to achieve, and it cannot be maximised if we are not getting out the most from scarce 
resources, or that providing equal access to care will eventually reduce inequalities in health (hierarchical 
relationship between objectives), but the rationale of the separation of intermediate and ultimate 
objectives is 110t addressed by the authors themselves. 
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interpersonal utility comparisons are possible and individuals have the same utility 
function [S4,pp.III-112], but that this utility depends only the health gain they acquire. 
It is also called the extra-welfarist approach to efficiency [61]. Similar differences of 
interpretation can be observed concerning equity, which is concerned with the fair or 
just distribution of benefits and costs amongst individuals or groups in society rather 
than maximisation of benefits at the population level. Roberts et a1. argue [53] that 
distributional issues are the prime concerns of liberals, who seek to respect the 
autonomy of individuals to make their own choices. Both negative right liberals, or 
libertarians and positive right liberals, or "egalitarian liberals" advocate that each 
human being is equally entitled to something, but not necessary to health or health 
care.8 From a libertarian moral-philosophical point of view, seeking to ensure that 
others do not interfere with the right of individuals to choose for themselves how to live 
their life, everybody has a right to the possession and enjoyment of justly acquired 
(work, inheritance, gift or exchange) income or wealth, which implies that inequalities 
in health are not unfair. In contrast, egalitarian liberals argue that a certain level of 
health is a prerequisite to making real choices concerning our life. Consequently all 
members of society should be entitled to a certain level of health as a prerequisite for 
making a meaningful choice. What this level of health is, and whether it is health itself, 
or instead health care, is debated by different writers, not just on grounds of feasibility, 
but of principles, since redistribution may force choices and individuals' choices may 
affect their health.9 
The implication of this relativist analytical framework for informal payment is that 
policy makers with different ethical views would judge differently \vhether or not 
8 For a more extended discussion in a similar vein see Pereira [61]. 
9 A detailed critique of this classification of moral theories is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it may 
be helpful to mention an example here. The category of "communi/arianism" seems to mix two important 
classification criteria. First, what the authors argue, communitarianism emphasise the virtue of the good 
character, or how people should behave. This introduces another set of values (objectives), which 
differentiates communitarianism from liberalism and utilitarianism. Second it is the community that 
decides what these values are. In this later respect, Roberts et al. [53] distinguish two forms of 
communitarianism. The relativist communitarians, who acknowledge that different communities can 
have different visions on the good character or the good society, whilst universalist communitarians 
believe that their vision is the only good, which should be extended to others. I would argue that this 
latter differentiation has a more general descriptive importance, which can be extended to the other 
moral-philosophical views. The question in this respect is not what the objectives are, but who sets these 
objectives. For instance, libertarians and to a certain extent subjective uti litarians believe, although on a 
different basis, that individuals should pursue their own objectives, objective utilitarians believe that 
experts have to determine these, while communitarians believe that it is the community. But should 
different communities follow the same objectives or respect each other's choices? At the level of 
communities a liberal or a utilitarian can be as universalist as a universalist communitarian is. 
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informal payment causes a problem, and what this problem is. 10 Certainly, it seems 
necessary to clarify in any policy debate whether differences in views of various policy 
proposals are due to divergent views on the appropriateness of the policy for achieving 
agreed objectives, or are attributable to differences in the desirability of the objectives, 
themselves. Nonetheless, one can argue that a relativist approach like this entails the 
risk of paralysing meaningful policy analysis if there is no consensus on objectives. 
Furthermore, policy makers may not even know what they really want to achieve. This 
is not necessarily because they are ignorant, but because there is something appealing in 
each of these moral-philosophies. The World Health Report 2000 is a good example of 
this stand [58]. The authors of the report delineate a very similar set of ultimate 
objectives (or as they put it goals) as do Roberts et al. [53], but they consider not just 
overall goal achievement, e.g. the average level of health status, but also its distribution 
among the population. In turn, experts construct an overall index, which is calculated 
from the individual goal achievements, using specific \veights. Finally, they incorporate 
efficiency considerations by relating the overall attainment to the resources spent in the 
various health care systems. According to the terminology of Roberts et al. [53] the 
World Health Report has developed perhaps the most unique form of moral-philosophy, 
an egalitarian liberal objective utilitarian universal communitarian approach, with the 
distinctive feature that it synthesises equity and efficiency. Most notably, however, the 
World Health Report suggests that each country has to follow not just the same health 
policy objectives, but also a pre-defined balance (priority) between them. 
In this study I take a middle position, advocated by certain economists [54,p.112], 
that says that experts should analyse the likely effect of policies on all the important 
objectives without taking a stand on which one of them is more or less important than 
others. II This position assumes that there is an agreement on the objectives to be 
considered. Here Hungary provides a good example. In Hungary there seems to be a 
general consensus among mainstream political parties concerning the main objectives of 
10 One may criticise the analytical framework that it virtually takes a consequentialist approach, when 
defines problems at the level of outputs or outcomes. For instance choice is typically a value linked to the 
process of health services. Nevertheless one may regard all intrinsic objectives as outcomes of the 
system. 
II Three points may be worth mentioning here. First, that the ethical positions described by Roberts et al. 
[53] may seem to be committed to a particular policy objective, but that does not mean that they have 
nothing to say on other objectives. For instance, the objective utilitarian (extra-welfarist) approach does 
imply considerable redistribution, since access and valuation should be linked to need rather than ability 
to pay. Second, different ethical positions may imply the same solution, when it comes to practical 
implementation. For instance subjective utilitarians and libertarians both prefer the market as a resource 
allocation and distribution mechanism. Third, the variolls areas of the health sector can in fact work on 
ditTcrcnt principles within the same health care system. 
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Box 1.1. 
health policy. These include patients' rights, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equal 
access for equal needs (Box 1.1). Nonetheless, there is no attempt to prioritise amongst 
these objectives in the relevant laws and regulations, showing how it is difficult to agree 
on priorities but less difficult to agree on the objectives that count. 
Health policy objectives in Hungary 
Article 1 and 2 of Act CLIV of 1997 on Health defines the principles of (a) the protection and 
promotion of patient rights, (b) equal access to health services for equal needs, (c) the effectiveness of 
health care interventions, based on scientific evidence, and (d) the cost-effectiveness of health 
services, on the basis of which the health care system has to be built [I]. Equity seems to be a 
defining objective backed up by a wide social consensus, since the state-socialist health care system's 
fundamental principle that access to care should not depend on ability to pay has remained unaltered 
throughout the period of successive reform governments. Act LXXXJlI oj 1997 on the Services oj 
Statl/tory Health Insurance further clarifies the practical implementation of this equity objective [2]. 
Social insurance financing of health care not just removes ability to pay as a barrier to access to care, 
but the law explicitly prohibits giving priority to patients who would be willing to pay extra, should 
there be a waiting list [2,20(3); 1,9(4)]. In the frame of the statutory health insurance scheme each 
patient should receive the same standard of care as far as clinical quality is concerned, but they are 
allowed to pay extra for higher quality hotel services, like one-bed or two-bed rooms with telephone 
and colour TV [2,3,23(g)]. Moreover, social insurance contracted health care providers cannot charge 
extra for medical treatment that are included in the benefit package, except for the centrally 
determined and regulated cases of co-payments [2,21,23; 3]. Only few services are excluded totally 
from the benefit package. These are stipulated in Article 18 of the Act, and in Decree 
No. 46/1997. (XJI. /7.) NM [4j. 
Hence, according to the logic of the Roberts et a1. framework, but drawing not on 
their classification and definition of objectives, but on the Hungarian laws and 
regulations, informal payment matters if it causes inefficiency (cost-effectiveness), 
prevents access to care or detrimentally affects (the clinical and/or service) quality of 
care or patient rights (effectiveness, responsiveness). Although, as we have mentioned 
before, there are debates over the definition of various objectives, as well as their 
relationships to each other (for instance whether clinical effectiveness and quality can 
be regarded as a separate objective or they are part of efficiency), the detailed 
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, we note that Aday 
et a\"s [55] definition of effectiveness and quality, the extra-welfarist notion of 
efficiency [61] and the definition of the World Health Report 2000 for responsiveness 
[58] provides a relatively consistent framework that are used here, while the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the 'equal access for equal needs' principle 
is discussed extensively in chapter 7. 
But does informal payment really have such impact on system performance? 
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1.3.2. CURSE OR BLESSING: THE IMPACT OF INFORMAL PAYMENT ON THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The impact of informal payment on the performance of the Hungarian health care 
system has always been disputed, not just at the level of policy-making, but amongst 
academics and researchers. For instance, researchers such as Orosz [39] and Bondar 
[63] have argued that informal payment has a central role in ensuring that the system 
functions. Balazs [64] went even further by talking about informal payment as an 
organising principle, the removal of which could easily result in the collapse of the 
system. In contrast, researchers such as Blasszauer [65], Adam [66; 50; 49; 67; 8] and 
Lengyel [68] emphasised the immorality and illegal nature of the phenomenon and 
argued for stricter enforcement of laws to eliminate informal payments. Another good 
example is the dispute about the interaction between new provider payment methods 
and informal payment. Bordas [52] argued that output-based provider payment 
methods would eventually drive informal payments out of the system, while Csaba [69] 
thought that they could even increase them. These contradictory opinions suggest that 
there is disagreement amongst researchers on the nature of informal payment and the 
incentives it introduces into the system, since eventually these determine its impact on 
system performance. 
Roberts et al. [53] argue that behind performance failures there are complex causal 
chains, which should be explored and analysed to identify the possible points for 
interventions. 12 In the case of informal payment, ho\vever, these cause-effect 
relationships are equivocal, because there are competing claims on the causes of the 
phenomenon itself and the motivation of patients and physicians, discernible in the 
speech of the former minister of health. The images of grateful patients giving thanks 
for being cured and the corrupt physician, who effectively extorts payment imply 
different answers to the question of why people give, which in turn have differing 
12 They argue that in the causal chains there are certain variables that are amenable to government 
intervention. Because the adjustment of these variables can eventually change system performance, they 
call these variables "control knobs". They propose four main control knobs: financing, payment, 
organization and regulation. These knobs have many different settings, whose combination, Roberts et al. 
[53] argue, eventually determines, how a particular health system performs in relation to the 
aforementioned objectives, although the adjustment of a control knob usually affects other health policy 
objectives and not just the one, for which improved performance is sought. For instance, the options of 
financing, i.e. the settings of the health care financing control knob, comprise taxation, social insurance, 
private insurance, user fees (direct payments, out-of-pocket payments) and community financing. In turn, 
each of these options has special characteristics that can influence system performance. Using this 
framework, informal payment can be understood as a financing option (user charges), as well as a method 
of payment (fee-for-service), which is one possible way to model its potential impact on system 
performance. Whether informal payment is virtually a form of user fee and fee-for-service has long been 
debated and crucial to decide on what should be done about it. 
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implications on the impact of informal payments on system performance and 
consequently on what to do about it and how. 
If informal payments are given truly voluntarily, and physicians and other health 
workers do not provide any better services to paying patients, one can say that informal 
payment is a desirable form of private health care financing, since it brings more funds 
to the health sector without introducing the equity problem of formal co-payments. 
This benign informal payment is called gratitude payment, a term, which, according to 
Adam [49], was coined by the medical profession in the 1950s. Moreover, if these 
conditions pertain, neither does gratitude payment adversely affect efficiency, but 
provides an incentive for physicians to stay in the profession, and ensures a sustained 
supply of human resources at least in those specialties where gratitude payment is 
substantial [52]. These assumptions about informal payment, which emphasize the 
benign nature of the phenomenon, can be summed up as the 'donation' hypothesis of 
informal payment. However, if any form of coercion is associated with informal 
payment, it is the worst possible form of private financing, since it is not possible 
formally to grant any exemption to the poor, given the informal nature of the 
phenomenon [70]. Informal payment could well become a barrier to access to care. 
According to this 'fee-for-service' hypothesis, informal payment can worsen the 
efficiency of service provision too, if doctors feel obliged to provide otherwise 
unnecessary services just to please the patients who paid [71; 63; 69]. 
As far as policy making is concerned, the 'donation' hypothesis, with its assumed 
cultural roots, implies that informal payment cannot easily be eliminated from the 
system [72], but this is not absolutely necessary, given the benign nature of the 
phenomenon. In contrast, if informal payment is instead a fee for service, policy 
makers should act on the problems it causes, as the World Health Report 2000 put it: 
" ... A widespread example is the condoning of public employees charging illicit 
fees from patients and pocketing the proceeds, a practice kllOlI'n euphemistically 
as "informal charging". Slich corruption deters poor people from lIsing services 
they need, making health financing even more urifair, and distorts overall health 
priorities." [58,p.xv] 
In summary, whether informal payment is a curse or a blessing for the Hungarian 
health care system depends on why patients give and why physicians and other health 
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workers accept it. This question lies in the hearth of the dispute on informal payments 
and has been selected as the central theme of this study. 13 
1.3.3. POLITICS OF THE POLICY PROCESS: THE IMPACT OF INFORMAL 
PAYMENT ON HEALTH SECTOR REFORM 
As well as exploring the normative approach, Roberts et al. [53] emphasize that what 
reaches the policy agenda does not necessarily coincide with normatively defined 
problems. They argue that the cultural context, which makes various topics taboo and 
others salient, the various actors, such as issue entrepreneurs, or the media and the 
issue-attention cycle, are all examples of forces that influence problem definition. 
The recognition of private interests and politics in the policy process helps to point 
out another aspect of the possible health policy importance of informal payment. Even 
if informal payment has no undesirable consequences on the performance of the health 
care system, we should consider the impact of the interests it creates on the reform 
process. Regardless of the exact nature of informal payment, it makes the recipients 
better off and that may in turn create resistance to reform measures that aim to change 
the status quo. Thus, informal payment could be an obstacle to health care reform [64; 
73; 9; 74]. 
1.3.4. LARGE ENOUGH TO BOTHER? THE EXTENT, MAGNITUDE AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
So far we have argued that informal payment matters only if the incentives it introduces 
make the health care system fail to achieve policy objectives and the interests it creates 
block health sector reform efforts. However, one can argue that if the overall 
magnitude of informal payment is small it does not distort incentives and system 
performance so much and does not create so strong resistance to change that would 
justify policy makers' attention. Indeed, the magnitude and distribution of informal 
payment is key to whether informal payment is regarded as a source of policy concern. 
Thus, this study will also address the scale of informal payments to the extent that it 
justifies any further research into the phenomenon. 
1.3.5. CONCLUSIONS: THE POLICY IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
In summary, this section has examined why informal payment matters for health policy 
and health sector reform. Applying the analytical framework developed by Roberts et 
13 See chapter 3 for a more detailed disclission of the theories of informal payment. 
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a1. [53] to informal payment, first we have argued that it only matters if it alters the 
operation of the health care system so that the system does not achieve its goals 
(unsatisfactory system performance), and second if it influences health sector reform 
through the interests it creates, with the provision that the scale of the phenomenon 
matters too. Using the terminology of Roberts et a1. [53] infom1al payment is not a 
problem itself, but a possible cause of problems that are manifest in failures to achieve 
health policy objectives. Whilst moral-philosophies address different health policy 
objectives that eventually influence whether a particular aspect of system performance 
is considered a problem or not, we have argued that policy makers are not necessarily 
committed to a single ethical position, rather a mixture of them, although priorities 
between the various health policy objectives are often neither clear nor explicit. 
Hungary offers a good example, since there seems a general agreement amongst 
mainstream political parties about the objectives that count, which include both 
efficiency (cost-effectiveness) and equity (equal access for equal needs), but there are 
no explicit means of trade-off between the two. Nevertheless, whether we think about 
informal payment as a 'donation' or a 'fee for service' implies not just totally different 
impacts on these policy objectives and consequently justification to act, but different 
policy options to eliminate the phenomenon. 
1.4. What do we know about informal payment: further 
complications for policy-making 
Applying the analytical framework of Roberts et al. [53] to th~ s~lbject of this study, I 
have argued in the previous section that what motivates patients and physicians to give 
and accept informal payments in the Hungarian health care system fundamentally 
determines whether policy makers should pay attention to this phenomenon at all. 
However the exact nature of informal payment has long been disputed amongst policy 
makers and researchers alike. Indeed, a benign gratitude payment has very different 
implications for policy making than a fee for service with its potential to deter the poor 
from utilising care or induce the provision of unnecessary services. Although these 
working hypotheses inevitably simplify reality, they make the ambiguities that surround 
the issue particularly evident. 
Unfortunately the scarce empirical evidence offers little help in clarifying the 
situation. Findings on the scale of informal payments are inconclusive. For instance a 
household survey by Bond{u- and Ekes [75] estimated the yearly total amount of 
informal payment in 1994 as almost twice as much as the estimate from the household 
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survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office [76]. The available evidence 
concerning the motivation of patients and doctors [77-82] is equally inconclusive and 
contradictory, whilst other areas, such as the actual impact of informal payment on 
access to care, have remained by and large unexplored. For instance T6th et al. [78; 81] 
and Csap6 [80] found gratitude by far the most frequently mentioned reason for paying 
physicians informally, whilst other studies, including T6th et al. [77] and Dobossy et al. 
[79] arrived at the opposite conclusion. Moreover, in a qualitative study Szab6 [83] 
found that even physicians thought that the majority of patients paid in expectation of 
better care. 14 
1.5. Rationale, overall aim and focus of the research 
This study takes its starting point from this unsatisfactory situation. Informal payment 
is a long-standing phenomenon in Hungary that has long been recognised as an issue by 
policy makers, but its double image has created a confusing situation in which both its 
real nature and scale have remained uncertain. The existing research accurately reflects 
this ambiguity. Both the theoretical debate and the scant empirical evidence are fraught 
with contradictions and inconclusion, whilst important aspects of the phenomenon, such 
as its impact on system performance have remained largely unexplored. It is now time 
to try to create some clarity, first by systematically reviewing available knowledge and 
second by filling in some of the most important missing pieces of empirical evidence. 
1.5.1. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this study is exploration, description and explanation of the phenomenon of 
informal payment [84], in order to support informed (evidence-based) policy-making in 
this area. To achieve this aim the research has pursued the following objectives within 
the following framework. 
First, the broad focus of the study was set out and, on the basis of the literature about 
the theoretical debates, a theoretical framework was developed and used to outline a 
research agenda, to select research questions and to formulate hypotheses. Second, the 
available evidence on informal payment was reviewed and summarised. Third, in light 
of the empirical evidence, research questions were refined and research methods were 
selected. Fourth, the research aimed to collect empirical evidence to allow the theory to 
be refined and policy proposals formulated. Whilst this approach may seem to be 
I~ Sec chapter 3 on the review of the theories of informal paymcnt and chapter 4 on cmpirical cvidcnce, 
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mechanistic, it must be noted that the process was rather iterative than sequential, and 
experiences from one phase fed back to others. 
1.5.2. FOCUS AND RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
The discussion on the importance of informal payment from the policy-making point of 
view has already shown that the magnitude of payment and the impact on health sector 
reform and system performance taken together make informal payment a source for 
policy concern, but the latter crucially depends on what motivates patients and 
physicians in the transaction. As mentioned before, there are ambiguities concerning 
why patients give informal payment, which have been summed up in two rival theories. 
The 'donation' hypothesis is based on the assumption that patients pay because they are 
grateful for being cured. In contrast the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis considers informal 
payment as a means to get better services than they expect to receive without payment. 
These rival hypotheses imply markedly different consequences for the efficiency and 
equity of the health care system as well as suggesting conflicting policies concerning 
what to do about it. Given that the available empirical evidence pertaining to 
motivation is not just scarce, but inconclusive and contradictory, the motivation of 
patients and physicians is selected as the main theme of this thesis, beside the extent, 
magnitude and distribution of informal payments, which are important, as argued 
before, to establish the policy relevance of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the double 
focus of this study is complemented with further aspects of informal payment, as the 
motivation issue is assessed not just directly, but indirectly, For instance, if the 
gratitude payment concept is valid then informal payment should not prevent access to 
care, hence study of the impact of informal payment on equity can indirectly inform us 
about the validity of the gratitude payment concept. 
Nonetheless, it is not just the lack of evidence that justifies further research in this 
area. Although the majority of researchers in Hungary dismiss the validity of the 
gratitude payment concept [64; 9; 70; 71; 63; 52; 85; 67], the idea is firmly embedded in 
society and especially fa\'oured by many physicians. For instance the Code of Ethics of 
the Hungarian Medical Chamber declares that "the expression of gratitude, which 
accompanies reCOl'elY fi'om illness, saving of lives and the birth of a new life is not 
sllbject to coercion and is based on fi'ee will". It goes fUl1her by saying that "one of the 
causes of gratitude payment is the hllmiliatingly 10\1' salaries (~r medical doctors" and 
"within certail/limits" gratitude payment is legal and legitimate [86,73-79]. 
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Moreover, study of informal payment has even more relevance today than it had at 
the beginning of post-transition health care reform in Hungary. During the transition 
period economic recession and fiscal deficit have made cost containment an 
overwhelming priority, but since 1997 the country has been enjoying healthy economic 
growth (Table 1.2) that may open the gate to increased health care spending. There is a 
grave risk, however that the performance of the health care system will not improve 
significantly unless policies are designed on the basis of evidence. 
1.5.3. INTERNATIONAL RELEVANCE OF STUDYING INFORMAL PAYMENT 
As well as policy-makers in Hungary, other countries may benefit from the study of 
informal payment. Although the English language literature was extremely limited in 
1997 when I started to work on the issue, the available evidence at least confirmed that 
many of the former communist countries, such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria had 
been struggling with the same problem [87; 88; 74]. The countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) had common health care systems, i.e. they shared a starting point 
with the same roots and problems. On the other hand, some countries opted for very 
different tools to tackle these problems. Hence the evaluation of experiences of health 
care reform in one country could yield useful lessons for the policy makers of others. 
Comparisons between the countries of the region can offer valuable insights about the 
applicability of various reform measures. IS Moreover some anecdotal and empirical 
evidence suggested that informal payment was not an exclusive feature of the state-
socialist model of health care systems as was reported from other countries such as 
Greece [89-92]. 
Since then the literature on informal payment has been expanding [93-95], reflecting 
a growing international interest in the issue, led by, among others, the World Bank and 
the World Health Organisation [96; 97; 58]. The World Health Report 2000 refers to 
"informal charging" as a widespread phenomenon [58]. Amongst others, informal 
payments have been reported from Uganda [98], Bangladesh [99] and China [100; cited 
in 10 1]. Indeed, in international training programmes I too have encountered 
15 This is not to say that meaningful comparisons can be made between all countries of the former Soviet 
Bloc, for instance between the Czech Republic and Georgia. In this respect, countries can be divided at 
least into two groups. In the first group are countries that have achieved a relatively quick and casy 
transition to democracy and market economy, including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Romania, the Baltic States, Hungary and maybe Bulgaria and Croatia. That is the economic recession of 
the transition period did not result in the collapse of the economy, or the breakdown of law and order. 
The rest of the countries may form the other group, in which countries are (have been) struggling with the 
collapse of the economy, like Georgia and Ukraine or political instability, like in the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia, and maybe Croatia). (See Chapter 3 for mon: details) 
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participants, who came from countries outside the CEE and Central Asian regions, and 
mentioned informal payments as an issue to be addressed in their health care systems. 16 
It seems that informal payment is a world-wide phenomenon, which many low and 
middle income countries struggle with [102; 103; 95]. 
I have argued before that informal payment cannot be understood without exploring 
the motivation of patients and physicians and that this issue has remained contentious in 
Hungary throughout the long history of the phenomenon. Whether or not gratitude 
motivates informal payments may not be a dilemma in all of these low and middle 
income countries, but some evidence suggests that the gratitude payment concept is not 
just a Hungary-specific custom or societal rationalisation. Similar questions have been 
posed in other countries such as Poland and Bulgaria [104; 105; 74], and the cultural 
roots of the phenomenon have been suggested in the Central Asian Republics of the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) [96; 97]. The situation in Hungary shows remarkable 
similarity with Bulgaria, where the guidelines of the Bulgarian Physicians' Union 
differentiate between ex ante and ex post payments, condemning the former as 
unethical, but accepting the latter as the right of patients [74,p.91]. 
1.5.4. PERSONAL MOTIVES 
While the list of possible beneficiaries of a study on informal payment is longer than I 
had originally thought, the motivation to undertake this research comes partly from 
personal factors. As a medical student I had to experience what informal payment 
meant in real life, and its humiliating nature pushed me away from clinical practice. I 
have chosen health services management with the ambition of contributing to changing 
the system, but in studying health services management I have had to realise that 
anyone \vho embarks on health sector reform inevitably encounters informal payment. 
This somewhat embarrassing thought has not just remained with me, but was later 
strengthened by my teaching experiences, as a member of the academic team of the 
newly established Health Services Management Training Centre at Semmelweis 
University.16 For instance, in the dozen institution-based management development 
programmes in which participants have to present individual management development 
16 Besidl! the two-year MSc level training programme, the Centre offers a wide variety of continuing 
education programmes, from short, one or two-day courses to long, institution-based management 
development programmes, as well as international courses in cooperation with leading universities and 
the World Bank Institutl!. The international cooperation extends to research activities, including for 
instance the out-of-pocket payment study. whose findings are presented in the frame of this thesis. 
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projects, informal payment has frequently come up during the discussions as an issue 
either explicitly or at least implicitly. 
1.6. Conclusions 
Although informal payment has long been recognized as an issue in the Hungarian 
health care system, it is not clear whether it causes real performance problems and on 
what scale. Consequently it is not clear whether it should be eliminated and if so, what 
to do about it. 
This study aims to support evidence based policy making in this area with a review 
of the available literature, the development of an explanatory theory of informal 
payment and the collection and analysis of empirical evidence focusing on the scale of 
informal payments and the motivation of actors with an emphasis on the validity of the 
gratitude payment concept. The theoretical framework puts informal payment into a 
broader system context that will facilitate further research. Hence in many respects this 
study aims to prepare the ground for further studies in this field. 
1.7. The structure of the document 
The aim of a PhD thesis is to generate new knowledge in the field of study concerned. 
In this respect the document has two main parts. The first part, in chapters 2 to 4 
provides contextual information and sets out the theoretical underpinnings for the 
empirical research implemented in the framework of this study, whose findings are 
presented in the second part of the thesis, in chapters 6 to 8. 
The novel elements of the first part are presented in chapter 2 and 3. Following this 
introductory chapter, chapter 2 describes the current organisational structure of the 
Hungarian health care system, provides an overview of recent health care reform and 
summarises the history of informal payment. The chapter is original insofar as it is 
based on documentary analysis of laws and regulations and the analysis of published 
official statistics. Chapter 3 conceptualises informal payment using Hungarian and 
international literature. One of the novelties of this chapter is a proposed new definition 
of informal payment, which has emerged out of the realisation of the shortcomings of 
existing definitions, especially as they make international comparisons difticult if not 
impossible. Chapter 3 also develops a new theoretical framework on the basis of the 
existing Hungarian literature and Hirschmanls [106] theory of exit, voice, loyalty and 
the theory of government failure [54] from which research questions and hypotheses are 
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formulated. The novelty of this explanatory framework is that it not only synthesises 
the existing thinking on informal payments, but it puts the phenomenon into a broader 
system context. The first part of the document ends with chapter 4, which examines 
existing evidence, confronts this evidence with the research questions and hypotheses 
and helps to refine them. 
The second part of the thesis, which covers the empirical part of the study, begins 
with chapter 5, which presents the final research questions and hypotheses that are 
addressed by means of empirical research. Chapter 5 also elaborates on the selected 
research methods. In turn, the data that have been collected are analysed and findings 
are presented and discussed thematically in relation to the previously developed 
hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 deals with the extent, magnitude and distribution of informal payment. 
The analysis brings together the findings of the published empirical evidence, expert 
opinions, official statistics, secondary analysis of certain surveys and the findings of a 
household survey carried out in the framework of this study. The aim of this chapter is 
to demonstrate the importance of the phenomenon in terms of its scale. 
Chapter 7 relates the gratitude payment concept to access to care. The definition of 
gratitude payment implies that it should not prevent access to care in any way. To 
assess the consequences for equity of informal payment, the household survey 
addressed the issue different ways: whether utilization of health care was delayed or 
deterred for financial reasons, whether money was a significant factor in uncompleted 
treatment and whether the cost of care placed a substantial burden on households, 
requiring, for example, use of savings or borrowing or selling household assets. The 
analysis is complemented with official statistics and the secondary analysis of previous 
surveys to assess the cost burden of informal payments on poor households and the 
differences in terms of the service provided. 
Chapter 8 directly addresses gratitude as a motivation factor. Asking why patients 
give, several previous surveys found gratitude as the most frequently named option, 
which seems to support the donation hypothesis. It is argued, however, that this answer 
does not necessary match the definition of gratitude payment. Respondents may 
rationalize their previous actions later, if they felt the situation embarrassing, or they 
just adopt the most convenient option where they felt some gratitude although other 
factors may also have played a role in their decision to pay. To address this potential 
inconsistency, the research combined quantitative and qualitative methods. First, in the 
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framework of the household survey, the question of 'why' was posed and those who 
answered gratitude or custom only, or the combination of the two (,non-coercive' 
reasons) were asked to participate in an unstructured interview. The analysis focused 
on discrepancies between the stated motivation in the survey and the comments in the 
interviews. This chapter also explores the motivation of those receiving payments using 
unstructured interviews with physicians. 
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the mam findings of the research, and their 
implications for policy making and the need for further research. 
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2. INFORMAL PAYMENT IN CONTEXT 
The aim of this chapter is to place informal payment in the context of the Hungarian 
health care system and in particular the changes that have taken place in the past 15 
years. The first section briefly discusses the health status of the Hungarian population 
and is followed by an outline of the current organisational structure of the system and its 
evolution from the pre-war period through the crisis of the state-socialist system to the 
stage of recent health care reforms (Appendices A 1 and A2 discuss these topics in more 
details). The chapter closes with a brief account of the history of informal payment, 
exploring successive government policies and the academic perspectives that have been 
brought to bear upon it. 
2.1. Health status of the population 
Figure 2.1. 
Since the end of World \Var II the health status of the Hungarian population has passed 
through four main phases (Figure 2.1). 
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The first period, until the end of the 19605, saw a major improvement that brought 
life expectancy to a level comparable with the more developed Western European 
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countries. Yet while life expectancy continuously improved in Western European 
countries during the 1980s, it stagnated in Hungary. The fall of the communist regime 
brought about a third period, which was characterised by a marked decline in health 
status, further widening the gap between Hungary and countries of the EU. 
Nevertheless, a late recovery started in 1994, and since then a steady improvement in 
life expectancy has occurred, which at least ensured that the gap between Hungary and 
its neighbours has not increased. 
Life expectancy at birth in Hungary, however, remains among the lowest in Europe, 
with high mortality among middle-aged men being the most important factor explaining 
this gap. In 1993, 16 out of 1000 men between the age of 40-59 years died, a rate twice 
as high as in 1970 [20; 31]. 
The immediate causes of death that account for the gap with the West include 
cardiovascular diseases and external causes, particularly suicide, high levels of lung 
cancer and cirrhosis, which are not surprising in light of the unhealthy Hungarian 
lifestyle, especially diet, smoking and alcohol consumption [107]. 
Kopp [108] offers an interesting explanation for these self-destructive tendencies. 
She links the increasing income inequalities and decreasing social support - which 
characterized the liberalization policy of 'goulash' communism and which was further 
enhanced by the economic transition - with ill-health, alcoholism and suicide through 
depression, i.e. feeling one's situation poor and hopeless in comparison with others. 
Nevertheless, health services do playa part in population health as the inadequate 
response of the state-socialist system to the health transition of the population has 
contributed to high premature mortality from avoidable causes [109; 39; 40]. 
Persisting geographical and social inequalities in health are also a source of concern 
in Hungary. For instance, the gap in life expectancy at birth bet\veen counties with the 
highest and lowest levels was 6.7 years for men and 4.3 years for women in 2000 [110]. 
The difference is partly attributable to the presence of disadvantaged population groups, 
especially the Roma minority, whose health is substantially worse than that of their 
ethnic Hungarian neighbours [Ill]. 
Hence, the challenges facing the Hungarian health care system are complex, an aging 
population coupled with high rate of premature death (and consequently of preceding 
illness), unequally distributed within the population, a situation that is partly attributable 
to the failures of the system itself. 
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Overview of the Hungarian health care system 
The current structure of the Hungarian health care system represents a considerable 
departure from the former, highly centralized, state-socialist model. Since 1989 the 
system has become more pluralist with responsibilities divided between various players, 
while the previous hierarchical relationships have partly been replaced by contractual 
relationships and quasi-public arrangements. 
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Figure 2.2 presents the current organizational structure of the health care system 
according to the three levels of public administration and three main functions, 
governance (stewardship), financing and service delivery. The new system is based on 
contracts, in which purchasing and service delivery are separated, although the current 
Hungarian health care system is still predominantly publicly financed and provided. 
2.2.1. FINANCING 
According to statistics supplied to international agencies, Hungary spent 6.7% of its 
GDP on health care, 75.5% of which came from public sources in 2000 [107], although 
health expenditures data vary with different sources, because of divergent estimates on 
general and local tax sources and informal payments [112-116]. 
Public sources are chiefly compulsory social insurance for recurrent costs and 
taxation for capital costs. Within the framework of the social insurance system the 
statutory health insurance scheme is a distinct entity. Contributions are held in an 
earmarked budget, the so-called Health Insurance Fund (HIF), which is administered by 
the National Health Insurance Fund Administration (NI-IIFA) [117; 118]. The NHIFA 
is the single most important monopsonistic purchaser in the system. However the rules 
within which it acts, such as contribution levels, its operating budget, and methods of 
provider payment, are made by the National Assembly, the national government and 
within that the tvlinistry of Health, Social and Family Affairs (MOH). [119,19; 2,34,35; 
120-122] 
The revenue of the HIF comes from a proportional payroll tax (14% in 2002) - the 
employer (11%) and employee (3%) health insurance contributions [119,24] and from 
the so-called 'hypothecated health care tax', which has two components: a lump sum 
tax (HUF 4,500 in 2002)17 and a proportional tax (11 %), levied on those types of 
income which are not subject to social insurance contributions, for instance certain 
dividends or fringe benefits [123]. The statutory health insurance scheme provides 
almost universal coverage, with compulsory participation as well as comprehensive 
coverage, with few exclusions, such as cosmetic surgery [2, 18(4-6); 4], and no or little 
co-payment except for pharmaceuticals, medical aids and prostheses, dental prosthesis, 
balneotherapy, treatment in sanatoria, long-term chronic care, above standard 'hotel' 
services and if the rules of utilisation are not observed [2,18(4-6),21,23; 3]. Private 
sources of health care financing, though, are almost exclusively out-of-pocket for 
17 €Ig. 
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informal payment and for services, which are either partially or fully excluded from 
cover by the HIF, as the private health insurance market is insignificant [124]. 
As a general rule the HIF covers only the recurrent costs of services. The owners of 
health care facilities, mainly local governments, are responsible for capital costs 
according to Act CLIV of 1997 on Health (the principle of 'maintenance obligation') 
[1,155(2)]. They are obliged to cover the capital costs of services, which usually come 
from general and local taxation. In addition, the central government offers substantial 
help via conditional and matching grants [125]. 
The HIF is divided into over twenty budget lines (sub-budgets) according to service 
types (such as family doctor services, dialysis and acute inpatient care), which are not 
devolved to the county level [e.g.l26, Annex 1]. A national budget ceiling is set for 
most sub-budgets, and various payment methods are used to ensure that the budget is 
not exceeded [2,34; 127,22-30; 120]. Institutional providers are paid from the sub-
budgets of the HIF according to the type of service provided. Outpatient specialist 
services are paid on a fee-for-service basis, using a point system (points for procedures), 
acute inpatient care is reimbursed using DRGs, and chronic care by patient days [2,34; 
127,22-30; 120; 122]. Health workers are predominantly salaried public employees 
[128], with the exception of family doctors, most of whom contract with both the 
NHIF A and local governments and are paid on a capitation basis [46; 120,11 (l), 12(2)]. 
In 2000, health care workers were the fifth lowest paid among the full-time employees 
of the 14 main sectors of the Hungarian economy [12,4.12,p. 90]. The situation was 
even worse when compared with the average salary of workers with higher education 
qualifications. The health sector ranked as the second worst paid among the other main 
sectors [1 2,4.1 6,p.96]. 
2.2.2. SERVICE DELIVERY 
Local governments are the main service providers in the system, owning most health 
care facilities, including primary care surgeries, polyclinics and hospitals [43,107(1 )c; 
129]. Tasks are divided between municipalities, responsible for providing primary care, 
and county governments, responsible for specialist care for their resident population 
[43,8(4),70(b)], but if municipalities are willing and able to provide specialist in- and 
outpatient care, county governments have to transfer the ownership of health care 
facilities along with the responsibility for service provision, according to the principle 
of 'subsidiarity' [43,69(2-6)]. In general municipalities own independent, multi-
speciality ambulatory institutions (,polyclinics', which provid~ outpatient specialist 
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care), single-specialty ambulatory institutions ('dispensaries l , which provide outpatient 
care for chronic diseases), and multi-specialty municipal hospitals (which provide 
secondary acute and chronic, inpatient and outpatient care). County governments own 
large, multi-specialty county hospitals, which provide secondary and tertiary, acute and 
chronic, inpatient and outpatient care. 
While local governments are responsible for making health services available for the 
local population, i.e. they have 'territorial supply obligation', they are allowed to 
contract out service delivery to private providers [1,155(2); 130]. Nevertheless, the 
private sector is small except for primary care, whereas most family doctors work as 
independent entrepreneurs, although their surgeries and equipment are owned and made 
available for them by local governments (a scheme known as 'functional privatisation'). 
Service providers, whether public or private, have to contract with the NHIF A to 
become eligible for HIF funding [2,30-33,36-38; 131,13-25]. 
The national government is responsible for the provision of certain special services, 
including for instance public health (via the National Public Health and Medical Officer 
Service), emergency ambulance services and blood supply [1,35-74,94-96,223-
227,142(2)], and it still owns a limited number of special hospitals, including national 
institutes of health, university medical schools, sectoral services and sanatoria [e.g.132]. 
2.2.3. GOVERNANCE AND OTHER ROLES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
The national government is the dominant regulator of health services, exercises 
statutory supervision over the HIF and controls the NHIFA [133-135; 121], covers the 
deficit of the HIF [119,3(2)], pays premiums in respect of non-contributing groups 
[119,39(1),16(1)b-o; 123], provides capital funds [125], finances and delivers public 
health services and provides most tertiary care services, mainly through the MOH [I]. 
The government also finances health education, research and development, and co-
payments that would otherwise be paid by the poor [136-138]. 
Despite early decentralisation measures, the national government has retained a 
central role in resource allocation decisions within the health sector. All aspects of the 
purchasing function have been centralised, and health care capacities are addressed 
through the contracting process [139]. Although the national government does not 
directly determine the inputs or outputs of the health sector, it regulates all aspects of 
the production process, including human resources [140; 141], pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices and health care facilities, which fall under registration and licensing 
systems [142-148] and price regulations apply to publicly employed health workers, 
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pharmaceuticals and medical aids and prosthesis. Further, patient rights are regulated 
extensively in the Act CLIV of 1997 on Health [1,6-25,28-34; 149-151]. 
2.3. Evolution of the health care system 
The evolution of the Hungarian health care system in the 20th century can roughly be 
divided into three main periods. Before World War II both the financing and the 
delivery of health services were characterised by a public private mix, with health 
insurance gaining ground rapidly and increasing state involvement in the Bismarckian 
model [66; 152,pp.31,37; 153]. Physicians could be in private practice or be employees 
of public or private insurance companies or hospitals, but frequently they combined 
these options [49,pp.36-37; 154; 73]. 
This development was disrupted at the end of World War II, when the integrated 
state-socialist model of health care systems was established [153]. The state assumed 
virtually exclusive responsibility for both the financing and delivery of health services, 
including hospitals, polyclinics and the district doctor services [155; 156], with no 
private insurance, while private practice was permitted only on a part time basis 
[157,39(2)b]. The system promised comprehensive, high quality care free of charge to 
each citizen, but an increasing gap had developed between rhetoric and reality [40; 39; 
153]. Health services were regarded as an unproductive sector of the economy, \vith 
low priority in resource allocation decisions [70], and health workers, especially 
physicians, were kept on a low salary [50; 49; 8; 67]. 
The system was unable to respond adequately to the revolution in medical 
technology and the health transition of the population, when non-communicable 
diseases began to dominate mortality [158; 40]. It reacted to the changing needs by the 
inflation of input targets, which led to the development of excess capacities, whilst 
patients wanted not more, but better care [52]. Tensions were further aggravated by the 
influence of politics on the budget setting process, which created regional inequalities in 
service provision, as well as inequalities in terms of medical specialities [40; 159; 71; 
153; 39]. As a result, a crisis had gradually developed, which was characterized by 
excess capacity and deteriorating service quality, a mixture of waste and shortages, 
inefficiency and unequal access [39; 52; 153]. 
The need for radical health care reforms became increasingly apparent in the 1980s, 
coinciding with signs of incipient collapse of the centralised economic and political 
system. Major health care reform has been on the policy agenda ever since. 
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2.4. Health care reforms 18 
Major health care reforms in Hungary began in the mid 1980s, when the continuously 
deepening recession of the economy and the increasing pressure from the emerging 
political opposition allowed a reform-oriented, liberal faction of the communist party to 
take control of government and formulate policies for the reform of the health care 
system. In the first phase of the reform, until 1994, most reform measures were 
implemented as originally devised during the reform communist period, with 
considerable decentralization. All this happened in the context of the transformation of 
the economy, which was characterized by a deep economic recession. Although GOP 
began to recover in 1994, the state budget deficit prompted restrictive measures. The 
second phase of the reform was overwhelmed by the economic stabilization efforts of 
the government of 1994-1998, and the goal of cost-containment began to dominate 
health care policy. Despite the favourable economic climate characterized by 
impressive and stable economic growth, cost-containment remained the main policy 
objective throughout the period of the government of 1998-2002. 
The reform measures implemented so far reflect the disparity between objectives 
pursued before and after 1994. Before 1994, health sector reform was characterized by 
decentralization and by the end of 1994 the new contract model of health services was 
operating. The emphasis was placed on incentives (e.g. payment methods) to produce 
the necessary structural changes without direct government intervention. After 1994, 
cost-containment became the utmost priority of government policy. The HIF was 
increasingly seen as a potential threat to fiscal balance and efforts were made to restore 
government control to allow fiscal restrictions and direct intervention in the system. 
2.4.1. THE BLUEPRINT FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM: THE REFORM 
COMMUNIST ERA (SECOND HALF OF THE 19805) 
During the second half of the 1980s, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
established the so-called 'Reform Secretariat' in 1988, which produced policy proposals 
on the basis of international experiences [36; 41]. The Ministry launched a number of 
pilot projects, including the adaptation of the American ORG-based hospital payment 
system, and successfully implemented some early changes, including the shift from tax-
based financing to compulsory social insurance in 1989 [42], and the legalization of 
private health care provision [44; 45]. 
18 This section is a summary of the Health Care Systems in Transition country profile for Hungary, 
currently being published (Gaal P: Health Care Systems in Transition: Hungary [29]). 
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2.4.2. IMPLEMENTED AS PLANNED (1990-1994) 
The first freely elected government continued the major structural reforms according to 
previous plans. The 1990 Local Government Act created the provider side of the new 
contract model [26; 43]. The ownership of primary care surgeries, polyclinics and 
hospitals was devolved from national to local government along with the 'territorial 
supply obligation' [43,107(I)c,8(4),70(b); 129,132(1)]. The new owners became 
responsible for maintenance and investment costs, but central government established 
the system of 'earmarked and target subsidies' to support local governments with 
conditional and matching grants [125]. 
Policies to strengthen primary care were implemented gradually. In 1991 the 
National Institute of Family Medicine was established [160]. In 1992 district physicians 
were renamed 'family physicians', postgraduate training for general practitioners was 
made compulsory, and undergraduate training in family medicine for medical students 
was introduced [161; 162]. People were allowed to choose their family physician [161], 
and the system of capitation payment with contracting of family doctor services was 
introduced [46]. Family doctors were encouraged to become private and contract with 
local government, with surgeries and equipment still owned by the local government 
(,functional privatization'). Real ( ownership) privatization was significant only in the 
pharmaceutical sector, where the majority of manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers 
were sold off and the market was liberalised. 
In 1993 new provider payments mechanisms were introduced for specialist services 
(fee-for-service points, i.e. points for procedures, DRGs and patient days) with the cost-
containment mechanism of capping the sub-budgets of the HIF [47; 163; 122). No real 
change happened, however, in the remuneration of the health workforce. The act of 
public employment guaranteed a minimum salary, and although no upper ceiling was 
determined, salaries remained low in comparison to other sectors [128; 17; 
23,4.12,4.16). 
At the end of 1993, parliament created a legal framework for the establishment of 
non-profit health insurance on a complementary basis [164], and in 1994 the Hungarian 
Medical Chamber and the Hungarian Chamber of Pharmacists began to operate on a 
self-regulatory basis, with compulsory membership for practising doctors and 
pharmacists [165; 166). 
By the end of the first governmental period post-transition, the foundations of the 
new model of the Hungarian health care system had been laid down. There was a single 
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monopsonistic purchaser, the NHIF A, which contracted with service providers, mainly 
in the public but also in a growing private sector with family doctor services and 
pharmacies. The supervision of the HIF and the control of the purchaser were delegated 
to a quasi-public body, the Health Insurance Self Government, but most purchasing 
decisions were made by the national government and the National Assembly. The 
transition of the economy was well under way, and began to show signs of recovery in 
1994. In 1994, the successor of the communist party was voted back to power [167]. 
2.4.3. THE BEGINNING OF COST CONTAINMENT (1994-1998) 
The first significant measure taken by the new government in June 1995 was not 
favourable for the health sector. The government had anticipated an economic crisis 
(see Table 1.2, Figure 1.3) and in the middle of 1995 introduced an economic 
stabilization package, which targeted the welfare provisions of the state [168; 169]. The 
health care budget was cut in two consecutive years [170; 171], along with some 
restrictions in the benefit package, such as the exclusion of dental care and occupational 
health services [168,80,92; 169; 172]. 
The government decided to tackle directly the oversized hospital sector by 
determining the upper limit of capacities the NHIF A could contract for [170,10(2); 
139,8-9]. As a result, approximately 18,000 beds were removed from the system 
between 1995 and 1997 [35,1.5; 173,8.1]. 
The government also had a revenue-side strategy to mitigate the evasion and 
avoidance of social insurance contributions. The social insurance contribution base was 
widened, the employers' health insurance contribution rate was decreased, and a lump 
sum tax (the 'hypothecated health care tax') \vas introduced in 1996 [174,10; 175]. 
The other main policy thrust was to target the Health Insurance Self Government, 
since the government considered its extensive power over budgetary decisions as a 
potential threat to the proposed budget cuts. Thus it curtailed these rights in 1996 [176; 
177], decreased the number of representatives, and made members no longer elected, 
but delegated [178). 
In summary, the government implemented a strict cost-containment policy, which 
resulted in a significant cut in the health care budget. By the end of 1997 health care 
expenditures were almost 30% lower in real terms than in 1990 while, in the same year 
the GDP increased by 4.6% (Table A 1.4 in Appendix A.I and Table 1.2). However 
preoccupation with economic stabilization left little time to think about the future of the 
health care system. Although a regional modernization project was launched, and the 
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Ministry of Finance prepared a proposal, which envisaged financing reform by 
introducing competition between insurance funds [179], the government had no time 
left to put the idea into practice, since the 1998 elections brought the opposition parties 
into power [167]. 
2.4.4. SEARCHING FOR THE WAY FORWARD (1998-2002) 
One of the first measures of the new government was to abolish the residual autonomy 
of the social insurance funds, thereby taking full control over the HIF and the NHIF A 
[133; 134]. The Secretariat for the Supervision of the Social Insurance Funds of the 
Prime Minister's Office proposed a model of competing health insurance funds, but the 
MOH opposed the idea. Eventually, after a year-long debate, the Prime Minister 
dropped the plan for insurance competition and shifted the supervision and control of 
the NHIFA to the Ministry of Finance [135], the MOH regained its primacy in policy-
making, and the policy focus was shifted to the delivery system, but within a context 
characterized by persistent efforts of the government to contain overall health 
expenditure. 
The government targeted both the revenue and the expenditure side of the HIF. The 
hypothecated health care tax was extended and increased substantially [123], \vhile the 
health insurance contribution was decreased from 18 to 14% [180], and later on the 
upper ceiling of the employee contribution was abolished [181]. The expenditure side 
was more problematic, since there was no easy way to cap the pharmaceutical budget as 
had been done with other budget lines of the HIF. Nevertheless, the government kept a 
close eye on the pharmaceutical budget and implemented a number of rationalization 
measures, including the revision of the subsidy system and the decrease of wholesale 
and retail price margins of expensive medicines [126,4(l)d,5(3); 182-184]. 
The first delivery side reform measure by the MOH came in the beginning of 2000, 
when the 'practice right' was introduced with the original objective to create a market 
for family doctor practices [185; 186]. The government offered subsidized loans for 
family doctors to help them buy their surgery and equipment from local government 
[186]. The reform continued with establishment of the 'freelance' physician status, and 
encouragement of the corporatization of public providers in 2001 [130]. 
The effect of the new legislation at the end of 2001 and the first measures of the 
current government, which was formed by the previous opposition parties after their 
clection victory in 2002, on informal payment has yet to be seen, but as indicated by the 
response of the former minister of health to a parliamcntary qucstion, expl:ctations an: 
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high that these measures will ultimately eliminate informal payment from the system. 
Nevertheless, it is conspicuous from the above summary of health care reform in 
Hungary that there have been no attempts to tackle the problem directly. Indeed, as the 
following brief summary of the history of informal payment will show, the ambiguity 
concerning the nature of the problem has had profound effect on policy making and 
implementation, ever since informal payment got onto the agenda [50; 67]. (Appendix 
E provides a more detailed discussion of the history of informal payments.) 
2.5. The history of informal payment 
According to Adam [50; 49,pp.56-61], informal payment was an unknown phenomenon 
before World War II. He argued that the spreading of informal payment as a problem 
was first mentioned in the autumn of 1948 and it subsequently occupied a key position 
in the health policy agenda. The official party policy distinguished between gratitude 
payments ('thank you' payments that are given voluntarily after the service) and other, 
corrupt forms of informal payments (e.g. cheating with sickness benefit), which in fact 
meant the toleration of the phenomenon [49,pp.62-213]. Legal actions against gratitude 
payments were ruled out and physicians in specialties, where informal payment was rare 
or non-existent received higher salaries. 
The reform communist era has brought no change in this respect, except for that in 
1988, just before the political changes, the government decided to tax gratitude payment 
on the basis of the declaration made by the tax payer in the tax returns [187; 188,17(7); 
8,pp.58-91]. The taxation policy is examined in somewhat more details in chapter 5. 
Since then, no further direct governmental intervention has been proposed to tackle 
the issue. National health policies in the new reform era are remarkably consistent in 
how they view informal payments [189]. The phenomenon is undesirable, but its 
elimination can be envisaged only in the long term, with the exclusive use of indirect 
measures [37; 38,p.190). Although in 1998 the new minister of health convened an 
expert committee to propose solutions for informal paymcnts, the report of the so-called 
'Gratitude Payment Committee' had no visible effect on policy making. This is not 
sLlrpnsmg, however, as the academic debate has long been characterised by much 
polemic. 
In Hungary scientific research on informal payment dates back to the 1970s, initially 
with the aim of supporting official policies. Empirical research papers in the official 
journal of the MOB [e.g. 77; 78; 82; 190; 80], were accompanied by articles on medical 
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ethics, which echoed the official policy of separating the corrupt and non-corrupt forms 
of informal payment on the basis of the cultural origin of the phenomenon [e.g.191; 
192-194]. 
In parallel with the softening political climate in the 1980s, a second wave of 
academic debates enriched the discussion with approaches that explicitly criticised the 
system [85; 195; 65; 196; 70; 66; 197] 19, and the intensive debates received a new push 
at the beginning of the 1990s when expectations of reforms were articulated [e.g.202; 
64; 71; and subsequent discussion in Replika 63; 9; 52; 69; 203; 153], but the nature of 
informal payment remained contentious with confronting views on the desirable policy 
measures to address the phenomenon [e.g,39; and 63; vs.68; or 52; vs.69]. 
2.6. Conclusions 
Hungarian health care reforms in the 1990s have sought answers to the crisis of the 
state-socialist health care system, in the context of massive political, social and 
economic changes. Early structural reforms have established the new contract model of 
health services and introduced incentives for efficiency via output based provider 
payment methods. 
The system is contract-based, with purchasing (NHIF A) and serVice delivery 
(providers, owned mainly by local governments), as well as responsibility for service 
provision and service delivery are separated, Despite large scale decentralization 
measures and privatization efforts, the Hungarian health care system is still 
predominantly publicly financed and provided. Nevertheless, further reform efforts 
were overwhelmed by strict cost-containment policies, which were characterized by 
centralization and direct government interventions. 
The most important challenges the Hungarian health care system faces are the 
disappointing health status of the Hungarian people, and the continuous financial 
pressure, despite the fast and stable economic growth of the past 5 years. After 15 years 
of continuous reform, the health sector is still struggling with the legacy of the state-
socialist system, which informal payment has remained integral part of. 
Health care reforms of the past 15 years have created a new health care system, but 
were unable to cope with informal payment. Building on the concept of gratitude, the 
idea of 'separate treatment' and 'no direct action' has dominated policy making ever 
19 For empirical research in this period see for instance B{mlaky et al. [\98] Antal [199; 159], Szabo [83], 
Ekes [200], Dobossy et al. [79], Hungarian Central Statistical Office [20 I], 
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since informal payment emerged in the Hungarian health care system. The reluctance 
of politicians to act more directly and explicitly is not, however, surprising since the 
role and nature of informal payment has always been contentious, with academic 
debates characterised by much polemic. 
PETER CiAAl 
PAuE ~4 / TlIlSIS_GP REVISE(J_VI7 
1 . THEORIES OF I NFORMAL PAYMENT 
) . 1 . THE DEFI N ITION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
3. THEORIES OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
Chapter 2 provided background information for the study. Reviewing the changes of 
the past 15 years and the history of informal payments we have concluded that recent 
health care reforms were unable to cope with informal payments. The reluctance of 
politicians to address the phenomenon explicitly is not surprising though, since the 
nature of informal payment has always been subject to intensive debate. This study 
steps back from this debate to examine the theoretical basis for understanding the 
persistence of informal payment in the Hungarian health care system, to review the 
available empirical evidence, and to generate new pieces of evidence to finding an 
answer to the key question facing policy makers: 'why do patients give?' 
This chapter proceeds by exploring the theories of informal payments. First, the 
available definitions of the phenomenon are examined and a new definition is proposed, 
which identifies the additional nature of payments beyond what is defined by the 
concept of entitlement as the key distinguishing feature between formal and informal 
direct contributions. Then, we summarise the arguments in the theoretical debate about 
informal payment in Hungary in terms of the causes of the phenomenon, the motivation 
of patients and doctors, and its impact on health system performance. The essence of the 
debates is distilled in two contrasting hypotheses of informal payment. Finally, the 
limitations of existing theories are considered and a new cognitive-behavioural model of 
informal payments is proposed, which builds on the economic explanation of the 
phenomenon, the theory of government failure, Hirschman's theory of behavioural 
responses to decline in organizations [106] and allows for the peculiarities of the health 
sector. 
3.1. The definition of informal payment 
So far we have talked about informal payment without discussing what precisely 
informal payment is. Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted definition of 
informal payments [96], so it is necessary to look at the issue in more depth. Drawing 
on not just the Hungarian, but the broader, international literature, this section highlights 
the main definitional issues, while Appendix F elaborates on the case for a new 
definition. 
The international literature contains at least as much controversy as seen in the 
debates in Hungary. Even the terms used to denote the phenomenon vary greatly: 
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gratuities or gratitude payments [67], envelope payments [204], under-the-counter 
payments [74], unofficial payments [103], under-the-table payments [101] to name but a 
few. More importantly, the proposed definitions either reflect certain assumptions on 
the nature of the phenomenon (why patients give, is it good or bad), which are not 
necessary true in all cases, or are inconsistent, i.e. they are not able to separate informal 
payments from other ('formal') payments, so that the same phenomenon is consistently 
included or excluded across all countries and within a particular country over time. 
Furthermore, an appropriate definition should be broad enough to capture the diversity 
of the phenomenon, i.e. it should include all observed variants of informal payments. 
Indeed, informal payments have shown to be heterogeneous with many faces, from 
sweets and flowers to goods and services, which should be part of the service, but which 
patients must provide for themselves, such as nursing, meals, bedding, clean laundry, 
medical supplies, pharmaceuticals and even diagnostic tests, from "brick payments" 
(patients and relatives are invited to buy a token brick for a certain sum, by which 
means they supported the health care institution) to "advance payments" (which are 
made by patients to specialists in their private surgery, not for the private visit, but to 
gain subsequent admission to a public hospital), from small tips to enormous amounts 
for a single operation [104; 102; 96; 101; 103; 95]. Another classic example is the so-
called "gratuities" or "gratitllde payments", defined as patients thanking physicians for 
their services entirely voluntarily after the treatment, a phenomenon often thought to 
have deep cultural roots [67; 96,pp.3,10; 104,ppA,10,17,21]. 
3.1.1. INFORMALITY, ILLEGALITY, CORRUPTION? 
The proposed definitions in the literature generally view informal payment as a public 
sector phenomenon and are based on four distinctive characteristics that separate it from 
other, related phenomena: informality [189; 102], illegality [Chawla, 2000 cited in 104; 
102], corruption [96] and voluntariness [67]. We argue that none of the distinctive 
features implied by these definitions are able to provide a consistent basis to 
discriminate between informal payments and other phenomena. 
First, illegality is not a good criterion, because the legal assessment of the various 
forms of the phenomenon, i.e. whether or not they contravene the established lmvs and 
regulations, differs not just between countries, but even within a particular country over 
time. For instance, in his historical analysis, Adam [49,pp.83,93-95] shows how all 
forms of informal payments made to doctors became illegal in Hungary once physicians 
became civil servants during the nationalisation process implemented by the communist 
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regime in the 1950s. In contrast, since 1989, the income from informal payments must 
be reported in tax returns [8]. Or to provide another example, informal payments paid 
to physicians and other health workers ("envelope payments'') may be illegal in Poland 
[Chawla, 2000 cited in 104], 'brick payments' are certainly not. 
Second, these two examples are good illustration of the point that informality is not a 
good defining criterion either, while another example is the aforementioned advance 
payments, reported by Shahriari et a1. [104] in Poland. If the private practitioner reports 
these payments to the tax authorities as part of his or her income, they become 'formal', 
although advance payments are informal in that they are paid to gain admission to a 
public hospital that levies no formal ch.lTges. Furthermore, there are certain payments, 
not registered by the state, but excluded by researchers from the phenomenon. For 
instance, voluntary purchases from private providers are not, in essence, informal 
payments [96,p.l], even if these are informal in the sense that they are not accounted for 
by the provider to avoid paying tax. One could argue, however, that if not all 
unregistered payments are informal payments and not all forms of informal payments 
are informal in the sense that they are unreported and unaudited, the usage of the term 
'informal payment' creates confusion. We acknowledge this problem, but recognise that 
there is an emerging consensus in favour of this approach amongst researchers [97; 205; 
102; 104; 93; 95]. 
Third, we should discuss the identification of informal payments with corruption, and 
the idea of differentiation between payments that are discretionary as opposed to what is 
required [67; 96,p.l; 104,p.l0]. One contradiction of this approach is that that while 
Lewis and Shahriari suggest that only payments where there is some degree of coercion 
from the provider side (which they exercise to further their own interests at the expense 
of the public interest), should be considered informal[96,p.4], Adam's definition implies 
the opposite. Furthermore, there are a number of examples of informal payments that 
are difficult to fit into the framework of corruption, for instance in-kind contributions. 
Even Shahriari et al [I04,p.1O] acknowledge that "there is a difference between 
payments from which providers directly benefit, and those thaI reflect... the dire 
financial sitllation of the institl/tion", and refer to the example of bringing one's own 
clean linen and food during hospital stays. Examples from many developing and 
transitional countries [96; 1 03], however, identify a more fundamental problem with the 
corruption framework. In countries where salaries of health workers have not only 
plummeted, but non-payment is also common, the alternative to informal charging is 
leaving one's job, which would result in the total collapse of the system. We argue that 
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stigmatising patients and health workers as corrupt in these extreme circumstances is 
absurd. Patients and doctors simply adapted to the rules of the game. But if informal 
payments are not always corrupt, illegal, and not even informal then what is the 
characteristic that is common to all forms of informal payments described so far? 
3.1.2. ENTITLEMENTS: AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
We argue that all forms of informal payments involve some form of direct contribution 
by patients or their households in addition to what is formally required, i.e. what the 
legally defined terms of entitlement determine. These describe those services that can 
be utilized by patients, what these services comprise and how much out-of-pocket 
payment has to be paid. "Legally defined" does not necessarily mean that entitlements 
to health services are regulated in detail by law. Entitlements can be defined by several 
actors in the health care system, for instance private providers or insurance companies. 
Hence, informal payments are a subset of out-of-pocket contributions, the 
distinguishing characteristic being that formal out-of-pocket payments are stipulated in 
the terms of entitlements, whilst informal payments are made in addition to them. 
Accordingly, informal payment for health care can be defined more precisely as: 
'a direct contribution, which is made in addition to any contribution determined by 
the terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or those acting on behalf of 
patients, to health care providers for services which the patients are entitled to'. 
It is important to note, however, that the boundaries of informal payments set by this 
definition imply a number of inclusions and exclusions, such as voluntary purchases 
from private providers, which are not accounted for by the provider to avoid paying tax. 
In contrast, our definition does not exclude informal payments in the private sector. In 
principle, it is possible that patients pay more to a private provider than the 
predetermined fee, even if there is no obvious rcason why they would do so. Further, 
our definition does exclude a number of informal activities, such as forcing patients to 
go to private practice, pilfering of drug supplies, misuse of formal reYe!1ues or rarely 
showing up during official working hours [98], which arc not informal payments, 
nonetheless they can have similar implications to informal paymcnt for policy making. 
Finally, our definition deliberately ignores the motivation ofthc actors and the timing of 
the transaction, and therefore it does not exclude gratuities. \\' e argue that \vhile it is 
possible to argue a case against the validity of the gratitude payment concept on a 
theoretical basis, for instance whether before and after can be m~aningfully separated in 
health care, or that whether gift giving can be envisaged as a unilateral act, or that ther~ 
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is a correlation between the extent of financial hardship and the various forms of 
informal payment, this remains a question that should be explored by empirical 
research. It is rarely sufficient to conclude whether a gift was given voluntarily or was 
(in its wider sense) coerced from knowledge of what is given, when and to whom. 
Empirical research on this issue should address the motivation of actors, which remains 
a key distinguishing characteristic of 'true' gratuities. 
It must be noted, however, that while the proposed definition seems to be consistent 
with the experiences of former communist (CCE and FSU) countries, it may not be 
applicable to Western European countries and Australia. One such phenomenon, whose 
informal payment nature is debated is the extra-billing practices of French physicians. 
In the French system there are two groups of physicians, Sector I and Sector II [206]. 
Sector I physicians are reimbursed according to a fee schedule and agree not to bill for 
additional amounts, so if a Sector I physician charges extra, that would be considered an 
informal payment according to the proposed definition. On the other hand, an extra fee, 
charged by Sector II physicians is not informal payment, since they do not subscribe for 
the fee schedule, they do not agree not to charge extra, i.e. physicians in the French 
system are allowed to choose whether they would like, at least partly, to determine the 
terms of entitlement. One may argue, however, that this distinction is not relevant, 
since these practices are in general not considered akin to the practices of physicians in 
CEE and FSU countries. While we think that informal payments are a more general 
phenomenon that is not exclusive to former communist countries, the relevance of our 
definition to more developed countries has to be explored further. 
3.1.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH: OPERATIONALISATION OF INFORMAL 
PAYMENT 
Whilst the above conceptualisation of informal payment provides a starting point for its 
study even in an international context, it is not obvious how to put the definition into 
practice. The difficulty of operationalisation relates to the problems of obtaining 
appropriate data that will permit separation of formal and informal payments, as well as 
of the various forms of the phenomenon. 
The complexity of the task of separating formal and informal payments reflects the 
difficulty in assessing whether entitlements are clear to the various actors, and to what 
extent formal and informal payments coexist in the same system, in particular for the 
same service. There are two possible ways to operationalise informal payments. First, 
patients can be asked directly to distinguish formal and informal payments. Second, it 
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is possible to ask respondents how much they spent (contributed) according to different 
type of services and different type of providers, and then researchers have to 'distill out' 
informal payments on the basis of total out-of-pocket payments reported and of the 
knowledge of existing formal direct payments determined by the laws and regulations in 
the health care system under study. 
If entitlements, including the level of co-payments, are laid down centrally and apply 
equally to all health care providers, the indirect method can work well, while as systems 
increasingly decentralize decisions about terms of entitlement, researchers increasingly 
rely on patients to separate the formal from the informal, since it is increasingly difficult 
to distinguish informal payment when formal co-payments are widespread and 
individual providers are allowed to set them freely. Ho\vever, if patients are asked 
directly, their perception of what constitutes an informal payment may be different. 
Furthermore, the direct method assumes that patients know what they are entitled to, but 
evidence has shown that patients are often confused about their health entitlements 
[96,p.16; 102; 104,p.1O]. 
Further difficulties arise when it comes to the separation of the various forms of 
informal payments. The distinction between in-kind contributions and cash payments is 
not straightforward as certain in-kind contributions, such as pharmaceuticals, may need 
to be paid for, even if ultimately they are provided in-kind. More importantly, as 
discussed before, gratitude payments are not easy to distinguish, and quantitative 
methods alone may be insufficient to capture the motivation of the actors. As Lewis 
[96,p.14] argues, qualitative methods are important to explore motivation, which is 
difficult to assess in surveys. 
In conclusion, there seems no unambiguously ideal way to operationalise the concept 
of informal payments, as important aspects of formality or informality, legality or 
illegality, terms of entitlement and the existence of formal out-of-pocket payments vary 
between countries. Nonetheless, conceptualisation in a way that makes it possible to 
incorporate the findings of existing empirical studies is the first step towards 
understanding informal payments and so providing an empirical basis for new effective 
policies to tackle the phenomenon. 
The proposed new definition suggests that the essence of informal payment is that 
patients pay more than is required by the terms of entitlement. So, the question arises: 
why do they do so? From the policy perspective knowledge of the causes of informal 
payment and the motivation of the actors is important, not just because it helps to decide 
PETER G"AL 
P AGE 6 U I TIl E SIS _ G P ~ E V I S E V _ \' I 7 
3. THEORIES OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
3 2 WHY PAY INFORMALLY FOR HEALTH CARE' THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 
what to do about it, but whether it is necessary to do anything at all. Different causes 
imply different consequences for the performance of the health care system and, as we 
have argued in chapter 1, whether informal payment is source of policy concern 
ultimately depends on how it prevents the system to deliver the desired health policy 
objectives. The next section addresses exactly these issues in more detail. 
3.2. Why pay informally for health care? The theoretical debate 
This section discusses the theories of informal payment on the basis of the Hungarian 
theoretical literature. Although the available literature is fairly extensive, little is 
published in English. In contrast, the English language literature is still limited, despite 
growing international interest in the issue [74; 101; 99; 98; 96; 102; 104; 103; 97; 95; 
94]. Whilst the Hungarian debate may not be relevant in all settings, accounts of other 
countries' experiences, such as Bulgaria, Poland and to a certain extent even countries 
of the FSU, show a remarkable similarity of arguments and threads of discussion [74; 
104; 105; 96]. Beside the review of the Hungarian theoretical debates we use some 
elements of the previous section, drawn from a wider international literature. 
3.3. Theories of the origin of informal payments 
The causes and origin of informal payments have long been debated in Hungary. 
Researchers have advanced at least 13 different casual factors, singly or in combination 
with others, which we have grouped in three main categories: social-cultural, legal-
ethical and economic. These were put forward in two major waves. 
During the 1970s the theoretical discussion was dominated by the social-cultural and 
ethical explanations of informal payment. These theories provided scientific 
underpinnings for the official policy, which did not acknowledge that informal 
payments had anything to do with the construct and operation of the Semashko system 
itself. During the 1980s, however, the regime had increasingly permitted the 
publication of critical views, which introduced the legal and economic explanations into 
the dispute. These causal factors explicitly linked informal payments to the failures of 
the health care system, or openly criticised the official policy of 'no direct action'. This 
section provides a brief summary of these explanations. An extended discussion is in 
Appendix G. 
The earliest explanations considered informal payment a custom rooted in the culture 
of society. As Szabo [72, p.285] put it: "We must accepl thaI tipping and presentation 
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existed in the past and will be with us in the future for a long time, too. It is impossible 
to forbid people to give gifts ". The proponents of this 'gift giving' or 'gratitude payment' 
approach argued that healing traditionally creates a sense of gratitude that patients 
express in the form of gifts. Being embedded in national culture, the origin of informal 
payment predates the establishment of the state-socialist 'Semashko' system, thus it is 
difficult, if not impossible to change. 
In contrast, economic explanations argue for causes rooted in the design and 
operation of the ISemashko' system that eventually lead to shortage, the immediate 
cause of informal payment. The first economic interpretation was introduced into the 
theoretical debate only in 1983 as the regime increasingly permitted the publication of 
critical voices. Petschnig [85] identified the Ifreeness' of health services and the 
resulting excess demand as the cause of informal payments, which was later extended 
with other arguments, including that the system restricted the sovereignty of consumers 
by denying free choice of provider [70], the defencelessness of patients [109], the fear 
and anxiety that accompany medical interventions [71], and the sudden increase in the 
demand for health services as a result of nationalisation of the health sector after World 
War II [49]. Nonetheless, these demand side arguments still did not imply a 
fundamental problem with the delivery of health care. The first supply side criticism 
came from Kuti [70], who argued that increased demand could have been satisfied if 
investments in health care had been given priority, but the macroeconomic policy of the 
communist regime did not favour this "lInproductive" sector of the economy. She 
argued that low salaries of health workers could also contribute to inadequate supply 
either by making them withhold performance or forcing them to moonlight, whilst 
Bordas [52] saw inappropriate provider payment methods as a key cause of informal 
payments. 
Finally, the legal-ethical approaches emphasized a different aspect: how internal 
(professional ethics) and external (legal sanctions) norms and controls gave rise to and 
facilitated the spreading of informal payments. At the centre of the ethical explanation 
is the 'greedy physician', who abuses his power to extract money from patients [192], 
whilst the legal explanation sees ambiguous regulations and weak enforcement as the 
cause of informal payments taking roots in the system [66; 65]. 
In summary, the various theories concerning the causes of informal payment can be 
classified into three main groups, each of which has markedly different implications for 
policy responses. The cultural explanation assumes a never ending struggle with few or 
no effective tools in the hand of policy makers, whilst the economic and legal-ethical 
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explanations offer feasible responses within a reasonable time period, even if the 
implied policy measures are different. Policy on informal payment, however, should 
not only focus on whether informal payment can be eliminated, but also whether it 
should be. Has the phenomenon any undesirable consequences for patient care? If not, 
why bother? The policy relevance of informal payment depends on its impact on 
system performance, a matter that has also been the subject of intensive debate. The 
following sections review the main elements of this debate. 
3.4. Impact of informal payment on the performance of health care: 
the theoretical debate continued 
The theoretical discussion on the impact of informal payment on system performance 
has been taking place at two levels. First, at the level of the individual transaction, it 
has been asked how the actual service received differs between paying and non-paying 
patients. Second, there is no agreement on how informal payment influences the 
functioning of the health sector at the system level in terms of the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of income. In general, opinions were polarised between 
those, such as Balazs [64] and Orosz [39], who emphasised the central role of informal 
payment in allowing the system to function, and others, such as Blasszauer [65], Adam 
[49] and Lengyel [68], who saw its undesirable consequences outweighing any positive 
effect. 
3.4.1. CONSEQUENCES AT THE LEVEL OF PATIENT-DOCTOR ENCOUNTERS 
In line with the main causal hypotheses, writers on informal payment saw its impact on 
service provision lying between two extremes. Advocates of the social-cultural 
explanation argued that patients who paid typically received exactly the same quality of 
care as those who did not pay. In contrast, proponents of economic explanations 
assumed that, as a general rule, informal payment did yield better quality of care for the 
paying patients. To what extent, and whether this was true in all cases was disputed. 
The arguments did not just distinguish between clinical and service quality, but raised 
the question of what was the point of reference and even the possibility that paying 
patients could be worse off. 
Kuti [70] and Bondar [63] argued that the standard could be lowered artificially, thus 
a 'better' service simply meant a return to the original standard. Kuti [70] also believed 
that paying patients usually received the same service, but with a better 'wrapping', i.e. 
informal payment influenced how physicians and nurses behaved with patients, their 
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kindness and attention, rather than the quality of the intervention per se. On the other 
hand, Petschnig [85] argued that paying patients could receive worse care insofar as 
appropriate referral was delayed because of the physician's fear of loosing informal 
payments. This argument was elaborated by Antal [153] and Csaba [69], who argued 
that paying patients might be disadvantaged if payment motivated physicians to provide 
otherwise unnecessary services. They noted the international evidence for supplier 
induced demand resulting from information asymmetry between patients and physicians 
(principal-agent relationship), with far reaching consequences for theoretical 
speculation about the impact of informal payment on patient care. Even if the primary 
motivation of patients is to obtain good quality services, physicians are able to 
manipulate not just the supply of services, as argued by Kuti [70] and Bondar [63], but 
the wants of the patients, manifested in supplier induced demand [71; 69]. 
Consequently paying patients cannot be certain whether they get what they would 
demand if they had the same knowledge as physicians. 
On the other hand, citing Ellis and McGuire, Csaba [69] suggested that the response 
of physicians to incentives embedded in the payment system was limited by, for 
example, professional, ethical and legal sanctions. He argued that the concept of 'sense 
of duty' in the medical profession assumed that the welfare of the patient was not 
indifferent to the physician's own utility, which implied that there were limits to the 
extent to which they were willing to provide more services than necessary, even if 
incentives drove them to do so. This applies not just to over-treatment, resulting from 
supplier-induced demand, but to under-treatment (supplier-reduced demand). 
Conversely, Bondar [63] argued that informal payment did motivate physicians to 
provide services in inappropriate circumstances, for instance with obsolete equipment or 
reused disposables, that they would not have done had there been no such incentive in 
the system. She argued that this was an important element in the sustainability of the 
state-socialist health care system. She also called attention to the diversity of health 
services, suggesting the need to adopt different explanations in different circumstances. 
For instance, in emergencies it is difficult to imagine how one might pay for better 
services in advance or how physicians could manipulate clinical quality in order to elicit 
informal payment. 
3.4.2. IMPACT OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL 
So what are the implications of these hypotheses for the performance of the health care 
system? The underlying difference between the cultural and the economic explanations 
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is that the cultural explanation suggests no impact on the demand for and supply of 
health services, whilst the advocates of the economic explanations see informal 
payment as influencing the distribution of services and resource allocation. They did 
not agree, however, whether it acted as a co-payment, which affected the demand side 
only, or a real price mechanism, which led to changes in supply. 
The earlier theorists, such as Petschnig [85] and Kuti [70] argued that informal 
payment were given directly to health workers it did not lead to an improvement in 
standards but just redistributed resources among patients according to their willingness 
to pay. As Kuti [70] put it " ... the money paidJor a one-bed room does not contribute to 
other one-bed rooms being built in the hospital, instead it goes to 'weekend hOllses oj 
senior consultants ... ". In this respect it is not crucial whether paying patients received 
the same clinical quality in a better 'wrapping' (service quality), as argued by Kuti [70], 
a reversion to the original quality compared to an artificially lowered standard, argued 
by Bondar [63], or more, but unnecessary services (supplier-induced demand) as put 
forward by Csaba [69]. The common core of these arguments is that informal payment 
is merely a rationing mechanism, which redistributes the cost burden and the benefits of 
services within a given level of supply. 
In contrast, Antal [71; 153] and Bondar [63] put forward the possibility that informal 
payment did influence the level of supply insofar as it contributed to the extension of 
capacities in those areas where the amount of informal payment was high enough to 
motivate doctors to lobby for more resources at the national level. Losonczi 
[109,p.192] reinforced this position by identifying the "physician's proximity or 
remoteness to the distributive power" as an important barrier to need-based resource 
allocation, whilst Buda [9] pointed out how subtle these bargaining mechanisms were. 
Moreover, Csaba [69] raised the possibility that these mechanisms could work the other 
way round, i.e. good connections might yield more resources, which in turn induce 
informal payment. These arguments, however, do not necessary imply more resources 
for the health sector, i.e. resource reallocation across sectors, just the reallocation of 
resources among specialities within the health sector, i.e. t~1Vouring one specialty at the 
expense of another. 
The debate brought up another aspect of the impact on supply by informal payment, 
which was not the expansion of health services but rather prevention of a reduction in 
supply. Amongst others Bordas [52] argued that informal payment contributed to the 
ability to recruit physicians despite low salaries, whilst Bondar [63] pointed out the 
possibility that informal payment provided incentives for physicians to supply services 
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even if the infrastructure had deteriorated to otherwise unacceptable standards. These 
mechanisms were thought to contribute to the sustainability of the state-socialist health 
care system inasmuch as they kept the 'machine' running. In contrast, Kuti [70] 
emphasized the negative distributional impact of informal payment on the physicians' 
side. She argued that it was unevenly distributed among health workers and had too 
little connection to real performance to serve as a mechanism for complementing low 
salaries. 
Whilst the primary question in relation to its system-wide consequences is whether 
informal payment solely acts as a redistributive process or whether it also influences 
resource allocation, the extent and nature of the redistribution is also important in terms 
of system performance. The mildest form is where only non-clinical elements of 
quality of care are redistributed from non-paying to paying patients, as suggested by 
Kuti [70], but clinical outcomes could also be involved in the 'reshuffle'. Antal [71] and 
Csaba [69] discussed the potentially worst case scenario, when both paying and non-
paying patients were worse oft~ if non paying patients were 'under-treated', whilst 
paying patients were 'over-treated'. On the other hand, KlIti [70] argued that 
consideration of the distributional impact of informal payment on the cost of obtaining 
health care was as important as the distribution of benefits. She argued that informal 
payments were regressive, disproportionately affecting poorer people. Moreover, she 
argued, informal payment had become an unwritten law and the poor were least able to 
resist the resulting societal pressure. Unfortunately, she concluded, it was not possible 
to grant a formal exemption to something that was informal. In contrast, Galasi and 
Kertesi [202] argued that the deterrence effect of informal payment was not necessarily 
undesirable insofar as informal payment restricted unjustified consumption (resulting 
from the excess demand at zero price), i.e. it \-\lorked in the same way as a co-payment. 
Apart from any impact on the allocation of resources and the distribution of income, 
benefits and costs of health services, many researchers pointed a positive feedback 
effect, with the characteristics of informal payment encouraging its further spread and 
thus obstructing health care reform. Galasi and Kertesi [202] argued that any 
perception by non-paying patients that they received worse care than paying patients 
might make them begin to pay in order not to loose out against paying patients, whilst 
KlIti [70] pointed out that as informal payment became customary, people would feel 
obliged to give it. From the provider's perspective, Adful1 [49] described a downward 
spiral in which the existence of informal payment justified low salaries, which in turn 
justified greater acceptance of payments, and so on. Among others, Petschnig [85] and 
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Csaba [69] raised the possibility that the spread of informal payment was also 
encouraged by a growing weakening of 'moral consciousness' among physicians as 
increasingly few felt any internal conflict in accepting them. Moreover, Csaba [69] 
noted that informal payment influenced the patient-doctor relationship in ways that 
increased its acceptability. He argued that the information asymmetry between patients 
and doctors could make informal payment a dysfunctional form of communication. For 
instance, refusal of an offered payment might cause the patient to believe that there was 
no hope for recovery; in contrast, accepting informal payment became a "sign of hope". 
Finally, many writers on informal payment, including Balazs [64; 73] and Buda [9] 
argued that payments endured because their presence served to block attempts at health 
care reform by those who benefited most, usually those at the top of the medical 
hierarchy. 
3.4.3. BRINGING TOGETHER THE ARGUMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY 
CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 summarises the contrasting arguments concerning the impact of informal 
payments on system performance, distilled from the above debate. This offers a means 
of determining how different mechanisms will impact on resource allocation and the 
distribution of cost and benefits of services, i.e. the efficiency (cost-effectiveness) and 
equity (equal access for equal needs) of the health care system?O 
Hypotheses concern ing the actual impact of informal payment on the performance of the health 
care system 
Level Hypotheses 
Demand side (patients) voluntary gratitude payment 
feel obliged to give to receive ad~uate care 
Supply side (physicians) same service 
better/more service accordif!.& to need 
supplier inducedlreduced demand 
Supply-demand interaction no change 
redistribution of existing services (co-payment I ike 
mechanism) 
extension of services (price mechanism) 
20 As we have discussed in chapter I, the goodness or badness of a particular eftect of informal payment 
depends on the decision-makers' views of the competing health policy objectives and the priorities set 
among them. Whilst in Hungary no explicit prioritisation of the policy objectives has taken place, at least 
there is agreement on which objectives cOllnt and how to interpret them. So we relate the hypothesised 
effects of informal payments put forward so far to the extra-welfarist notion of efficicncv (cost-
effcctiveness) and the definition of equity that involves equal access for equal needs. . 
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As the theoretical debate shows, the impacts on efficiency and equity could differ 
markedly depending on assumptions about how informal payment works. First, it is 
important to distinguish whether patients give entirely voluntarily or feel obliged to pay. 
Second, does informal payment behave like a gratitude payment, a co-payment, or a 
price mechanism? 
A voluntary gratitude payment should not alter either resource allocation or the 
distribution of services, whilst a 'compulsory' co-payment may not just restrict 
unnecessary services, but either deters the poor to utilize health services or place a 
disproportionate cost burden on their shoulders. This is not just an equity problem, but 
adversely affects resource allocation (cost-effectiveness) insofar as services are not 
consumed by those who would benefit the most. On the other hand, the equity impact 
of informal payments might be mitigated if physicians are able to price-discriminate 
among patients according their ability to pay. 
Furthermore, even if the aforementioned co-payment is given voluntarily, the impact 
of informal payment on system performance depends on what is given in exchange. 
From the equity point of view any difference between paying and non-paying patients 
implies unequal access for equal needs, regardless whether or not all services are 
distributed among patients within existing capacities. However the relationship 
between supply and demand (or need) determines the impact of informal payment on 
efficiency, and in this respect it becomes important if physicians manipulate supply 
(supplier-induced/reduced demand). 
If we attribute to informal payment the characteristics of a price mechanism, as 
argued by Antal [71; 153] and Bondar [63], we cannot exclude the possibility that it 
contributes to the expansion of supply by means of political connections and lobbying, 
and this may increase the efticiency of the system by alleviating shortages. 
Nevertheless, any effect will depend on where and how resource reallocation takes 
place. 
On one hand, if shortage exists throughout the health sector, and overall health 
expenditures are not increased, resource reallocation between specialities (and services) 
increases cost-effectiveness only if patients' willingness to pay for a particular service 
coincides with the dominance of this service over others in terms of cost per unit of 
health gain. Moreover, as Csaba [69] noted, increased capacity does not necessarily 
diminish informal payment, since physicians are able to induce demand and maintain 
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shortage. In any case, however, reallocation can also have adverse distributional 
impacts. 
On the other hand, if supply is expanded with additional resources, both paying and 
non-paying patients may be better off, insofar as the benefits of improved standards 
spill over to non-paying patients. Whether efficiency is really improved, however, 
depends on the benefits forgone from not using these resources elsewhere, as argued by 
Galasi and Kertesi [202]. 
In most of these scenarios, paying patients cannot be sure that they receive the care 
that they want, as pointed out by Petchnig [85], Antal [71; 153] and Csaba [69]. This is 
not just related to the opportunistic behaviour of the physician, manifested in supplier-
induced demand. Even if the physician seeks to act in the best interest of the patient, 
there is a degree of uncertainty about the outcome of any intervention. The very fact 
that consumers in the health sector have limited information about their need (wants), 
and in many cases the outcome of the service provided is uncertain and difficult to 
judge, separates the motivation of the patient from the impact of informal payment on 
system performance. This separation differentiates voluntary gratitude payment from 
those cases of informal payment given in the hope of obtaining better care, whereas 
paying patients receive exactly the same service as non-paying ones. From the policy 
point of view, the motivation of the patient is more important than the actual impact, 
since the potential is always there, and the appropriate policy tools could be very 
different to address either a cultural issue or shortage of capacity. In this respect, it is 
less important whether there is a real shortage or just one that is perceived by patients. 
Finally, informal payment tends to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon as, once it 
emerges, its characteristics lead to it becoming embedded in the system and diffusing 
through it. This is not only related to its nature as a dysfunctional tool of 
communication or the politics of informal payment. The presence of informal payment 
may give rise to a process of selection in \vhich those who reject it on moral grounds 
will be less likely to choose medicine as a career while those who are more 'materialist' 
will dominate the profession. 
3.5. Summing up the debate: 'fee-for-service' or 'donation'? 
The theoretical discussions involve many different views and comprise quite complex 
argumentation but it is possible to distil two main hypotheses that capture the essence of 
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the phenomenon from the perspective of its impact on system performance and the 
effectiveness of various policy tools to tackle it (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. Two contrasting hypotheses of informal payment 
Fee-for-service Donation 
Origin of informal payment State-socialist health care system Before the communist regime 
(system dependent) (culture dependent) 
Causes, preconditions Shortage (health care system Tradition, culture 
performance fail ure) 
Patients' principal Ensure quality care Gratitude 
motivation 
Health workers' principal Make ends meet Refusal would adversely affect 
motivation patient-doctor relationship 
Impact on efficiency Negative or positive No 
Impact on equity Usually negative No or minor 
3.5.1. THE 'DONATION' HYPOTHESIS OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
The first, which we call the 'donation' hypothesis, builds on the social-cultural and 
ethical explanations of informal payment. In its pure form, the donation hypothesis was 
described by Szabo [72]. Patients are grateful to physicians for having been cured from 
an illness. Health is so valuable that it is not possible to pay for it, but patients would at 
least like to express gratitude in the form of gifts. This kind of present is entirely 
voluntary and always happens after treatment is completed. Thus, informal payment is 
in fact gratitude payment (gratuity), which possesses the same characteristics as a 
donation. It is important to note that development of the gratitude concept is not an 
exclusive feature of the Hungarian health care system. For instance, it is seen in Poland 
[104; 105], in Bulgaria, where the Bulgarian Physicians' Union uses this distinction to 
justify ex post informal payments [74], and it has been described in countries of the 
FSU [96; 102]. In Hungary, the Medical Chamber is the most 'devoted' advocate of the 
gratitude payment concept. As Buda [9] put it, "it is integral part of the medical 
mythology", which "most physicians believe in". 
According to the 'donation' hypothesis, gratitude payment is part of the culture of 
society, with roots that predate the establishment of the state-socialist health care 
system. In this respect it is immaterial whether informal payment is closer to the 
concept of the votive offering proposed by Szabo [72,pp.61-68], Kornai's tip 
[207,p.l05] or a replacement for a fee, as suggested by Magyar [208,p.140]. The key 
issue is that the elimination of informal payment would require a change of culture, 
which is very difficult to achieve, at least in the short term. Moreover, as this 
phenomenon has no causal link with the state-socialist health care system, the 
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'donation' hypothesis implies that the relevant policy tools lie outside the organization 
and functioning ofthe formal health sector. But should gratitude payment be eliminated 
at all? 
The donation hypothesis implies that informal payment is a benign phenomenon. It 
brings in additional funds to the health sector, with no (or minor) effect on the equity 
and efficiency of the health care system. First, it does not deter the poor to utilize health 
care and second, it does not influence physicians in the choice of services to provide. It 
is true, that gratitude payments changes the distribution of costs insofar as it fall on 
patients rather than the healthy, but any equity problem is limited as giving is linked to 
ability to pay. Nevertheless, irrespective of common cultural roots, there could be 
subtle differences between a votive offering, a tip and a fee-replacement in this respect. 
For instance, a tip is usually associated with improved responsiveness, even if clinical 
quality is not affected. This certainly deviates from the benign gratitude payment 
concept, but still be closer to that than the other main hypothesis of informal payment, 
which we call'fee-for-service'. 
3.5.2. THE 'FEE-FOR-SERVICE' HYPOTHESIS OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
The' fee- for-service' hypothesis represents the other end of the theoretical spectrum. It 
is based chiefly on the economic explanation of informal payment, whose centre point 
is shortage. According to this hypothesis, patients seek to ensure that, despite (real or 
perceived) shortages, they will receive the service they need. They pay health workers 
informally, who gladly accept the offered payment to make ends meet, and they provide 
the service that was requested. Whilst the most obvious case is when patients pay 
before receiving treatment, the timing of the payment is not a crucial issue, not least 
because the distinction between 'ex-ante' and 'ex-post' becomes somewhat artificial as 
health care increasingly involves a series of encounters rather than an individual 
procedure (Appendix F). 
In contrast to the 'donation' hypothesis, the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis 
unequivocally links the origin and genesis of informal payment to the state-socialist 
health care system through the disequilibrium of supply and demand, with two major 
policy implications. First, the causes of informal payment are not deeply embedded in 
society, consequently it is not hopeless to think it can be changed within a generation. 
Second, the design of the state-socialist health care system is responsible for the 
phenomenon, which implies that reform of the system may eliminate it. The 
appropriate policy tools, however, largely depend on the causes of the shortage. It 
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matters whether this is due to excess demand because of moral hazard, as proposed by 
Petschnig [85], the existence of a strict referral system that prevents patients choosing 
their doctor freely, as argued by Kuti [70] and Boc [196], or insufficient supply as a 
result of overstretched and demotivated health care staff, as argued by Kuti [70]. A 
detailed examination of these options is beyond the scope of this thesis, but they will be 
addressed later in the framework of a new theory of informal payment. 
From the perspective of the impact of informal payment on system performance, the 
causes of that shortage are immaterial. Regardless of the sequence of events that led to 
shortage and the emergence of informal payment, the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis 
implies that informal payment introduces the same incentives into the system as a fee-
for-service method of payment, with all of its adverse effects on the efficiency and 
equity of service delivery. At worst, this malign informal payment will prevent access 
by the poor, placing a disproportionate cost burden on their shoulders, and at the same 
time it will encourage physicians to provide otherwise unnecessary services or to reduce 
their performance to elicit informal payment from those who do not intend to pay, As 
discussed earlier, however, its actual impact on efficiency depends on several factors, 
including whether informal payment simply redistributes existing services, or is able to 
expand supply because it encourages lobbying of decision makers, Within a fixed 
capacity informal payment can improve efficiency if it restricts unjustified consumption 
of services or if it redistributes existing services to achieve greater health gain. On the 
other hand, it will reduce efficiency if it deters justifiable demand, but this also depends 
on whether or not physicians price discriminate among patients, which could also 
mitigate the adverse effect on equity. Regardless of the actual impact on the 
performance of the health care system, however, the distinctive feature of the 'fee-for-
service' hypothesis is that patients would like to get better services, hence there is 
always an element of coercion. This 'coercion factor' is not primarily external, and is 
based on the patients' perception, i.e. patients cannot be sure that they will get necessary 
services without informal payment (see Appendix F for a more detailed discussion). 
So far we have summarized the theories of the origin of informal payment in two 
contrasting hypotheses. The 'donation' hypothesis builds on the social-cultural 
explanation of informal payment, whilst the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis adopts an 
economic explanation. But how do legal-ethical explanations come into the picture? 
The lack of control and accountability argument of Adam [66] and Blasszauer [65] is 
certainly a plausible hypothesis in the genesis of informal payment insofar as it 
influenced the diffusion of payments, Any theory of informal payment is incomplete 
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without consideration of this factor, and a legal-ethical perspective highlights the need 
to extend the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis to include the broader context of the 
phenomenon. In the following section we attempt to do exactly this, using the 
arguments contained in the theoretical debate as building blocks of a theoretical 
framework constructed from Hirschman's [106] theory of "responses to the decline in 
firms, organizations and states" and the theory of government fail ure [54], 
3.6. Extending the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis: informal payment 
and the theory of 'inxit' 
Our theoretical framework is built on two key assumptions. The first is that the 
underlying cause of the problem is shortage associated with the Semashko system. We 
argue, however, that restricting the discussion to a particular cause of shortage may 
decrease understanding of the phenomenon. Instead, many factors contributed to the 
failure of the Semashko system, which we will accommodate in the context of the 
theory of market and government failure to gain insights into how publicly funded 
health care systems develop and react to shortage. 
The second key assumption is that informal payment is a reaction by dissatisfied 
patients and physicians to shortage a manifestation of deteriorating 
organizational/system performance. In his 1970 work, "Exit, Voice, Loyalty", 
Hirschman analyses this situation to gain insight into how people react to "decline in 
firms, organizations, and states", which leaves consumers' (patients) and employees' 
(doctors) wants unsatisfied [106]. He identifies two main reactions: (a) "exit", i.e. to 
leave the situation and satisfy the want elsewhere, and (b) "voice", i.e. complaining 
using available channels. This latter option assumes, as Hirschman puts it, "loyally" to 
the organisation/system insofar as voice is usually less effective, more risky (and 
involves considerable externalities, insofar as the benefits of improvements are also 
frequently enjoyed by non-complaining consumers or employees). 
We argue, however, that while the theoretical literature on informal payment fails to 
consider other possible responses to shortage (specifically exit and voice), Hirschman's 
theory does not capture all options and, specifically, cannot embrace the phenomenon of 
informal payments. To overcome these limitations we apply Hirschman's theory but 
extend it with a new option, which we call 'inxit'. We complement Hirschman's analysis 
by examining how the specificities of the health sector influence the development of 
shortage, and the perception of this performance decline. We will consider the 
determinants of choice between alternative behavioural reactions, accommodating the 
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legal-ethical explanation of informal payment. Finally, we will discuss the implications 
of our cognitive behavioural model for policy-making including the range of policy 
options that might be used to tackle the problem_ 
3.6.1. THE STARTING POINT: PUBLIC FINANCE AND SHORTAGE 
Drawing on the economic explanations, our theoretical framework links the emergence 
of informal payment to the development of shortage_ But what is the association 
between public finance and shortage? 
According to standard economic literature, the market for health care inefficiently 
allocates resources and inequitably distributes services among patients [54, pp.289-
300].21 Providers are assumed to extract extra profit by exercising monopoly power and 
physicians to earn rent by capitalizing on information asymmetry, i.e. to provide 
unnecessary services to maximize income, while the market denies access to care to 
those, who cannot afford payment. Government intervention through public finance can 
remedy both problems, but can lead to shortage with excess demand and inadequate 
supply. 
First, public finance may be a better means of cost containment through 
centralization of financing and monopoly purchasing power, but this can go too far, 
leading to under-provision in relation to expected benefits. Inadequate supply, the 
argument of Kuti [70], fits well in the government failure framework [54, pp.5_6].22 
Even if we set aside the influence of politics on public choice (the less 'powerful' 
sectors often loose in the quest for public money), which is one source of government 
failure, determining the efficient level of health care spending requires much complex 
or unavailable information on needs, costs and consequences of various interventions, 
another source of government failure. 
Second, the rationale of public finance is to ensure that those who cannot afford to 
pay for health care can get access to services if needed [54, pp.80-81; 53]. Public 
finance enables patients to express previously unmet needs as demand_ Removal of the 
21 Inefficiency is attributed to the special features of health care as a commodity. The demand for health 
care is a derived demand for health, which is the underlying condition of most of our everyday activities. 
Consequently health care has many complementary goods, and few or no substitutes, which in certain 
cases result in low price elasticity of demand (i.e. patients are willing to sacrificr: a lot to get the necessary 
treatment). Furthermore, patients' ability to determine what health services they want and to judge the 
outcome of the provided services is limited by the lack of specialized knowledge that only physicians 
f:0ssess, which enables the supplier to determine (and even to manipulate) demand. 
2 Stiglitz [54,pp.5-6] distinguished four sources of government failure: (a) lack of information to make 
appropriate decisions concerning resource allocation and distribution of income, (b) limited control over 
(-» 
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price barrier, however, as argued by Petschnig [85], leads to excess demand, insofar as 
patients over-consume services because they face zero price at the point of utilization 
(moral hazard), If excess demand is not met by matching supply, shortage inevitably 
develops.23 
Nonetheless, the tension between cost-containment and excess demand is not specific 
to Semashko systems, which suggests that public finance and the resulting shortage in 
themselves do not necessary lead to informal payments. What were the special features 
of these systems that made patients react to the problem by paying informally? 
4.5.2. EXIT, VOICE AND 'INXIT' 
Our cognitive-behavioural model of informal payment takes its point of departure from 
the 'declining' performance in the health care system, manifested in shortage, which 
leaves both patients and physicians dissatisfied and provides both groups with a 
motivation to change the situation, 
Applying Hirschman's theory to this situation offers only two options. Either they 
leave the organization, or the whole system, and satisfy their wants elsewhere, or they 
decide to remain with the provider (within the systemi4 and complain openly if there is 
a possibility to do so. However, we argue that informal payment is one manifestation of 
another option: linxit', which goes beyond exit and voice. What is the difference 
between these behavioural reactions? 
According to Hirschman, the difference betv,:een exit and voice is how and where 
dissatisfaction with declining performance is expressed. While both exit and voice are 
corrective mechanisms insofar as they force the organization improve its performance, 
exit works indirectly, through leaving the organization or stopping buying its products 
or services, and voice is aimed at directly "changing tile organization's aclivities, 
objectives and olltpllls" [106, ppA,30]. 
Informal payment, however, mixes certain characteristics of both. It resembles voice 
inasmuch as the dissatisfied persons do not leave the organization (system) but seck to 
the reactions of the I'rivate sector, (c) limited control over the bureaucracy, and (d) the influence of 
~olitics on public choice. 
_3 This problem has two components. The first is that there is an additional group of people, who were 
previously unable to pay for health care and whose needs now become expressed as demand, enabled by 
public financing. The second is that patients may over-consume services because they face zero price at 
the point of utilization (moral hazard), although this is a characteristic of the private insurance market too. 
It should, however, be notcd that thc separation of these two components is imprecise, exactly because the 
individuals' valuation of health services is not separable from their ability to pay. 
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Table 3.3. 
change its activities (at least for the particular service concerned), not through open 
complaints, but using informal methods, such as payment or connections, These 
mechanisms are different from the option of voice as they are usually covert and do not 
involve persons other than the employee and the consumer, generally bypass the 
established rules of the organisation or the system and they can precede the utilisation 
of the service, On the other hand they resemble the exit option, insofar as they are 
depersonalised and generally secure benefits for only the persons concerned. Informal 
payment can be regarded as an exit mechanism, but within the organisation. Thus it is 
an informal/internal exit, hence the term 'inxit' (Table 3.3). 
Comparison of possible behavioural reactions to declining organizational performance 
Exit Voice Inxit 
Place of action out of the organisation in the organisation in the organisation 
Method of expressing leaves the organisation open complaints using try to satisfy wants in the 
dissatisfaction and satisfy wants available (formal) organisation using informal 
elsewhere channels; overt channels (generally bypass 
established rules); covert, can 
precede the use of service; 
involves only the consumer 
and/or the em.£.l~ee 
Method of improving indirect direct direct 
organizational 
performance 
Benefits of the action primarily individual other users can also individual, but with the 
benefit (large possibility of benefits 
external ities) ~illi~ over to other users 
In the initial development of this concept the term 'manipulation of the system' was 
used, since these informal methods often violate established rules, i.e. were illegal. 
There are, howewr, four reasons why we suggest a new descriptive term. First, it is not 
always illegal, and illegality does not always imply illegitimacy or corruption. Second, 
'manipulation of the system' has a negative connotation, which implies undesirability, 
but this mechanism may serve useful purposes, just like exit and voice_ Indeed, 
Hirschman deliberately chose neutral terms to avoid stigmatising expressions that 
economists and political scientists alike used to describe each other's mechanisms [106, 
pp.17-18,31). Third, the brevity of the word linxit' goes better with exit and voice. 
Fourth, whilst there is no doubt that the most characteristic form of 'inxit' is informal 
payment, we argue that 'inxit' is a better term to describe the phenomenon, since 
24 It is important to note that the option of exit can be understood not just at the level of individual 
providers, but at the system level. This is where the private sector is an alternative to the public sector, 
even if there is the possibility to choose between individual providers within the public sector. 
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informal payment inevitably restricts the richness of the concept in the real world. Even 
the earliest theorists, such as Petschnig [85], argued that it was impossible to understand 
informal payment if one overlooked social and political connections as a means to 
obtain better care. She concluded that " ... patients, who pay with money, often would 
like to make up for their disadvantaged position in the social hierarchy. Money, as 
leverage, substitutes the benefit which cannot be obtained at their level of the social 
echelon." Buda [9] explicitly linked toleration of informal payments to connections 
between the medical profession and the ruling elite. On the providers' side, physicians 
can modify performance, carry out an informal functional privatization by using public 
facilities for private practice, prescribe unnecessary drugs to obtain bonuses from 
pharmaceutical companies [104], and tailor performance reports. They can even pilfer 
drug supplies [98]. These examples extend beyond informal payment and require a 
broader category. 
We argue that Hirschmanls model has to be refined in another respect as well. 
Information asymmetry, a characteristic of health services, complicates judgment of 
provider performance. Patients may perceive a problem if they do not trust physicians 
and the system in general, even if there is no real decline in quality. The belief that they 
will not receive a service of appropriate quality need not arise from their own 
experience, but from reports of relatives, friends or the media. Thus, a general distrust 
in the system could develop, related to the loss of social capital in health care 
(Appendix F). 
4.5.3. OPTION APPRAISAL: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION 
But why would a patient or a doctor choose linxit'? To explain the choice between the 
various options, our model works with three concepts: (a) availability, (b) ability to do, 
(c) willingness to do. We argue that the choice depends on whether the option is 
available, whether the individual concerned has the necessary means to select the option 
(ability to do), and whether the potential benefits of exercising an option is exceed its 
costs (willingness to do). 
Availability means whether the particular option really exists. If we consider the 
patient's vie'vvpoint, availability is concerned with the supply of services, while for 
doctors it usually means demand for their human resource. Ability to do is concerned 
with the doctors' and patients' individual circumstances in relation to a particular 
option. For instance, patients are able to exit or 'inxit' if they have the necessary 
financial resources to do so, i.e. they are able to pay. In the case of doctors, the option 
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of quitting the system (exit) is very much constrained by possible alternative uses of 
their expertise. 
Willingness to do is concerned with the subjective availability of an option, i.e. on 
which grounds individuals judge those behavioural responses that are open to them, 
because all objective conditions to act are given, In general, we hypothesize that this 
decision involves the consideration of the costs and benefits of the various options, but 
this should be explored by empirical research. Nevertheless, the theoretical literature 
summarised above has highlighted a few considerations that we think relevant in this 
respect. 
First, as Adam [66] and Blasszauer [65] argued, legal ambiguity was an important 
factor in the evolution of informal payment in Hungary. Adam [50] pointed out that 
although informal payment had never been legal in Hungary, official policy tolerated 
Igratitude payment', creating the impression in both physicians and patients that it was 
actually not forbidden. The legality or illegality of a particular action celiainly 
influences an individuals' willingness to do it, but does not guarantee total compliance 
with the law. Indeed, the individuals' own judgement may be different from legal 
proscriptions, and if the whole or at least the majority of society think differently, 
regulations become illegitimate and enforcement becomes difficult, or even impossible 
[53]. 
Second, regardless of laws, professional and individual ethical norms can influence 
what physicians are willing to do in pursuit of their own self interest [192; 70; 69]. A 
weak sense of duty can encourage the adoption of certain income maximisation 
strategies by providers, One is supplier-induced demand [209], a phenomenon that 
becomes important once informal payments become established, creating, de faCIO, a 
fee for service system. A second is the creation of artificial shortage by, for instance, 
denying or delaying care (supplier-reduced demand) to elicit payments, as argued by 
Kuti [70]. Although strong professional norms can limit such practices, ethical provider 
behaviour might also give rise to informal payments insofar as doctors had to take up 
part-time jobs to complement poor salaries and the 'exhausted doctor' created the 
impression of low quality of care in patients [70], Further, what is considered ethical or 
unethical is influenced by the 'unacceptably' low official salaries [86], but also the 
examples of how others behave [202], so that in certain situations informal payments 
are seen as legitimate. 
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Third, Hirschman discusses two related concepts in his theory: (a) who are the 
consumers that are the most sensitive to, i.e. activated first by performance decline and 
(b) what are the factors that make people stay rather than leave, a concept that he calls 
"loyalty"- Hirschman uses the concept of consumer surplus to conceptualize the former 
question, He argues that whilst a price increase induces the consumer with least 
consumer surplus to stop buying the product or service, decline in quality makes the 
consumer with the highest surplus leave, i.e. those who are the least sensitive to price. 
Hirschman calls these consumers quality-conscious consumers, or "connoisseurs" [106, 
pp.44-54]. The identification of "connoissellrs" by means of personal attributes (such 
as place of residence, education, occupation, income, health status, religion, ethnic 
origin, age, gender, etc_) could be useful to explore the phenomenon. Furthermore, 
Hirschman's argument suggests that in this respect service attributes (the type of service, 
speciality, the level and location of the health care provider, the qualification and 
position of the doctor, etc.) also matter, since patients probably derive different amounts 
of consumer surplus from different health services_ 
Concerning loyalty, Hirschman [106, pp.76-105] identifies one particular factor with 
obvious relevance to the health sector. He argues that the more difficult it is to gain 
admission to an organization, what he calls "severe initiation", the stronger the loyalty 
of members will be. This applies to physicians and more importantly to specialists, 
whose training may take 10-12 years. Another barrier to exit, as mentioned before, is 
the alternative use of this highly specialized knowledge (if not in the health sector)_ 
Using the terminology developed by Williamson [210] physicians exhibit asset 
specificity, and exit is associated with large sunk costs, which certainly increases 
loyalty. 
3.6.4. THE DECISION TO PAY: EMERGENCE OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
The decision to act according to one of the three options (exit, voice, inxit) has 
detectable consequences at the system level. Exit, for instance, will result in an increase 
of private sector activity, and voice will lead to an increase in the number of complaints. 
The decision to pay and the act of paying at the micro level will determine the overall 
magnitude and distribution of informal payment. But what determines how much is 
paid in individual transactions? 
We argue that the actual payment 1S determined by a reassessment of official 
entitlements both by patients and doctors. As Balazs [211] put it "informal payment is 
the interpretation of the official service in the patient-doctor relationship". Patients 
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Figure 3.1. 
perceive that they do not get what they want, yet judge what it is reasonable to expect in 
a system with such low-paid doctors. That is, they define a basic level of care (that may 
or may not be included in the official service) and pay for what else they would like to 
obtain (i.e. for those 'extra' services for which they are willing to pay). Similarly, 
doctors think that they are not paid enough for the work that is demanded from them, 
and thus determine what is reasonable to expect from them for the official salary. If the 
patients' and the doctors' interpretations coincide in individual transactions, then both 
their wants are satisfied. Further, if the outcome of this process of reinterpretation of 
entitlements coincides in the minds of most patients and physicians, then a new, 
unwritten set of entitlements emerges, for which the choice of physician and receiving 
home visits provide excellent examples in Hungary. Furthermore, even if the 
'reinterpretation' of the official entitlements does not overlap, which is possible as it is 
left to the individuals' own judgement, doctors are in a position to impose their 
interpretations on the patient, thereby effectively forcing them to pay. 
The cognitive-behavioural model of informal payment 
SYSTEM (MACRO) LEVEL 
Causes and preconditions (I) 
Demand 
TRANSACTION (MICRO) LEVEL 
I Motivation (2) 
vs --. Shortage 
Supply 
Perception -+j'-P-A-T-I-E-N-T-'r unsatisfied wants 4-4----, 
--+ of the + \,---'-----, 
situation Consideration of DOCTOR f '--___ --...J 
Impact of other options (5) 
Private sector activity 
Other possibilities 
Expression through the 
available channels 
J 
4 
~ 
l 
r 
I 
Magnitude and distribution (4) , 
Impact on the system (5) I 
op Ions 
Determinants 
of choice (3) 
.J / Exit Exit ~ 
Loyalty .- Behavioural --. Loyalty 
Voice ~"'P'"'\~ Voice 
Inxit --+ Reinterpretation of +- Inxit 
the official service 
... 
INFORMAL PAYMENT -+ Impact on 
the decision -
OTHER options (e.g. informal (5) 
functional p rivatization 
Figure 3,1 summarizes the main building blocks of our theoretical framework as 
discussed above, and suggests main research areas (numbered) where one might seek 
empirical verification of it. In essence, we argue that reactions to any performance 
decline, such as shortage experienced in the Semashko system, are fundamentally 
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determined by the availability of various behavioural responses, and popular ability and 
willingness to go for a certain option. The logic of the model suggests that, where exit 
and voice are not available in a system, the only possible active reaction to the decline 
in performance is 'inxit', so leading potentially to informal payment. 
3.6.5. EXPLAINING INFORMAL PAYMENTS IN HUNGARY 
Our model explains the emergence of informal payment in Hungary on the basis of this 
argument. The establishment of the Semashko system assumed a virtually exclusive 
role for the state in financing and service delivery (chapter 2). The nationalisation 
process eliminated the private sector, voluntary private insurance was forbidden, and 
private practice was confined to a small amount of spare-time surgery. Further, the 
regime left little room for the public's voice to be heard. The channels of voice were 
strictly controlled, and complaints were regarded as an assault against the ruling regime. 
We argue that blocked exit and voice made the Semashko system react differently to 
shortage than other integrated health care systems, such as the British National Health 
Service (NHS), thereby aggravating the problem further. 
In the Semashko system equity was a prime objective, guaranteeing comprehensive 
high quality health services for all citizens. Yet this was an unrealistic objective, 
especially in light of the unfavourable investment policy of the regime, as argued by 
Kuti [70], and the increased sensitivity of the decision making process to private 
interests, as argued by Antal [71]. With the suppression of democratic accountability, 
the communist regime divested itself of the benefits of the checks and balances in a 
pluralistic democracy, while suffering the disadvantages as private interests continued 
to operate behind the scenes and distorted resource allocation in health care.25 
Furthermore, uniform provision did not allow differentiated wants to be satisfied, for 
instance the free choice of physician [70], which was explicitly denied along with 
alternative ways of provision (blocked exit). 
Consequently, many found their wants unsatisfied, but the regime would not admit 
this openly. Instead of developing explicit waiting lists, it pushed rationing decisions 
down to providers, where shortage was manifested in diluted service quality. The 
regime used its monopoly power to set health workers' salaries low, especially 
physicians, initially for ideological reasons [49, p.86], but also to control health care 
25 In general, as argued by Stiglitz [54,pp.5-6], the prerequisite of effective government intervention is 
adequate information and the neutralization of interfering private interests. In a pluralistic democracy 
(-+) 
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expenditure. However, low salaries in themselves could have caused shortage (through 
overwork, and/or manipulation of performance), as argued by Kuti [70], given no 
alternative employment options for health workers. 
In summary, the system was unable to provide what doctors and patients wanted (or 
at least patients perceived a performance failure), which consequently led to the 
activation of the 'inxit' mechanism, because no other option was available. The regime 
tolerated informal payments, they gained legitimacy and became widespread. 
Moreover, the initial shortage was worsened by the challenges brought about by the end 
of the 1960s with the revolution in health technology and the deteriorating health of the 
population [40; 39] and the inadequate policy responses with quantitative development 
instead of quality improvement [40; 52]. The policy of tolerating informal payment 
continued until it was included in the taxable income of physicians in 1989 [8]. 
3.6.6. EXPLAINING OTHER COUNTRIES' EXPERIENCES: THE REACTIONS TO 
PERFORMANCE DECLINE REVISITED 
So far we have explained the emergence of informal payment in Hungary, which we 
contend applies to other former state-socialist health care systems. But what happens if 
there is a decline in performance of public services, such as deteriorating quality or 
increased waiting times, and exit is not blocked? 
Hirschman [106, pp.44-54] argues that in those situations where there is a private 
alternative to the public service, 'exit' may deprive the public system of those who 
would be willing to act (complain) to improve performance, should they choose to stay. 
Arguably some of the current problems of the British NHS are examples of this, as 
many potentially vocal patients have opted for exit, using the private sector. 
Further, the existence of a private alternative limits governments' ability to control 
costs by pushing down physicians' salaries, since mass exit of health workers would 
threaten sustainability of the public system. To retain human resources, salaries have to 
rise, but this may divert resources from other areas with consequences for performance 
decline, and so induce the exit of 'quality-conscious' patients. The system may then 
split into a poorly performing public service and a well performing private one, echoing 
Titmuss's [212] famous saying that "a service for the poor is a poor service", as 
illustrated by accounts of Chilean health care reform [213]. 
competing interests groups can playa role in both provision of information and development of checks 
and balances on each other and on government. 
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The adverse effects of exit from the public sector can be extended to reach a more 
generalized conclusion_ Suppose there is a private alternative to public services and 
workers do not leave, but instead complement their salaries from a part-time private job. 
Public services can still suffer insofar as workers concentrate their efforts on their other 
job, from which more income can be expected. This can reach the point where 
physicians do not even turn up for their public sector employment. This 'show up' 
problem has been reported in certain Latin American and African countries [98]. In this 
situation informal payment can lure the physician to work in the public sector from 
which non-paying patients may also benefit. The theory of 'inxit' suggests that 'inxit' 
may be preferable to exit if benefits spill over to other users of public services. 
Informal payment can even induce the extension of supply through lobbying at the 
national level, as suggested by Antal [71] and Bondar [63]. 
Nevertheless, we argue, that governments' ability to control costs by pushing down 
the price of human resources is limited even if there is no private alternative to public 
services, because the government has limited control over private responses (yet another 
source of government failure described by Stiglitz [54, pp.5-6]). 'Inxit' can bt: activated 
by low pay, since health workers can choose to restrain performance, as suggested by 
Kuti [70], but even if there is no apparent performance decline, patients can perceive 
such a problem ('can I reasonably expect that this low paid physician will do herlhis best 
to provide the service that I want?'), and it is very difficult to prevent those who want 
better service to get it if they can afford to pay for it. On the other hand "connoissellrs" 
represent a driving force for performance improvement and policy makers should find 
innovative ways to harness this force for the public benefit. If they choose exit, the 
public sector looses not just their additional money but their willingness to criticize poor 
performance. There is the potential risk that the split between the public and the private 
sector will widen, leading to a downward spiral of quality in the public sector. 
However, if they stay in the public sector, there is the risk of incorporating this split into 
the public sector with the additional problem of di\'t~rting public money to support 
private wants. \Ve argue that an understanding of this dilemma is crucial to finding the 
appropriate policy response to informal payments and that the increasing popularity in 
some countries of a market-based response that simply creates the conditions for exit is 
unlikely to yield the best possible outcome for the public system. 
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3.6.7. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Table 3.4. 
Hungarian researchers advocated various proposals to tackle the problem, reflecting 
their theories about the causes. Table 3.4 reviews these proposals, which range from 
"voluntary gratitude cheques", essentially a method of incorporating feedback from 
patients into the remuneration of physicians without actually taking money from them 
[195], to increasing the pay of health workers coupled with prohibition of acceptance of 
informal payments [66; 65]. 
Some proposals have already been implemented in Hungary (chapter 2): a social 
insurance system was introduced and provider payment was changed to capitation in 
primary care, fee-for-service points in outpatient specialist care and DRGs for acute 
inpatient care. Moreover, the strict referral system of the communist era has been 
relaxed; since 1992 people can choose their primary care physician. However changing 
the financing system did not increase resources in the health sector; health workers 
remained poorly paid. Most notably, economic recession in the first half of the 1990s 
was followed by a strict cost containment policy, but policy makers proved reluctant to 
review coverage by the public system or introduce co-payment. There was no change to 
the policy of tolerating informal payment, which must be declared in tax returns. 
Although exit and voice are no longer blocked, the private sector remains insignificant. 
Not surprisingly informal payment has not disappeared from the Hungarian health care 
system [214]. 
Proposed solutions for eliminating informal payment from the Hungarian health care system 
Policy tool Source 
Voluntary "gratitude cheque" [ 1951 
Prohibition and legal enforcement [66; 50; 49; 65; 681 
Pay-rise of physicians (in combination with other measures) [66; 67; 651 
Patients' free choice of providers PO; 196; 671 
Some form of co-payment [85; 195; 66; 70; 52; 691 
Output-based provider payment methods [521 
The considerable restriction of social insurance financed services [211 ] 
Nevertheless, it may not be so bad that unsatisfied patients have not moved to an 
expanding private sector, since it is still possible to retain most of them and channel the 
force they represent for the benefit of the public system, using innovative methods of 
control and accountability (voice). But to make sense of this, we argue that the design 
of the social insurance system must be appropriate, as it is unlikely that most 
"connoissellrs" will stay in the public system if there are not enough resources to 
provide sufficient quantity and quality of care for them. The logic of our model 
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suggests this as a crucial element in the failure of previous reforms. First, publicly 
funded services should pursue realistic objectives concerning what is affordable. This 
should include the definition of a package of services provided at a reasonably high 
standard for everyone within the funding available, and the funding should cover all the 
costs of providing these services, including a higher salary for the health workers. 
Second, entitlement to these services should be made unequivocally clear to the public. 
But even if users are fully aware of their entitlements and the system is able to provide 
them, informal payments may persist if there is insufficient trust in the system. 
Consequently, a comprehensive policy to eliminate informal payments should also 
address the loss of social capital. Third, we argue that a move from dilution of services 
to explicit waiting lists (insufficient quantity), would not improve the chance of keeping 
"connoisseurs" in the system. 
While the incorporation of private financing in the form of co-payments or 
complementary private insurance could be seen as a way to improve viability of the 
public system, it requires great caution because of implications for equity. It is 
important that the poor should not experience worse access to care than at present. In 
this respect definition of a benefit package involves difficult decisions. The alternative 
is to think in terms of non-medical aspects of care, but that is very difficult to separate 
from clinical quality (for instance if paying patients are ultimately treated by the best 
clinicians) and a legal two-tier system may emerge, 
We propose an alternative possibility. If patients regard free choice of physician as 
an 'extra service' not covered by social insurance, consumers could take out 
complementary insurance, whilst the non-insured mllst utilize services according to a 
strict referral system, as in Denmark, If patients with such complementary private 
insurance need care they could choose the doctor freely in the public system, and the 
insurance company would pay the physician a fee, thereby utilising formal private 
sources to increase the remuneration of doctors. However, to avoid patients without 
private insurance being neglected, physicians, who treat these patients, would receive 
the same, or at least a similar amount from the social insurance fund for each patient 
treated. 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of our analysis depends on the validity of the 'fee-for-
service' hypothesis on which the outlined theory of 'inxit' is built.26 There is still a need 
26 Should gratitude payment prove to be a valid concept, there will be still a challenge policy makers face, 
whether it is feasible to separate gratuities from other (coerced) informal payments. A good example of 
(~) 
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to examine the extent to which there is a deep-seated cultural dimension to informal 
payments, which ultimately remains a question for empirical research. 
3.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter \ve have reviewed the theoretical literature on informal payment with the 
aim of providing a consistent definition and contrasting and summarizing the various 
arguments, exploring their implications for policy-making, and synthesising the various 
arguments into a theoretical framework that places the phenomenon in a broader 
context. First, the existing definitions have been reviewed and a new definition has 
been proposed, \vhich describes informal payments as an additional contribution above 
what is determined in the terms of entitlements. Second, the various theories of the 
causes of informal payment have been discussed and three main groups of explanations 
have been identified (social-cultural, legal-ethical, and economic). Then the views on 
the assumed impact of informal payment have been contrasted and summarized in terms 
of efficiency and equity objectives of health policy and the main arguments integrated 
in two contrasting theories, which we call 'donation' and 'fee-for-service'. The former is 
rooted in the socio-cultural explanations of informal payment, assuming that patients 
pay because they are grateful for being cured and that this gratitude payment has no 
impact either on access to care or efficiency whilst it brings in additional financial 
resources into the system. Based on the economic explanations, the latter assumes that 
patients give because they want to have decent care in a system that exhibits chronic 
shortages. According to this 'fee-for-service' hypothesis, informal payment may 
prevent access to care for the poor and may induce the provision of unnecessary 
services, although the possibility of beneficial effects on efficiency and only a modest 
negative impact on equity can not be excluded. While the two theories have been 
contrasted to emphasise their differing implications for policy making, it is possible that 
the two co-exist within the same health care system. From the health policy point of 
view what is important is which one is dominant. 
On the basis of the 'fee-for-service' explanation of informal payment and using the 
arguments of the theoretical debate as building blocks, we have outlined a new, 
cognitive-behavioural model of informal payment. It is the theory of 'inxit' as it extends 
this dilemma is brick payments [I 04,p.21], which have been described in the previous chapter. Is it 
possible to separate forced 'donations' from voluntary donations? If not, should all donations be banned, 
because it turns out that sometimes patients feel obliged to give, because they fear that they will not get 
adequate care otherwise? 
I'[TER GAAl 
PAGE 86/ TIIES'S_GP RI.VISIIJ \,17 
l. THEORIES OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
l.6. CONCLUSIOSS 
Hirschman's theory of "exit, voice, loyalty", which he identified as the main "responses 
to decline injirms, organizations and states". We argue that 'inxit', whose most obvious 
manifestation is informal payment, is another option, which mixes the characteristics of 
voice and exit. If both exit and voice are blocked, as was the case in the state-socialist 
health care systems, the only reaction to shortage is 'inxit' (apart from doing nothing). 
The model advocates that solutions for informal payments and the failures of the 
Semashko system in general should balance mechanisms based on both exit and voice. 
The framework seems to be applicable to the explanation of many other situations, 
and it generates plausible hypotheses not just in the narrow topic of informal payment, 
but concerning more general dilemmas of health care systems. These include, among 
others, the question of two-tier health care, the role of public financing in health care, its 
functioning, shortcomings and the effectiveness correction mechanisms, and whether 
these dilemmas are really confined to the public sector. Indeed, before the 
establishment of the state-socialist care system in Hungary, public and private insurance 
companies financed health care. It was widely held that insurance companies exercise 
their market power to push down the fee (salary) of practising physicians, and thereby 
"expropriate their work below its real value" [7; cited in 8,pp.lD-II]. The theory of 
'inxit' does not exclude the possibility that there are other models of health care system 
that may give rise to informal payments. For instance, it is theoretically possible that a 
private insurance based system would give rise to informal payment if insurance 
companies are powerful enough to press down the market price of services resulting in 
diluted clinical and/or service quality. Yet the insured may not be able to shift to 
another insurance company, because of its associated costs, especially those, who are at 
higher risk of illness, as existing conditions are usually excluded from coverage. If the 
insured considered voice too costly, 'inxit' might remain the only choice. 
Nonetheless, the usefulness of the predictions of our explanatory theory crucially 
depends on the validity of the fee-for-service hypothesis of informal payment. In 
Appendix F we have already raised some theoretical arguments and indirect 
international evidence against the donation hypothesis. The circumstantial evidence 
presented in cross-national comparisons suggests that there is a causal link between the 
lack of financial resources and the extent and types of informal payments. We have 
discussed the interpretation of 'coercion' as well as what makes a gift. In any case, the 
validity of the gratitude payment concept remains an empirical question, which should 
be answered by empirical evidence. 
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4. RESEARCH AGENDA AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the previous chapter we have argued that, from the policy perspective informal 
payments can either be seen as 'donation' or 'fee-for-service'. On the basis of the latter 
hypothesis, we have developed a new theory of informal payment, the theory of'inxit', 
which has generated certain predictions about how to approach this issue and has 
provided a possible explanation as to why informal payments have persisted in Hungary 
and other former communist countries. Nevertheless the validity of all hypotheses 
generated by this model is fundamentally determined by the validity of the assumption 
that informal payment is similar to 'fee-for-service', which is an empirical question. 
Consequently it must be confronted with empirical evidence. 
This chapter first explores further the implications of the 'donation' hypothesis to 
formulate a research agenda with the help of which the available empirical evidence can 
be systematised. We pose research questions and corresponding hypotheses derived 
from the gratitude payment concept, according to the main research areas identified in 
chapter 3. Then the available empirical studies are reviewed and the available evidence 
is summarised to see to what extent it is sufficiently conclusive to support the 'donation' 
as opposed to the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis of informal payments. 
4.1. Research agenda 
The focus of this research is the question of 'why do patients pay informally for health 
care?' for which the 'donation' and the 'fee-for-service' explanations provide conflicting 
answers. But, as we have argued in chapter I, from the viewpoint of the policy maker it 
is irrelevant whether informal payment is a donation or a fee-for-service, if it is not 
sufficient to exert any detectable system level impact. Hence the scale of informal 
payments should first be established. 
If informal payment proves to be important in terms of its scale, the central question 
of policy making is whether it adversely affects the performance of the health care 
system, which, as we have argued before, crucially depends on the validity of the 'fee-
for-service' versus the 'donation' hypothesis. Both explanations involve a complex set 
of assumptions and predictions, from the causes and preconditions of informal payment 
to policy options for how to tackle it. The consideration of all these interdependent 
hypotheses allows us to relate a wider range of empirical evidence to the question of 
'why pay informally for health care?'. 
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Table 4.1. 
Using the mam research areas outlined in Figure 4.1, and the contrasting 
characteristics of the 'donation' versus the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis summarized in 
Table 4.3, we propose a possible research agenda by summarizing the research 
questions, hypotheses and relevant pieces of evidence in Table 4.1 that could be used to 
verify or refute the gratitude payment concept. We focus on 'gratitude payment', the 
key concept of the donation hypothesis, since, as we have argued in chapter 3, it is 
sufficient to demonstrate that informal payment is not 'gratitude payment' to consider it 
a source of policy concern. If informal payments are not motivated by gratitude, the 
potential for adverse effects is always there, even if it is not possible to demonstrate 
these effects in each case. Rejecting the cultural roots of the phenomenon would justify 
intervention in the system, even if selection of the most effective policy options would 
need further consideration. 
Research agenda 
Main research area / Research questions Hypotheses (,Donation') 
(4) Magnitude and distribution 
Is it worth paying attention to the~henomenon? Scale is indifferent 
(3) Determinants of alternative behavioural options 
Personal attributes or service characteristics? Large variations in personal 
attributes even for the same 
service 
What is the attitude of patients and the general public towards Indifferent or positive 
informal payments? 
(5) Impact on the system 
Does it influence access to care? No 
Does it influence the distribution of cost burden of care? Yes, but payment is a 
function of ability to pay 
(6) Policy options and the politics of informal payment 
Does informal payment exist in a pure private setting? Yes 
(1) Causes and preconditions 
Did informal payments exist before World War II in Hunga!2'.? Yes 
What are the special features of health care systems, where Culture 
informal payments exist compared to those systems where they 
do not exist? 
(2) Motivation of the actors 
What is the principal motivation of the actors? Gratitude 
Does the stated motivation fit with the circumstances of Yes 
payment? 
Indeed, a key assumption of the 'donation' explanation is that informal payment is a 
national tradition with cultural roots. If this is true then it would have existed in 
Hungary before the establishment of the communist regime, and the distinctive 
difference between the Hungarian and other otherwise similar health care systems that 
have no informal payments is cultural. 
l'J:llH GAAL 
PAGE 1191 TIIES'S_GP RFV'SJ:o_VI7 
RESEARCH AGENDA AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4 I RESEARCH AGENDA 
The impact of informal payment on equity can also be used to test the validity of the 
gratitude payment concept. If informal payment really is a gratitude payment then it 
should not be a barrier to access to care, and even if it changes the distribution of the 
cost burden of care between the healthy and the sick, the gratitude payment concept 
assumes that patients do not voluntarily shoulder disproportionate financial burden. 
However, if there is a 'coercion factor' in giving, one can expect that patients do make 
sacrifices, for instance using their savings, borrowing money or selling household assets 
to pay (or simply choose not to utilize health services). 
The experiences of the reform measures that have been implemented so far can also 
inform us about the validity of gratitude payment concept. If gratitude payment 
persisted in a pure private setting, that would support a cultural explanation. 
The study of the determinants of alternative behavioural reactions could provide 
further evidence. The concept of gratitude payment assumes that the amount of 
payment is determined by the payers themselves. That is, the amounts of informal 
payment should exhibit large variations even if informal payment was given for the 
same service in the same health care institution. However, if informal payment is rather 
a fee for service, then the amount of informal payment given should be the same or 
similar, even if patients differ in terms of personal attributes, such as education, 
occupation, gender, etc. Furthermore, the donation hypothesis implies that patients and 
the general population have a positive or at least an indifferent attitude towards informal 
payments, as people are unlikely to do something voluntarily if they disapprove of it. 
However, as we have argued in chapter 3, ultimately the principal motivation of the 
participants determines, whether a payment has been given truly voluntarily or has been 
forced, in its wider sense. The aim is to capture this 'coercion factor' in the transactions, 
which requires a broader analysis of the situation that relates the stated motivation to the 
circumstances of giving. For instance, the 'donation' hypothesis assumes that patients 
have not lost trust in the health care system to deliver adequate care, that gratitude 
payment is associated with satisfaction with the service used, that patients pay after the 
service, th:1t there is no real or perceived difference between services provided, that 
payment is not associated with any expectations for future episodes of care, and so on. 
The detection of the 'coercion factor' requires an exploration of these associations. 
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4.2. Summary of empirical research on informal payment 
There is a growing body of evidence that informal payments for health care are both 
widespread and enduring, not just in Hungary but elsewhere, in particular in the former 
communist countries of CEE and the FSU [96; 94], many other low and middle income 
countries [98; 99; 215; 92], but also in more developed countries of Western Europe, 
where they are still substantially under-researched [205]. The available evidence on the 
scale of the phenomenon suggests that informal payments are not only widespread, but 
in certain countries, such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, the most 
important source of health care financing [96,pp.16, 19]. 
Despite growing international interest in the issue, the literature on the empirical 
research of informal payments is still limited. The few publications in peer-reviewed 
journals and the conspicuous lack of cross-national research, as well as an absence of 
research in certain countries does not necessary mean that the phenomenon is under-
researched in all countries. Rather the language in which empirical research is 
published may make it poorly accessible, but even those reports available in English 
have rarely published subsequently in peer reviewed English language journals so far. 
For instance, Lewis [96] reviewed 26 empirical studies from 15 post-communist 
countries of CEE and the FSU. The findings of 24 of these studies are available only in 
the form of internal research reports, 15 of which are drafts or "informally reproduced 
works" that are not easily accessible. Or, from the 22 studies that have been 
implemented so far in Hungary, only three are available in English [67; 216; 214] and 
only one in a peer-reviewed English language journal [67]. Furthermore, the review of 
the literature has been complicated because informal payments have frequently been 
addressed only as a side issue in studies with a wider focus [e.g.217; 92; 204]. 
The strategy of searching the literature thus comprised two equally important 
components. have searched the main electronic databases (BIDS, MEOLINE, 
HEAL THSTAR) using a wide range of broader (bribe, bribery, black-market, informal 
economy & health care) and more specific (informal, unofficial, under-the-table, under-
the-counter, under-the-bed, envelope, gratitude payments, gratuities & health care) 
search terms to identify relevant literature, then followed up cited references including 
grey materials. I have contacted researchers directly to obtain material that otherwise 
would not have been accessible. Findings of 9 out of the 22 empirical studies in 
Hungary presented here come from grey sources, which illustrates well the need for this 
latter approach. 
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4.2.1. EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN HUNGARY 
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the research carried out in Hungary between 1969, when 
the first empirical research of this kind was implemented, to the present (see Appendix 
E for a more detailed description of studies). So far 22 independent studies have been 
undertaken on informal payment in Hungary, but only two had informal payment as 
their focus (TK-1985; TARKI-1998). Most are surveys, sometimes in combination with 
other methods, such as content analysis (TK-1985), unstructured (MTA-SZKI-1988) 
and semi-structured interviews (T ARKI-1996). In addition there are two independent 
sets of in-depth interviews (MTA-SZKI-1983; SZEKI-1983-84) and one historical 
analysis [49]. Only six of these studies targeted medical doctors, of which two also 
looked at other health workers (DOTE-1970; ELTE-1973; SZEKI-1983-84; TARKI-
1998 and TARKI-1992,1996, respectively). Although the quality of the studies is 
uneven, the findings and the lessons of the methodological approaches form a valuable 
starting point for further research. 
4.2.2. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
Informal payments have been reported 111 at least 22 countries in three continents. 
Among the former communist countries, the phenomenon has been documented in 
Bulgaria [74; 93], the Czech Republic [218; 219], Poland [87; 204; 105], Romania [88], 
Slovakia [220], the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan [10 1], Estonia [102], Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine [96; 94], with the possible exceptions of the former German Democratic 
Republic [220] and Slovenia [96]. There is evidence that the phenomenon is known in 
Greece [221; 90-92], China [100; cited in 101], Vietnam [215; cited in 96], Uganda 
[98] and Bangladesh [99]. 
Unfortunately, in most of these countries, there is little empirical literature that goes 
beyond simply demonstrating the existence of the phenomenon. At the beginning of 
this research I was aware of only four studies: two from Bulgaria [74; 222], one from 
the Czech Republic [218] and one from Poland [87]. Only two of these reports were 
written in English. Since then the English language literature has broadened [see 96; 
102; 103; 95; 104; 94], amongst which the most important is a review by Lewis [96], 
who summarised 26 empirical studies on informal payments in 15 post-communist 
countries. It is probable that the literature from individual countries concerned is wider 
than this, but the language barrier reduces accessibility. Nonetheless, even the majority 
of the reports reviewed by Lewis are not generally accessihle. 
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Summary of empirical research on informal payment in Hungary 
Research (source) Nationally Sample size Remarks 
representatiYe (response rate) 
SURVEYS 
I. Households/general population 
OTKI-1969 [77J 459!?(?) 
DOTE-1973 [190] 461/500(92.2%) 
OTKI-1984 [201] + 20, I 03/20,204(99. 5%) 
(in 7.398 households) 
TK-1985 179] + 1,0001'?(?) 
GKI-1986 1200] + 13,500/16,000(84.4%) 
SZGTI-1992 [223] + 2.000!?(?) 
SZGTI-1994 [75] + 5,000!?(?) 
SOTE-1995 [224] + 12,640!?(?) 
KSH-1997 [225J + 2.682/2,879(93.2%) 
TARKI-1996 [216] + 1,500!?(?) 
TARKI-1998 1214] + 1,392!?(?) 
2. Patients 
OTKI-1970 1226] 718/?('1) 
OTKI-1972-73 [78; 227] + 4,396/9,898( 44.4%) 
County-Hospital-Eger-1973 [80] 1,046/4,300(24.3%) 
OTKI-1981 [81, preliminary report; only for 1,606/3,000(53.6%) 
228] inpatients 
MTA-SZKI-1988 171; 217] 294/?(?) 
TARKI-1996 + I,OOS/'!(?) primary care outpatients 
3. Physicians 
DOTE-1970? 182] 130/300(43.3%) 
ELTE-1973 (1981 + ?!?(?) 
TARKI-1992 [229] + I,OOO!?(?) 
TARKI-1996 + 1,351/?(?) family doctors 
TARKI-1998 1,006/?(?) 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
I. Patients 
I\ITA SZKI-1983 11991 99 
1\ IT A-SZKI-1988 294!?t?) follow-up inteniews 
2. Physicians 
SZEKI-1983-84 183] IOO(?)I?(?) 
TARKI-1996 272/296(91.9%) semi-structured 
HISTORICAL ANAL \'SIS 
t\d{lm 150; 49; 67] 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
1'K-1985 (Vago, unpublished) 
Following the framework presented in this thesis, the following sections provide a 
summary of what has been found out about the phenomenon so far, on the basis of the 
literatun: rcview of empirical studics in Hungary. Where relevant, the analysis of 
available evidence is complemented with international experiences. Evidence from 
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other countries might help to reinforce the Hungarian findings, or can call attention to 
important differences. In any case they deepen our understanding of the phenomenon. 
4.2.3. LIMITATIONS 
The findings of empirical studies do, however, have to be interpreted with caution, 
because of limitations originating from the study designs and implementation. These 
limitations affect the internal and external validity (generalisability) of research results, 
and complicate comparability, for instance to asses trends using findings from different 
studies. 
First, studies have applied different frameworks to the definition of informal 
payments in terms of the media of transaction (cash or in-kind payments), participants 
(physicians, nurses and other health workers) and motivation (gratitude payment, 
paying for private services in public institutions). Some studies considered only cash 
payments (DOTE-1975; TK-1985; GKI-1986; SZGTI-1992,1994; KSH-1997), others 
cash and in-kind payments (gifts) together (OTKI-1969, 1981,1984; TARKI-
1996,1998), while only the OTKI-1972-73 study addressed them separately. Similar 
inconsistency is discernible in the recipients of informal payments. There are six 
studies that distinguished the receiving persons (physicians, nurses and other health 
workers) (OTKI-1972-73,1984; TK-1985; SZGTI-1992; KSH-1997; TARKI-1998). 
The OTKI-1969, TARKI-1996 and DOTE-1973 studies, however, exclusively dealt 
with physicians, the GKI-1986 and OTKI-1981 studies considered doctors and other 
health workers, but using the same questions, the SZGTI-1994 research simply used the 
term 'gratitude payment' without referring to whom exactly it was given, while the 
study in the County-Hospital-Eger-1973 is the most interesting in this respect, because 
Csapo [80] applied two different approaches in the frame of the research. 27 As we have 
discussed in chapter 3, operationalising informal payment using the term 'gratitude 
payment' could be another source of inconsistent categorisation. The GKI-1986, the 
SZGTI-1992 and 1994 studies employed this concept, and there is evidence from the 
former study that respondents mixed gratitude payments with tips ("lip to nurses "), 
which the researcher considered a separate category [200]. The division is not clear 
between informal payments and payments for private services, either. For instance the 
SZGTI-1994 study differentiated between gratitude payment and payment for private 
27 In the study at the County-Hospital-Eger-1973, three questions addressed the topic of informal 
payment. Two of them were asked about payments to medical doctors, while the third that to doctors and 
other hospital staff, all three in different context [80]. 
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practice in public institutions, by operationalising the latter as "visiting the physician in 
a public provider institution as a paying patient" [75]. Whether this was a 
straightforward distinction for all respondents is not evident, while other studies left this 
area unexplored and hence uncertain. 
Second, the validity of research findings has been affected by selection, respondent 
and recall bias. Selection bias is manifested in the choice of study population, 
inclusion-exclusion criteria applied, response rates and non-responses. The OTKI-
1969,1970,1981, the DOTE-1970,1973, and the County-Hospital-Eger-1973 studies 
selected samples from households, the general population, patients and physicians that 
were not representative nationally. Furthermore, the exclusion of certain sub-groups 
also questions the generalisability of certain research findings. For instance the OTKI-
1972-73 study of hospital patients excluded short term stays (less than 5 days), thereby 
excluding most normal deliveries, who have frequently been found to give substantial 
informal payments. In addition, one of the Achilles heels of certain studies is the 
disappointingly low response rate: 25% (County-Hospital-Eger-1973), 43% (DOTE-
1970),44% (OTKI-1972-73), 54% (OTKI-1981). Whether this is attributable to the 
study designs (research methods) or the sensitivity of the issue is unclear, but refusals 
seem especially likely in studies of this topic. This is supported by the observation that 
in those studies that addressed informal payments as one among many other topics the 
number of refusals to answer questions related to informal payment were sometimes 
much higher than non-responses to other questions. For instance the OTKI-1972-73 
study found that between 3.9-11.3 % of respondents refused to tell whether or not they 
paid physcians, nurses and other health workers informally (there were separate 
questions for each), and those who admitted giving, but refused to tell the exact amount 
were 1.3 -7.7% of all respondents [78]. The corresponding figures in the DOTE-1973, 
OTKI-1981 and GKI-1986 studies were 19.6%, 18.5%-19.2% and 1.4% (said to be high 
compared to other questions), respectively [190; 81; 200]. The sensitivity of the issue, 
however, does not only lead to non-responses, but we must ask whether people answer 
some questions truthfully, such as on the scale of informal payments and the motivation 
of giving and acceptance. Harding and Jenkins [230] discuss in detail respondent bias 
in relation to informal economic activity, and there is some evidence from research in 
Hungary that informal payment is no exception. In the OTKI-1969 and GKI-1986 
studies interviewers noted their observations. Many commented on feeling that 
respondents did not tell the truth concerning informal payments [77; 200]. Respondent 
bias among physicians has also been demonstrated in Hungary (TARKI-1992), which 
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corresponds well with the observation of Lewis [96,p.l0] in the international context. 
In conclusion, most experts believe that surveys underestimate the true scale of informal 
payments [e.g.77; 200; 207; 214], but it is not clear to what extent. It is possible that 
the sensitivity of the issue has changed over time and vary between places, as informal 
payments have gained increasing legitimacy in the system, which in turn has increased 
'willingness of reveal the truth'. In contrast, others, like Balazs [231], have argued that 
survey respondents may overstate informal payments, insofar as they perceive the act of 
payment and the amount given as a symbol of the social class to which one belongs.28 
Surveys assess informal payments on the basis of retrospective accounts of health 
care utilization, which is another problem with validity. The various studies employed 
different time frames from one month (SZGTI-1992) to three years (OTKI-1984), with 
the latter raising the possibility of recall bias. While Ekes [200] argued that hospital 
stays are major family events where it is not unrealistic to expect that even non-affected 
family members could recollect a year later, Bognar et al. [214] argued that recall bias 
could lead to serious underestimation of the true magnitude of informal payments, 
which they sought to overcome by "refreshing" questions. Kadar et al. [226] noted that 
the place of interview also influenced how patients remember to these events. During 
hospital stays patients have fresh memories of bad experiences, but they may be 
unwilling to give their honest opinion for fear of the consequences. In contrast, at home 
after discharge, they may be more likely remember the good things. 
Finally, we have to take into account how research on informal payments in Hungary 
spans a 30-year long period. Many results are dated and hence should be extrapolated 
to the present only with caution. 
4.3. Research findings in Hungary 
The following sections give a brief summary of the main findings of empirical studies, 
according to the areas of research presented in Table 4.1: the scale of informal 
payments, the determinants of informal payments, impact of informal payments on 
equity, policy options and motivation of the actors. 
28 He argues that lower social classes may deliberately overstate informal payments to show themselves 
part of a higher social class. Indeed, this motive ("other patients disdain those who do not pay") has been 
documented in the TK study [79]. 
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4.3.1. SCALE OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS (EXTENT, MAGNITUDE, 
DISTRIBUTION) 
The findings of quantitative studies which addressed the extent and magnitude of 
informal payments are summarised in Table 4.3 (bold figures in shaded cells), along 
with expert estimates from both national and international sources (non-shaded cells). 
The overall extent and magnitude of informal payments are available only from seven 
studies, which, in addition to the aforementioned limitations, are too sporadically 
distributed across the 30-year period to permit far reaching conclusions. There are other 
studies though, which also addressed the scale of inforn1al payments and would help to 
complement the available evidence, but unfortunately there is insufficient detail in study 
reports. Nevertheless, the available evidence is sufficiently conclusive to draw some 
basic conclusions. 
4.3.1.1. Overall extent and magnitude 
There is evidence that informal payment is prevalent and, despite more than a decade of 
health care reform, still an issue in the Hungarian health care system (Table 4.3). 
According to the most recent T ARKI study more than one-third of all patients, who 
utilised health services paid physicians and other health workers informally in 1998 
[214]. The same study estimated informal payments as HUF 33 billion29 (24-42 billion 
at 95%CI), which amounted to 4.8% of total expenditures on health. Nevertheless, 
findings on the overall magnitude of informal payment are inconclusive, especially if 
we consider expert estimates as well (Table 4.3). For instance, the KSH hidden 
economy study estimated the total amount of informal payment for health care to 3 
billion HUF in 1997, which is approximately one-tenth of the estimate of the TARKI-
1998 study, in real terms. Conversely, Balazs's guestimate for 1997 is more than 50% 
higher than that in real terms. Or the GKI's household survey in 1986 came up with a 
figure that is exactly half of the guestimate of Losonczi and less than one-third of the 
guestimate of Gyet\'ai and Szab6 for the same year, and so on for 1992 and 1994. Most 
interestingly, the World Bank even published two different expert estimates for the 
same year, 1989 (Table 4.3). What is conspicuous though from Table 4.3 that 
guestimates are consistently and considerably higher than survey data, which 
corresponds well \vith the general opinion that informal payments 'must be' a 
significant component in health care financing in Hungary. 
29 This is equivalent to (:137 million and US$ 154 million at annual average exchange rates in 1998: 1 
EUR = 241 HUF, I USD = 214 HUF [23,19.21]. 
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Extent and overall magnitude of informal payment in Hungary 
Research Extent 
Magnitude (in million HUF) 
Year (er) (% of current constant prices Remarks I Source 
utilisers) prices (1969=100)* 
1952 Adam · 48 12 • expert opinion on the basis of period 
documents 
• [49] 
1969 OTKI :r . ? ' 7) 1 -.:v 100 • money & gift; only physicians included 
, 
,.~, 
' .' ;'. • (77] 
~ 
1973 DOTE 25% 620 ' 79 • only money; only physicians included 
1 
.. ; 
• 19.6% refused to answer 
. 
;.:, ~ ( ~.,; • • [190] 
1981 Petschnig · 3,150 268 • 2,300·4,000 
• [85; on the basis of 77; 190; 78 , and own 
investigation] 
Ekes (GKI) 
· 
4,500 383 • 4,000·5,000 
• [232; 200] 
1984 Levendel - 4,000 275 • [195] 
1985 Ekes - 3,750 241 • 3,500·4,000 
• [200; on the basis of 83] 
1986 GKI 55% 2,000 <' 122 • only money; all health workers included 
:\, • [200] 
Losonczi - 4,000 243 • (l09,p.123] 
Gyetva i, 
-
7,000 426 • 6,000-8,000 
Szab6 • [233 ,p.145] 
1989 \VB - 12,000 496 • [cited in 203] 
\VB 
· 
10,300 425 • constant 0.6% of the GDP 
• [112] 
1990 \VB · 12.500 401 • [112] 
1991 \VB · 14,900 354 • [112] 
1992 SZGTI 14%** 7,300 141 • gratitude payment; all health workers incl. 
. 
• [223] 
\VO - 17,300 334 • [112] 
1993 \VB - 21,500 339 • [112] 
.. 
1994 SZGTI 13%** 7,407 98 • gratitude payment wlo explanation 
• excluding non-di sease utili sation, outpatient 
! 
Ii : ,; I ~ cases wlo sickness leave, pri vate practice in .' public instituti ons 
'." 
• (75] 
\VB - 26,200 348 • [112] 
1995 \VB - 33,700 349 • [II 2] 
Kap6cs · 10,000 104 • 5,000· 15,000 
• (234] 
1996 \VB · 41 ,400 347 • [112] 
.. 
1997 KSH 13%** 3,028 21 • gratitude payment; all health workers incl. 
-.- • [225] 
Oalazs · 45,000 319 • 40,000·50,000 
• [73; on the basis of229] 
1998 Tt\RKI 36% 33,000 20-1 • gifts & money; all health workers included 
, 
• [214] , . 
Notes: *Appiying CPt dcnator; .. % of respondents not ofutiliscrs 
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Experts usually consider surveys underestimating the overall magnitude of informal 
payment [e.g.207; 235], while researchers usually think the same about their own 
findings [e.g.77; 78; 200; 223; 225; 214]. 
Research which tried to address the magnitude of informal payment by asking 
physicians proved to be unsuccessful in eliciting valid information, although in the 
T ARKI -1992 study 52% of the respondents confessed that they accepted informal 
payment [229]. In contrast, when physicians were asked in the T ARKI -1998 study, 
they thought that 79-94% accepted informal payments, depending on specialty, and that 
only 20% of physicians did not receive informal payments at all [214,pp.18-19]. 
Concerning trends, Galasi and Kertesi [202] analysed the results of five studies 
between 1969 and 1985.30 They found a steady rise both in the extent and amount of 
informal payments during this period. Since then no such trend is discernible (Table 
4.3), but inferences on the pattern and dynamics of changes is limited as it is difficult to 
assess how much change from one year to the next is real and how much due to 
methodological differences. 
4.3.1.2. Distribution 
The available evidence on the distribution of informal payment between different health 
workers is more conclusive. We have summarised findings concerning three service 
attributes: physicians versus other health workers (Table 4.4), levels of care (Table 4.5) 
and types of services (Table 4.6). 
The distribution of informal payments has been uneven in terms of all three service 
attributes, which suggests that informal payments are concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small group of health \vorkers. 
First, the OTKI-1972-73, KSH-1997 and TARKI-1998 studies are remarkably 
consistent in that medical doctors receive about 90% of the total sum of informal 
payments, while the much larger group of other health workers share the rest (Table 
4.4). Second, the extent and the amounts are highest in hospitals and lowest in 
outpatient specialist care, with primary care somewhere in the middle (Table 4.5). 
According to the OTKI-1969 and TARKI-1998 studies this means that specialists 
collect approximately two-thirds, while family doctors one third of the 90% of informal 
payments that go to physicians. Furthermore specialists who work exclusively in 
JO OTKI-I969,1972-73,1981,1984 and TK-1985. In order to increase the comparability of research 
findings, the authors used the data for hospitals and for Budapest only. 
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Table 4.4. 
Table 4.5. 
inpatient care are considerably better off than those in independent polyclinics or 
dispensaries offering specialist outpatient care only (Table 4.5). 
Distribution of informal payments in Hungary: Physicians and other health care workers 
Extent I\J agnitude -., -Year .~ ~ Source (% of givers among utilisers) (in HVF/respondent) .~ f: 
Study ,. co Remarks 
Physician Nurse Other Physician Nurse Other .c .c =- ., 
1972173, OTKI (78) 
hospital (money) 37% 36% 24% 197 25 6 87% excluding non-
hospital (gift) 15% 25% 9% ? ? ? ? 
respondents 
1984,OTKI [201) 
hospital 50% 41% ? ? ? 
outpatient sp. ? ? ? ? ? 
primary care ? ? ? ? ? 
1985, TK (79) 
hospital ? ? ? ? ? 
outpatient sp. ? ? ? ? ? 
primary care ? ? ? ? ? 
1992, SZGTI ? ? ? ? ? [223) 
1997, KSH ? ? 737 46 9.t% [225) 
1998, TARKI [214,p.30) 
hospital ? ? 6.122 756 89% 
outpatient sp. ? ? 477 54 90% 
primary care ? ? 218 29 88'% 
Distribution of informal payments in Hungary: Levels of care 
Extent Magnitude 
I Share of Year (% of givers among utilisers) (in HVF/respondent) Source specialist 
Study Remarks Outpatient Hospital care (%) Primary care 
specialist care (inpatient care) 
1969,OTKI 22% 61 11% 12 46% 88 62% (77) 
only physicians 
1972'73,OTKI - - - - 44% 197 - [78) 
only physicians 
1973, County - - - - 30% - - [80) 
Hospital Eger only physicians 
1981,OTKI 4S% ? 57% ? 64% ? ? [SI) 
1984,OTKI IS% ? 33% ? 55% ? ? [201] 
1985, TK 12%* ? 9%* ? 19%· ? ? (79] 
1996, TARKI 22~o - - - ? ? - [216] 
1998, TARKI 26% 1181 15% 778 59% 1837 69% [214,pp.14,29J 
/13-l/lonth period 
Not~; *% ofr~sponJcnts not ofutiliscrs; 
Third, informal payments are unequally distributed in terms of actual health services, 
suggesting that specialists do not enjoy an equal share of the amount given in hospitals 
Crable 4.6). The OTKI-1984 study found that 69.1 % of hospital patients paid 
PI'TER GAAl 
PAGE 100' TIIESIS_GP HEVISEIl_ VI7 
RESEARCH AGENDA AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4 J RESEARCH FISDINGS IN HUNGARY 
Table 4.6. 
informally for delivery, 61.4% for operations, 50.4% for 'conservative' treatment, 
47.8% for medical investigation (check up), 45.5% in the case of injuries and 31.7% for 
all other causes of hospitalisation. These findings have been supported by the TARKI-
1998 study, which asked respondents about the usual amount of informal payments for 
certain services, and by the TK-1985 study, also providing information about average 
'tariffs'. Operations and deliveries are not only the most frequently 'remunerated' 
services, but also the most 'expensive'. In contrast, diagnostic services are rarely paid 
for informally, according to the TARKI-1998 study (Table 4.6). These findings 
correspond well to views of physicians' and the public about non- and best-paying 
medical specialties. In the TK-1985 study the general population were asked to rank 
medical specialties according to the amounts physicians received [79]. Not surprisingly 
obstetrics and gynaecology was 'voted' first, surgery second, internal medicine third 
and family medicine fourth. The TARKI-1998 study asked both the lay public and 
physicians, obtaining ranking that exactly coincide with the finding of the TK study 
[214]. However it is interesting to note that physicians consistently estimated the 
lowest frequency of informal payments in their own specialty. This phenomenon was 
also observed by Szabo [83] in the SZEKI study. 
Distribution of informal payments in Hungary: Services 
Extent (% of givers among utilisers Magnitude (in HUF/utiliser 
Service type 
(share among all paying patients» (/all utilisers» 
OTKI-1984 TK-1985* TARKI-1998* 
[201] [79] [214.p.13,2t1] 
Delivery 69% (16%) ? (?) - 1.200 92~o 11,000 
Operation 61% (36%) ? (?) - 1,300 - -
- tonsillectomy - (-) - (-) - - 77% 3,500 
- appendectomy - (-) - (-) - - 87~o 6,000 
- open heart surgery - (-) - (-) - - 910 ' _,0 29,000 
Hospital check-up 48% (14)% ? (?) - 310 - -
F:lmily physician - (- ) - (-) - 140 75~o 1,600 
visits patient at home 
X-ray - (-) - (-) - - 8°' ' ° 130 
1\1easuring blood - (-) - (-) - - 12~0 60 
pressure 
Notes: *Rcsponocnts' opinion 
I 
There are no quantitative data available on the association of informal payments with 
other service attributes, such as the geographical location of the institution and the 
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health workers' position in the hierarchy.3l With respect to the former, the place of 
residence of patients can be used as a proxy, which will be analysed in the next 
section,32 while we have some data from SZEKI-1983-84 and the TARKI-1998 studies 
regarding professional status and related factors. According to the SZEKI-1983-84 
study, physicians think that higher position in the hierarchy implies more 'paying' 
patients offering larger amounts [83]. For instance, one physician commented that: 
" ... There is a very sophisticated mechanism of patients' selection everywhere, that is 
why the junior doctor gets, for instance the gypsy woman". This vie\v is supported by 
the TARKI-1998 study. Physicians ranked 'position' as the second most important 
factor influencing the amount of informal payments, immediately after specialty and 
before 'fame' and 'assertiveness' [214,p.20]. It is interesting to note that only one-third 
of medical doctors mentioned performance, which fits the finding of the SZEKI-1983-
84 study that so-called "pretence-activities" mattered more [83]. 
4.3.1.3. Conclusions 
Is the available evidence on the scale of informal payments sufficiently conclusive to 
regard the phenomenon as an important health policy issue? The findings reviewed 
here suggest that informal payments are indeed widespread in the Hungarian health care 
system. For instance, the findings of the most recent TARKI study reporting an overall 
frequency of 36%, with 59% of 'paying' patients in hospitals, indicate a much higher 
level than the 1.6% of respondents admitting making small gifts to health workers 
reported by Masopust [218] in the North Bohemian region of the Czech Republic 
(Czechoslovakia), but comparable with Poland, where in a national representative 
survey by Chawla et al. [204] found that 69% of the patients in non-regional and 61 % in 
regional hospitals made "envelope payments" to physicians, and with Bulgaria, vvhere 
Delcheva et al. [74] found that in the two years prior to their national survey, 43% of the 
respondents had paid for health services that were officially free of charge. 
31 Analysing the results of 4 studies (OTKI-1984;TK-1985;SZEKI-1983-84;GKI-1986) Adam [8,pp.138-
164] has found that "medical gratitude payment" is associated with the medical speciality, the location, 
type and level of the institution and the doctor's position in the hierarchy. However, for most of the 
above factors there are no such data available in the cited studies. For instance the location of the 
institution has not been included in any of these studies, he probably drew his conclusion from the data on 
the place of residence of the payers. Not denying the association between the two factors, they are not the 
same. 
32 It must be noted that the variables, which are discussed here as factors which influence the distribution 
of informal payments are the same as the variables, which are conceptualised as one group of variables 
(referred to as service attributes) that determines the alternative behavioural options and are discussed in 
the next section. 
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Nonetheless, the frequency of giving, in itself, does not indicate that the overall sums 
are substantial. The evidence of the overall magnitude of informal payments in 
Hungary is inconclusive and contradictory, with an order of magnitude difference 
between the highest and lowest survey estimates (Table 4.3). One can argue, though 
that even the highest survey estimate (T ARKI-1998) is far below the level reported 
from countries of the FSU and even some other CEE countries. The estimated HUF 33 
billion [214] is still less than 5% of total expenditures on health in Hungary, while 
according to Lewis [96,p.19], informal health expenditures make up 84% of all national 
health expenditures in Azerbaijan, 56% in the Russian Federation and 30% in Poland. 
The aggregate total is not, however, the key factor. It is the distribution of informal 
payments that matters more. There is conclusive evidence from Hungary that health 
workers benefit unequally of informal payments. Physicians receive the bulk of these 
payments, especially certain specialists, including obstetricians and surgeons who work 
in inpatient care, as well as family doctors. We argue that to establish the policy 
significance of the phenomenon, we must conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
relationship of informal payment to salary for the various groups of health workers. For 
instance, Chawla et al. [204] found, in Poland, that distributing envelope payments 
equally among all health workers in general hospitals gave each individual an additional 
income of 10% of their gross salary. In contrast, considering only physicians, who 
received 81 % of the total amount, each took home more than double of their gross 
salary in informal payments. 
Thus, the scale of informal payments needs further consideration. Since many of the 
data collected in previous studies have yet to be fully analysed (OTKI-1981, 1984; TK-
1985; SZGTI-1992; TARKI-1996), additional secondary analysis seems to be a rational 
first step. 
4.3.2. DETERMINANTS OF ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIOURAL REACTIONS 
Let us now consider what the empirical literature says about the factors that influence 
choice of the various behavioural responses (with willingness to do as the dependent 
variable), with the focus on inxit. We have categorised the potential independent 
variables into three main groups: personal attributes (e.g. age, gender, family status, 
socio-economic status), behavioural attributes (e.g. attitudes, perceived legality and 
legitimacy) and service attributes (e.g. levels of care, location of the institution, 
position, specialty, service types). We have already discussed service attributes in the 
section about the distribution of informal payments so here we focus on the first two. 
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Exploration of associations between informal payments and individuals' various 
characteristics could capture the 'coercion factor' in giving. In particular, we are 
searching for evidence that allows us to distinguish the associations between informal 
payment and personal attributes from those directly attributable to service 
characteristics. We have argued that if informal payments are similar to a donation then 
the amount paid by patients should exhibit substantial variations even in the same health 
care institution for the same service, provided by the same physician. However, there 
are certain personal attributes that are correlated with service attributes, such as place of 
residence and the location of the health care institutions. The analysis of their 
relationship requires that both are addrc:ssed within the same study. 
4.3.2.1. Personal attributes 
Table 4.7. 
Most of the studies addressing informal payments have recorded the basic demographic 
features of respondents (including age, sex, occupation, education, place of residence). 
The published findings, presented in Table 4.7, show remarkable consistency, but 
unfortunately few publications went beyond a simple univariate analysis. So far the 
most detailed analysis of the association between informal payments and personal 
attributes of the givers (payers) comes from the OTKI-1972-73 study [78; 227]. 
Determinants of informal payment to physicians (personal attributes) 
Determinant Association Source 
gender women give more frequently 178; 2141 
age women between 20-49 give most frequently [781 
place of residence +: larger settlement implies higher amounts, [78;200;201; 75; 214] 
more frequently 
level of education +: higher level of education implies higher [78; 75] 
amount, more frequently [831 
occupation +: higher position implies higher amounts [78; 190; 201] 
more frequently 
income +: higher income implies higher amount [75] 
more frequently 
health status (self- -: healthier gives less frequently [201; 75;2141 
assessed) 
health care utilisation +: more visits to the family doctor implies [201] 
more fn:quent payment 
satisfaction with -: dissatisfaction implies more frequent [227; 214J 
services payment 
T6th et al. found a positive association between informal payments to physicians and 
gender, age, socioeconomic status (level of education, occupation) and place of 
residence of hospitalised patients while, interestingly, there was an inverse relationship 
with patient satisfaction (Table 4.7). For instance, the percentage of payers and the 
average amount per payer were found to be 24.6% and 504 BUF respectively in the 
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group who had completed fewer than 8 classes at school and 53.3% and 754 HUF in the 
group with higher education [78]. Other studies not only confirmed most of these 
associations, but identified other determinants, such as income [75]. 
Both the frequency and size of payments increase with the size of the settlement in 
which respondents live. For instance, according to the OTKI-1972-73 study, patients 
living in the capital, Budapest, paid almost twice as frequently as those living in villages 
(55.8% vs. 30.2%), and the average amounts per payer were 600 HUF vs. 477 HUF 
respectively [78]. This suggests that informal payments are unequally distributed 
between health workers in different regions, insofar as the respondents utilise health 
services at their place of residence. Unfortunately there is no published evidence on the 
location of the health care provider that would allow us to separate the two. 
T6th et al. [78] conducted a separate analysis of in-kind payments (gifts) and cash 
given to nurses. They found that the same factors were associated \vith each type of 
payment, but they examined only the frequency of giving. Among nurses, level of 
education, occupation and gender had the same effect on informal payments as with 
physicians, while place of residence was associated only with the frequency of giving 
and not the amounts paid. 
Some studies addressed other relevant personal attributes such as trust in, knowledge 
of and opinion about health services (as in the TK-1985 study), but the correlation 
between the various factors associated with informal payments has hardly been 
considered. One exception is the OTKI-1972-73 study. T6th et al. [78] found that level 
of education and place of residence were independently associated with informal 
payments. Among patients who lived in the same type of settlements, the more 
educated gave more frequently, while patients with the same level of education paid 
more frequently with increasing urbanisation. 
4.3.2.2. Behavioural attributes 
The TK-1985 study addressed two behavioural attributes, public attitudes and the 
perceived legality of giving and accepting informal payments [79]. It is interesting to 
note that the majority of respondents condemned informal paymcnt (77% disapproved 
of giving, while 66% disapproved of accepting), and saw it the third most important 
problem facing the health care system.33 Unfortunately, the authors did not analyse the 
association between attitude to payment and the frequcncy or amounts of payment. 
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Neither did they publish any findings concerning the perceived legality of the 
phenomenon. 
4.3.2.3. Association with exit and voice 
Nine studies have looked at both private sector utilisation and informal payment (OTKI-
1969,1972-73,1981,1984; DOTE-1973; SZGTI-1992,1994; TARKI-1996; KSH-1997). 
The role of personal attributes in explaining exit resembles what is found with informal 
payment. Furthermore, there is some evidence that exit and inxit are associated. Petone 
[190] found that those who utilised private health services more frequently paid 
informally in the public setting, a finding confirmed by the OTKI-1981 study [228]. 
Two studies addressed the issue of voice (TK-1985; TARKI-1996), however only the 
latter have been published so far. The voice option was found to be associated 
educational background, also linked with informal payments [216]. 
4.3.2.4. Discussion and conclusions 
So is there sufficient evidence to support either the 'donation' or the 'fee-for-service' 
hypothesis? The empirical literature has established that informal payments are 
associated with both service and personal attributes, but the published findings are 
insufficient to determine which group of variables explain the variation in how much 
patients pay. The analytical problem is twofold. First, certain personal attributes, such 
as education, occupation and income, are correlated, but researchers rarely separate their 
effects on informal payments. Second, certain personal attributes could be correlated 
v./ith service characteristics, which would then need to be distinguished. For instance 
wealthier patients may be more likely to seek physicians with a better reputation and 
hence who are more 'expensive'. Similarly, any effect of living in an urban or rural 
settlement may be confounded by differing 'fees' of urban and rural health care 
providers 'charge'. To test this hypothesis we must control for both groups of variables 
(personal and service attributes) within the same study. Unfortunately, the data in the 
two studies that recorded both the place of residence of respondents and the location of 
providers (OTKI-1972-73, 1981) are not available for secondary analysis. 
Nevertheless, the empirical literature docs contain a few interesting findings that may 
help to clarify the motivation of actors. It seems that the association between 
dissatisfaction with services and informal payments is incompatible with the gratitude 
33 In the DOTE-1973 study Petone [190] got to the same conclusion: "lIlost respondents disagrt!t! with 
in/orilla! paYlllents ". The exact proportion has not been revealed though. 
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payment concept [227; 214], reflected in the disapproving attitude of the overwhelming 
majority of people in the TK-1985 study [79]. Nonetheless, the association between 
attitudes and informal payments remained unexplored, as with other relevant factors, 
including trust in the system, knowledge and opinion about health services. 
4.3.3. IMPACT ON EQUITY 
Relating equity to the validity of the 'donation' hypothesis we have assumed that a 
disproportionate financial burden, as well as the resulting differential access would 
challenge the validity of the gratitude payment concept. Nonetheless, this is a topic that 
has rarely been addressed so far. Here we present the scant evidence available and 
provide a few examples that address the impact of informal payments, albeit requiring 
further analysis. 
The TARKI-1996 study analysed factors that prevent people from visiting a doctor. 
Even though visits were free of charge, 11.7% mentioned that they delayed seeking 
assistance if they had a problem because of the cost. Furthermore it found that the 
frequency of giving informal payment was higher among those who smv the doctor 
early (those with no or mild symptoms) than those who visited the doctor later (with 
more serious illness, or a major problem). The author concluded that informal payment 
influenced the timing of utilisation, suggesting the existence of a financial barrier to 
entry [216]. This is not the only possible explanation, though, as reverse causality 
cannot be excluded with certainty. 
T6th et al. [78] found that more educated patients were more likely to be placed in 
smaller wards (assessed by numbers of beds). Similarly, the physician was more likely 
to hand the discharge note personally to more educated patients. Since the frequency of 
giving and the amount of informal payments have been found to be associated with 
patients' level of education, these findings could reflect to the impact of informal 
payment. Another example comes from the OTKI-1984 study, where researchers found 
an association between the respondent's occupation and the role of the hospital doctor 
in rehabilitation after discharge. Many of the studies also addressed other factors, for 
instance the type, number and length of discussions with physicians and nurses during 
the hospital stay (OTKI-1972-73), waiting times, information provided to the patient 
(OTKI-198l ;TARKI-1996), sickness benefits (OTKI-1984; TARKI-1996), and number 
of home visits (T ARKI-1996), but the data have not b~en analysed yet. 
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As we have discussed in chapter 3, patients perceptions of the consequences of 
paying or not could be as important as the true impact of informal payment.34 The TK-
1985 study addressed this issue by asking people "what they think 'would happen with 
those who do not pay". Dobossy et a1. [79] concluded that the overwhelming majority 
of respondents expected some sort of discrimination from health care staff; either poor 
service quality (57% of the respondents thought that the doctor 'would be impolite, 55% 
that would they be ignored by the nurses, and 52% that they would be kept waiting), or 
clinical quality (50% thought that they would be treated superficially), while only a 
small fraction of respondents expected disdain from fellow patients. This is in sharp 
contrast with the opinion of medical doctors, according to the SZEKI-1983-84 study. 
Most physicians thought that their standard of care was not influenced by informal 
payment, and only a small fraction (8%) saw substantial advantages accruing to those 
who paid, either in terms of service provided or clinical quality (free choice of doctor, 
shorter waiting times, rare and expensive treatment) [83]. 
4.3.4. POLICY OPTIONS AND POLITICS OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
In chapter 2 we have reviewed the wide-ranging health sector reform brought about by 
the collapse of the communist dictatorship in Hungary. Although considerable changes 
have been implemented in the organisation and functioning of the Hungarian health care 
system, I have not found any research (not even a single case study) that sought to 
evaluate the effect of reform on informal payments. The only exception is the historical 
analysis of Adam [49; 8], but that addressed only the pre-reform period. His detailed 
retrospective account on the history of policy responses to informal payment has 
already been summarised in chapter 2. 
Some studies sought the views of the general public, patients and physicians about 
what to do about informal payments (DOTE-1973;SZEKI-1983-84;TK-1985). For 
instance Pet6ne [190] found that 73% of respondents had some opinion about how the 
practice of giving informal payment could be abolished. Most (24.5%) saw the solution 
as increasing physician's salaries, others proposed tighter accountability, and some 
condemned patients for seeking inappropriate advantage. In the TK-1985 study only 
35% of the respondents thought informal payment could be eliminated from the system. 
Among the possible options, 62% mentioned formal payments, 56% saw the solution as 
raising salaries of physicians, 47% as increasing the number of health staff and 
strengthening institutional capacity, while 38% suggested infrastructural developments. 
H See the concepts of 'trust in the system' and 'perceived performance decline' in Chapter 4. 
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These options were more frequently mentioned by younger males. Others, mainly older 
people and those living in small settlements saw the solution in administrative 
measures, including punishment for accepting payment (63%), tighter control over 
physicians (56%), and educational measures such as the enhancement of doctors' sense 
of vocation (57%). Finally, 45% proposed the extension of private practice. 
In the DOTE-1970 study, 50% of clinicians considered informal payment unethical 
and only 25% agreed with it, mainly the younger ones. In contrast two-thirds of the 
respondents thought gifts to be acceptable [82]. Furthermore Szabo [83] found that 
physicians had an ambivalent view about informal payment. They did not particularly 
like the system, but they needed the additional income to make ends meet: " ... informal 
payment is the curse and benefactor of the medical society" as one of the physicians put 
it. Most of the doctors condemned the expectation of informal payment, but would 
have liked higher (2-3 times more), performance-related payment. 
Evidence of the effectiveness of policies to address informal payment from other 
countries is rare in the English language literature. The Greek HiT profile reports that 
an increase in physicians' setlaries decreased informal payments, but temporarily. The 
difference between the salaries of medical doctors and other public employees gradually 
diminished, leading to the re-emergence of informal payments [89]. In contrast, the 
OEeD considered this experiment a total failure, achieving nothing [221]. Man~e and 
Groenewegen [220] cite the former GDR as an interesting example of a former 
communist country where informal payment for health care was less of a problem. 
They attribute this to the relatively higher salaries of medical doctors, but it is not clear 
on what evidence they base this conclusion. The examples of the former GDR and 
Greece suggest that physicians' salaries playa key role in the initiation of informal 
payment, but once established simply raising pay is unlikely to eliminate it. 
4.3.5. CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS 
In this section we ask whether informal payments existed before the establishment of 
the state-socialist system in Hungary and search for evidence of (common) features of 
health care systems that struggle with informal payments compared those that do not. 
So far the analysis of the causes of this phenomenon has been dominated chiefly by 
theoretical debates, with the exceptions of the historical analysis by Adam [236; 237; 
154; 238] with its focus on informal payments and Balazs [236; 237; 154; 238] which 
looked more widely at the remuneration of physicians. While Adam unequivocally 
linked the emergence of informal payments with the state-socialist health care system, 
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Balazs claimed that the roots lay in the pre-war period. The main elements of both 
approaches have already been summarised in chapter 2. Comparative analysis of health 
care systems could provide further evidence, but to my knowledge no such research has 
been carried out so far. 
4.3.6. MOTIVATION OF THE ACTORS 
Table 4.8. 
As we have argued previously, it is ultimately the intentions of patients and physicians 
that determine whether informal payments are truly voluntarily or are forced, in a wider 
sense, regardless of their actual impact on patient care. In this section we present 
evidence that claims to reveal the true motivation of the actors, either directly or 
indirectly. 
First, we focus on whether gratitude is, and to what extent, a real motivating factor. 
The empirical literature about the principal motivation of the actors relates to the two 
participants in the transaction, with various research questions about each of them 
(Table 4.8). 
Exploration of the principal (stated/revealed) motivation of participants 
Stated motiv'ltion Research question laddressed in 
Motivation of patients as seen by the: Why do patients give informal payment? 
• payers themselves Why did those pay who actually gave? 
OTKI-1972-73, 1981; County-Hospital-Eger-1973; DOTE-
1973 [78; 81; 80; 190] 
• people in general What do the people think about why people give? 
TK-1985 [79] 
• doctors What do the doctors think about why people usually give? 
SZEKI-\983-84 [83] 
Motivation of doctors as seen by the: Why do doctors accept informal payment? 
• doctors themselves Why did those who accepted it actually accepted it? 
DOTE-\970; SZEKI-\983-84 [82; 83] 
• doctors in general What do the doctors think about why doctors accept it? 
Not addressed in any studies 
• people What does the patient think about why doctors accept it? 
Not addressed in any studies 
Second, in the empirical literature we have identified satisfaction with services (and 
with the workplace), the timing of the transaction (before and after), attitude towards 
informal payments, stated willingness to pay for services and trust in the system (what 
happens if someone does not pay?), as factors that can help understand whether people 
honestly reveal their true intentions about informal payments in surveys. For instance, 
it is incompatible with the gratitude motive if patients pay before receiving the service. 
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Similarly, it is very unlikely that patients who believe that physicians have not provided 
adequate care in the absence of informal payments will pay purely to express their 
gratitude. 
4.3.6.1. The stated motivation of patients 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 summarise the published findings on motives revealed by patients 
and, in the case of the TK-1985 study, the general population. Unfortunately the data 
collected in these studies have not been fully analysed. Many of the papers present only 
broad rankings and the findings of the T ARKI-1996 study have not been published at 
all. 
It is conspicuous that the various findings are inconclusive and contradictory. By 
and large the empirical literature assesses four main motivation categories: gratitude (in 
the TK-1985 identified with patient satisfaction), custom and practice, better care (in 
general or for specific services, such as rare and expensive treatment, home visits or 
more thorough examination) and enforcement by providers. There are, however, some 
other factors such as "the low salary of physicians" and "p~ychic security", which are 
mentioned only in the TK-1985 study. 
While the OTKI-1972-73, County-Hospital-Eger-1973, and OTKI-1981 studies have 
found gratitude to be the single most important motivation of patients, the OTKI -1969 
study did not mention gratitude at all, and it is the least important factor in the DOTE-
1973 and TK-1985 studies. According to physicians in the SZEKI-1983-84 study real 
gratitude is rare as a motivating factor. 
Findings concerning the issue of '\vant for better care' reflect exactly the same 
contradiction. While the OTKI -1969 and TK -1985 studies have found that patients 
primarily pay to ensure good quality care or certain 'special' services, this motive is less 
important in the OTKI-1972-73 and 1981 studies, and the County-Hospital-Eger-1973 
study did not even mention it. Petone [190] has placed it between 'customary' and 
'gratitude' in the DOTE-1973 study, 
One form of enforcement is when informal payment is the result of expectation 
created by health care staff. In the empirical studies reviewed this appears as either 
"expectation" (OTKI-1972-73, 1981), or the more direct "enforcement" (TK-1985), 
while in the County-Hospital-Eger-1973 study Csap6 [80] operationalised it as "the 
doctor called your allention [to give] ", 
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Findings of empirical research on patients' motivation in Hungary 
::0 Motive I ~ 
:::l 
~ OTKI-1969 OTKI-1972-73 County-Hospital-Eger-1973 
:::l 
CJQ [77] [78] [80] 
1 better care vast majority gratitude 66 gratitde 
2 customary small fraction customary 13 other patients suggested 
3 expected II relatives recommended 
4 better care 6 doctors called my attention 
5 only this way could get 3 more than one good care 
6 more than one 2 
7 
Findings of empirical research on patients' motivation in Hungary: levels of care 
Motive 
-
"" ~ 
Frequency of responses (%) 
DOTE-1973 TK-1985 
[190] [79] 
85 customary ? better care (safe recovery) 87, 
3 better care ? psychic security 75 ! 
I gratitude ? thorough examination 65 
I rare & expensive treatment 54 
10 modem diagnostic equipment 43 
I 
enforced 40 i 
low salary of doct~ ___ 37 
Frequency of responses (%) 
:::l Hospital (inpatient care) Outpatient specialist Primary care Hospital (inpatient care) Outpatient specialist Primary care ~ 
:::l care care 
CJQ 
OTKI-1981 TK-1985 (79) 
1 gratitude 55 gratitude 44 gratitude 48 distinguished 30 distinguished II home/night visit; 60 
treatment treatment accepting outside 
surgery hours 
2 expected 14 expected 24 expected 17 serious illness 25 regular treatment 7 sickness benefit 19 
3 customary 14 better care 21 better care 12 satisfied (gratitude) 19 sickness benefit 5 distinguished treatment II 
4 better care 8 customary 6 customary 10 hospital admission 6 satisfied (gratitude) 3 satisfied (gratitude) 3 
5 other 8 other 6 other 9 
----
----_ .. -
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Findings on the importance of provider coercion are equally inconclusive, even if we 
take into account how changes could have occurred over time. While it was the second 
and third most important motivation factor according to the OTKI -1981 and 1972-73 
studies, it was among the least important factors in the TK-1985 and the County-
Hospital-Eger-1973 studies. Moreover the OTKI-1969 and DOTE-1973 studies did not 
mention it at all. In the OTKI -1970 study hospital patients considered provider 
coercion as the most problematic aspect of inpatient care [226], while the more recent 
SOTE-1995 study found it the third most important complaint about health services 
[224]. 
The conceptually most ambiguous category is the fourth one, summarised as 'it is 
customary to give', which lies bet\veen 'gratitude' and 'coercion' according to our 
interpretation. Petone [190] identified this as the most important motivation in the 
DOTE-1973 study, while T6th et al. [78] found it to be the second most important after 
gratitude in the OTKI-1972-73 study. It also appeared in the OTKI-1969 and 1981 
studies, but among the least important factors, while the TK-1985 study did not even 
mention the concept. Interestingly, physicians considered 'custom' as the most 
widespread motive of patients, along with "the fear of not getting adequate care" 
according to the SZEKI-1983-84 study [83]. 
However, the most important problem within this category is not the 
inconclusiveness of the findings, but that it is unclear what researchers meant by 
'customary' and whether it is conceptually justified to treat it as a separate category. Is 
it part of the 'donation' explanation or is it a special form of coercion, a "society wide 
pressure" as one physician put it in the DOTE-1970 study [82]? 
Indeed, the OTKI [228] paper has raised the idea that there is an overlap bet\veen 
'gratitude' and 'custom', as it might not be easy to distinguish whether people are really 
grateful or have 'learnt' that they should be grateful. However, we argue that this 
interpretation rather supports a possible overlap with 'coercion' categories of 'better 
care' and 'enforced', since when people have learnt that they 'should' do something it is 
not truly voluntary. In the County-Hospital-Eger-1973 study, this aspect of custom 
emerged more clearly. Csap6's [80] 'other patients or relatives recommended' refers to 
the pressure from others, which is also discoverable in the motive of 'paying, because 
others pay as well', and the 'disdain of other patients' as a consequence of non-payment 
in the TK-1985 study [79]. Although Dobossy et al. [79] did not explain what they 
meant by their 'psychic security' motive (the second most frequent in their study), it is 
possible that these kinds of external pressures underlie anxiety of patients that could be 
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reduced with informal payments. The findings of the SZEKI-1983-84 study could offer 
another plausible explanation that brings 'customary' even closer to the 'coercion' form 
of motive. In this study, physicians considered the patients' fear of Iwhat happens if 
they do not give' as an important motivating factor as well as it being customary to give 
[83]. While the authors of the OTKI-1981 study pointed out the difficulties of drawing 
a clear border between gratitude and custom, we argue that it is equally difficult to find 
a sharp border between custom and expectation (coercion). It is possible that behind the 
custom of giving informal payment is "a society wide pressure" [82], which could be 
identified as the "fear of the consequences" of non-payment, which could well be the 
consequence of a general distrust that the provider will deliver adequate care, as we 
have argued in chapter 3. This distrust can be created by a real or perceived decline in 
quality. This line of thought suggests that, in terms of the donation hypothesis, the real 
difference in motivation lies between gratitude and the various forms (continuum) of 
expectation, \vhether the source lies in society in general (loss of social capital), specific 
groups (patients, relatives, friends), or health care staff.35 
Nonetheless, this speculation still does not resolve the conflict between those studies 
in which gratitude was found to be the most important motivation of patients (OTKI-
1972-73;County-Hospital-Eger-1973;OTKI-1981) and those that arrived at the opposite 
conclusion (OTKI-1969;TK-1985). 
4.3.6.2. Discussion 
So is it possible to explain these contradictory findings? We have to consider the 
differences in study designs, including timing, study population, sampling, response 
rates and method applied. One of the most important issues though is how motivation 
and motivating factors are conceptualised and operationalised in the various surveys. 
In the case of closed questions, the options offered could influence the answers. By 
leaving out certain options, researchers may lead respondents (as in the County-
Hospital-Eger-1973 and TK-1985 studies). Moreover, the various categories should be 
valid, distinct and exclusive. Researchers should have ensured that there was a shared 
understanding of what the various options meant, and that these options did not overlap, 
a possible problem of the OTKI-1972-73, 1981 and DOTE-1973 studies. By using open 
questions to supplement a closed question, Dobossy et al. [79 J has overcome this 
problem, but in this case the coding of answers has to be conceptually sound. The 
35 In the context of ollr study, however, we assllllled that it was a 'non-coercive' Illotive, in order to be on 
the 'safe side'. 
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findings of the TK -1985 study provide a good illustration of these operationalisation 
problems. While in the closed question, 'gratitude' was not offered as an option, it 
came out as a response from the open questions (Tables 4.9,4.10). The data collected in 
the TARKI-1996 study could have yielded evidence to clarify this issue, insofar as 
researchers used the same coding scheme as T 6th et al. in the OTKI -1972-73 and 1981 
studies, but the question itself was open, giving respondents the chance to express their 
own thoughts, using their own words. Unfortunately these findings have not been 
reported in the paper. 
Further, there is evidence from the County-Hospital-Eger-1973 study that surveys 
alone may not be able to capture the true 'gratitude' motive. Csap6 [80] found that in 
10% of cases gratitude was mentioned in combination with another, 'coercive' 
motivating factor, which in theory were mutually exclusive. This indicates that the 
concept of gratitude has diverse interpretations, or raises the possibility that people 
might rationalise their decisions after the eYent if they consider enforcement 
embarrassing and unacceptable. They resolve the conflict by believing that they gave 
voluntarily to express their gratitude. 
At the same time we should not forget that the question itself is sensitive, insofar as 
people consider it illegal or illegitimate to expect enhanced services in exchange for 
payment. This suggests that we must assume selection bias, especially where response 
rates are low, and respondent bias, perhaps in the form of citing gratitude as what is 
perceived to be the most legitimate motive. This could explain the large differences 
between the findings of the OTKI-1972-73, 1981 and the TK-1985 studies. Moreover, 
these studies differed in terms of study populations. While the OTKI-1972-73 and 1981 
studies targeted those who actually paid, the TK-1985 study sought views from the 
general public. It is not unreasonable to assume that most people feel gratitude towards 
the medical staff if they were cured from a serious illness, but the feeling of gratitude 
does not necessary mean that it is the principal motivation for informal payment. It 
could be that the measurement of motivation partly captured the gratitude that the 
person felt after the treatment rather than the 'true' motivation. 
Nonetheless, changes in the motivation of participants cannot be excluded with 
certainty. The huge difference between the findings of OTKI-1972-73 and TK-1985 
studies might well be attributed to the 13-year time lag between the two studies. This is 
less likely to be the case, though, concerning studies, which \vere implemented close to 
each other in time, such as studies of OTKI in 1969 and in 1972-73, and the OTKI-1981 
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and TK-1985 studies. Thus, the contradiction between available studies remains an 
issue that is as yet unresolved. 
The analysis of the association between stated motivation and other factors, such as 
satisfaction and willingness to pay, might help to clarify the validity of the various 
categories. Unfortunately, analysis of this kind is very rare and often omitted from 
publications. In the next section we will review what is known. 
4.3.6.3. The association of motivation with personal and service attributes 
Stated motivation was found to be associated with the level of care (Table 4.10), gender 
[226; 78] and education of the respondents [78]. Researchers have found that men cite 
gratitude more frequently, while the less educated cite 'coercive' motives. Otherwise, 
the published findings are very limited. For instance T6th et al [77], Csap6 [80], Petone 
[190] and Dobossy et al. [79] did not present any findings on this issue. 
4.3.6.4. Motivation and stated willingness to pay 
Table 4.11. 
One approach could be to ask about 'willingness to pay' for various services rather than 
to ask specifically about informal payments. This may be less sensitive than 
mentioning informal payment directly, but still asks people about their own intentions 
and not their opinions about tl:e views of others. However, its methodological 
weakness lies in the difference between how people actually behave and what they say 
would do in a hypothetical scenario, especially if people suspect that an agenda 
promoting 'future charges' lies behind this kind of question. 
Willingness to pay for health services in the general population in 1985 in Hungary 
Service Percentage of 
respondents 
Operation is done by the best surgeon 67% 
Free choice of doctor 51% 
Rare, expensive medication 48% 
Up to date diagnostic equipment 48% 
To be served more quicklv concerning important examinations 40% 
To get hospital admission when it is most convenient 39% 
Distin!.!uishcd. especiallv good care 38% 
GP always provides service at the home of the patient 33% 
One or two-bed ward in the hospital 28% 
Source.· [79. Nol,OOIl} 
Three studies addressed stated willingness to pay for services: TK-1985, SOTE-1995 
and T ARKI-1996, although only findings of the TK-1985 study have been published 
(Table 4.11). Even in this latter study, the data collected remained largely unanalysed. 
On the other hand the SOTE-1995 study found that 39% of the general popUlation 
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would have been willing to pay to replace informal payments. Unfortunately this is not 
a particularly useful finding for our purpose, since the study did not address motivation 
to pay informally. 
4.3.6.5. Before and after 
The timing of informal payments is important inasmuch as payment after the service is 
a defining characteristic of the gratitude payment concept. The County-Hospital-Eger-
1973 and the TK-1985 studies addressed this issue, but only the former provided data 
that can be analysed for our purpose. 
Csapo [80] found that 30% of those who paid gave before (17%) or during (13%) the 
treatment, while 86% stated that they gave to express gratitude. Although it is not 
possible to find out from the publication who paid before or during the treatment among 
those who were motivated by gratitude, from the available information we can conclude 
that there must have been an overlap between the two (of at least 16%). This is true 
even if we consider only those who paid beforehand (a minimum of 3 %). Paying before 
to thank for the service, however, is a conceptual nonsense. This suggests that the 
concept of gratitude as a motivation factor is not so straightforward in practice as in 
theory. 
4.3.6.6. Trust in the system 
As we have argued in chapter 3, distrust that the health care system will deliver 
adequate services can be an important factor in the initiation of informal payments. It is 
unlikely that patients who do not trust in the system will pay physicians informally 
because of gratitude. There are a few pieces of evidence that suggest that trust is indeed 
an important factor, but unfortunately researchers have not related these findings to the 
issue of motivation. 
We have already mentioned that Dobosssy et a!. [79] posed the question of 'what 
happens with those, who do not pay' in the TK-1985 study, and the majority of 
respondents expected some sort of discrimination; that 'psychic security' was the 
second most frequently mentioned motive for informal payments in this study; and that 
in the SZEKI-1983-84 study physicians regarded 'fear of consequences' as one of the 
most important reasons of why patients pay [83]. Other studies examined the reasons 
for private sector utilisation (exit). T6th et a1. [77] have identified 'higher confidence' 
in private physicians (47%) as the most important motive for seeking private care, while 
it was also mentioned in the DOTE-1973 study [190]. The OTKI-1981 study suggests 
that the perception of not getting proper treatment is a more important factor in seeking 
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private care than the kindness of the physician. The MT A-SZKI-1988 study identified 
how one component of the fear and anxiety that accompanied delivery was the fear of 
not getting appropriate care, which was six times higher in less educated primipara than 
among those with higher education qualification [217,pp.74,96]. Moreover, 66% of 
primipara planned to hire a private doctor for the delivery, while 33% had already done 
so during the pregnancy [217,p.95]. Finally, there is evidence that trust is a relevant 
issue in other countries struggling with informal payments. Lewis [96,p.18] reported 
the findings of a survey in the Russian Federation where 25% of respondents utilised 
private care because "they lacked confidence in the professional qualifications oj public 
health physicians". 
4.3.6.7. Other factors 
There are a number of other factors, previously mentioned, whose association with 
patients' stated motivation could facilitate testing the validity of the 'gratitude' motive. 
For instance, purely voluntary payment is unlikely by people who disagree with 
informal payment, who advocate its elimination, or who are dissatisfied with the care 
they receive. Unfortunately these issues have not been explored in the existing studies. 
4.3.6.8. The stated motivation of service providers 
There is very little evidence about the motivation of physicians. Petone [82] carried out 
a survey among uniycrsity physicians while Szabo [83] conducted in-depth interviews 
with 100 specialists working in inpatient care. Their findings arc summarised in Table 
4.12. Unfortunately PeWne's publication does not contain exact figures, but she states 
that the most frequently mentioned motivation for accepting payments is 'low salaries', 
which corresponds with the finding by Szabo. Enhanced performance (15%, 
exceptionally here the figure is provided) was only the fourth most often cited reason 
after 'low salaries', 'refusal would offend the patient' and 'it is customary'. The 
analysis does not, however, go further than this. 
Szabo [83] provides many fascinating qualitative findings about the acceptance of 
informal payments. While most doctors cite low salaries as the most important factor, 
the story of how willingness to accept payment develops over time shows the role of 
other 'minor' pressures. These come from patients who become upset if 'gifts' are 
refused or from colleagues whose business is 'damaged by the aberrant physicians' .36 
36 This expression is from one of the interviews ] conducted with medical doctors, but it very much 
matches with the findings of Szabo [83], even if she does not use these words. 
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4.3.6.9. Conclusions 
Is it possible to determine what motivates giving and accepting informal payments? 
The main conclusion is that evidence from empirical studies is contradictory and cannot 
be explained simply by changes over time. There seems to be an issue of validity of 
questions used to assess some potential motivation factors, but the diverse methods used 
to operationalise the concepts make it difficult to assess where the problem lies. 
Unfortunately, many analyses from empirical studies that could contribute to the 
understanding of the problem remained unpublished. Nevertheless, the available 
evidence raises the possibility that surveys alone are not sufficient to capture the real 
motivation of patients. 
4.4. Overall conclusions from empirical research 
At the beginning of this chapter we formulated research questions and generated 
corresponding hypotheses that were derived from the 'donation' explanation. Although 
several studies have dealt with the topic of informal payment, the available evidence is 
insufficient or inconclusive with regard to the validity of the gratitude payment concept. 
Informal payment is widespread in the Hungarian health care system and it is 
concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of health workers (mainly 
specialists working in hospitals). However evidence about the overall magnitude of 
informal payments is contradictory, with the highest and lowest estimates varying by an 
order of magnitude. Hence, we have not been able to quantify the importance of the 
issue with certainty, but it is also true that not all the available data have been fully 
analysed. 
Findings concerning the motivation of actors are equally contradictory, and those 
factors (such as attitudes towards informal payment and satisfaction with services) 
which could have helped to clarify the picture have remained largely unexplored. 
Further, the determinants of informal payment and their inter-relationships have not 
been explored adequately. 
Evidence is most limited in relation to the impact of informal payments on equity 
and on policy options that might tackle the issue. Neither question has really been 
addressed so far. 
Adequate evaluation and interpretation of empirical evidence cannot be complete 
without considering the methodological and contextual limitations of previous research. 
First, empirical research on informal payments in Hungary embraces a 30-year period, 
so that 1110st studies are outdated. Second, a major problem is the lack of a common 
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framework (the definition and operationalisation of informal payment and motivation 
factors, etc.) which makes the results of the various studies difficult to compare. Third, 
the external validity of the results is questionable in many cases, because of the choice 
of study population and low response rates. The sensitivity of the issue makes the 
various studies prone to respondent bias, and we have limited knowledge about the 
effect of the various study designs on responses. 
Finally it is conspicuous from this review that many relevant data remain unanalysed 
or unpublished. This highlights the importance of secondary analysis of available 
databases a necessary first step in the present study. 
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5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
In chapter 4 we proposed a research agenda focussing on two particular aspects of 
informal payments that are key to establishing the health policy relevance of this 
phenomenon: the scale of informal payments and the motivation of participants. Taking 
the 'donation' explanation we formulated research questions and tested corresponding 
hypotheses with the available empirical evidence. We concluded that it is not possible 
to reach a conclusion on the basis of existing evidence, so justifying further research in 
this area. Consequently this chapter takes the research agenda set out in chapter 4 as the 
starting point for the empirical part of our study. 
First, the research questions and hypotheses are selected. Then the chapter describes · 
the issues, which informed the choice of research methods, including broader 
methodological considerations and experiences in relation to informal payments. 
Finally, each of the research methods employed in this study is explained in detail. 
5.1. Objectives, research questions and hypotheses 
The main objective of the study is to establish the importance of informal payment for 
health policy in Hungary. As we have argued before, this has two aspects. First, we 
must establish the magnitude and distribution of informal payments to demonstrate that 
any possible adverse effect of the phenomenon on the performance of the health care 
system is not negligible. Second, we need to clarify the controversies concerning 
participants' motivation, so as to determine whether informal payment does have the 
potential to affect systen1 performance adversely. 
We have identified participants' motivation as being of crucial importance in this 
respect, given the contrasting claims and implications of the 'fee-for-service' and the 
'donation' explanation of informal payments. Consequently, in order to establish the 
policy importance of informal payments we must refute gratitude as the most prevalent 
motive among patients. We focus on the validity of the gratitude payment concept, 
which allows us to apply a wider range of empirical evidence to the issue. Thus, going 
beyond examination of the stated motivation and the context of utilisation, the objective 
of the study is to address the impact of informal payments on equity according to the 
assumptions derived from the 'donation' explanation, as discllssed in the previous 
chapter. 
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Research questions and objectives of the study 
Main objectives, research areas and research questions 
To establish the magnitude and distribution of informal payments 
01. What is the overall amount of informal payment in a year? 
02. How is it distributed among health workers, especially 
physicians? 
To establish the impact on equity of informal payments 
03. Does it influence access to care? 
04. Does it influence the distribution of cost burden of care? 
To establish the main motivation of~articipants 
05. What is the principal motivation of the actors? 
06. Does the stated motivation fit in the circumstances of payment? 
Hypotheses 
('Donation' explanation) 
Scale is indifferent 
No 
Yes, but payment is the 
function of ability to pay 
Gratitude 
Yes 
It has not, however, been possible to include the whole research agenda set out in 
chapter 4 in the empirical part of our study. It was necessary to reduce the original, 
more comprehensive plan twice during the conduct of this study to arrive at a realistic 
agenda, presented in T:lble 5.1. This is a shortened version of Table 4.1 from which the 
origins and causes, private sector informal payments, as well as the determinants of 
informal payments have been excluded because of the scale of the undertaking that 
would have been required.37 
5.2. Research strategy 
This section justifies the methods that I have selected to address the research questions 
in Table 5.1. I have taken account of methodological issues, including my ontological 
and epistemological position, previous experiences with research methods addressing 
the informal economy in general and more specifically informal payments for health 
care, ethical and political issues, feasibility (or as Mason [239] put it practical matters), 
as well as the strategy for analysis. The aim of the research and its background were 
discussed in the introductory chapters to this thesis. All of these issues informed the 
choice of methods and the study design [240; 239], but by no means in a sequential 
manner, and not only in the planning phase. Ideally the appropriateness of the method 
to address a research question should be the most important criterion for these choices, 
and I agree \""ith Mason [239,p.25] that researchers should begin with "the fit/lest and 
most creatil'e range oj data generation and data soufces". I would argue, however, 
37 Originally, I planned 43 research questions in 6 main research areas, which were reduced to 4 main 
research areas with 17, and later on 6 research questions. I consider this process a very important lesson 
to learn. The realistic assessment of feasibility is of key importance for the sllccessful implementation of 
any research project, but especially within the frame of PhD studies, where Olle of the critical success 
(-.) 
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that creativity is equally important, when constraints of feasibility, for instance changes 
in funding, deny us the most appropriate option. The next section will thus synthesize 
the considerations discussed here to arrive at the final choice of method for each 
research question. 
5.2.1. METHODOLOGY 
According to Mason [239,p.30] the choice of research method should be guided by an 
overall methodological strategy, essentially the "logic by which you go abollt answering 
your research questions ". This methodological strategy translates the researcher's 
more general assumptions (beliefs) about the nature of social reality (ontology) and the 
nature of knowledge and evidence (epistemology) into actual research methods, but the 
ontological and epistemological position is more pervasive insofar as it lies behind the 
selection of research topic and the strategy for analysis [239,p.14-16,37-38,173-204]. 
From the methodological point of view the importance of varying ontological and 
epistemological standpoints is that they suggest different research methods to use, 
which can be incompatible if the standpoints, which they stem from contradict each 
other, or as Lincoln and Guba [241] put it, are incommensurable [e.g.241; 242; 239]. 
Hence, there are various sets of basic beliefs regarding ontology, epistemology, 
methodology and axiology, known as scientific paradigms [243,p.157; 241] or models 
[242,p.77], and more loosely formulated epistemological stances, known as perspectives 
[243,p.157] with specific preferences for and interpretation of methods. Research 
methods thus are not "mere techniques ", but "techniques which take on specific 
meanings according to the methodology in which they are used" [242,p.89], and this 
poses a considerable challenge where multiple methods are used, especially if 
qualitative and quantitative methods are mixed [242,p.98-99; 239,p.33-36,59-60]. 
I cannot pretend that when I started to work on this research topic I thought about 
research methods as strategically as Mason [239] urged us to do, insofar as I did not 
explicitly formulate either the ontology or the epistemology I subscribed to. Drawing 
largely on Babbie's [84], otherwise excellent and easily accessible work, I was unaware 
that I actually followed what Lincoln and Guba [241] called a post-positivist paradigm, 
in which quantitative as well as qualitative methods could be considered along the 
conventional positivist criteria of validity and reliability. I-laving made the decision 
more conscious by reflecting on these issues in connection with the study design 
described below, I consider my position to be one that in some respects integrates the 
factors is to finish the work in time. I am especially grateful to my supervisor for not letting me fall into 
( ...... ) 
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critique of positivist beliefs. I use Lincoln and Guba's [241] conceptual framework, 
which distinguishes five main paradigms (positivist, post-positivist, critical theory et aI, 
constructivism, participatory), and description to illustrate my points [241 ,pp.168, 170-
173]. 
According to Lincoln and Guba [241] the ontology of both the positivist and post-
positivist paradigm is characterised by realism, the belief that social reality exists 
independent of our minds (" 'real' reality "), and consequently there are facts and laws 
"out there", which can be established if the researcher's personality does not interfere 
with the process of knowing (disengagement, objectivity) [see also 240,pp.9-11], a key 
issue discernible in the positivist criterion of reliability. Acknowledging the relevance 
of the critique by the followers of other paradigms and perspectives, I contend that 
critical theory, constructivism, or perspectives such as feminism and philosophical 
hermeneutics would invalidate the positivist/post-positivist scientific framework. 
would rather say that the rightful criticism by, for instance, critical theory nnd feminist 
researchers about value-free science, disengagement and rationality [see 240,p.17-26; 
241], or the constructivists' rejection of the context free being, the "'real' reality" [241; 
244], draw attention to how the positivist paradigm is built on implicit assumptions 
about shared understanding, whose ignorance could preclude research relying on 
positivism/post-positivism producing valid knowledge. I argue, however, that the 
problem of shared understanding is more pervasive and cannot simply be resolved by 
integrating the critique of independent social reality into the positivist framework 
through the replacement of objectivity with the notion of inter-subjectivity 
[84,pp.77,87], i.e. a negotiated reality. First, I share the views of, what Schwandt 
[244,p.I77] called "an ordinmy sense of constructionism" or perspectivisl11, which says 
that knowledge about social reality is not discovered, but constructed, insofar as people 
"invent concepts, models, and schemes to make sense of experience ", and that this 
process is not isolated from the historical and socio-cultural context in which it takes 
place. That is, social reality is not just negotiated, but constructed within a pm1icular 
context, which suggests that it is false to assume unity of these created concepts among 
groups of people or even individuals. Second, if this is the case, feminists may rightly 
criticise the positivist researcher ideal, insofar as disengagement, for instance a lack of 
empathy or identification with the research subject, prevents understanding of these 
differences. Consequently, I argue that the positivist/post-positivist framework can 
work well if there is a shared understanding and agreement of the constructed and 
the trap of overambitious scope, where m)' enthusiasm and inexperience would have led me. 
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negotiated social reality, but if this underlying condition does not apply, research based 
on the positivist paradigm is unlikely to be able to establish it. In this respect maybe it 
is not an exaggeration to compare the revolution that qualitative inquiry has brought to 
the theory and practice of social sciences to Einstein's theory of relativity in physics, 
with the positivist view of social reality analogous with Newtonian mechanics, insofar 
as both are a derivative of a more widely applicable general framework. 
I consider research on informal payments in Hungary, particularly on the motivation 
of participants, a good example of the point that, if shared understanding is taken for 
granted but in fact is not there, positivist research cannot produce conclusive evidence. 
One of the crucial themes of this study is to examine this problem by exploring the 
context of giving and contrast it with the personal motives revealed. On the basis of the 
contradictory evidence I hypothesise that motivation is a complex issue that cannot be 
easily understood, and in particular cannot be captured as a one-dimensional category in 
a context characterised by ambiguous policies, equivocal legal frameworks and outright 
dishonesty. Consequently the very condition of shared understanding must have been 
(is) absent, which suggests that research based exclusively on a positivist epistemology 
is insufticicnt to address the issue of motivation. 
Nonetheless, I do not wholly agree with the anti-positivist criticism, especially when 
it takes relativism to its extreme. I argue that the uncritical infiltration of the research 
process with values, the 'victory' of the unjustly oppressed emotion over rationality, 
and over-emphasised individuality of experience and knowledge (i.e. the 'idiosyncratic' 
nature of social reality) in fact erodes, or even eliminates the very foundation of science 
itself. Among the epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry, "strong holists" 
argue that there is no rational basis (foundational criteria) to distinguish between more 
or less correct interpretations, with the implication that justification is irrelevant as 
"there are many eqllally acceptable intelpretations ", or that justification is solely based 
on "rhetorical criteria - whether an intelprelation invites, persuades, compels, 
entertains, evokes or delights" [244,pp.201-202 my emphasis]. The question then 
obviously arises: 'is there any difference between scientific and everyday kno\ving or 
knowledge, and between a scientist and an artist?' Taken to its extreme, this position 
may endorse an interpretation full of what Babbie [84] calls common errors of everyday 
knowing, for instance inaccurate observation, over-generalisation, sdective perception 
and bias, just because the researcher possesses the skills to present it amusingly. If not 
then there must be some criteria after all - maybe not foundational in a sense that they 
exist 'out there', but that they are negotiated and agreed upon, hence independent from 
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individual researchers - to discriminate between better and worse knowledge other than 
the elocutionary talents of researchers. These are different from conventional positivist 
criteria but exist as a modified version of validity [e.g. "extended consideration of 
validity" in 241 ,p.173, 178-182; and "weak or nonsceptical holism" in 244,p.202J. 
I argue that knowledge assessed against these criteria could gain increased legitimacy 
of being scientific, but there are limits to what science can claim to know about social 
reality. Feminist perspectives may rightly criticise the axiology of positivism, when 
they argue that the concept of value-free science is untenable [e.g.240,p.54-59J, but I 
contend that the infiltration of all stages of the research process with values would 
invalidate the means and ends distinction of Mill and Weber [quoted in 240,p.56-58; 
245,pp.135-138], i.e "it is logically impossible/or the social sciences to establish in a 
scientific manner the truth of ideals which people believe in" [240,p.55]. For me this 
does not mean that researchers cannot analyse or even criticise 'ends', but that they 
cannot claim the legitimacy of science to back up their value position and impose it on 
others. This was one of the most important reasons why I selected the policy 
framework of Roberts et al. [53J as the framework of the current study. 
Relating the importance of informal payments to the health policy objectives (ends) 
of Hungarian governments I have not just followed the means and ends distinction to 
separate 'value claims' from 'scientific claims', but surpassed the positivist axiology, 
which, according to Lincoln and Guba [241,p.172], regards knowledge as intrinsically 
valuable.38 Rejecting the intrinsic value of knowledge, however, does not mean that I 
subscribe to the axiology of critical theory, constructivism or the participatory 
paradigm. It is not primarily because the proposed ends, such as "flollrishing in a 
Cllltllre" are not self-evident, but because I dispute that a society pursues only one end, 
or where there are multiple ends, prioritise them in a fixed manner. I would argue that 
there could be many values, equally appealing to different members of society, and goal 
setting involves only temporary fixing of priorities in a way that crl.:ates an appropriate 
balance between these values over a long period of time. 
38 Nonetheless I would argue that this characterisation is perhaps too simplistic. I f knowledge was indeed 
intrinsically valuable, then there would be no constraints on what researchers can do to generate 
knowledge. In contrast, conventional research ethics, which aims to protect research subjects, does 
impose restrictions on the research process, which suggests that for instance the individuals' right to 
refuse to be studied is more valuable than the knowledge could have been gained by neglecting informed 
consent. 
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5.2.2. METHODS IN THE STUDY OF INFORMAL ECONOMY 
In this section we review experience of using different methodologies to research the 
informal economy, so setting the broader context for methods to study informal 
payments for health care. Some studies in Hungary addressed informal payments as 
part of the "hidden economy" as "invisible incomes" [232; 200; 223; 225], but we can 
also draw on the work of Harding and Jenkins [230,pp.S4-102], who present a detailed 
review of research studies and methods from a critical perspective. 
Fuelled by the interest of politicians, much of the research in this area has been 
concerned with measuring the scale of the informal economy, either indirectly by using, 
what Thomas called the "statistical fingerprints" of the black economy [quoted in 
230,p.55], or directly by asking consumers or providers of informal economic activities 
[230,p.54-55; 223,pp.103-118], but direct approaches were also employed to explore the 
phenomenon in specific settings, such as the workplace or the household [230,p.83]. 
In her methodological review, Ekes [223,pp.l 03-118] sets out five different indirect 
methods for the measurement of the informal economy, all of which are based on the 
analysis of official statistics, including money supply, labour market, household 
expenditures, national accounts, and taxation, which, by and large, correspond with 
Harding and Jenkins' list [230,p.55]. They discuss another interesting indirect method, 
Smithies' approach [246; cited in 230,pp.74-76], which took local newspaper reports of 
court cases, examined over time, to draw conclusions about the size of and change in 
the black economy. As pointed out by Harding and Jenkins [230,pp.75-76], the 
weakness of this and other indirect methods lies in the questionable validity of 
assumptions concerning the association between the true informal economy and the 
actual measures used, i.e. the problem is not primarily methodological, rather 
conceptual [see also 223,pp.1 03-117]. Even if we assume that official statistics provide 
good quality data, which is not at all self-evident, \ve must demonstrate that the 
available data do have the 'fingerprint' of the informal economy on them, and changes 
are attributable only to changes in the informal economy. For instance, estimations 
using cash flow assume that transactions in the informal economy mostly involve cash 
so that increased demand for cash is an indicator of the expansion of the informal 
economy. This monetary approach involves other assumptions, sllch as that the formal 
economy is based on non-cash money transfers and that its expansion increases only 
non-cash money transfers, none of which is supported by much evidence [223,pp.1 07-
110]. The weakness of these approaches is clearly demonstrated from empirical 
evidence on informal payments, sllch as that by Adam [49] who compared reports of 
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proceedings in the official journal of the Ministry of Health, and found a steady decline 
between 1959 and 1984, at a time when surveys indicated the opposite trend. 
Harding and Jenkins [230,pp.83-1 0 1] discuss surveys, participant observation, and 
the time-budget (dairy) approach (used to document daily activities) as direct methods 
used in the study of informal economic activities. They consider the wording of 
questions, respondents' reaction to these types of questions and respondent bias as the 
most important challenges facing survey research, however only the last of these is 
addressed in more detail [230,pp.86-93]. The respondents' fear of detection can lead to 
underestimation (as most informal payment researchers have argued in Hungary), but 
overestimation is also possible as a result of "fhe bravado of informants" [230,pp.88] 
seeking status enhancement (as Balazs [231] has suggested this possibility in connection 
with informal payments for health care). Harding and Jenkins [230,pp.88] cite the 
research of Edgell and Hart [247] on informal economic activity among fire-fighters, 
where both phenomena have been observed. Concerning respondent bias, Pahl and 
Wallace [248; quoted in 230,pp.86-87] complemented their household survey of paid 
informal work with in-depth, follow up interviews on carefully selected sub-samples 
(using different researchers), and informal (participant) observation in the area. These 
not only confirmed the survey findings but added to their interpretation. 
In conclusion Harding and Jenkins [230,pp.1O I-I 02] argue that there is no one best 
method for research on informal activities, as both direct and indirect methods have 
their shortcomings. However direct approaches may be more defensible (especially if 
they are used in combination with each other). This view is shared by Ekes [223,p.191], 
insofar as she considers expenditure surveys as the best method to measure the informal 
economy in Hungary. Furthermore, Harding and Jenkins [230,pp.83,100-102] argue 
that the various direct methods are best suited to different settings and different types of 
informal economic activities; for instance time-budget analysis to the study of the 
household and participant observation to certain work-place related activities, such as 
fiddling, but not self-provision or moonlighting. On the other hand they argue that the 
illegality of many such activities creates difficult ethical and political dilemmas, which 
we will return to later in this chapter. 
The study of informal payment for health care has specific features in terms of the 
setting and participants, and it is different from the general topic of informal economic 
activities inasmuch as understanding the nature of the phenomenon is at least as 
important as the magnitude and distribution of payments, which studies of the informal 
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economy mostly focus on. Consequently it requires consideration of a wider selection 
of research methods. 
5.2.3. METHODS IN THE STUDY OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
As we have discussed in chapter 4, informal payments in the Hungarian health care 
system so far have almost exclusively been addressed in surveys, usually as a secondary 
issue, and according to the review by Lewis [96,pp.II-16] this dominance by surveys is 
characteristic for other countries of the region, not just for Hungary. The few 
exceptions are mostly qualitative interviews of individuals (in-depth or semi-structured) 
and groups (focus groups), including patients, physicians and administrators [96,pp.12-
16; 104; 83; 199; 71; 216], while there is also a content (Vago, unpublished) and a 
historical analysis [49]. Unfortunately few methodological considerations are discussed 
in these publications, and these are usually not related to the suitability of different 
methods. Nevertheless, some findings are relevant to the selection of research methods, 
e\"en if these are no'. discussed in the original papers. 
Next, we will consider the suitability of a wider range of techniques for addressing 
the main research areas outlined in Table 5.1, along with the methodological 
experiences distilled from the studies on informal payment conducted so far. 
5.2.3.1. Methods in measuring the scale of informal payments 
One objective of this study is to establish the importance of informal payment in terms 
of its scale, which obviously requires some sort of quantification. The demonstration 
that informal payments are large enough to influence the behaviour of providers, 
however, does not require absolute precision, but should just resolve the contradictions 
of an order of magnitude between figures obtained in the literature review. Hence we 
have considered only a limited set of options, including official statistics and surveys, 
and setting aside the detailed discussion of all the methodological subtleties the 
measurement of informal phenomena would otherwise involve. 
Official statistics of the kind discussed by Harding and Jenkins [230] and Ekes [223] 
mostly contain aggregate numbers that do not allow separate identification of informal 
payments, with the possible exception of those household expenditure statistics where 
informal payment for health care is captured separately. Datu collection, however, is 
usually not tailored to this particular research question, hence it is not possihle to 
analyse the issue in depth, for example to assess the distrihution of informal payments 
according to levels of care or type of services. Data accuracy could also be problematic 
and the way official statistics have been constructed n:quircs thorough consideration 
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[e.g.84,pp.356-364; 240,pp.71-87]. We have identified two sources of official statistics 
in Hungary that could be relevant here: the Tax Office and the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (HCSO). 
The Tax Office has been gathering information on informal payments since 1989 
when the government decided to try to tax the so-called 'invisible incomes' of health 
workers. If the income tax return contains a separate question on 'gratitude payment', 
that would, in principle, allow assessment of the magnitude and distribution of informal 
payments from the recipients' perspective. However the validity, reliability and 
accessibility of these data are questionable. Data accuracy ultimately depends on 
physicians' willingness to admit income from informal payments, but despite the 
intentions documented by Adam [8], I am not aware of any effort to enforce such 
declarations. Threats by the Tax Office, on the other hand, could induce some 
physicians to declare an income from 'gratitude payment' even if there was none in 
order to reduce the risk of harassment. Moreover, taxation data may not be accessible 
for research purposes if a particular, \vell defined population is the focus. 
There is a regular income-expenditure survey of households conducted by the 
HCSO, which contains a section about health expenditure in which, 'gratitude payment' 
and expenses for health services are identified separately. The obvious advantage of 
this data source is its ready availability, allowing the assessment of trends according to a 
standardised methodology, even if the aggregate figures limit analysis in depth. The 
HCSO has used the time-budget approach to estimate household income and 
expenditures. This method, in principle, enables a detailed and accurate recording of 
both, but keeping a diary is a demanding task, which raises the possibility of inaccurate 
recording and, as we have discussed in chapter 3 and Appendix F, the concept of 
'gratitude payment' is also in question. Thus the study design has to be explored 
critically to assess its impact on the accuracy of data. 
As it has been pointed out by Harding and Jenkins [230] direct quantitative methods 
constitute more defensible approaches to the assessment of the magnitude and 
distribution of informal economic activities than the use of ofticial statistics, and this, I 
contend, also applies to informal payments for health care [see also 223). Such direct 
methods increase the likelihood of getting information from those involved in the 
activity, whether individuals or households, but unlike the analysis of official statistics, 
direct methods allow the researcher to decide on the source of data and the technique of 
data gathering, making it possible to carry out more detailed analyses focused on the 
study objl.::ctives, and potentially increasing the validity and reliability of the data by 
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minimising selection, respondent and recall bias. As we have discussed in chapter 4, all 
have been identified in the study of informal payment's in Hungary. 
For instance, prospective methods, such as cohort studies or time-budget analyses 
have the potential to minimise recall bias compared to surveys. Conversely, surveys are 
relatively easy to administer, they enhance the probability of external validity, and 
minimise the demands on respondents, compared, for example, with diary keeping that 
may increase the risk of refusal and possible resultant selection bias. Furthermore, 
surveys have the additional benefit that many topics can be studied in parallel. 
Potential data sources include individuals and households, whether among the 
general population, patients or physicians, but the method used to access these 
informants has implications for data reliability and validity. In chapter 4 we have 
discussed the influence of the setting (during hospital stay or after treatment is 
completed or at home after discharge) on responses, but there is evidence from Poland, 
where an exit survey met "virtual silence", that selection of an appropriate setting is a 
critical success factor [96,p.15]. Lewis suggests an alternative, to identify patients from 
"insurance rolls", but access to such data is prohibited in Hungary [249], which makes 
access to patients very difficult other than via a general population sample. 
In principle, the scale of informal payments can be addressed from either the givers' 
or the recipients' side. Experiences with the latter, however, have shown that it is 
unrealistic to expect physicians to provide accurate information on their income. 
Polonyi [229], \\'ho has enquired about the overall income (including 'gratitude 
payment') of a nationally representative sample of medical doctors, has found that the 
average declared income in the 'non-paying' specialities was somewhat higher than in 
the 'paying' ones. Using in-depth interviews Szab6 [83] found a reluctance among 
physicians to discuss actual amounts of informal payments, although after several 
attempts she was able to elicit some information. Nonetheless, the finding that people 
are usually more willing to talk about their expenditures than their incomes corresponds 
with the experiences of similar surveys [200; 223; 75]. This is especially relevant in the 
specific situation of physicians in Hungary, who face double jeopardy if detected: the 
potential consequences of the ambiguous legality of informal payment, and of tax 
evasion. There is, of course, the possibility of eliciting information from physicians 
indirectly, thereby masking the true intentions of research and making the question less 
sensitive. The conceptual problem with these 'tricky' methods lies in the validity of the 
indirect measure employed. For instance the TARKI-1992 and 1996 studies asked 
physicians about their expectations in terms of income [229; 216], but it is not apparent 
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that this will necessarily equate to what they do earn (formally and informally). Such 
methods have also been attempted with patients (e.g. in the SOTE-1995 study of the 
willingness to replace informal payments), but direct questioning of patients has been 
considered much less problematic in terms of respondent bias [e.g.223; 96,p.l OJ. 
In conclusion, the most suitable method for addressing the scale of informal 
payments seems to be gathering information on expenditure directly from individuals or 
households. Whether to use questionnaires or dairies is not clear cut, as the possible 
distortion arising from recall bias has to be balanced against the increased chance of 
selection bias. Nevertheless for the purpose of our study the analysis of official 
statistics seems to be sufficient, since obtaining the most precise estimate is not the 
objective of our study, and the main data source, the regular household budget survey 
(HBS) of the HCSO employs the time-budget (diary) method anyway. Secondary 
analysis of previous surveys, which we have identified in chapter 4, have not, however, 
been ruled out, insofar as they can enrich the available body of evidence at little extra 
cost, but the same cautions apply as in the case of official statistics. 
5.2.3.2. Impact on equity 
One of the major problems with surveys and other cross-sectional study designs, 
however, that it is rarely possible to identify the causation of observed associations 
[e.g.84,pp.121-123], which is an important aspect of the impact of informal payments 
on system performance or the effectiveness of different policy options. Longitudinal 
(observational or experimental/intervention) studies can establish temporal 
relationships, while certain intervention studies, such as randomized controlled trials, 
are designed to control for confounding factors [e.g.8-l,pp.251-275,373-399]. 
Nonetheless, such methods are not always necessary, for instance if the temporal 
relationships between variables are unequivocal, or if we can ask survey respondents to 
establish the sequence of events [84,pp.123-12S]. 
In the case of equity of financing the temporal relationships are clear-cut, while in 
the case of access to care they are irrelevant. As we have discussed in chapter 3 and 
Appendix F, the interpretation of before and after in health care is problematic, hence it 
is immaterial when exactly the money was paid. Any difference between 'paying' and 
'non-paying' patients implies unequal access to care. 
5.2.3.3. Understanding motivation 
The central theme of our study is to understand the motivation of patients with a focus 
on gratitude. Lewis argues [96,p.15] that "surreys are clums)' tools for capturing the 
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perceptions and beliefs that underpin the practices of informal payments ", and indeed, 
as the review of the literature has shown in chapter 4, in Hungary surveys have yielded 
contradictory findings that cannot be explained only by methodological differences. 
We argue, however, that qualitative methods cannot only make sense of quantitative 
findings, as suggested by Lewis [96,p.lS], or to generate ideas and hypotheses, as stated 
by Babbie [84,p.304], but can also cast light on the limitations of survey methods in 
measuring complex or ambiguous concepts. 
Our research has sought to identify patients who claimed that they gave because they 
were grateful and to explore the broader context in which informal payment occurred. 
The obvious choice is in-depth interviews, which Pahl and Wallace [248; quoted in 
230,pp.86-87] employed to complement their survey of households on paid informal 
work, and which provided important insights into how informal payment actually 
worked in real life in the MTA-SZKI-1983 [199] and the SZEKI-1983-84 studies, albeit 
in the latter from the perspective of physicians [83]. 
Group interview techniques, such as focus groups can enhance the information that 
can be obtained from individual interviews through the interaction of group members, 
and are best suited for issues shaped by group norms and real life dynamics 
[e.g.240,pp.l25-126]. Although in other countries focus groups have been used in the 
study of informal payments [96,p.16] the methodological rationale and experiences 
have not been discussed, and there are some findings form Hungary which suggest that 
the application of focus groups might be limited. In the SZEKI-1983-84 study Szabo 
[83] found that informal payment is a taboo subject betvveen medical doctors, which 
suggests that a great deal of the phenomenon occurs in private (i.e. between patient and 
physician only). This also creates considerable difficulties for the use of participant 
observation, along with the previously discussed influence of the setting on the honesty 
of elicited opinions and the inevitable ethical dilemmas entailed by covert participant 
observation [230,pp.96-1 01]. 
In summary, a survey coupled with in-depth follow-up interviews seems to be the 
best approach to address the issue of gratitude as a motive for informal payments. 
Although the most complete approach would be to identify and interview the physicians 
with whom the surveyed patients interacted, this is not possible without breaching the 
anonymity of patients. Nonetheless, the perspectives of physicians are important for 
understanding the motivation for paying for health care informally, even if they can 
contribute only to the wider picture. 
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Finally, it must be noted that quantitative methods alone could contribute to 
understanding the role of gratitude in giving, insofar as a survey addresses both the 
motivation of informal payment and measurable aspects of the context of giving, for 
instance patient satisfaction, the timing of payment, and so on. If appropriate data from 
previous studies are available, secondary analysis can yield valuable insight into the 
issue without considerable extra effort. 
5.2.4. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
In the previous sections we have considered the appropriateness of various research 
methods to address the research questions outlined in Table 5.1. The methodological 
issues discussed earlier suggest that answering all questions require multiple methods, 
which combine qualitative and quantitative approaches. However, as argued by 
Silverman [242] and Mason [239], multiple mixed methods, using different units of 
observation and analysis, and producing different types of empirical findings, create the 
challenge of how to integrate them during data analysis, especially if the methods draw 
on different ontological and epistemological perspectives. 
There are 1\\'0 reasons why I do not see the analytical integration as problematic. 
First, as I have argued in the section on methodology, the positivist/post-positivist 
paradigm is not totally inconsistent with the key tenets of interpretivist paradigms. 
Second, the research does not seek methodological triangulation in sense that same 
topic is addressed with different methods, but rather it uses multiple methods to address 
different topics, albeit each connected to one an other at the level of theory, as described 
in chapter 3. The only exception, though, is the stated motivation of patients, but here 
we do not need to corroborate the findings of different methods, but rather to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of surveys in capturing the true intentions of respondents. 
Consequently, the purpose of multiple mixed methods in this study is to shed light on 
different parts of the same picture, and on the same picture from different angles. 
This strategy is very well illustrated with the metaphor of Mason [239,pp.17-18]. 
who talks about research as an intellectual puzzle, which is in our case is a jigsaw, and 
with the metaphor of Denzin and Lincoln [239,p.4-6], who see the researcher as 
"bricoleur" or "quill maker", in our case producing the 'quilt of informal payments for 
health care'. 
5.2.5. FEASIBILITY (PRACTICALITIES) 
According to Mason [239,pp.43-44] the choice of methods is inevitably constrained by 
practical matters, such as available financial resources, time and skills, but she argues 
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that feasibility should be accommodated within the intellectual framework and not vice 
versa. Practical problems do not emerge only in the planning phase, but also during the 
conduct of research, and consequently require adaptation that will not undermine the 
intellectual soundness of the study [239,pp.44]. Of course our study was no exception, 
but fortunately practical constraints did not upset the foundations of the underlying 
intellectual framework. 
The three (maximum four) year time frame of PhD studies with one year for data 
collection has limited the number of research questions and methods, which could be 
addressed realistically, while the available financial resources placed further constraints 
on the choice of research methods. Initially the 'Health Sen·ices and ~1anagement' 
project of the Ministry of Health financed my studies, and there was enough money for 
fieldwork to implement for instance a large nationally representative survey. However, 
the project came to an early end, which removed virtually all the money for research, 
and made the anticipated costs a critical factor. Fortunately we managed to find 
sponsorship in the frame of an international collaboration, which allowed us to return to 
the original plans with some modifications. 
Other practical obstacles have limited access to data sources. For instance health 
care provider institutions and the NHIF A have excellent sampling frames for patients, 
but these are not accessible for research purposes in Hungary because of the 
confidentiality of medical records [249]. As we have mentioned before the alternative 
is to recruit patients at surgeries or immediately after discharge (exit surveys), but 
experiences with this technique are not encouraging in terms of \villingness to 
participate [96,p.15; 226]. 
Of course there have been other practical problems in the course of the research, 
which are related to the methods that have been finally selected, but these are discussed 
in the sections describing the detailed study design. 
5.2.6. ETHICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
All research can raise ethical and political dilemmas [e.g.84,pp.526-546; 240,pp.59-67; 
245], which must be considered in the choice of research methods [239,pp.41-43]. This 
is especially so with a research focused on an activity that is illegal or clandestine 
[230,pp.97-1 01], but the ethical issues are certainly more prominent for some methods 
than others. Participant obsen·ation, for instance, would certainly raise the problem of 
whether to reveal the identity of the researcher, as remaining covert would increase the 
information that could be collected. Nonetheless our choice of methods and the conduct 
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of the research have been guided by the standard ethical principles of informed consent, 
the rejection of deception and the protection of privacy and confidentiality (i.e. 
preserving anonymity) [245,pp.138-140], with the realisation that it is not always 
possible to adhere strictly to these rules (for instance to preserve the anonymity of 
research locations, for example where there is only one appropriate site, e.g. one private 
for-profit hospital in the whole country). 
Furthermore, as Harding and Jenkins [230] have pointed out, the publication of 
research results could have a negative effect on those studied, even if full anonymity is 
preserved, given the illegal nature of most informal economic activities. They argue 
that research on informal economic activity is by its nature political, and while it is not 
possible to control the use of the published data, the researcher at least should consider 
the possible harm which the publication might cause to those who have been studied. 
This is certainly an important point for informal economic actiyities in general, but we 
argue that topic of informal payments for health care in Hungary is different in this 
respect. As we have discussed in chapter 2, the history of informal payments has 
always been characterised by an ambiguous legal status and ambiguous policies; for 
instance it should still be declared in income tax returns. Further, there is evidence that 
informal payments are widespread in Hungary (chapter 4), which makes its contested 
legality/illegality immaterial. Finally, the TK-1985 study has shown that the majority 
of people disagree with the practice of informal payment [79], which makes any 
research on the topic a laudable effort, as it holds the possibility that ultimately most 
people in society will benefit. 
5.3. Research questions and methods chosen 
In the section we will synthesise the arguments concerning the issues that have 
informed the choice ofresearch methods and in turn the final study design. For each of 
the major research areas we have selected one major research method and 
corresponding data sources and data collection (generation) techniques,39 but the 
selection process has been interactive, insofar as the choice of one method has informed 
39 Reading a numba of books on research methods and methodology [84; 2·lj; 242; 240; 239) I have had 
the impression that there is no consensus on what exactly is a research method as opposed to techniques, 
approaches, or even studies, which have sometimes been used in a very similar sense. To resolve this 
problem, I have found very useful Silverman's [242,p.89] distinction of methods and techniques, and 
Mason's [239] distinction of data sources and methods. If we define method. which encompass the whole 
data generation process from the identification and selection of sources, through techniques of gathering 
data to data analysis, and whose final product is evidence, we can say that methods are often, but not 
always, named after the technique of data collection (inquiry). For instance the case study method 
emphasises the selection of the object to be studied, and not the inquiry technique [250,p.236). 
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the choice of another method and vice versa. As we shall see, however, this does not 
mean that one main research area has only been addressed by one method. We have, of 
course, utilised the potential of other methods to complement the data generated by the 
main method concerned. 
The backbone of the research has been made up of methods that we have selected to 
address the motivation of patients directly. Drawing on the inconclusiveness of 
available evidence we hypothesise that surveys cannot capture the complexity of the 
motivation issue because of the lack of shared understanding, thus they cannot 
discriminate between payments that are given truly voluntarily and those that are 
coerced, in its wider sense (chapter 3 and Appendix F). To capture the Icoercion factor' 
in informal payments, we must explore the context of giving and contrast it with the 
stated motivation revealed by patients in surveys. More specifically, we need to 
identify patients who have reported paying out of gratitude, and explore the context in 
which it actually happened. As \ve have argued before, in-depth interviews are best 
suited for this task, because of the covert nature of informal payments and the individual 
nature of the experience, but also because much depends on the perception and previous 
experiences of patients, which cannot anyway be observed. Furthermore, in-depth 
interviews less likely to involve serious ethical dilemmas than participant observation. 
Initially we planned a national representative survey, but as we have pointed out 
before, this had to be dropped, chiefly because of financial reasons. Fortunately, later 
we obtained sponsorship that would enable participation in a household survey, 
although not national level, but adequate for the task of identifying cases for the in-
depth intervie\vs. A patient sample may have been better, but the key issues of study 
design have been determined by the international project team, and, as we have pointed 
Ollt previollsly, direct access to patient sampling frames is complicated in Hungary. 
Furthermore, the survey itself, especially \vhen combined with secondary analysis of 
previous surveys, could make it possible to go beyond tl1e stated motivation, insofar as 
they addressed questions related to the context of giving. 
For the exploration of the context of giving, we have considered as equally important 
the perspectives of physicians. The best option would have been to identify those 
physicians, who participated in exactly those transactions that we have identified from 
the household surveys, but this would have revealed the identity of patients, hence we 
have dropped the idea for ethical rcasons. Instead, \YC have identi fied a general sample 
of physicians working in the health care facilities of thc town where the household 
survey was carried out. 
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Given that the survey was not nationally representative, we have not considered it 
appropriate to use it as a primary source of evidence to answer the research questions on 
the magnitude and distribution of informal payments. Here, we have opted for the 
analysis of the regular HBS of the HCSO. This has the advantage of cost-effectiveness 
and provides direct data on expenditure (time-budget or diary approach), which, despite 
its shortcomings, researchers have considered one of the best methods of measuring 
informal payments [223 ,p.191]. As already noted, it is only necessary for the present 
purposes to determine the order of magnitude of informal payments and not their 
precise amount. 
In contrast, as the topic being virtually unexplored, we have used our survey as the 
primary method to explore the impact of informal payments on equity. 
An equally important part of our research strategy was that we explored and utilised 
the potential of the aforementioned primary methods for addressing questions other than 
the one for which they have been chosen in the first place. For instance, we have found 
relevant data in the household expenditure statistics of the HCSO to address equity in 
financing, and we have used secondary analysis to generate complementary evidence 
for all main research topics. 
In summary, Table 5.2 presents the final choice of research methods, according to 
the main research topics (questions) of Table 5.1. These methods have formed the basis 
of the study design, which the next sections describe in details. 
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Research questions and methods 
Research Areas I Primary Method Questions 
Magnitude & 
distribution 
Ql,Q2 Analysis of official 
statistics 
Equity impact 
Q3,Q4 Survey 
Motivation 
Q5 Qualitative 
interviewing 
Q6 Survey 
Sources of Technique of Data 
Data Generation 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(household survey, diary approach) 
Households Structured interview 
(questionnaire) 
Patients, In-depth interviews 
physicians 
Households Structured interview 
(questionnaire) 
Justification (Possible) Complementary Drawbacks Methods 
• Low costs • Data quality? • Literature review 
• Appropriate technique (selection, recall • Secondary 
• No special accuracy is and respondent analysis 
needed bias) • Survey 
• Low costs (economies of • Generalisability • Analysis of 
scope) 
• Limited potential official statistics 
I • Feasibility (time constraints) to address equity • Secondary 
• No longitudinal design is in delivery analysis 
needed 
• Perception and experiences • Generalisability 
matter 
• Ethically least problematic 
• Low costs • Selection and • Secondary 
recall bias analysis 
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5.4 Study design 
Figure 5.1 
This section provides a more detailed description of how the data have been collected 
and analysed using the methods chosen. The overall study design is shown in Figure 
5.1. We describe each method according to the following criteria: objectives, unit of 
analysis and observation, study population, sampling method, sample size, data 
collection, data processing and analysis. We also consider the limitations of the 
methods in addition to the general pros and cons discussed before. 
The design of the study 
QU~NTITATIVE.·:" QUAl:JTATIVE I. 
"1 '" . t ~ 
Secondary 
analysis 
Analysis of 
official statistics 
930 households 
random sample of 
households of a 
medium size town 
Household 
SPSS 
Tables 
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5.4.1. SECONDARY ANALYSIS 
In the literature review in chapter 4, we pointed out that important elements of many 
previous studies have remained unanalysed and unpublished. Hence we began the 
research by looking at these sources and undertaking new analyses of the data that 
would address the study questions, going well beyond the simple tabulations that had 
been reported in the original publications. 
We created a shortlist of studies on the basis of, first, their potential to address the 
research questions and second, the quality of research. Some previous empirical studies 
were poorly designed and implemented, so we dropped, for instance the County-
Hospital-Eger-1973 [80] and the OTKI-1970 [226] studies. Although I managed to 
speak all but one researcher personally, it turned out that the databases of most previous 
studies have either been disposed of, or are not available for secondary analysis. This 
has reduced the number of studies to three, which I finally managed to retrieve from the 
database archive of the Social Research Informatics Center (TARKI). Hence secondary 
analysis has played only a complementary part in our study. 
The OTKI -1984 study has been considered as a source of evidence on the magnitude, 
distribution, and impact on equity of informal payment, while the TK-1985 and 
TARKI-1996 studies also address these issues and clarify the motivation of actors. The 
major features of all three pieces of research have already been summarised in Tables 
4.2 and El. 
The analysis involved identification of relevant variables and specification of 
associations to be explored, with data analysis using SPSS. On the basis of the original 
questionnaires we expected to identify overall amounts of informal payment (OTKI-
1984;TK-1985), their distribution according to the types and levels of care (TK-
1985;OTKI-1984;TARKI-1996), and between physicians and other health workers 
(OTKI-1984;TK-1985). In terms of equity, assessment of the cost burden imposed by 
informal payment seemed particularly relevant. Both the OTKI-1984 and the TK-1985 
studies date from before the 1988 tax reform and, according to Bondar & Ekes [75] 
information about the income of respondents was much more reliable prior to this 
reform. Finally, we expected to obtain evidence about motivation, especially from the 
TARKI-1996 study, which posed an open-ended question, but used the same coding 
scheme as the OTKI-1972-73 and 1981 studies. 
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5.4.2. QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
The literature review suggests that in 
testing the validity of the 'donation' 
hypothesis the motives of patients 
are of the utmost importance. The 
literature review also suggests that 
the current inconclusive findings are 
attributable to the inability of 
surveys accurately to reflect the 
complexity of motivation. We have 
tested this idea by identifying cases 
who stated that they paid because of 
'gratitude' and/or 'custom' ('non-
coercive' reasons of giving), from 
our household survey, and later 
"",:,. ,'~,,, '.~ ,~~, . ~1f1i~i:( ''7,,'' , , " . 
Box 5;1. . , Qualit~h e i~terviews' . " 
~ " '~,-, ' .... ' . 
Objectives to explore the context of giving 
Unit of analysis individuals 
(observation) 
(Study) population patients, practising physicians 
Sampling method purposive (theoretical) sampling 
Sampling frame household survey, management of 
health care institutions 
Sample size 15+6 patients, 22+9 doctors 
Method of data in·depth interview, observation 
collection 
Topics, questions motivation (Q6) 
Implementation 07/2001·101200 I 
Interviewer Pt!ter Gaal 
Analysis Cross·sectional and contextual 
indexing of transcripts and notes 
interviewed them personally in a loosely structured way to explore in detail the context 
of informal payments. We have assumed that the decision to pay the physician 
informally does not take place in isolation, and specifically is not disconnected from 
previous experiences with health care. Thus the objective of qualitative interviewing 
was to gain insight into the context of giving and identify factors that predisposed to 
informal payments as opposed to the concept of voluntarily giving thanks. From this 
respect, we have considered the perspectives of physicians equally important, although 
it was not possible to identify with certainty those who participated in these 
transactions. 
5.4.2.1. Sampling 
The unit of observation has been the individual, and the study popUlations were patients 
who utilised health services and practising physicians. Practising was defined as those 
who were working in patient care during the course of the research regardless of the 
level of care and speciality or service. 
We selected patients from those who responded to our household survey. All those 
who reported paying and attributed this either to gratitude or custom, or a combination, 
were considered for follow-up interview. However, out of the 21 cases, only 11 
interviews were possible as 6 persons refused to participate, 1 person could not be 
contacted and in 3 cases it was not possible to find a mutually suitable time for the 
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interview. However it was also possible to interview a further four who raised relevant 
issues with the interviewers during the survey. Of the additional four, one commented 
that "it was a pity to give gratitude payment beforehand", another indicated to give 
because of 'custom' and 'enforcement' at the same time, and two others used both 
public and private services, and were dissatisfied with the former. All together I 
therefore interviewed 15 patients, whose demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics are summarised in Appendix B. Furthermore, the interviews of 6 other 
patients, who were interviewed within the frame of a case study on private sector 
informal payments, have also been included in the analysis.40 Their demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics are presented in Appendix C. This raised the final 
sample size to 21. 
The second set of interviews was with physicians. As discussed earlier, they were 
not linked directly to patients from the survey, but they were service providers in the 
town where the household survey was conducted. The head of the health department of 
the local government facilitated the sampling process, introducing me to the 
management in the relevant health care institutions (two hospitals, one 'county' and one 
'town' and the health department itself that provided primary care). Altogether I 
interviewed 18 physicians from Kecskemet. The sample was designed to ensure 
inclusion of a broad range of medical specialties, but to broaden the type of institutions 
covered, the sample was supplemented with four other doctors chosen from university 
hospitals and national institutes of health. Thus the final sample comprised 22. 
However a further set of interviews with 9 more physicians was also conducted within 
the framework of a case study on private sector informal payments, making a total of 31 
physicians interviewed overall during this study. Appendix B provides a description of 
the age, sex and specialty distribution of the physicians interviewed. 
5.4.2.2. Data collection 
Qualitative interviews were used, with the objective of exploring the context in which 
the decision to pay the physician informally was made, as we have assumed that this 
decision is shaped by a number of contextual factors, without recognition of which it is 
not possible to understand why patients pay for services that would otherwise be free of 
charge. Clearly the literature review suggested what these factors might be, but one 
objective of the interviews was to identify these more concretely, focusing on the 
40 The preliminary findings of this study are presented in Appendix I. We could not include this analysis 
in the thesis because of space constraints. 
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concept of the 'coercion' factor, which we developed in Appendix F. Thus, I 
constructed the interview schedule in a way that would allow sufficient flexibility to 
develop the interviews on site, both in terms of the depth with which a particular issue 
was studied and the range of issues covered. These interview schedules are presented in 
Appendix B. Nevertheless, both the patient and the physician interviews had certain 
core topics, which formed the backbone of interviews. 
Interviews with patients centred around the disease episode and treatments received, 
where informal payment had been made. This proved to be a good strategy, as I always 
came to the topic of informal payment without explicitly raising it. Part of the strategy 
was to explore previous experiences when obtaining health care and to ask the 
respondents' opinions about the performance of the system in general. Furthermore I 
deliberately did not pursue the issue of motivation directly (unless the respondents 
brought it up), as I would not have wanted to confront the respondt!nts with their 
previous answer in the survey, or to linger on any potential ambiguity in their accounts 
of events (this is not an issue of 'right' or 'wrong' answers). 
In a similar vein, I began the interview with physicians by exploring their work 
experiences, and their opinion on the functioning of the health care system. With 
almost no exceptions this brought up the issue of informal payments without asking, 
which provided a lead to continue exploring their experiences of the phenomenon that, 
in this case, included the question of 'why people pay'. Both patient and physician 
interviews covered the question of alternative options (exit and voice), but this topic has 
not been included in the analysis, because of constraints on thesis length. 
At the beginning of each interview I introduced myself, briefly explained the aims of 
the research and emphasised that as participation was voluntary, the interview could be 
terminated at any time, the respondent could refuse to answer any questions, and the 
respondent's identity was strictly confidential and anonymity would be preserved. I 
also asked for permission to record the interview using a dictaphone, and offered the 
alternative option of hand-writing instead. In any case, I was prepared to make notes 
during the interview. Overall only 8 interviews were not tape-recorded. 
I carried out all the interviews personally, between July and October 2001. The 
administrative staff of the Health Services Management Training Centre prepared the 
draft transcriptions between November 2001 and March 2002. 
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5.4.2.3. Analysis 
The analytical strategy has been centred around the concept of 'coercion', and 
comprised two equally important elements combining cross-sectional (categorical) and 
contextual indexing [239,pp.l47-172]. First, using all available interviews, we searched 
the material to identify particular factors that lead patients to pay informally. Second, 
using only patient interviews, we tried to identify factors that played a role in cases 
payment seemed voluntary (i.e. the stated motivation was either gratitude, or custom, or 
both). 
5.4.2.4. Limitations 
According to the post-positivist framework, there is a trade-off in terms of validity and 
reliability between the employment of qualitative and quantitative methods [84]. In-
depth interviews are only loosely structured and the dynamics of the interview 
influences the data that are generated by the interview. Furthermore the personality of 
the interviewer also impacts upon the process as well as on the analysis and 
interpretation of the data. These limitations of qualitative interviewing, however, 
cannot be overcome without sacrificing the very essence of the research method itself. 
The standardisation of the interview process in itself does not ensure that there is a 
shared understanding of concepts and leaves less room for exploring discrepancies in 
understanding. While the analysis and interpretation of qualitative interviews depend 
on the researcher, and it can be argued that there arc not better or worse but just 
different interpretations [244,pp.20 1-202], in our case it is possible to challenge the 
correctness of interpretation of the data by looking at the transcripts of actual 
interviews. Furthermore, in most cases, they are also available in audio files. 
The other limitation of in-depth interviews is that it is very difficult to establish 
external validity. Both the selection of interview subjects and the small sample sizes 
(because of the demanding nature of the undertaking) limit the generalisability of 
findings. Although representativeness is not always essential in qualitative 
interviewing, in this study we have taken steps to achieve some degree of 
representativeness. The bulk of patients have been selected on the basis of the 
household survey, while in selecting physicians, we have taken into account not just 
med ical specialties and levels of care, but the age and sex of interview subjects. 
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5.4.3 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
The household survey, certain parts 
of which have been integrated into 
the present study, was implemented 
in the framework of an international 
collaboration, with the participation 
of 5 academic institutions and 4 
survey sites, in the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania and Hungary. The 
loss of funding from the Ministry of 
Welfare project could thus be 
overcome, but it also imposed some 
constraints. We had to reassess 
what could be realistically achieved 
within the limitations the study 
Objectives 
Unit of analysis 
(observation) 
to explore the phenomenon in the 
'pure' private setting 
household 
(Study) population households of Kecskemet 
Sampling method random 
Sampling frame household addresses provided by the 
Central Population Registering and 
Electorate Office 
Sample size 817 out of930 households (87.8%) 
l\lethod of data structured interviewing (questionnaire) 
collection by telephone 
Topics, questions equity (Q3,Q4), motivation (Q5) 
Implementation 0212001-061200 I 
Interviewers 10 trained interviewers 
Analysis SPSS 
design entailed. The objective of the study was to estimate the magnitude and 
distribution of all out-of-pocket payments, and had a predefined core questionnaire, 
used previously in other studies, which limited to what extent informal payments could 
have been addressed. Further, the research team has decided that the study population 
would be households in a medium-sized town in each country, and that the 
questionnaire would be administered by the telephone, mainly for financial reasons . 
Both of these design features inevitably reduced the external validity of the research. 
Nevertheless, they did not decrease the ability of the survey to address the motivation 
issue and to identify cases for qualitative interviewing and, despite the limited 
generalisabiIity, findings concerning the impact on equity of informal payments would 
be valuable, as this research area was virtually unexplored in Hungary. 
5.4.3.1. Study population 
As an example of a medium-size town, we chose Kecskemet, which is the 8th largest 
among the 19 county-seats in Hungary, with 105,000 inhabitants [23]. It is located in 
the centre of the country (Figure 1.1). One reason for selecting Kecskemet is that it has 
a densely populated urban core, and a surrounding area of small farms and 8 villages, 
thereby covering a mixed rural-urban population. Although, while there are some 
similarities, the population of Kecskemet is not representative to the country as a whole, 
as a more detailed analysis in Appendix D shows. The most marked differences are that 
P E T E R G ,\AL 
I' AGE I~G I TII ES I S_GP REVISED _ VI7 
RESEARCfl QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
l 4 STUDY DESIGN 
Kecskemet has a more educated population with fewer blue-collar agricultural workers, 
fewer unemployed people, and fewer poor households compared to the country as a 
whole. Further, households with two or more families, and larger households with 5 
persons or more are underrepresented, while 2-person households are over-represented, 
so there is a slightly smaller average household size than in the country overall. Further 
comparison is limited as other important household attributes, such as health status, 
household income and expenditures are not available in the published statistics for 
Kecskemet. 
5.4.3.2. Sampling frame 
After the consideration of the available options, we obtained a random sample of 1,500 
households in Kecskemet, from the Central Population Registering and Electorate 
Office, and identified those households with a residential telephone line from public 
directories. This way we could avoid certain sampling biases arising solely from the 
use of telephone directories (e.g. households with more than one line, or the same 
household number listed twice). Further, this method offered the possibility of carrying 
out additional face-to-face interviews with households where there was no telephone. 
Unfortunately this was not implemented due to financial constraints. 
The chosen method of sampling could not eliminate another sampling bias. As the 
sampling was based on residential addresses, households, who shared the same 
accommodation, had less chance to get into the sample. However, there was no other 
option available which could have eliminated this bias (see Appendix D for a more 
detailed discussion of these issues). 
5.4.3.3. Sample size and characteristics of the sample 
There were 930 telephone numbers, which were valid and could be contacted in the 
course of data collection, and 113 persons refused to participate in the survey, giving a 
response rate of 87.8%. The interviewers were asked to record the gender of the non-
respondent and to ask about the reasons for refusals. We have gender information on 
56.6% of non-respondents, 53.1 % of whom were women and 46.9% were men. 
Although many interviewees (34.5%) did not provide a reason, some refusals were 
directly associated with the topic (being a health worker, bad experiences with the 
system). Table D9.0 in Appendix D provides a more detailed analysis of the reasons for 
non-responses. In addition 9 respondents broke off questioning in the middle of the 
interview, but these incomplete questionnaires have been included in the analysis. 
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Unfortunately the responding households were quite unrepresentative of the 
population of the town and, to a lesser extent, of Hungary (see Appendix D for a 
detailed analysis). The most notable differences are that responding households arc 
larger, and more active economically. One obvious explanation may be that differences 
are attributable to the possession of domestic telephone line, but this requires further 
investigation. 
Over two-third of the responding persons \vere women (68.5%), and just over half of 
them (51.4%) fell into the 19-45 age category. Nineteen respondents were under the 
age of 19 (1.1%), and 14.5% of them were over 60. The rest of the responding persons 
(14.5%) fell into the 46-60 age category (see Table DI0 in Appendix D). 
5.4.3.4. Data collection 
The international research team chose the method of data collection, i.e. structured 
telephone interviews, but not simply because this was less expensive. In a previous 
study in Krakow, Polish researchers achieved an impressive response rate using the 
telephone. While, in general, face-to-face interviews are regarded as yielding the 
highest response rates compared to postal questionnaires and telephone interviews, the 
response rates in this study is encouraging. Nonetheless, as we have mentioned before, 
it is not possible to get a representative sample using this method unless telephone 
coverage is complete and all numbers are in the public domain. A low level of 
telephone coverage was a problem during the communist dictatorship, but the past ten 
years brought rapid improvements. In 2000, telephone coverage in all the larger cities, 
including Kecskemet was over 80% [251]. 
The research team developed a common questionnaire in order to allow a meaningful 
comparison of results between countries. A core questionnaire was drafted and piloted 
in each country. On the basis of the experiences of the pilot study, the questionnaire 
was refined. This does not mean, however, that the country questionnaires were 
identical. The model or 'core' questionnaire was able to be modified to fit the 
specificities of individual countries. 
In Hungary, the telephone interviews were carried out over a four-month period, 
betwcen February and June 200 1. Altogether 10 trained intcniewers participated in the 
survey, as well as the principal researcher, who undertook the training sessions. The 
interviewers were university students and colleagues at the Health Services 
Management Training Centrc. Each interviewer was given a list of telcphone numbers 
which wcre callcd during weekdays, usually between 6 and 9 pm, and during the 
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weekend all day. Non-answering numbers were tried at least twice per week (weekdays 
and weekends) over the period of data collection. 
5.4.3.5. Questionnaire: the operationalisation of informal payments 
As we have discussed in chapter 3, informal payment can be operationalised either by 
asking the patient directly to separate informal from formal payments, or by asking 
respondents, how much they spent on different types of services and different types of 
providers, and by distinguishing informal payment during the analysis, using knowledge 
of the entitlement to services in the health care system concerned. Although both 
methods are open to miscategorization, we have opted for the second method for two 
reasons. First, as Appendix D shows, formal co-payments are still negligible for 
services in Hungary, and what exists is determined centrally, which makes it feasible to 
distinguish them. Second, we have been suspicious that there is no shared 
understanding of the widely used term, 'gratitude payment'. Third, informal payment 
has proven to be a sensitive question and the use of neutral categories might facilitate a 
better response rate. 
The questionnaire, reproduced in translation in Appendix D, had two main parts. 
The first part was related to the households, including questions regarding the basic 
socioeconomic characteristic of the household, such as number of members, their sex, 
age, marital status, education, occupation, the income of the household and certain 
general questions about attitudes towards out-of-pocket payments. The interviewer 
filled in one questionnaire per household. 
The second part of the questionnaire comprised different questions regarding each 
type of health problem that had affected the household in the previous four months. 
Health problems were separated into two categories: diseases, and utilization of health 
services for other reason than disease. Respondents were asked to name the disease or 
the reason for utilization. If the episode involved a disease, the respondent was asked 
whether any health services had been utilized, and if not why. For all cases of health 
care utilization, including those not involving treatment for a disease, the service 
received was recorded along three dimension: (I) the type of provider - primary, 
outpatient specialist, inpatient, emergency, diagnostic, dental and other care, (2) the 
ownership of the provider - public or private, (3) the financing of care - public or 
private. Then three questions were posed on out-of-pocket payments: one for cash 
payments, one for gifts and one for in kind contributions. In the case of cash payments 
and gifts various categories were offered, linked to each provider used during the 
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episode. These were admission, consultation, pharmaceuticals, surgery, nurses and 
other health care staff, patient transfer, travel, food and other services. 
In the course of the analysis, the information on health care providers, and the 
information on payment for various service categories were used to separate the formal 
from the informal. The process is described in more detail in Appendix D. 
Although we cannot be certain that this method has avoided misclassification 
entirely, any misclassification that occurred is likely to have underestimated informal 
payments. 
5.4.3.6. Analysis 
The completed questionnaires were processed electronically. Data were entered into 
four different databases, according to the units of analysis (households, members, 
disease episodes, health care utilisation episodes) using Microsoft Access, which made 
it possible to link the separate databases by means of identification numbers. The 
software also made it possible to carry out extensive data cleaning and quality control 
processes, using the control questions, and the internal logic of the questionnaire. The 
statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS. 
5.4.3.7. Limitations 
We have already touched upon some of the limitations of the survey design, such as the 
choice of the study population (medium sized town, not the whole country), the 
sampling frame (two and more households under the same roof had less chance to get 
into the sample) and method of data collection (households with no domestic telephone 
lines or with secret numbers has been excluded), which limits the generalisability of the 
findings of the survey. These can be considered significant defects in terms of 
estimating the scale of payments, so we did not rely our estimate on the findings of our 
survey. Refusals to participate in the survey have most probably also biased the 
findings insofar as, in a few cases, the reason for non-response was associated with the 
suhject of the study. We have also identified some respondent bias, as in a few cases 
the interviewee admitted giving, but refused to tell the amount. However it is not 
possible to tell the exact scale of respondent bias, since there could have been 
respondents who denied payment; neither can false declaration of informal payment be 
excluded with certainty. Furthermore, responses might have been affected by recall 
bias as interviewees had to remember past events of health care utilisation, and not just 
for themselves, but for other household members. We have deliberately selected a 
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period shorter than a year to minimise this sort of bias, and the questions that had to be 
asked for each episode of health problem and health care utilisation might have also 
facilitated the recollection process. Although one can not say that these design features 
have totally eliminated recall bias, it has probably affected less serious health problems 
with minor out-of-pocket payments. Nevertheless, choosing a four-month period might 
have caused another bias, as there are seasonal variations in the scale and types of 
disease episodes. This type of bias, though, may have been mitigated by the fact that 
the interviews were carried out over a four and a half month period. 
We have also mentioned that misclassification of out-of-pocket payments might have 
caused an underestimation of informal payments. The estimation of in-kind 
contributions has been problematic because of a weakness in the questionnaire (the 
questionnaire did not capture in kind contributions, if no out-of-pocket payments were 
paid). Data quality could have also been affected by mis-recording both in the phase of 
interviewing and data input. As it has been mentioned before, we have carried out 
extensive data cleaning, but we also tried to limit data input errors by designing a user-
friendly data input interface in Microsoft Access. 
5.4.4 REVIEW OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS 
To establish the importance of informal payment in terms of its scale, we used mainly 
the regular HBS of the HCSO, but we also managed to obtain some basic statistics from 
the Tax Office on the overall magnitude of 'gratitude payments', based on tax return 
data. Although we suspected in advance that there would be substantial differences 
between assessments of income and expenditure, we felt it important to confirm this. 
As discussed before, one possible drawback of official statistics is the quality of data 
that can be obtained. To address this concern, we tried to explore the methodological 
basis of the household statistics as deeply as possible by interviewing those involved in 
the implementation of the surveys. I personally spoke to the head of the department, 
who provided me with the background documentation on the research, for instance the 
standard diaries used by the households to record income and expenditures, and the 
questionnaire for yearly expenditures (such as consumer durables), and to the person 
responsible for the health care section of the sun·ey. She provided me with valuable 
information on methodological issues, including recent changes in the method of 
addressing health care expenditures. These will be discussed in chapter 6, where the 
official statistics are analysed to address to scale of informal payments. 
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5.4.5. DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS 
Documentary analysis was originally planned to establish the availability of the exit and 
voice options, by exploring the legal background of these options, past changes and 
future plans. Many of the relevant documents, laws and regulations, policy documents, 
and where relevant, newspaper articles have been collected, but not included in the 
analysis because of space constraints. Thus apart from the analysis undertaken to 
prepare the description of the Hungarian health care system and health sector reform 
(chapter 2), documentary analysis will be carried out as part of future research in the 
area. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Drawing on a modified post-positivist epistemology and within the confines of 
feasibility, ethical and political considerations, this study has utilised a mixture of 
quantitative (official statistics, surveys) and qualitative (qualitative interviewing) 
methods to generate evidence to address a modest research agenda, which has the policy 
importance of informal payments for health care in its focus. Focussing on the 
contrasting implications of the 'donation' versus the 'fee-for-service' explanation, the 
research has to explain the motivation of participants (both directly and indirectly) and 
to assess the magnitude and distrihution of informal payments. In selecting the various 
research methods to address these topics we have considered their limitations. We have 
considered the external validity limitations of the survey sufficiently serious enough not 
to rely upon it for assessment of the scale of informal payments. In other cases, such as 
the equity of informal payments and motivation of patients and doctors, we will 
consider the impact of these limitations on the validity of the findings. 
In the following chapters we will present the main findings of the study, synthesise 
and confront them with the 'donation' explanation. 
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6. MAGNITUDE AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the scale of informal payments. As we have 
argued previously, it is immaterial whether informal payment is 'fee-for-service' or 
'donation' if the amounts are so small that they do not put a real financial burden on the 
poor and they represent only a minor source of income for health workers, especially 
physicians. However, we were unable to establish the scale of informal payments from 
the existing information, noting that reports of the overall magnitude of the 
phenomenon have been contradictory. Although we did not seek to obtain a precise 
figure, our review of the available evidence in chapter 4 found a difference of an order 
of magnitude between different survey estimates and between empirical data and expert 
estimates. 
6.1. Outline of the chapter 
In order to resolve these contradictions, first we will attempt to at least to clarify the 
order of magnitude of informal payments, using available official statistics, as described 
in chapter 5, assessing critically the findings in relation to the methods used to collect 
these data. Then we will examine the distribution of informal payments, using findings 
from previous surveys, which were shown in chapter 4 to exhibit a remarkable degree of 
consistency about this issue at least. We consider knowledge of the distribution of 
informal payments crucial to assess the impact on the system of informal payments, 
since a relatively small amount of money could have a substantial impact on some 
individuals. For instance, as Chawla et al [204] have reported, the overall sum 
accounted for by informal payment in a year was estimated to be only 10% of the gross 
salaries of all hospital personnel in Poland in 1994, but equivalent to twice the annual 
salary bill for physicians. Thus, to establish the importance of the phenomenon in terms 
of its scale, we will compare the income from informal payments with the official salary 
of physicians, first by establishing the best estimate of its overall magnitude, and second 
by modelling a plausible distribution of the sum among health workers and within them, 
physicians . Both steps of the analysis will be complemented by secondary analysis of 
previous surveys and by the findings from our household survey, while recognising the 
limitations of these studies as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
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6.2. 1, 10 or 100 billion? The overall magnitude of informal payment 
revisited 
To assess the overall magnitude of informal payments we have analysed available 
official statistics, both in relation to income and expenditure. This section relies 
primarily on the household budget survey (HBS) of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Oftice (HCSO), which has collected data on gratitude payment from both payers and 
recipients, within the framework of the same study, annually, since 1992. Before 1992, 
the survey was conducted only every other year and gratitude payment was not 
separated from formal out-of-pocket expenses on health services, except in 1983, when 
the general survey was complemented with a detailed health care specific component. 
Then we compare these data with survey findings identified in chapter 4, critically 
assessing the methods used to identify their limitations and consequent impact on the 
validity of the final figures. This will then allow us to determine the range in which the 
'true' magnitude of informal payment lies. 
6.2.1. INCOME-SIDE ESTIMATES 
We have analysed data from two official sources. First, in the framework of the HBS, 
the HCSO regularly collects data on both the income and expenditure of a nationally 
representative sample of households in Hungary. Second, as we mentioned in chapter 
2, the recipients of informal payments have been required to declare these types of 
income in their tax returns since 1989. We have asked the Hungarian tax office 
(APEH) to provide us with the available data and their Department of Planning and 
Analysis not only acceded our request, but they also volunteered information on the 
history and known shortcomings of the taxation policy. Table 6.1 presents the data 
obtained from both sources. They include not only informal payments for health care, 
but income from tips in all other sectors of the economy. 
Table 6.1 well illustrates the point raised, for instance, by Ekes [223] and Lewis [96], 
that recipients of informal payments are an unreliable source of data, even if the 
questioning is not related to income taxation. If we compare these estimates with the 
findings of expenditure surveys presented in Table 4.3, even the highest figure among 
the fonner is almost half of the lowest figure of the latter. Given that both types of 
income estimates include tips unrelated to health care, this difference is certainly higher 
for informal payments for health care alone. 
Table 6.1 also illustrates how the taxation policy failed. Over the 9 years when 
information on gratitude payments and tips was collected separately in the income tax 
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Table 6.1. 
declaration form, the number of persons admitting to have such income in the previous 
year decreased substantially, with the figure in 1996 less than one-third of that in 1988. 
Since 1998 (relating to income in the calendar year 1997) there has been no separate 
line in the tax return and the official instructions no longer mention "medical gratitude 
payment" as an example. The attempt to tax informal payments yielded a negligible 
amount of revenue, even in the early years of the policy, when the most strenuous 
efforts were made to enforce compliance [8], although the tax office admits to technical 
difficulties limiting such efforts. For instance, it was not possible to identify practising 
physicians from the tax returns forms, so the audits targeted only those doctors, who 
were well known by name. Furthermore, Adam [8] argued that there was a more 
fundamental, legal obstacle going beyond the 'legal-illegal' debate. According to Act II 
of 1972011 Health [252,75] health workers were forbidden to provide better services to 
one patient compared to another; consequently gratitude payment should have been 
considered not to be tips but gifts, which were not the subject to income tax. 
Income-side assessment of informal payments in Hungary 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199-1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
lIeso data· 
Per capita income from - nla - nla nla 5-1 82 49 149 167 123 156 nla 
gratuities and tip 
(HUF) 
Overall magnitude per - n/a - n/a nla 0.5-16 0.828 0.495 1.50-1 1.683 1.236 1.562 n/a 
year (billion HUF)* 
Tax office data" 
Number of persons 68,406 63,150 56,023 52,449 45,569 39,755 33,870 29,567 21,621 n/a nla nla nfa 
declared income from 
gratuities and tip 
O\·erall magnitude per 0.827 0.768 0.685 0.799 0.740 0.781 0.716 0.681 0.61-1 nla n/a n/a n/a 
year (billion HUr) 
Notcs: n/a=not availablc 
SOl/rce: *Ca/cl/laledjrolll data oj HCSO's liES [253; 76; 25-1-257; 27); **[258.06-12-1999) 
6.2.2. EXPENDITURE-SIDE ESTIMATES 
As we have seen in the previous section, assessments based on data provided by health 
workers underestimate the overall magnitude of informal payments. Although this 
conclusion fits well with the general observation that people are more willing to reveal 
their expenditures than their income, one can argue that it is possible that differences 
between the findings of expenditure surveys and official statistics on income are 
attributable to the differences in methods of data collection, and this does not exclude 
the possibility that other surveys have overestimated informal payments. Table 6.2, 
which summarises expenditures on informal payments according to HBS, resolves this 
doubt. The difference betvveen the income and expenditure assessments in the same 
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survey, which used the same method of data collection and the same households, is 
equally substantial. This suggests that the expenditure assessments indeed provide 
better estimates of the overall magnitude of informal payments. Consequently we have 
based our analysis on findings of expenditure surveys, particularly the HCSO HBS.41 
Overall magnitude of informal payments per year in Hungary according to various sources (billion 
HUF) 
1983 1986 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Household budget 1.398 nfa 2.440 3.875 4.313 4.666 5.271 5.775 5.900 7.890 9.037 17.122 
surveys of IICSO* 
Nationalllealth 13.400 16400 20.900 
Accounts of HCSO** 
KecskemH-surny 13.0J3 
Other expenditure-
side surveys*" 
GKI-1986 2.000 
SZGTI-1992 7.300 
SZGTI-1994 7.407 
KSH-1997 (HCSO) 3.028 
TARKI-1998 33.000 
Notes: nla=not availabk 
Source: ·Hungarian Central Statistical Office. partly Oll'n calculations [259-26/; 253; 76; 25,/-257; 27; 262; 263j; **[2M}. 
···[20(); 223; 75; 225; 21-1j 
However, as Table 6.2 shows, there are substantial differences between the estimates 
of the HBS and other expenditure surveys (with the possible exception of 1983), the 
HBS and the recently published National Health Accounts (NHA) of the HCSO or the 
HBS data for 2000 and 200 1. The source of these differences, especially where there 
are divergent estimates for the same year, must be methodological, off~ring a possibility 
to understand to what extent differing research methods can explain the differences in 
the various surveys and in turn try to assess where the 'true' magnitude of informal 
payment most probably lies. 
6.2.3. HOW MUCH? 100. WHAT IS 100? WHAT IS HOW MUCH? 
To identify the cause of the differences discernible in Table 6.2, we have looked in 
more detail at the research methods used. First, there is a more or less detailed 
41 Originally we planned to complement published findings and the official statistics from the HCSO with 
the secondary analysis of the OTKI-1984 study, but to our surprise the database we managed to obtain 
only contains limited data on informal payments. Furthermore, we have discovered a more fundamental 
methodological problem with all, three studies whose databases have been available for secondary 
analysis. The OTKl-1984 and TARKl-1996 studies addressed only the last episode of hospitalisation 
within three years prior to the interview, while the TK-1985 study addressed only those health care 
utilisation episodes that were associated with the disease that involved the 1110st intensive utilisation of 
an)' level of care within the past "couple of years" prior to the interview. These shortcomings limited the 
usefulness of secondary analysis, especially concerning the assessment of the overall magnitude of 
informal payments. 
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methodological supplement for each set of HBS statistics, and there are methodological 
sections in the publications of the other surveys. Second, as far as possible, I sought to 
contact the heads of the research teams or the officials responsible for the research 
projects.42 I learnt that the NHA estimates (first published at the end of 2002 for the 
period of 1998-2000) have been based on the HBS data and drawn on adjustments made 
in relation to the calculation of national income (the 'big' national accounts project), but 
the exact method of correction is, unfortunately, not in the public domain. 
Consequently, the NHA data on informal payments have been of little use for our 
analysis. 
As we discussed in chapter 5, the HBS uses the 'time-budget' technique of data 
collection, whereby households record their income and expenses in a diary, with the 
recorded items summed after the data collection period according to predefined 
categories. The HCSO selects about 10,000 private households each year (i.e. 
institutions, such as residential homes for the elderly, Hungarian citizens living abroad 
and foreign citizens living in Hungary are excluded), producing a sample of about 
0.25% of all households in Hungary [263,pp.241-244]. Nevertheless, respondent 
households do not have to keep the diary for the \vhole year. The sample is divided into 
twelve equal parts and each has to record household income and expenditures for one 
month only. In addition, there is a two-part annual interview for the whole sample, first 
at the beginning of the subsequent year and then at end of the first quarter of the 
subsequent year, to collect data on personal and family incomes and a number of 
exceptional expenditure items, such as cars, household electric appliances, computers 
and mobile phones. The rationale for using an annual interview is not just the rare 
occurrence of these events but also the seasonal variation in certain types of 
expenditures [263,p.244]. 
In principle this study design should be suitable to obtain an accurate picture of 
health expenditures, but the implementation of the survey has posed difficulties, some 
42 Specifically I have contacted Dr. Maria Redei (head of the Household, Income and Consllmption 
Statistics Section of the Living Standard and Human Resources Statistics Department of HCSO), who 
kindly provided mc with generalmcthodological information on HBS and rcsearch documents, including 
the household diary and the coding booklet, and the materials of the KSH 1997 'hidden economy' study; 
Zsuzsanna Szab6, who is responsible for the health section of the HBS and has explained to me the 
methodological problems and relevant changes in estimates of household health expenditures, and 
provided me with the most recent research materials used in 2000 and 200 I; and Dr. Maria Mann6, who 
has been member and currently the head of the NHA team and provided me with basic information about 
thc method of the estimation of the overall magnitude of informal paymcnts within thc framc of the NHA 
project. 
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of which have been addressed in different years, both in respect of data collection and 
analysis. 
6.2.3.1. Selection and respondent bias 
Table 6.3. 
Participation in the HBS is voluntary, so refusal to participate in the survey has always 
been a challenge, particularly since the collapse of the communist regime, which 
widened social inequalities and decreased willingness to cooperate [27,p.359]. Table 
6.3 shows that response rates decreased until 1997. In 1996 almost 40% of the 12,135 
available households that were requested to participate refused to keep the diary. The 
most important reasons for refusals, a lack of time and distrust in the HCSO, imply that 
rejections are associated with personal and household attributes such as economic 
activity that inherently influence both the income and expenditures of households and 
so potentially introduce bias. What information on refusals exists reveals not only 
regional variations, but substantial differences in terms of economic activity of the head 
of the household [27,pp.372-377]. 
Refusals and response rates in the household budget surveys 
]983 1!l9] ]992 ]993 ]994 1995 ]996 ]997 ]998 1999 2000 2001 
Nu mber of households 14.376 7.530 13,327 13,891 16,304 13,702 13,085 17,601 17,31 I 17,243 16,631 
approached 
Refusals 3,505 4,112 4,092 4.604 4,897 3,949 
Of which lack of time 37.8% 42.8% 
Of which distrust 392°,o 42.0% 
Other reasons of failure 1,716 1,853 1.630 1.567 2,229 2,392 
(emptv flat, moved. etc.) 
Final sample size 3,878' 11,813 4,911' 8,106 7.926 10,582 7,531 7,560 10,144 10,185 10,191 10,320 
Response rate for one-
month diary keeping 
Including all failures 82.2% 65.2'Yo 60.8% 57.1% 64.9% 55.0% 54.7% 57.6% 58.8% 59.1% 62.1% 
Including refusals only 69.8% 65.8% 72.1% 62.1% 67.5% 723% 
Refusal of annual 270 128 147 155 285 
interview 
% of final sample 5.5% 13% 14% 1.5% 2.8% 
Other reasons of failure 212 221 191 356 
of annual interview 
Response rate for 96.6% 96.4% 96.6% 93.8% 
annual inten'iew 
Notes: 'Only 50% of the original sample of households kept a diary on detailed hcalIh expenditures [259,p. 161 J; +The data 
collection period was 6-111011th only. 
SOllrce: IiCSO's fiBS. partly Olrn calclIlations [159-161; 153; 76; 254-257; 27; 262; 263} 
To overcome this sampling bias the HCSO has acted in two ways. First, they have 
introduced sample adjustments using corrective weights on the basis of census data. 
Between 1993-1998, only demographic (age group and sex) correction was applied but 
this was extended in 1999 to include economic activity and education of household 
members [27,pp.350,360-369]. Second, the HCSO has begun to implement measures to 
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Table 6.4. 
increase response rates, for instance, in 1999 increasing the remuneration of 
interviewers [27,pp.374,377], a policy that does seem to have made a difference (Table 
6.3). 
In addition, partial non-responses and respondent bias, especially in relation to 
income, have also been dealt with since 1999, using various methods of "imputation" 
[27,pp.370-372; 263,pp.245-248]. For instance, in the case of missing annual 
interviews, data are substituted with the average expenditure of respondent households, 
and this amount is assigned to non-respondents randomly according to the average 
frequency of the occurrence of the expenditure item in question. The income of the 
self-employed is inflated to be comparable the level of their household expenditures. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that any of these adjustments has made a 
difference in terms of estimates of health expenditure. In 1999, when these additional 
corrections were introduced, the same adjustments were applied to the data from the 
1998 survey. Table 6.4 shows that there is hardly any difference between adjusted and 
non-adjusted figures for 1998. This suggests that these types of selection and 
respondent biases have not disto11ed household expenditures on informal payments. 
Comparison of original and adjusted health expenditure data of the household budget survey for 
1998 (yearly per capita expenses in HUF) 
Original health expenditures* Adjusted health expenditures** 
Pharmaceuticals 5,582 5,507 
Medical aids and prostheses 787 768 
Health services 1.073 1,043 
Informal payments 591 587 
Total 8,033 7,905 
Notes: .Only dcmographical correction was applied on the sample using updated census data by counties. age groups and sex . 
•• Imputation of annual expenditures in the case of partial non-responses. and extended sample correction. including age, 
sex, educatiun and economic activity of househuld memhers on the basis of updated census data. 
Source: "[257,p.37}, ""[n,p.37} 
It is true, however, that these adjustments are not able to address all elements of 
selection and respondent bias. For instance, there is some indirect evidence that 
households with really high incomes are underrepresented in the sample, because 
refusals are higher among them than among households whose head has the same level 
of education and economic activity, but lower income. Furthermore, these methods of 
data correction are not able to eliminate distortions from suppression and concealment 
of some forms of income and expenditure [27,pp.362,368-369]. 
Both of these problems might have an impact on the estimation of the overall 
magnitude of informal payments, although to differing degree. Higher income implies a 
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higher overall expenditure and within that health expenditure, but also better health 
status and consequently fewer and less serious diseases. Further, the really wealthy can 
afford to pay for private health care, which might be a more attractive option than 
informal payment to public providers, insofar as the former offers a more secure basis 
for higher quality care. 
Refusals and informal payment related non-responses in other surveys 
OTKI- DOTE- OTKI- GKI- KSH- TARKI-
1972-73 1973 1981 1986 1997 1998 
Response rates 44.4% 92.2% 53.6% 84.4% 93.2% n/a 
% of respondents refused to 3.9-11.3% 19.6% 18.5- 1.4% n/a n/a 
answer questions on informal 19.2'lo 
payments 
% of respondents, who paid, \.3-7.7% ? ? - - n/a 
but refused to tell the amount 
Notes: nia=not available; ?=\t is not possible to tell, whether the survey design allowed to make this distinction. 
SOllrce: [78; 190; 228; 200; 225; 21./, and own slirvey} 
Kecskemet-
study-200t 
87.8% 
-
0.5% 
Concerning the concealment of informal payments, there is evidence from previous 
surveys that the sensitivity of the topic resulted in substantial non-response (Table 6.5). 
Although not all relevant information has been published, it seems that non-responses 
were more of an issue during the 1970s and 1980s than in the past decade. For instance, 
the report of the KSH-1997 "hidden economy" study mentions, among other topics, 
gratitude payments to physicians as a "sensitive area ", for which "not everybody 
answered fully truthflllly" [225,p.1O 1], but does not say that such dishonesty has been 
any more extensive for informal payments than for any other item. In contrast, in a very 
similar 'hidden economy' study (GKI-1986), Ekes [200,p.6] experienced higher non-
response in relation to medical gratitude payments than most other items. Further, in 
the TARKI-1998 study, Bognar et al. [214,pp.28-30] extensively discuss factors that 
influence estimates of the overall magnitude of informal payments, but they do not 
mention non-response as a problem at all. This suggests that non-response may not 
have been an issue in their survey. Finally, in our Kecskemet survey we encountered 
such cases, but they represented only 0.5% of participating households whose members 
had utilised health care. 
It is not possible to assess the extent of respondent bias in !-IBS, because households 
simply do not record in the diary expenditures that they would like to conceal and 
before 2000 health expenditures were not part of the annual interview. Although health 
expenditures have been addressed in the framework of the annual interview since 2000, 
there is no published information on non-responses related to informal payments, but if 
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our assumptions are correct, non-responses in respect of informal payments for health 
care are less of a problem now than previously. The incorporation of health 
expenditures in the annual interview, however, has uncovered two specific problems 
that are likely to have caused a massive underestimation of the overall magnitude of the 
phenomenon before 2001: miscategorisation and the limited ability to capture 
infrequent expenses. The step by step methodological changes allow us to assess the 
effects of these problems. 
6.2.3.2. Mis.classification of health expenditures 
In the HBS, households record their expenses in a diary that does not contain predefined 
categories for non-regular expenditures, and the items in the diary are sorted into 
expenditure categories by coders after the data collection period. Until 2000, health 
expenditures were allocated into four main categories in the coding phase: 
pharmaceuticals, medical aids and prostheses, gratitude payment and health services 
(out-of-pocket payments to private doctors/providers). While medical products (such as 
hearing aids, wheelchairs and various drugs) can easily be distinguished from out-of-
pocket payments to service providers, such distinction between gratitude payment and 
payments to private providers is not straightforward. It is not possible to tell whether 
the expenditure was formal or informal from notes such as 'doctor - 1000 Ft' [265]. 
This suggests that informal payments could have been underestimated if ambiguous 
items had been placed in the category of 'health services' and not 'gratitude payment'. 
Table 6.6 shows evidence that such misclassification may have occurred in the HBS. 
Expenditure on gratitude payments and health services individually exhibit marked 
changes from year to year, while with the exception of 2000, changes in the sum of, 
gratitude payments and health services are under 20%. In 1983, when the HBS was 
supplemented with a health care specific component, half of all households recorded 
health expenditures in a separate diary according to predefined categories that separated 
gratitude payments, private health sen'ices and medical products. Consequently the 
1983 HBS provides a more reliable estimate of the share of informal payments; in that 
year households spent almost twice as much on gratitude payments than on private 
health services. For 1992 this ratio had seemingly been reverscd, and in 1993 spending 
in the two categories was almost equal. While the collapse of the communist regime 
has created an opportunity for the expansion of the private sector, which would explain 
a shift between these two categories, change on such a scale is unlikely to have 
occurred, since, as we have discussed in chapter 2, the private sector is still very limited 
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in Hungary. But even if we assume that these findings represented reality, how could 
the subsequent year's change in the opposite direction be explained? 
Informal payments ('gratitude payment') and out-of-pocket payments to private providers ('health 
service') in Hungary according to the household budget surveys 
1983 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Health expenditures at 
current prices (billion 
HlJF) 
Gratitude payment 1.398 nla 2.440 3.875 4.313 4.666 5.271 5.775 5.900 7.890 9.037 17.122 
Health services 811 nla 4.270 3.265 4.060 6.333 6.129 7.741 10.483 8.792 30.496 18.741 
Total 2.209 6.130 6.710 7.140 8.373 10.999 11.400 13516 16.423 16.683 39.533 35.863 
Gratitude payment as % of 63% 36% 54% 52% 42% 46% 43% 36% 47% 23% 48% total 
Health expenditures at 
constant prices 
(1983=100)* 
Gratitude payment 100 0 45 59 55 47 43 39 35 43 45 78 
Health services 100 0 137 86 90 109 85 91 108 82 260 146 
Total 10li 89 79 69 68 70 58 58 62 57 124 103 
Health expenditures as % 
of previous year 
Gratitude payment 30% -6% -16% -9% -7% -11% 22% 4% 73% 
Health services -38% 5% 22% -22% 7% 18% -24% 216% -44% 
Total I -11% -13~~ -1% 3% -16% 0% 6% -8% 116% -17% 
Notes: *Applying Consumer Price Index deflator 
Source: Calculaledfrom HCSO's fiBS [259-261; 253; 76. 25./-257; 27; 262; 263J 
Findings of other surveys, which addressed not just informal payments but also out-
of-pocket payments to private providers, seem to reinforce the explanation of 
discrepancies as misclassification (Table 6.7). While there is an almost two-fold 
difference between estimates of informal payment, overall expenditures in the SZGTI-
1994 study are close to the HBS total for 1994. This suggests that informal payments 
are under-, while out-of-pocket payments for services are over-estimated by the HBS, 
especially given that the SZGTI-1994 estimate for the overall magnitude of informal 
payment is almost certainly an underestimate, given the exclusion of certain types of 
health care utilisation (such as those unrelated to specific episodes of illness). The 1997 
'hidden economy' study of the HCSO also offers an example of misclassification, but 
the other way round. Its estimate of the overall magnitude of informal payments is 
almost half of the estimate yielded by the HBS for the same year, while out-of-pocket 
payments to private providers in the KSH-1997 study are almost three times as much as 
that of the HBS. The source ofmisclassification can easily be identified in this case, as 
some informal payments have been misclassified as formal out-of-pocket payments for 
health services, for which the provider did not issue an invoice or receipt. There is 
indirect evidence that respondents probably did not distinguish between gratitude 
payments and non-documented private payments to doctors. While the survey found 
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that 44% of all episodes of dental care were documented, the corresponding figure was 
only 19% for physician services, the lowest among all other services considered 
[225,p.8]. 
Overall magnitude or informal payments and out-or-pocket payments to private providers in 
Hungary according to three surveys 
SZGTI,1994 KSH,1997 KecskemCt study, 2001 
Health expenditures at 
current prices (billion HUF) 
Gratitude payment 7.407 3.028 13.033 
Health services 2.259 21.825 31.696 
Total 9.666 24.853 44.730 
SOI/ree: [75; 225. alld 011'11 survey] 
In general, if we compare total expenditures, including gratitude payments and hl.!alth 
services, HBS estimates are closer to findings of other surveys (Tables 6.2,6.6,6.7). 
Nevertheless, HBS estimates of the overall magnitude of informal payments ar~ still 
lower, which cannot simply be explained by misclassification of expenditure items. 
There is another methodological explanation for underestimation, which is associated 
with the limited ability of diaries to capture large but infrequent expenditures [27; 263]. 
Until 2000, household health expenditures had only been collected using diaries, but in 
2000 data were also obtained from the annual intervi~w, which, as in the other surveys 
considered here, is based on retrospective accounts of households. This methodological 
change offers a plausible explanation for the sudden increase of total expenditures in 
2000, but also for the seemingly suspicious change in the share of informal payments 
between 2000 and 2001. 
6.2.3.3. Health expenditures as rare events 
The rationale for including the annual interview in the HBS is to provide a more reliable 
estimate of irregular or rare expenditures, usually on expensive items, such as cars, 
mobile phones, personal computers or washing machines. Experiences have indeed 
shown that households report expenditures on most of these items 4-11 times more 
frequently in the annual interview than in the one-month diary keeping period 
[262,pp.223-224; 263,pp.245-246]. 
Clearly some health expenditures, including informal payments for services such as 
complex surgical procedures are irregular and rare and, as we have shown, many would 
not have been captured prior to the inclusion of the annual interview in 2000, which is 
likely to have led to the underestimation of the overall magnitude of informal payments. 
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For instance, in 2000 there were 6,343 major heart operations in Hungary, equivalent to 
one procedure for every 1,600 inhabitants. If we assume, on the basis of the findings of 
the TARKI-1998 study, that about 60% of the patients pay the surgeon informally, and 
they pay an average of 50,000 HUF [214,pp.14,26], failure to capture payments for 
cardiac operations alone would result in underestimation of informal payments by about 
200 million HUF. 
The inclusion of household health expenses in the annual interview can thus be seen 
as an explanation for the more than doubling of total expenditures between 1999 and 
2000 in real terms (Table 6.6). Nevertheless, this increase fell almost exclusively on 
out-of-pocket-payments to private providers ('health services'), because in 2000 the 
annual questionnaire did not distinguish between formal and informal payments 
[266,p.3], and the resulting excess amount was probably (mis)categorised as 'health 
services' and not 'gratitude payment'. In 2001, however, a more detailed questionnaire 
was introduced, which collected information on formal and informal payments 
separately according to the type of service [267,p.14]. This more accurate classification 
revealed the scale of underestimation and provided evidence that the one-month diary 
keeping period for one-twelfth of the household sample was insufficient to detect all 
episodes of informal payment. Between 2000 and 2001 the proportion of households, 
who gave informal payment 'increased' from 4.4% to 25% and the overall magnitude of 
informal payments almost doubled (Tables 6.6,6.8). 
Extent and magnitude of informal payment ('gratitude payment') and out-or-pocket payments to 
private providers ('health services') according to the household budget surveys 
1992 1993 199-1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Proportion of 
households, which 
had expenses on: 
Gratitude payment 5.7%* 5.2%* 5.1%· 4.4%** 25%*** 
Health services 29.3%** 26.6%**** 
A,'erage amount in 
IIUF per household, 
which had expenses 
on: 
Gratitude payment 55,719** 18,246**+ 
Ilcalth services 27,780** 18.752**** 
SOI/rce: ·[JJ5}, .O[J?}: ···[J65}; • .. ·[J63} 
Underestimation resulting from misclassification and the unreliable detection of rare 
events can thus explain the discrepancy between findings of HDS and all but one of the 
other surveys presented in Table 6.2. The difference is still considerable between the 33 
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billion HUF of the TARKI-1998 study and an adjusted overall magnitude of 10-15 
billion of the HBS for 1998, which merits further attention. 
6.2.3.4. Recall bias 
The differences between the research methods used in the T ARKI-1998 study and the 
HBS can be used to explain this additional discrepancy, but if we take into account the 
adjustments described above, it is not possible to tell whether the HBS underestimates, 
or the TARKI -1998 study overestimates the overall magnitude of informal payments. 
First, although there is no reason to believe that respondent bias has had a different 
effect in the two studies, the HBS study could have suffered a more serious selection 
bias, insofar as the willingness of high income households to participate in a short, 30-
minute interview is higher than in a demanding month diary exercise, and those who 
refused to undertake this task were thus excluded from the annual interview. 
Second, in the T ARKI-1998 study, Bognar et al. [214] collected data from about 
1300 individuals, not households, \vhich suggests that recall bias might have been less 
of a problem there than in the HBS. In other household surveys a single respondent had 
to provide information on other household members and it is not unreasonable to 
assume that individuals report their own experiences more accurately than those of 
others. On the other hand, there could be misunderstanding of the question with 
individuals reporting expenditures of the whole household, causing overestimation of 
informal payments. This possibility has been raised by the researchers in the TARKI-
1998 study, but they argued that "this misunderstanding did not happen at all, or only 
in exceptional cases" [214,p.29]. On what basis they stated this is not clear. 
To minimise underestimation from recall bias, interviewers of the T ARKI-1998 
study asked "memory refreshing" questions before they alluded to the actual amount of 
informal payments. According to Bognar et al. [214,p.28] this design increased the 
accuracy of responses. However, general questions on informal payments, such as 
'what proportion of patients pay?', or 'how much is the usual amount for 'x' service?' 
might have created an atmosphere in which respondents felt pressure to overstate the 
payment if the amount they actually paid was lower than what they believed was 
typical. 
Third, as Bognar et al. [214,p.28-29] acknowledge, the sample size was too small to 
detect rare events (such as the aforementioned cardiac operations) with confidence, 
which was not a problem in the case of the HBS annual interview. We should not 
forget that the unreliable detection of rare cvents could havc caused not just under-, but 
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overestimation of informal payment, for instance if the 1,300 person sample included by 
chance two or three cases of cardiac operations, whereas their prevalence was only one 
per 2,000 person in 1998 [268,p,198]. 
6.2.4. CONCLUSIONS: AN ESTIMATE FOR 2001 
To assess the overall magnitude of informal payments in Hungary we have placed the 
HCSO HBS under scrutiny. Comparing the estimates of the HBS with findings from 
other expenditure surveys and analysing the recent changes in the methodology of the 
HBS, we can conclude that during the 1990s, the HBS underestimated the overall 
magnitude of informal payments for at least two reasons. First, diary records did not 
provide a sound basis for the differentiation of informal and formal payments, and a 
substantial part of informal (,gratitude') payments was probably misclassified as out-of-
pocket payments to private providers ('health services'). Second, the system of diary 
keeping was not a reliable means to detect informal payments for rare events, such as 
heart surgery or organ transplantation. 
The incorporation of health expenditures and within that 'gratitude payments' into 
the annual interview of the HBS in 2001 has made visible the scale of underestimation, 
as expenditures on gratitude payment almost doubled between 2000 and 2001. While 
this methodological change brought HBS estimates closer to the findings of other 
surveys, the HBS estimate for 2001 is still significantly lower than the estimate of 
Bognar et al. for 1998 from the T ARKI study, the only national representative survey 
dedicated entirely to informal payments during the 1990s.43 It is not possible to tell 
whether the former underestimated or the latter overestimated the overall magnitude of 
informal payments, as there are arguments supporting both possibilities. 
The most important problem with the HBS, which might have been a source of 
substantial underestimation, is the large number of refusals to keep a diary. Although 
the HCSO has implemented measures to increase response rates, in 2001 almost 3 out of 
10 households still refused to participate in the survey (Table 6.3). 
Let us assume that among non-participating households both the frequency of gi\'ing 
and the amount given were higher than among respondent households. Assuming that 
twice as many households paid on average twice the average amount, the }-IBS would 
have failed to capture 13.7 billion HUF (calculated on the basis of Table 6.8). Further, 
assuming that respondent bias among those who participated in the survey had also 
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distorted the overall magnitude of informal payment, with the highest figure of 20% of 
households concealing this kind of expenses at the average amount responding 
households paid (Tables 6.5,6.8), another 19 billion HUF would have been missed. In 
this scenario, the overall magnitude of informal payments would still remain at just 
under 50 billion HUF (17.2+13.7+19=49.9 billion HUF). Further, assuming that the 
HBS provided the lowest possible estimate, 16.2 billion HUF (with 95%CI), the overall 
magnitude of informal payments most probably fell between 16.2 and 49.9 billion HUF 
in 2001. Is this large enough to bother about? 
According to the forthcoming estimate of the NHA, in 2001, public expenditures on 
health were 754.4 billion HUF, while private expenditures, excluding the NHA estimate 
of informal payment, were 295.3 billion HUF [269]. Thus, the 16.2-49.9 billion HUF in 
informal payments amounted to 1.5-4.5% of total health expenditures in 2001. Looked 
at this way, informal payments do not seem to be an important source of health care 
financing, especially in comparison with countries, such as Azerbaijan and the Russian 
Federation, where, according to Lewis more than half of total health expenditures are 
informal (84% and 56%, respectively), and even Poland, where the corresponding 
figure is 30% [96,p.19]. 
Nevertheless, even this relatively small amount can make a difference if informal 
payments make up a substantial part of the income of health workers, especially 
physicians, who make important resource allocation and distribution decisions in health 
care. As discussed previously, there is fairly conclusive evidence that informal 
payments are unequally distributed among health workers. Next, we will address this 
issue by calculating a likely distribution of informal payments among groups of 
physicians on the basis of available evidence to explore what informal payments may 
mean in terms of physicians' income. 
6.3. The distribution of informal payments among physicians 
The model which we use to show the implications of unequal distribution of informal 
payments among health workers has been built on three distributional dimensions: type 
of health worker (physicians vs. other health workers), levels of care (primary care vs. 
specialist care), and specialties (diagnostic and other supportive medical specialties vs. 
'curative' specialties). We have assigned distributional weights to these groups of 
43 Significance is calculated using 95%Cl from Bognar [2l4,p.29] and frol11 Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office [263,p.252] using SE for all health expenditures. 
PETER GAAL 
PAGE 167 I TIiESIS_Gr RE\,ISlD_ VI7 
6. MAGNITUDE AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
6.3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS AMONG PHYSICIANS 
health workers, on the basis of evidence reviewed in chapter 4, the secondary analysis 
of previous surveys and the findings of our own study. In the calculation we have 
worked with our lower estimate of the overall magnitude of informal payments for 2001 
described before, first dividing the amounts between the various groups defined, 
according to the distributional weights, and then the number of physicians, to arrive at 
an average income that specialists and family doctors can be assumed to receive from 
informal payments. Data on the number of physicians are from the official statistics of 
the HCSO, which has its own data collection project covering the health workforce, but 
also reports tabulations of registered physicians in Hungary from the Hungarian 
Medical Chamber. 
6.3.1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS ALONG THREE 
DIMENSIONS 
Table 6.9. 
In Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 we have summarised the available evidence on the 
distribution of informal payments between physicians and other health care workers, 
between primary care and specialist care (including inpatient and outpatient care), and 
according to the type of services. As Table 6.9 shows, further evidence from the 
secondary analysis of previous studies (OTKI-1984 and TK-1985), as well as the 
findings of our own survey in Kecskemet supports the conclusion that physicians 
receive the majority, i.e. about 90% of informal payments. 
Distribution of informal payments between physicians and other health care workers 
Year Magnitude (HUF/respondent or utiliser) Physicians' Source 
Study Physicians Other health workers share (%) Remarks 
1972173,OTKI (78) 
hospital 197 31 87% excluding non-respondents 
only money 
1984,OTKI [201] 
hospital 325 81 80% only paediatric hospitals 
1985, TK [79] 
hospital 1832 484 79% 
outpatient specialist care 862 105 89% 
primary care 509 34 94% 
1997, KSH 737 46 94% [225] 
1998, TARKI [214,p.30] 
hospital 6122 756 89% 
outpatient specialist care 477 54 90% 
primary care 218 29 88% 
2001, KECSKEMET 3337 259 93% excluding non-respondents 
study 
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As far as the levels of care are concerned, family physicians (primary care) receive 
about 30% of the money, according to the findings of the TARKI-1998 study. 
Although a much older study (OTKI -1969) came up with a similar figure (Table 4.5), 
the finding of our own survey shows only a 10% share for primary care. In the model, 
we take the estimate from the TARKI-1998, study as, in contrast with the other two, it 
was a nationally representative survey. However a sensitivity analysis using the lower 
estimate did not change the final conclusions. 
Finally, we have further evidence from our own survey to support the observation 
that physicians in diagnostic and other support specialties receive no, or negligible 
informal payments. In the Kecskemet study we encountered no cases of informal 
payment for diagnostic services, which corresponds with the findings of the TK-1985 
and T ARKI -1998 studies, which asked about the opinion of the general population on 
this issue [79; 214]. 
6.3.2. THE NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS IN HUNGARY 
The HCSO publishes data on the number of physicians from two sources within the 
framework of the so-called National Statistical Data Collection Programme (OSAP) 
[270]. First, in each year since 2000, the Hungarian Medical Chamber prepares a report 
on all the physicians in Hungary on the basis of a register it maintains (OSAP 
1589,1590). Second, there is an obligation on all health care providers, whether public 
or private, to report on the establishment and employment of health care workers in 
their organisation (OSAP 1019). Comparison of the 1\vo data sources allows us to 
determine an approximate number of physicians in the aforementioned groups as the 
database of the Hungarian Medical Chamber includes all registered physicians, while 
the annual rep0I1 of health care providers includes only those physicians, who are 
directly or indirectly involved in patient care. 
Table 6.10 presents a breakdown of the number of physicians according to these two 
sources. The number of registered and of working medical doctors come from the 
register of the Hungarian Medical Chamber, while the number of physicians working in 
health care provider organisations comes from the providers' report. The difference is 
accounted for physicians, who work, for instance, for pharmaceutical companies, or for 
administrative bodies, such as the MOH or the NHIF A, or who are unemployed. 
We have divided physicians working in patient care into three main groups: 
physicians in primary care (family doctors), specialists who usually do not receive 
informal payments and other specialists, who are assumed to receive informal 
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Table 6.10. 
payments. 'Non-paying' medical specialties comprise three sub-groups. First, 
physicians in the National Public Health and Medical Officer Services, in the National 
Blood Supply Service and university researchers and teachers in non-clinical subjects 
(such as anatomy, physiology, biochemistry) who do not work in specialist in- or 
outpatient care. Second, there are a number of physicians, who work exclusively in the 
private sector, the most important group being dentists. Nevertheless, we have included 
all dentists, as dental care is part of publicly funded services. Third, there are 
physicians who work in- and outpatient care, but provide ancillary services, where 
direct patient-physicians encounters are limited. We have assumed that with the 
exception of these groups, all other physicians, including family doctors, may receive 
some informal payments. 
Number of physicians in Hungary, 2001 
Physicians Number Remarks 
Registered 39,648 Hungarian Medical Chamber, 
Active 33,088 registration database 
Working in paticnt care 30,586 Health care providers' report 
J. Family doctor (primary care) 6,733 
2. Specialists in 'non-paying' specialties, 7,740 
of which: 
Public health 608 
Blood supply 163 
Education and research 1,306 
Dentists 2,763 number of entrepreneur dentists 
Anaesthesio1ogy 1,024 
Clinica11aboratory 458 
X-ray and other diagnostic imaging 1,113 including diagnostic ultrasound 
Pathology 305 
3. Spccialists in 'paying' specialties 16,113 
Source: [27/,17. /,17,5./7, 9} 
6.3.3. SYNTHETISING THE DATA: INCOME FROM INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
We have created the model using the findings concerning the distribution of informal 
payments, the data on the number of physicians in the two, 'paying' groups and our 
upper u!1d lower estimates for the overall magnitude of informal payments and present 
our findings in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11. 
6.4. 
This indicates that both family doctors and specialists working in 'paying' medical 
specialties realized on average an income of about 50-160 thousand HUF44 monthly 
from informal payments in 2001. At the same time, the official regular monthly gross 
salary of a family doctor was 77,156 HUF on average, while a specialist earned 102,819 
HUF per month. If we add other earnings, the monthly gross salary totalled 120,666 
and 148,348 HUF respectively [271,19.7]. 
Estimated income of physicians from informal payments, 2001 
Overall magnitude of Number of 
Informal payment per 
Share informal payment physician (HUF) 
(billion HUF) Physicians /year /month 
Total (lower estimate) 100% 16.200 
Physicians total 90% 14.580 
of which: 
Family doctors 30% 4.374 6,733 649,636 54,136 
(primary care) 
Specialists 70% 10.206 16,133 633,402 52,783 
Total (upper estimate) 100% 49.900 
Physicians total 90% 44.9\0 
of which 
Family doctors 30% 13.473 6,733 2,001,040 166,753 
(primary care) 
Specialists 70% 31.437 16,133 1,951,033 162,586 
Conclusions: a relatively small overall amount can make a 
difference 
So, how can we interpret the final figures from the model in terms of the importance of 
informal payments as an incentive for physicians? 
To make an accurate comparison we assume that, except for a minor fraction of the 
overall amount, informal payments are not declared in tax returns and consequently are 
net income. Compared to the about 72,000 HUF net monthly salary for primary care 
physicians and the about 87,500 HUF for specialists, even the lower estimate of 53-
54,000 HUF informal payments are considerable, at about 75% and 60% of their total 
net official salary respectively. Thus, for physicians, income from informal payment 
does matter, suggesting that informal payment is of a scale that does have relevance for 
health policy, not primarily because of its overall magnitude but of its unequal 
distribution among health workers. 
4~ About E200-640. 
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While our analysis employed a crude distribution of informal payments among large 
groups of health workers, each physician in a particular group is most unlikely to 
receive the same amount of informal payments. There are other important differences 
between physicians that will influence distribution within these groups, such as the 
specialty, the type of health care provider, geographical location and the physicians' 
position in the hierarchy. For instance there is evidence that obstetrics-gynaccology and 
surgery are better 'paid' medical specialties than internal medicine or psychiatry [79; 
201; 214]. Unfortunately the missing data of the OTKI-1984 study made it impossible 
to quantify these differences. While we could not refine our model by incorporating 
these further dimensions, they would have certainly amplified the differences by 
increasingly concentrating informal payments in the hands of a smaller and smaller 
group of physicians. For some, the unequal distribution of informal payments will 
make a very big difference. 
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Having established in chapter 6 that informal payment is important in terms of its scale, 
the next step in establishing its policy importance is to examine the motivation of the 
participants in the transaction. As we have argued before, the key issue is whether 
informal payments are 'donations' motivated by gratitude, or 'fee for service' motivated 
by the desire to receive better care. In the next three chapters we contrast these two 
hypotheses by using the concept of, what we call, the 'coercion factor'. Given that the 
key distinctive feature of gratitude payments is that they are paid voluntarily, the 
validity of the 'donation' hypothesis would be questioned if one could detect any kind 
of direct or indirect pressures on patients to pay. 
Using the contrasting assumptions of the 'fee-for-service' and the ' donation' 
hypotheses, we attempt to capture this ' coercion factor' by presenting empirical 
evidence relating to the two main research areas described in Table 5.1. One of them, 
the equity impact of informal payments, addressed in this chapteris indirectly related to 
the 'coercion factor' ,45 while we directly address the motivation of participants in 
chapter 8 by examining the possible discrepancies between what survey respondents 
stated motivated them to pay providers informally and the broader context in which the 
transaction occurred. 
7.1. Equity and the motivation of informal payments 
On the basis of the 'donation' hypothesis we have assumed that if informal payments 
are really given voluntarily, those patients who cannot afford to pay, simply do not pay. 
That is informal payments neither represent a barrier to accessing services, nor people 
are willing to shoulder a disproportionate financial burden (compared to their ability to 
pay) to give informal payments. However, if informal payment is associated with 
coercion, in any form, it makes it the worst possible form of private financing since 
those already vulnerable will be least able to resists and its informal nature makes it 
difficult to tackle abuses. In this chapter, we present our findings from the Kecskemet 
study and complement them with the analysis of official statistics and secondary 
analysis of other surveys within this explanatory framework. 
45 It mllst be noted that the impact of informal payments on equity is directly related to the policy 
importance of informal payments. Because we selected the motivation isslle as the organising theme of 
( -+) 
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Although we have briefly touched upon the concept of equity in chapter 1, in the 
following sections we provide a more detailed discussion of how equity has been 
conceptualised and measured within the framework of this study, before presenting our 
findings. 
7.1.1. CONCEPTUALISATION OF EQUITY 
Equity is a concept of distributive justice [e.g.62; 60,pp.15-31,54-60; 53,pp.36-38; 272], 
in which the members (individuals or groups) in a society decide how to distribute 
something that they care about. As we have discussed in chapter I, equity is one of the 
performance criteria used to assess health care systems. An emphasis on equity focuses 
on the distribution of something in contrast to maximisation of its overall level 
(aggregate) given available resources (the criterion of efficiency). 
In economics the distribution of goods and services (and hence the distribution of 
income, which is the means of obtaining goods and services) is considered. The various 
goods and services, which include health care, have costs and benefits, whose 
distribution can be studied separately, and referred to as 'incidence' [60,pp.54-60]. The 
distribution of the cost burden in obtaining goods and services is referred to as fiscal 
incidence and the distribution of the benefits of goods and services, derived from their 
consumption (utilisation) is referred to as expenditure (or benefit) incidence.46 
Incidence is a positive concept insofar as it describes any distribution without taking 
a stance on the fairness (justice) or unfairness (injustice) of a particular distribution. 
While the concept of equity also involves analysis of the distribution of the cost burden 
of goods and services, which is referred to as equity in financing, and the distribution of 
the benefits of consumed goods and services, which is referred to as equity in benefits 
(or service delivery), it goes further by evaluating the fairness of this distribution [273]. 
But, as we have pointed out in chapter I, what is fair or unfair, depends on one's moral-
philosophical standpoint, i.e. on one's view of 'the good society'. Different moral-
philosophies imply different concepts of fairness, so different people may think 
our study, for the ease of presentation we have decided to relate the equity issue to the two contrasting 
hypotheses of the motivation of participants, and not to the policy importance of the phenomenon. 
46 They also talk about net (or budget) incidence, when fiscal and expenditure incidence is added up, and 
tells us whether any particular individual or group of people is better or worse off as a result of a 
particular program. Economists also distinguish statutory and economic incidence as those who should 
bear the cost burden of any program according to the provisions of laws and regulations are often not 
thosc, who eventually pay, since private actors are ottcn capable to shift this cost burden to others directly 
or indirectly. l60,pp.54-60] 
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different distributions of health care equitable or inequitable. Thus, equity IS a 
normative concept, which involves value judgements. 
Although the various philosophical positions provide a valuable conceptual 
framework to contrast the essence of different concepts of justice, they are of limited 
use to policy-makers for two reasons. First, as we have discussed in chapter 1, policy 
makers and the public that they represent are not exclusively committed to one 
particular moral-philosophy. Second, and more importantly, it is not always 
straightforward to translate the various principles into the language of practice. For 
instance, it does matter whether we would like to provide a minimum level of health for 
everybody or whether we would like to minimise the difference between those with the 
lowest level of health and those with that of the highest. There could even be different 
interpretations of what that minimum level of health means, and whether it is more 
desirable to bring as many as possible closer to this line or only the number of people, 
who go beyond the line is important. It also makes a difference whether we consider 
the ultimate health status of the members of the society, or only the distribution of 
utilisation of health services or even the opportunity for utilisation (access). 
A somewhat more useful way to put the various moral-philosophies into practice is 
to distil the contrasting concepts of justice into intermediate concepts, which can 
independently be applied to different aspects (elements) of health care. In the case of 
equity in health care financing these are the 'ability to pay' versus the 'benefit' 
principle, whereby the fonner requires that the cost burden of health care to be borne 
according to one's ability to pay as opposed to the latter, which considers it fair if those 
who benefit from health care pay for the services they utilise [273]. In the case of 
equity in health care delivery, these are the distribution of (the benefits of) health 
services according to 'needs' versus 'willingness (and ability) to pay', whereby needs 
are defined as capacity to benefit from the receipt of health services [274; 275; cited in 
273,p.1813], and willingness to pay is linked to one's capacity to pay for health services 
and the right to choose how to spend one's income, which is also referred to as a 
distribution based on 'merits' [273,p.1809], or as Miller [276; cited in 59,p.53] puts it 
"deserts ".47 While these intermediate concepts bring the abstract principles closer to 
practice, and the benefit principle coupled with a merit-based distribution of health 
47 The merit or desert based distribution is linked to ability to pay, and sometimes referred to as 
distribution according to ability to pay [e.g.277; in 273,p.1809], but I prefer to use the first two terms, as 
the latter can easily be confused with the 'ability to pay' principle in equity in financing, but the two 
describe two incompatible principles in equity in service delivery and financing. 
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services provide a relatively straightforward guide for implementation (where policy-
makers adopt a libertarian position), the 'ability to pay' principle and the principle of 
distribution of health services according to 'need' are still ambiguous concepts. The 
'ability to pay' principle does not tell us exactly how much people with different 
incomes should contribute to the financing of health care and the receipt of services is 
influenced by factors other than need [278; cited in 273,p.1813]. Further, although it 
makes sense in the measurement of equity, the separation of financing and service 
delivery is somewhat artificial insofar as the system of financing can be a barrier to 
accessing health care. All these points are very well illustrated in relation to the health 
policy objective of 'equal access for equal needs', which, as we have discussed in 
chapter 1 (Box 1.1) the Hungarian health care system seeks to achieve. 
7.1.2. INTERPRETATION AND MEASUREMENT OF 'EQUAL ACCESS FOR 
EQUAL NEEDS' 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer [273,p.1812] argue that policy-makers and academics alike 
often equate 'access' with the 'receipt of treatment', although, as LeGrand [279] and 
Mooney [278] point out, the two are not the same, since the former represents only the 
opportunity to use health services and not the actual utilisation of health care. LeGrand 
[279; cited in 273,p.1812] has proposed conceptual ising 'access' in terms of the money 
and time costs incurred by patients to obtain care, and the principle of 'equal access for 
equal needs' thus would require that patients with equal needs face the same cost of 
obtaining care. While LeGrand rightly reminds us not to confuse access with 
utilisation, this definition of access to care does not take into account how the same 
costs of obtaining care require a greater sacrifice by a poor than a rich patient [e.g.280; 
cited in 273,p.1812]. Indeed, the principle of 'equal access for equal needs' implies that 
access to care should depend on 'need' rather than 'merit' (i.e. willingness to pay), and 
even where patients with the same needs face the same costs, this could still deter the 
poor from utilising health services insofar as these costs represent a greater part of their 
smaller income. FUl1her, as Culyer [281; cited in 273,p.1817] noted, the justification of 
the 'ability to pay' principle in financing health care is to promote equity in the delivery 
of health care. Charging the same co-payment, or even the full cost of services for 
patients with the same health need would satisfy LeGrand's condition of equal access, 
yet it is contrary to the ability to pay principle. It does not ensure that those who cannot 
afford to pay for services out-of-pocket will be able to use services if they are needed, 
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consequently it is not consistent with the spirit of distribution of health serVIces 
according to needs. 
Notwithstanding that ignoring the 'ability to pay' principle in equity in financing 
goes against a need-based distribution of health care, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
[273,p.1817] argue that justification of the 'ability to pay principle' on the basis of 
equity in service delivery requires only that payments be separated from utilisation, and 
not that the poor pay an equal or smaller share of their income than the rich 
(proportional or progressive financing). They argue that, for example, "decoupling" 
payments from utilisation with the introduction of a lump-sum tax would eliminate the 
direct deterrence effect of user-charges, thereby would ensure equal access to health 
care, yet would require the poor to pay a larger share of their income than the rich 
(regressive financing). They conclude that the justification of the 'ability to pay 
principle' has to come from elsewhere, for instance to protect patients from health care 
payments that would preclude their consumption of essential goods and services [281; 
cited in 273,p.1817]. Although they contend that such a proposition would support 
contributions according to ability to pay further than simple "decol/pling", I argue that 
Culyer's argument has a special relevance to both the 'ability to pay' and the 'equal 
access for equal needs' principles. First, where many people are only just able to afford 
basic necessities, such as food and clothes, one cannot exclude the possibility that their 
consumption of these items will be adversely affected by a regressive lump-sum tax for 
health care. Second, if we accept that the rationale of the 'ability to pay' principle is 
indeed the desirl: to protect the individual's expenditures on other essential goods and 
services, then user-charges per se are not problematic, but only if they are not tailored to 
the ability of individual patients to pay, i.e. they represent a disproportionate burden on 
patients or households. 
We have measured the equity impact of informal payments in this sense on both the 
financing and thL' delivery sides. Although informal payments, as direct payments, are 
by definition regressive (there is no transfer between the sick and the healthy), the link 
between payments and utilisation does not in itself question the validity of the 
'donation' hypothesis. We have hypothesized that payments that are at least 
proportionate to the income of those who utilise health care arc not incompatible with 
the 'donation' hypothesis in that they could really be given voluntarily, with the 
provision that the amount paid does not exceed disposable income. However, if the 
poor pay a larger share of their income than the rich, especially where they must 
mobilise resources other than their disposable income (from savings, borrowing, etc.), 
1'1:'1 lOR (iAAL 
I' A G r I 7 7 I T Ii E SIS G I' R E \' I S E IJ _ ,. I 7 
7. IMPACT OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS ON EQUITY 
7.2 INFORMAL PAYMENTS AND EQUITY IN FINANCING 
this would contradict the gratitude payment hypothesis. We have examined these 
possibilities using official statistics (the HBS of HCSO), the secondary analysis of the 
OTKI-1984 and TK-1985 studies, and our Kecskemet study, which included a question 
on the sources of money used to pay for health care. 
In accordance with the 'equal access' principle, we have assessed equity in service 
delivery in two particular areas. Previous surveys and official statistics did not contain 
data that would have enabled us to analyse the direct deterrence effect of informal 
payments, i.e. whether or not they prevented utilisation of health services. We have 
addressed this issue in our Kecskemet study, by finding out how many people did not 
utilise health care or delayed utilisation for financial reasons, and by finding out 
whether money was a significant factor in failure to complete treatment. Of course, any 
direct deterrence effect would contradict the 'donation' hypothesis. Second, we have 
looked for evidence of differentiated treatment between 'paying' and 'non-paying' 
patients. Although this relates to service utilisation and not access per se, any 
difference implies different opportunities, even if access is not totally denied. 
7.2. Informal payments and equity in financing 
In the statistical publications of the HCSO on the HBS there are data on household 
income and expenditures by income decile. In 2000, this breakdown was changed to 
income quintiles, but while retaining income and expenditure data for the first and the 
tenth income deciles [27,pp.64-65; 262,pp.26-27; 263]. These data enable us to 
calculate the share that average per capita expenditure on gratuities constitutes in 
average per capita income in each income quintiles (deciles). Table 7.1 shows this 
calculation. 
As we can see, average per capita gratitude payments in absolute terms are 
increasing across the income spectrum. In 2001 average per capita spending on 
gratuities was 2.5 times higher in the highest income decile than in the lowest. 
Although the pattern of gratuities as percentage of income is not consistent across the 
range, the comparison of the first with the tenth income deciles and the first with the 
fifth income quintiles show that these amounts represent a larger share of the income of 
the poor than the rich. This association is more marked if we consider only disposable 
income. First, we have subtracted from the average per capita income only food 
consumption, which has not just increased the differences, but made the pattern of 
decreasing proportion of gratuities with income quintiles (decilcs) unequivocal. 
Second, if we consider the national poverty line, which is set by the HCSO each year, 
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we can see that the smallest per capita amount (the poverty line for a family of two 
adults and four children) is higher than not just the first income decile, but the first 
income quintile as well. This suggests that households in the poorest 20% of the 
population pay informal payments despite being under the national poverty line, which 
contradicts the' donation' hypothesis of informal payments. 
Informal payments and equity in financing health services in Hungary: household budget survey 
for 2001 
First Income quintiles Tenth 
income 
2nd 3rd 41h 5"1 
income 
decile 1" decile 
Per capita expenditure on gratuity 839 887 1,210 1,953 2,077 2,384 2,137 
(HUF/year) 
Expenditures on gratuity per 
household (HUF/year) 3,071 3,140 3,678 5,000 4,902 5,388 4,744 
Per capita net income (HUF/year) 194,771 241,173 365,914 455,138 565,011 904,304 1,098,657 
Net income per household 
(HUF/year) 712,862 853,752 1,112,379 1,165,153 1,333,426 2,043,727 2,439,019 
Gratuities as % of income 0.43% 0.37% 0.33% 0.43% 0.37% 0.26'% 0.19% 
National minimum food 127,272* - 149,376** 
consumption per capita (HUF/year) 
Per capita disposable income (net 
income minus food consumption)**· 67,499 113,901 238,642 327,866 437,739 777,032 971,3~5 
Gratuities as % of disposable 
income 1,24% 0,78% 0,51% 0,60(~;' 0,47% 0,31% 0,22% 
National poverty line per capita 290,532* - 471,132** 
(HUF/year) 
Notes: *Household with 2 adults and 4 children; "Singl\! person; "·Using minimum per capita food consumption in households 
with 2 adults and 4 children; 
Source: HCSO. partly 011'11 calculations [263; 282J 
Nevertheless, the limitation of these crude calculations is that they do not take into 
account the real incidence of informal payments. First, iL a given year not all 
households have at least one member who utilised health services, and second, among 
those who used health services not all paid the physician informally. The average per 
capita informal payments shown in Table 7.1 reflect this point very well as they are 
only a small fraction of the average per capita income even in the poorest decile of the 
population, even if food consumption is deducted. Unfortunately, the HBS data do not 
allow us to make any such analysis, since there are no data published on health care 
utilisation according to income groups. 
To go one step further, we have used the data of our Kccskemct study. Table 7.2 
presents the findings of our analysis, in which we have calculated the frequency of 
giving among users as well as the average amount of informal payments among those 
households who paid, both according to income quintilcs. 
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Informal payments according to income quintiles: Kecskemct study, 2001 
Income quintiles 
1'1 2nd 3rd 4th 51h 
Number of households 145 144 145 144 145 
Percentage of households with cases of 71.7% 67.4% 65.5% 56.9% 53.1% 
health care utilisation of public (64.2-79.2) (59.5-75.2) (57.6-73.4) (48.7-65.2) (44.8-61.4) 
providers (with 95%CI) 
Number of households with cases of 104 97 95 82 77 
health care utilisation of public providers 
Percentage of households with cases of 24.0% 16.0% 28.2% 13.7% 24.4% 
informal payments to public providers ( 15.7-32.4) (8.7-23.3 ) ( 17.2-39.2) (5.2-22.2) ( 14.9-33.9) 
(with 95%CI) 
Number of households with cas-.:s of 25 16 19 9 20 
informal payments to public providers 
Expenditure on gratuity per household 7,820 14,656 10,626 16,717 8,645 
in HUF/4 months (with 95%CI) (4,650- 10,990) (2,246-27,067) (4,806-16,447) (0-37,476) (5,331-11,959) 
Median amount of informal payments 5,000 5,000 5,000 2,000 7,750 (HUF) 
Mode of informal payments (HUF) 5,000 1,000 10,000 1,000 1,500 
Per capita expenditure on gratuities in 2,080 4.343 3,365 5,572 3,529 
HUF/4 months (with 95%CI) (1,550-3,663 ) (749-9,Q22) ( 1,602-5,482) (0-12,492) (1,777-3,986) 
Although the utilisation of public providers is higher among households in the poorer 
than the richer income quintiles, the percentage of households who made informal 
payments is almost the same in the first and the fifth income quintiles. Furthermore, 
there is hardly any difference between the average amount of informal payment per 
household in the poorest and the richest income quintiles even in absolute terms. This 
suggests that the burden of informal payments is not at all proportionate to the income 
of households and that among those \vho pay, informal payments are more like a 'fee 
for service' than a 'donation'. 
Nevertheless, the finding that there is no statistically significant difference between 
the average amounts of informal payments according to income quintilcs has to be 
interpreted with caution. The 95% confidence intervals (el) for these figures are 
strikingly wide for two reasons. First, of the small numhcr of cases, especially in the 
second, third and fourth income quintiles, all of which involve less than 20 households, 
make the analysis of statistical significance meaningless. Unfortunately, we had to 
exclude from the analysis 91 households, where the respondents refused to provide 
information on household income and 3 cases of informal payments, where the 
respondent admitted giving informal payments, but refused to state the amount. 
Second, there was a large dispersion of values, which ranged between HUF 150 and 
95,000 across income quintiles. This is attributable to the fact that our analysis included 
informal payments for all (and thus very diverse) services at all levels of care from 
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family doctors to hospitals. Although our research would in principle allow us to carry 
the analysis further by creating more homogenous groups of services, such as for 
inpatient care, the small number of cases has prevented a meaningful analysis. A 
further limitation is that the exclusion of households on which we did not have income 
data could have distorted the findings, insofar as higher income households were more 
likely to refuse to answer the income-related questions. Among the 91 households 
excluded, 54 utilised health care at public providers, and 4 gave informal payments. 
To investigate the issue further, we have used data from two studies whose design 
makes it possible to overcome these shortcomings. Both the OTKI-1984 and the TK-
1985 were implemented before the 1988 tax reform, when the personal income tax was 
introduced, and as Bondar and Ekes [75] argued, income data obtained from surveys 
were much more reliable during that period. Indeed, in the secondary analysis of the 
TK-1985 study, we had to exclude only one case because of missing income data, and 
no cases at all from the OTKI-1984 study. Further, the larger sample sizes, especially 
in the OTKI-1984 study, made it possible to disaggregate cases according to broad 
categories of services, from \vhich we have selected hospital inpatient care, and \vithin 
that, informal payments to physicians only. From the OTKI-1984 we have considered 
paediatric hospital cases as, for reasons that are unclear, the database contains informal 
payment data for only these cases. 
Table 7.3 presents our findings from the TK-1985 study. Although the richest 20% 
of the population gave informal payments to hospital physicians significantly more 
frequently than the poorest 20%, the average amount of gratuity per payer shows no 
significant difference (using 95%CI) across income quintiles, with the exception of the 
second and fifth quintiles. This reinforces our previous finding that informal payments 
are closer to 'fee for service', and consequently represent a disproportionate burden on 
poorer households. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 7.3, the 95%CI for the average 
amount of informal payments are still rather wide, with values ranging from a few 
hundred HUF to over 10,000 in each income quintile. One plausible explanation is that 
hospital services are too heterogeneous, and it is necessary to try to specify the services 
received further. The OTKI-1984 study has provided us with this opportunity, as the 
database contains information on the causes of hospitalisation (observation, check-up, 
treatment with operation, treatment without operation, accident, other) and the sample 
size was large enough to obtain a sufficient number of cases even for more specific 
services identified this way. 
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Informal payments to hospital physicians according to income quintiles: TK-1985 study 
Income quintiles 
I" 2nd 3'd 41h 5th 
Number of individuals· 199 200 200 200 198 
Percentage of individuals, who were 46.7% 48.0% 40.0% 42.5% 45.5% 
treated in hospital (with 95%CI) (39.7-53.8) (40.9-55.1) (33.1-46.9) (35.5-49.5) (38.4-52.5) 
Number of individuals, who were 93 96 80 85 90 
treated in hospital 
Percentage of individuals, who paid 29.0% 33.3% 40.0% 45.9% 50.0% 
the hospital physician informally ( 19.6-38.4) (23.7-43.0) (29.0-5\.0) (30.7-45.9) (39.5-60.5) (with 95%CI) 
Number of individuals, who paid the 27 32 32 39 45 hospital physician informally 
Average amount of gratuity per 1,686 1,366 1,914 2,336 2,407 
payer (with 95%CI) (930-2,441 ) (1,057-1,674) (1,056-2,772) (1,533-3,139) (1,723-3,090) 
Median amount of informal 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,500 
payments (HUF) 
Mode of informal payments (HUF) 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 500 
Note: ·The sample consisted adults only, aged over 18. 
Source: Secondary analysis oj the TK-1985 study [79] 
Table 7.4 presents the findings of the secondary analysis of the OTKI-1984 study. 
We have considered first informal payments to hospital paediatricians, and then we 
have narrowed down the analysis to cases of operations only. As we can see, the 
findings exhibit a pattern that is very similar to the findings of the TK-1985 study 
concerning the frequency of giving, both for paediatric inpatient care in general and 
surgical operations in particular. The average amount of informal payment, however, is 
not similar, but considerably higher among the poorer families than the richer ones, 
thereby undermining further the 'donation' hypothesis of informal payments. 
Unfortunately we could not verify the difference statistically, because the cases of the 
non-proportional stratified sample had to be adjusted (multiplied) during the analysis 
using weights, which provided extreme big, and thus unreal, sample size.48 Results in 
the fifth quintile are the most problematic in this sense, because the number of real 
cases of informal payments could be somewhere between 20 and 40. Given that the 
amounts of informal payment vary considerably (they fell between HUF 100 and 
10,000) the Standard Error (SE) must be high, which implies confidence intervals as 
wide as those we found in the other two studies discussed before. This equally applies 
to informal payments for operations, as the limitation of the analysis to surgical cases 
failed to restrict the variation of amounts as we expected, while reducing the number of 
48 The corrective weights were defined so that the final 'sample size' was the whole population of 
Hungary (10 million), i.e. one case in the sample represented 124 to 2569 'cases' after the corrective 
weights were applied in the analysis. With this new (virtual) sample size, very minor differences were 
statistically significant (type I error). 
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cases further. While the existence of this variation even where services are more 
narrowly defined would fit better the 'donation' hypothesis, in itself it does not 
contravene the 'fee-for-service' explanation. Different operations can have different 
'fees', and even the 'fee' for same type of operation can vary with different health care 
institutions and in the same health care institutions with different physicians. 
Informal payments to hospital paediatricians and for paediatric operations according to income 
quintiles: OTKI-1984 study 
Income quintiles 
}'t 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Number of households· 757,220 761,627 758,988 755,931 763,291 
Percentage of families with children 55.5% 46.5% 35.9% 23.4% 6.5% 
Number of families with children· 420,058 354,065 272,213 176,731 49,461 
Percentage of families with child treated 
in hospital (past three years prior to the 55.7% 55.2% 55.3% 59.2% 53.7% 
survey) 
Number of hospital cases· 186,276 158,769 121,815 72,050 22,878 
Percentage of families who paid the 38.1% 47.8% 49.3% 55.4% 74.7% physician informally 
A verage amount of informal payment per 2,126 1,995 2,252 1,249 975 pay\![ (HUF) 
Median amount of informal payments 700 1,000 500 500 500 (HUF) 
Mode of informal payments (HUF) 500 500 500 500 500 
Number of surgical cases· 82,085 71,124 63,509 46,104 16,782 
Percentage of famili.:s who paid the 47.6% 54.4% 50.0% 58.1% 78.7% 
surgeon informally 
Average amount of informal payment per 2,097 2,048 2.097 1,262 685 payer (HUF) 
Median amount of informal payments 500 600 800 500 500 (HUF) 
Mode of informal payments (HUF) 500 500 500 500 500 
Note: ·Cases are multiplied by weights to make thc sample representative nationally. The sample includes only 7,398 
houscholds. Since wcights had to be applied, the statistical signilicancc of differences could not be calculatcd. 
Source: Secondary analysis oflhe O1'KI-198-1 sludy [201} 
Using the arithmetic mean as a measure of central tendency, however, is problematic 
where there may be distortion caused by one or two extreme values. Thus, in Tables 
7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 we have included other measures of central tendency not sensitive to 
extreme values. As we can see, both the median and the mode also show that there is 
hardly any difference between income quintiles. 
In conclusion, there is evidence from all the studies considered here that health 
expenditures on informal payments represent a disproportionate burden on poor 
households, but the finding that those who pay, pay on average about the same needs to 
be explored further. This analysis has used the average amount of informal payment 
and income in the five groups of income quintiles, and has assessed the cost burden 
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indirectly insofar as we have assumed that payments that represent a larger share of the 
income of the poor than the rich adversely affect the former's consumption of other 
essential goods and services. A more direct indication of a disproportionate burden, and 
thus a more straightforward case against the donation explanation, would, however, be 
if households mobilised their reserves or relied on external resources to cover informal 
payments. We have attempted to assess exactly this aspect of equity in financing in our 
Kecskemet study, as the other surveys and official statistics do not contain any specific 
information in this respect. 
7.2.1. HOUSEHOLDS' SOURCES OF FINANCE TO COVER INFORMAL 
PAYMENTS 
Table 7.5. 
In the Kecskemet study, we asked respondents in households incurring out-of-pocket 
expenditures for health care utilisation about where the money came from (see Question 
32 in Appendix D4). For each episode of care we wanted to know whether they had to 
use financial resources other than the household's regular income. We have considered 
the use of savings, the sale of assets, borrowing or external help as a direct 
manifestation of inequity in financing and which is incompatible with the donation 
explanation of informal payments. 
The distribution of financial sources, that were used to coyer out-of-pocket payments for health 
care, and within that informal payments: KecskemH study, 2001 * 
Cash revenue Savings Sale of Donations Loan Other 
assets 
Cases of health care utilisation 
Use of sources as % of cases of 89.9% 7.3% 0.2% 2.2% 0.2% 0.5% 
health care utilisation (N=626)** (87.5-92.3 ) (5.2-9.4) (0-0.7) ( 1.0-3.4) (0-0.6%) (0-1.1) 
Percentage of cases, who relied 9.1%(7.3-12.0) 
on non-cash revenue** 
Usc of sources as % of cases of 90.4% 14.4% 1.0% 4.8% 0 1.0% 
informal payments (N= I 04)** (88.0-92.4%) (11.5-17.3) (0.2-1.8) (3.0-6.6) (0.2-1.8) 
Percentage of cases, who gave 
informal payments and relied on 19.2% (11.5-27.0) 
non-cash revenueH 
Households 
Percentage of households, who 
used non-cash revenues to cover 20.2% (11.7 -28. 7) 
informal payments (N=89)** 
Notcs: .Sce Question 32 of the qucstionnaire in Appendix Dol (multiple answers were allowed); ··With 95%CI in parenthesis 
Table 7.5 summarises our findings for all episodes of care that involved in any type 
of out-of-pocket payments and for episodes where informal payments were given. As 
we can see, informal payments required these alternative sources of funds in 19% of the 
104 cases. At the level of households this means that a little more than 20% of them 
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had at least one episode of care in which informal payments were covered from 
exceptional sources, mainly from savings and external help (donations). This finding 
suggests that informal payment does represent a special financial burden for at least one 
in five households, and it cast doubt on the validity of gratitude being the only 
motivating factor, since a sizable proportion of households do make informal payments, 
even if they have to sacrifice savings or household assets. 
Nevertheless, this figure of 20% does not mean that for the other 80% of the 
households informal payments are an insignificant issue. It is possible that a household 
paid for informal payments only from general income, because it had no savings or 
valuable assets to sell, and informal payment impacts immediately on spending on other 
essential goods and services, precisely because the special financing options considered 
above were not available. Our study was not designed to address this issue in detail, but 
it is certainly an interesting topic to be explored by future research. 
So far, we have considered the financial burden that informal payments represent 
when paid when health care is utilised. An equally important aspect of the equity 
impact of informal payments though, whether perceived pressure to pay can prevent the 
utilisation of health care in the first place. Consideration of this potential deterrence 
effect of informal payments leads us from financing to service ddivery. 
7.3. Informal payments and equity in health care delivery 
In the Kecskemet study, we tried to assess the barrier created by the need for money to 
access health services, by finding out how many people did not utilize or delayed 
utilization of health care for financial reasons (see Questions 11, 14 in Appendix 04). 
FUliher, we tried to find out whether money was a significant factor in failure to 
complete treatment (see Question 19 in Appendix 04). Finally, in line with the broader 
interpretation of access to care, we also undertook secondary analysis of available 
databases to seek evidence of unequal treatment associated with informal payments. 
7.3.1. SELF CARE AND DELAYED TREATMENT 
The assessment of non-utilization and delayed treatment is very important in terms of 
the establishment of informal payment as a barrier to access to care. As we have 
discussed in chapter 2, there is virtually no formal co-payment for the utilization of 
publicly funded health services in the Hungarian health care system, so any self care or 
delayed treatment for financial reasons can be attributed primarily to informal payments 
(although noting also the potential impact of other costs such as transport). 
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Reasons for self care: Kecskemet study, 2001 * 
Frequency Percent (with 95% CI) 
Not serious* 27 75.0% (60.6-89.4) 
Afraid, ashamed to go* 0 
Not enough money* 0 
Denied care* 0 
Required service was not available* 0 
Treatment is ineffective* 0 
Other* 8 25.0% (10.6-39.4) Of which: 
Know how to treat*· 3 
It was weekend** I 
Just started*· 2 
Notes: ·See Question II in Appendix D-f; MUltipk answers were allowed; N=36; ··Recoded from the category of 'OIher'; 
Table 7.6 presents our findings concerning reasons for lay care. Altogether, we have 
identified 813 disease episodes in 531 households with at least one episode of illness 
during the 4 months in question prior to the survey. Among the 813 episodes of illness, 
we have identified only 36 cases of lay care (4.4% of all disease episodes) in 28 (or 
5.3% of the) households. The analysis of answers to the question "If no formal 
treatment was sought, what were the reasons?" (see Question 11 in Appendix D4) has 
shown that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis of money being a barrier to 
access to care (Table 7.6). We have not found a single case in which an ill person did 
not utilise health care because she did not have enough money. 
Delayed health care utilisation: Kecsl,cmct study, 2001 
Q13. How long did the Valid Perccnt Valid Percent of person wait before Frequency Percent (with 95%CI) Acute Illness 
seeking care?* (with 95%CI) 
Chronic illness 223 28.7% 30.5% (27.1-33.9) 
Immediately 305 39.3% 41.7% (38.1-45.3) 60.0% (55.7-64.4) 
;g Few hours 37 4.8% 5.1% (3.5-6.7) 7.3% (5.0-9.6) 
~ Less than a week 102 13.1% 14.0% (11.4-16.6) 20.1% (16.5-23.6) 
:> 
More than a week 64 8.2% 8.8% (6.7-10.9) 12.6% (9.7-15.5) 
Acute illness total 50S 65.4% 69.5% (66.1-72.9) 100.0% 
Total 731 94.1% 100.0% 
Missing 46 5.9% 
Total 777 100.0% 
Notes: ·See Appendix D-f for the questiollnaire 
However the situation is not unequivocal if delayed treatment is looked at. In 40% 
of the 508 episodes of acute illness patients did not see the doctor as soon as symptoms 
appeared, with 12.6% waiting more than a week Crable 7.7). The reasons for delayed 
health care utilisation arc shown in Table 7.8. Although money does appear, the 
I'ETEK GAAl 
I' A G I' I S 6 / Til [5 I 5 _ G P R I' \' I 5 E U _ \' I 7 
IMPACT OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS ON EQUITY 
73. INFORMAL PAYMENTS AND EQUITY IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
Table 7.8. 
number of cases is very small: three. The finding that nobody was deterred from using 
health services and only a very few ill persons delayed utilisation for financial reasons 
suggests that financial barriers, which include informal payments, play only a very 
minor role in access to care, at least if the first contact with providers are considered. 
Reasons for delayed health care utilisation: Kecskemet study, 2001 * 
Frequency Percent (with 95%CI) 
Not serious iIIness* 150 78.1% (72.1-84.1) 
Afraid, ashamed to go* 5 2.6% (0.3-4.9) 
Not enough money* 3 1.6% (0-3.4) 
Health facility is far from us* 0 0 
Treatment is ineffective* 0 0 
Other* 
Of which: 
46 24.0% (17.8-30.2) 
No time** 5 2.6% (0.3-4.9) 
Did not want to be absent from work** 3 1.6% (0-3.4) 
It was weekend, end of month, bank holiday** 19 9.9% (5.6-14.2) 
Did not know it was an i1lness** 3 1.6% (0-3.4) 
Elective procedure** 4 2.1 % (0-4.2) 
Lazy** 2 1.0% (0-2.5) 
Notes: ·Sec Queslion I ~ in App~ndi:>; 04; Multipk answers \\we allowed; N= 192. ··Recoded from the category of 'Other' 
Nonetheless, another interesting fimling emerged from the analysis of 'other reasons' 
for delayed treatment. The far most frequent other reason was that it was weekend or 
bank holiday, comprising almost 10% of all causes. Here is a possible indirect link to 
financial reasons. Home visits by medical doctors are well known as eliciting informal 
payment and it is plausible that this may be a factor in some people not seeking care at 
the weekend. However it is not possible to confirm this hypothesis from the available 
data, since no further inquiry was made into why weekends were a barrier to access to 
care, and of course some people simply did not want to interrupt their weekend by 
seeking care if the disease was not considered to be serious. 
7.3.2. UNCOMPLETED TREATMENT 
Questions regarding uncompleted treatment further support the finding that money may 
influence access to care, but only to a limited extent (see Questions 17, 18, 19 in 
Appendix 04). The survey has identified only four cases of interrupted treatment, 
which does not permit any meaningful quantitative analysis (Table 7.9). Uncompleted 
treatment requires a more complex analysis, insofar as it does not necessary result from 
the inability to pay informal payment. For instance, substantial co-payment is required 
for pharmaceuticals. Hence, we had to analyze questions about 'How was the treatment 
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Table 7.9. 
interrupted?' (Question 18) and 'If treatment was interrupted, what were the reasons?' 
(Question 19) together. 
Reasons for interrupted treatment: Kecskemet study, 2001 
Frequency 
Not enough money* I 
Afraid, ashamed to go to specialist/hospital* 0 
Required service was not available* 0 
Treatment is ineffective* I 
Got better* 0 
Other* 3 
Notes: ·See Question 19 in Appendix D4: Multiple answers were allowed: N=4. 
There was one case of a spinal problem in which the patient did not buy the 
prescribed medicines because he did not have enough money. Thus the only identified 
case where treatment was not completed for financial reasons was not associated with 
informal payment but formal co-payment. The other three cases, (a) a spinal problem 
for which the patient sought alternative therapy, (b) a fracture \vith the patient being 
unsatisfied with the care provided, and (c) influenza where the patient could not be 
bothered to return to the doctor, do not suggest that out-of-pocket payments 'during 
care' acted as a barrier to access. It has to be noted, however, that these findings are 
related to acute care only. The interpretation of the concept of complete and incomplete 
treatment is not so straightforward in the case of chronic conditions. These 'episodes' 
are by definition incomplete, even if care is continuing exactly as the doctor prescribed. 
It is possible, however, that for financial or other reasons, not all medicines are taken or 
not all health care is utilized as prescribed. This type of incomplete treatment was not 
captured by the questionnaire. 
The evidence presented here that money essentially is not a barrier to access to health 
care does not address a further question, whether patients who pay providers informally 
get the same service as patients who do not, once they have made contact with the 
provider. In its broader sense, the equal access principle requires that patients with the 
same health needs who seek care should receive the same treatment. That is, if non-
paying patients receive lower quality care than paying patients, they face unequal access 
even though they have not been denied access per se. Although we did not seek to 
address the issue of differential treatment in detail in the framework of our study, the 
database from the T ARKI -1996 study provided the opportunity to start exploring this 
topic. 
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7.3.3. DOES INFORMAL PAYMENT MEAN BETTER CARE? 
Table 7.10. 
Table 7.11. 
We have looked at all three studies for which databases were available for secondary 
analysis. There are three aspects of care examined in the T ARKI -1996 study where the 
impact of informal payments on patient care could be analysed: the service provided in 
the surgery, home visits and if the patient has to go to hospital. In each of these areas 
we looked for the most objective characteristics of the service provided by the family 
doctor. We finally selected five variables whose association with informal payments 
was analysed: whether family doctors listen carefully to the complaints of patients; how 
much time do they devote to the patient in the surgery; whether they visit the patient at 
home when requested; whether they visit patients without being called; and whether 
they enquire about the patients if admitted to hospital. 
In the TARKI-1996 study the amount of informal payments to family doctors was 
not addressed except for specific services, such as home visits. Instead, respondents 
were asked whether or not they pay the doctor informally and, if so, is this regularly or 
just occasionally. For the analysis we first created a dichotomous variable by merging 
cases of regular and occasional 'payers' to identify 'payers' as opposed to 'non-payers', 
although where appropriate regular 'payers' were also considered separately. 
Association between informal payments and attention paid to patients by family doctors: T ARKI-
1996 study 
Does your f:tmily doctor listen Do you give money or gift to your family doctor? (Q81) 
to :),our complaints carefully? Total (QS2) Yes, regularly No 
No 0 0.0% 28 2.9% 28 2.8% 
Yes 27 100.0% 943 97.1% 970 97.2% 
Total 27 100.0% 971 100.0% 998 100.0% 
Test of statistical significance Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (I-sided) 
Fischer'S exact test 1.000 0.459 
Note: *Thc Pearson Chi-Square test is not applicable. because there is one cell, whose expected collnt falls below 5 (0.76). 
Source: Secondary analysis oflhe TARKf-f996 study [216} 
Association between informal payments and treatment time in the surgery: TARKI-1996 study 
According to your estimation Do you give money or gift to Your family doctor? (Q81) 
how much time does your family 
doctor spend exclusively on you Yes, regularly No 
per visit? (Q48) Total 
Less than 5 minutes 2 7.4% 112 11.8% 114 11.7% 
5 min utes + 25 92.6% 838 98.2% 863 88.3% 
Total 27 100.0% 950 100.0% 977 100.0% 
Test of statistical significance Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (I-sided) 
Fischer's exact test· 0.760 0.372 
Noll:: ·The Pearsoll Chi-Square test IS not applicable, b~callsc there is one cell, whose expected COllnt falls below 5 (3.15). 
Source: Secondary analysis oflhe TARKI-1996 study [216J 
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Table 7.12. 
Table 7.13. 
Table 7.14. 
The results of our analysis are shown in Tables 7.10, 7.11, 7.12,7.13 and 7.14. This 
shows that family doctors do not pay more attention to patients who pay than those who 
do not. Neither there is any significant difference in terms of treatment time in the 
surgery. This is the case even if only regular payers are considered. 
Association between informal payments and home visits denied by family doctors: T ARKI-1996 
study 
Did your family doctor visit Do you giYe money or gift to your family doctor? (Q81) 
you last time, when you 
Yes No Total requested him? (Q73)* 
No 0 0.0% 7 2.7% 7 1.6% 
Yes 175 100.0% 253 97.3% 428 98.4% 
Total 175 100.0'l-o 260 100.0% 435 100.0% 
Test of statistical significance Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (I-sided) 
Fischer's exact test*" 0.045 0.026 
Note: -Respondents. who requested home visits, at least once in the past 3 years prior to the survey; -·The Pearson Chi-Square 
test is not applicable, because there are two cells, whose expected count falls below 5 (2.82). 
Source: Secondary analysis of the rARKI-1996 study [216} 
Association between informal payments and uncalled home visits: TARKI-1996 study 
Did it happen that your family Do you give money or gift to your family doctor? (Q81) 
doctor visit you without being Total 
asked? (Q76)* Yes No 
No 253 8\.1% 1,031 90.3% 1,284 88.3% 
Yes 59 18.9% 111 9.7% 170 11.7% 
Total 312 100.0% 1,142 100.0% 435 100.0% 
Test of statistical significance Value Degree of freedom Asymp. Sign. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi Square 20.047 1 0.000 
Note: -Question fllr the whole I ,500-hcad sample; 
SOl/rce: Secondary analysis of tht! 7ARKI-1996 sllldy [216} 
Association between informal payments and the attention of the family doctor paid to patients in 
hospital: T ARKI-1996 study 
Did your family doctor enquire Do you give money or gift to your family doctor? (Q81) 
about you, while you were in 
Yes Total hospital? (Ql15)* No 
No 50 49.5% 164 61.4% 214 58.2~o 
Yes 51 50.5% 103 38.6% 154 41.8% 
Total 101 100.0% 267 100.0% 368 100.0% 
Test of statistical significance Value Degree of freedom Asymp. Sign. (2-sidcd) 
Pearson Chi Square 4.277 I 0.039 
Note: -Respondents, \\ho were in hospital at Ieast once in the past 3 years prior to the survey; 
SOl/ree: Secondary alJalysis ofth~ 7ARKI-1996 study [216} 
In contrast, the refusal to visit at home when requested by the patient, unsolicited 
home visits and enquires about hospitalised patients have all been found to be 
associated with informal payments. As shown in Table 7.13, the strongest association is 
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with unsolicited home visits, as almost 20% of 'payer' patients have been visited by 
their family doctor without being asked, while the corresponding figure for 'non-payer' 
patients is less than 10%. Furthermore, 'payer' patients can expect that their family 
doctor will always visit them on request (Table 7.12), and they have a greater likelihood 
that they will receive attention from the family doctor during a hospital stay (Table 
7.14). 
Nonetheless, the observed association between informal payments and the care 
provided by the family doctor must be interpreted with caution. First, while statistically 
significant, the differences between 'paying' and 'non-paying' patients are generally not 
especially striking. Second, a statistical association does not prove a causal 
relationship. Further, more detailed analysis is needed to explore, for instance, possible 
confounding factors, such as illness severity. Another important methodological issue 
is that giving informal payments in general was asked about in this study so it was not 
possible directly to link payment to particular episodes of care. Consequently we 
consider this analysis as no more than a first step in exploring the issue rather than a 
detailed explanation of the phenomenon. The evidence presented here indicates that 
informal payments might affect the service provided, but the situation is not at all 
straightforward and certainly not as clear, and worrying, as it is in FSU countries. On 
the other hand, these findings call attention to an important issue that requires further 
research. 
7.4. Conclusions 
So, how can \ve summarise the above findings? Certainly, the impact on equity of 
informal payments is not as straightforward as that with formal co-payments. In effect 
we have found no evidence that they deter access to care, and it seems that the rich pay 
more frequently than the poor. This may indicate that patients pay according to their 
ability to payor that physicians price discriminate, at least when payment or non-
payment is considered. On the other hand our findings show that informal payments do 
place a disproportionate financial burden on the poor, as we have found no significant 
difference in the average amount of informal payments among those who pay between 
the poor and the rich. Furthermore, according to our Kecskemet study, 20% of 
households make a special effort (using savings or depending on gifts) to cover these 
expenditures, and our first findings from the secondary analysis of the TARKI-1996 
study indicate that informal payments may indeed influence some aspects of the care 
providcd by family doctors. All these suggest that informal paymcnts have a more 
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subtle impact on equity. It seems to impose a disproportionate financial burden (and 
possibly a negative impact on consumption of other necessary goods and services) and 
in certain cases may lead to differences in treatment, rather than preventing access to 
services per se. Nevertheless, we have take into account the limitations of our survey, 
discussed in chapter 5, when we try to project our findings to the country as a whole. In 
general, our sample comprised economically more active households, which suggests 
that the poorer segments of the population may have been underrepresented. 
Respondent bias was more problematic in relation to household income than 
expenditures on informal payment, although we have experienced response rates better 
than those of the HBS of the HCSO. Recall bias might have also affected our findings, 
but this was probably less of a problem for not seeking care when needed because of 
financial reasons as such events may be more easy to recall. In addition, more research 
is needed to analyse the issue in detail, both in relation to financing (to examinc the 
amounts paid by poor and rich patients for more specific services, such as certain types 
of operation) and service delivery (to explore further the impact of informal payments in 
primary care, as well as in other levels of care). 
Although analysis of the impact of informal payments on equity is directly related to 
the policy importance of the phenomenon, we have used this approach to inform us 
about the validity of the 'donation', as opposed to the 'fee-for-service' explanation. 
While the evidence of a negligible deterrence effect and the finding of a larger 
proportion of 'non-payers' among the poor fit the 'donation' hypothesis better, 
differential access in terms of the standard of care argues against it. Further, the 
inequity in financing revealed, coupled with the fact that many households must make 
special arrangements to cover informal payments imply that there must be pressures, not 
necessarily overt, behind payments and that a 'coercion factor' does exist. It is the 
'coercion factor' and the motivation for informal payments that we now explore in 
depth. 
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8. MOTIVATION: GRATITUDE OR COERCION? 
In the previous chapter we explored the impact of informal payments on equity, relating 
our findings to the issue of motivation. While the evidence is strong enough to reject 
gratitude as the only motivating factor, it is not complete and convincing enough to 
exclude the possibility that the majority of informal payments are 'donations' rather 
than 'fee-for-service'. 
8.1. The need for exploring motivation in depth 
First, the average sums paid informally are only a small proportion of average income 
even in the poorest quintile and individual sums vary widely even within income 
quintiles. Second, as we have noted before, the association between informal payments 
and the standard of care only raises the possibility of differential access, but does not 
prove a causal association; Third, the share of non-payers among those who utilise 
health services is substantial. Although non-payment fits better with the 'donation' 
hypothesis, in itselfit does not refute the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis. We should know 
more about the reasons behind non-payment, but cUITently we know almost nothing. 
Fourth, the finding that 20% of households drew on savings or gifts from others to 
cover informal payments does not say anything about the remaining 80%. Although we 
have considered the use of savings or gifts incompatible with the 'donation' hypothesis, 
in the Kecskemet study we could detect such discrepancy in only 11 % of the episodes 
of health care util isation (10 out of 91 valid cases), i.e. savings were used 10 pay the 
provider informally, yet, at the same time, respondents said that payment was motivated 
by gratitude. 
On the other hand none of these findings refute the 'fee-for-service' hypothesis, as 
ultimately it is the motivation of the actors that determines whether the payment was 
given truly voluntarily or was subject to coercion in its wider sense. The absence of a 
difference between 'paying' and 'non-pay ing' patients does not exclude, for instance, 
the possibility that patients paid in the hope of receiving better care (but did not get it). 
Nevertheless, as shown in chapter 5, evidence from surveys of patient's motivation is 
contradictory, suggesting that surveys may not the best method to explore what motives 
lie behind payments to health care providers and, specifically, the extent of any 
coercion. 
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In this chapter we first revisit this issue by reviewing the findings of our Kecskemet 
study and the secondary analysis of the TARKI-1996 study. Then we seek to get to the 
heart of the conflicting survey evidence by analysing in-depth interviews with patients, 
who said that they paid because they were grateful, because it was customary or a 
combination of the two (which are henceforth together referred to as 'non-coercive' 
reasons for giving), complementing it with findings from the interviews with physicians 
and with other patients from the case study. We seek evidence of any inconsistency 
between the motivation stated and the circumstances of giving by looking closely for 
any manifestations of pressures on patients to pay, i.e. a 'coercion factor' in the 
interviews. 
8.2. Motivation captured by questionnaires: survey findings 
revisited 
8.2.1. SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF THE TARKI-1996 STUDY 
Table 8.1 
As we pointed out in chapter 4, the TARKI-1996 study is peculiar in that interviewers 
asked about the motivation of giving as an open question and answers were 
subsequently categorised according to the coding scheme used in the OTKI -1972-73 
and 1981 studies. To explore the pattern of motivating factors identified we carried out 
a secondary analysis of the data looking at the responses, which, if the respondent 
mentioned more than one reason for giving, were coded separately in up to five 
variables, presumably in the order they were mentioned. Table 8.1 presents the 
distribution of the first ans\yers given, while Table 8.2 provides a more detailed analysis 
including multiple answers, which were categorised into 'non-coercive' (gratitude, 
custom or the combination of the two) and 'coercive' motives (others, including the 
category of 'other'). 
Motivation of informal payment to family doctors, first answer: T A.RKI-1996 study 
Why do you give? (Q82)* Frequency Valid percent (with 95%CI) 
gratitude 169 54.2% (48.5-59.8) 
others gin as well, it is customary 64 20.5% (15.9-25.1) 
it is expected 15 4.8% (2.4-7.2) 
to obtain better care 14 4.5% (2.1-6.8) 
only this way could one get good care I 0.3% (0-1.0) 
other 49 15.7% (I \.6-19.8) 
Total 312 100.0% 
Notes: ·Open question, Illul!ipk answers were possihlc. First ans\\cr aillong those, who gave Illoney or gili to the family doctor. 
More than one llIoti\ atillg factor was named in 16% or the 312 cases. 
Sourc/!: Secol/dary al/alysis ofl"~ TARKI-1996 sllId>" [JI6} 
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Table 8.2. Motivation for informal payment to family doctors, all answers: TARKI-1996 study 
Why do you give? (Q82)* Frequency Valid percent (with 95%CI) 
Gratitude only 146 46.8% (41.1-52.4) 
Customary only 40 12.8% (9.0-16.6) 
Customary and gratitude 12 3.8% (1.7-6.0) 
Gratitude and customary 0 
'Non-coercive' total 198 63.5% (58.0-68.9) 
'Coercive' motivating factors (expected, better 39 12.5% (8.8-16.2) 
care, only this way could get good care) 
Other 40 12.8% (9.0-16.6) 
'Coercive' total 79 25.3% (20.4-30.2) 
'Non-coercive' and 'coerch'e' mentioned together 35 11.2% (7.6-14.8) 
Total 312 100.0% 
Notes: ·Open question, multiple answers were possible. Summary of answers among those, who gave money or gin to the family 
doctor. 
Source: Secondary analysis o/the rARKI-1996 study {216] 
As can be seen, the findings from this secondary analysis seem to support the 
'donation' hypothesis with almost two-thirds of the respondents mentioning exclusively 
'non-coercive' reasons, among which gratitude is the most important motive with more 
than 50% of the respondents mentioning it alone or in combination with 'it is 
customary'. Of course, such results are in sharp contrast with the findings 0 f the TKK 
1985 study and so they add to the confusion, especially if we extend our analysis a little 
further. 
In the TARKI-1996 study pressure to pay exerted by the family doctor was addressed 
in a separate question, answers to which are analysed in Table 8.3. If we collate 
answers to this question with answers to the question on motivation, we can see that 
almost 20% of those who cited exclusively 'non-coercive' reasons for informal payment 
felt such pressures. In contrast almost half of those who said that they paid because it 
was expected also stated that they never felt such pressures. These inconsistencies 
reinforce our suspicion that survey questionnaires (even with open questions) are 
inappropriate tools to capture the motivation behind informal payments, and 
consequently it is not possible to determine the validity of the gratitude payment 
concept solely on the basis of survey findings. 
It is interesting to note that 13% of the respondents gave reasons that did not fit in the 
predefined categories. This relatively large proportion again shovvs the ambiguities that 
surround the issue. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say anything more than this, 
since the original answers are not available in the database. 
P[TE'R UAAl 
PAGE 195 I THESIS_GP RE\,ISllJ_VI7 
MOTIVATION GRATITUDE OR COERCION? 
8.2. MOTIVATION CAPTURED BY QUESTIONNAIRES SURVEY FINDINGS REVISITED 
Table 8.3. Perceived pressure to pay and its association with the motivation of informal payments to family 
doctors: T ARKI-1996 study 
Have You ever felt that you would receive more thorough 
Frequency Percent Valid percent 
examination if you paid the doctor informally? (Q99)* (with 95%CI) 
No 1,120 87.2% 87.4% (85.6-89.3) 
~ Yes 
Oi 
144 11.2% 11.3% (9.S-\3.0) 
> Do not know 17 1.3% 1.3% (0.7-2.0) 
Total 1,281 99.7% 100.0% 
Missing 4 0.3% 
Total 1,285 100.0% 
Association of perceived pressure to pay with stated 
motivation 
Patients, who felt pressure, but stated that they paid 38 19.2% (13.6-24.8) because of 'non-coercive' reasons (N=198) 
Patients, who stated they paid because it was expected by 13 46.4% (27.6-65.3) 
the doctor, but said that never felt pressure to pay (N=28) 
Notes: ·Rcspondcnts who had contact with the family doctor atieast once in the past 3 years prior to the survey. 
Source: Secondary analysis of the TARKI-1996 study [216J 
8.2.2. FINDINGS FROM THE KECSKEMET STUDY 
The Kecskemet study went further than the TARKI survey in several respects. We 
offered predefined answers, including the option 'other', to choose from in the question 
of 'why?' (see Question 27 in Appendix D4.), but we also addressed the so far totally 
neglected question of 'why not?' (see Question 33 in Appendix D4.). For both we have 
carried out a detailed analysis of the option 'other'. Most importantly, however, we 
selected those cases where respondents cited 'non-coercive' reasons for giving and 
sought a follow-up interview about the episode of health care utilisation in question. 
We will present the findings of these in-depth interviews later in this chapter. 
8.2.2.1. Motivation for informal payments 
Table 8.4 summarises the motives for paying informally identified in the Kecskemet 
study. The findings appear to support the 'donation' hypothesis, as gratitude is 
mentioned most frequently, in almost 60% of all cases, followed by 'it is customary' 
with 40%. Overt coercion was rare, in only 1 of the 91 valid cases, with other 
'coercive' reasons selected in less than a quarter of cases when each is considered 
separately. It must be noted, however, that the number of people who paid in cash and 
for exclusively 'non-coercive' reasons is only 21, or 23.1 % of all cas~s (95%CI 14.2-
32.9%), while the number of people whose sole motivating factor \\'as gratitude was 
only 11, or 12.1% of the total (95%CI 5.3-18.9%). 
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Table 8.4. Motivation for informal payments: Kecskemet study, 2001 
Q27. Why were the additional contribution made?'" Frequency Percent (with 95%CI) 
was grateful* 53 58.2% (47.9-68.6) 
it is customary* 37 40.7% (30.4-51.0) 
it was forced* 1 1.1% (0-3.3) 
expedite treatment* 6 6.6% (1.4-11.8) 
obtain more attention form the doctor* 22 24.2% (15.2-33.2) 
obtain more attention form the nurse* 13 14.3% (6.9-21.6) 
obtain better quality medicines* 1 1.1% (0-3.3%) 
establish good relationship with physician for 12 13.2% (6.1-20.3) 
future treatment* 
extra hotel services (single room, TV in room, 1 1.1 % (0-3.3%) 
better food etc.)'" 
phYsician provided sick leave certificate* 0 
physician provided disabilitv certificate* 0 
other* 16 17.6% (9.6-25.6) 
of which: 
health workers are not Daid enough** 2 2.2% (0-5.3) 
other 'extra' service (home visit during 8 8.8% (2.9-14.7) 
weekend)*'" 
Notes: ·Sec Appendix 04; Multiple answers were allowed; N=91. ··Recoded from the category of 'other'; 
Furthermore, the analysis of 'other' responses has revealed that this category is 
almost exclusively related to 'coercive' motives, although in its broader sense. The 
information available is not sufficient to categorise two cases, but the findings 
concerning the remaining 14 are as follows. 
Two patients paid because of the low salaries of health workers, while a further 
seven were seeking 'extra' services, with three seeking home visits and four seeking 
contacts (either at home or at the surgery) at the weekend or after surgery hours. One 
patient wanted to go home before the scheduled discharge. In chapter 3 we argued that 
a crucial element of the definition of informal payments is 'entitlement for services', 
and we hypothesized than in a health care system that is unable to deliver a reasonable 
standard of care to everybody and where entitlements to services are not clear, patients 
make their own decisions about what they can expect to receive free and what not, 
regardless of its official status regarding the benefit package. We argue that home visits 
are a good example of this as the borderline between justified and unjustified home 
visits is blurred. Although one can argue that the concept of 'extra' services does not 
contradict the 'donation' hypothesis, secondary analysis of the TARKI-1996 study 
shows that there is indeed a substantial difference between the frequency of informal 
payments to the family doctor in relation to consultations in general (23.4% (95%CI 
21.0-25.7%)), and when home visits are considered alone (45.8% (95%CI 42.8-48.8%)). 
Should someone feel a need to express gratitude if a particular service is provided at 
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home but not if the same service is provided in the surgery? Two other patients 
provided evidence that can be interpreted as supporting this concept of 'extra' service. 
One paid because slhe received better care than s/he expected, while another paid 
because slhe felt that otherwise slhe would be a 'free-rider' in the system. The first case 
may illustrate how individual reassessments of entitlements may not be manifested by 
discrimination between different services, but rather in terms of the expected standard 
of care associated with a particular service. The second case may represent the extreme 
of reassessed entitlements insofar as 'free services' are seen as an illegitimate 
expectation. 
Finally, the remaining two cases fit well with the lost 'trust' hypothesis suggested in 
chapter 3 and Appendix F, highlighting another aspect of the 'coercion factor'. One 
respondent commented that it is not possible to get acceptable quality of care without 
informal payment, while the other said that the "risk is lower" this way, i.e. one cannot 
be certain that one will get the necessary treatment without paying the provider 
informally. 
8.2.2.2. Motivation for non-payment and a new understanding of 'custom' 
The analysis of the question 'why notT offers further insight into the motivation issue. 
Table 8.5 reports the distribution of frequencies of the specified options and the content 
of the category of 'other', which \vas disaggregated into new categories where these 
were cited at least five times. This shows that the existence of public coverage and 
within that social insurance is the most frequently mentioned reason, while having 
private insurance is negligible. This suggests that the majority of the population are 
aware of the fact that health care providers are paid by the social health insurance fund 
in Hungary. Sixty-three percent (95%CI 59.1-67.2%) cited exclusively the option of 
public coverage, but 36.3 % (95%CI 32.3-40.3%) provided other reasons, of which the 
largest category is that the 'doctor is a friend'. These results offer new insights into the 
motivation of those who do pay. 
Looking at what other options have emerged from the study, it is conspicuous that 
gratitude, or rather the lack of gratitude, has not been mentioned at all. There were only 
three cases \vhere the reason for non-payment is dissatisfaction with the provider or 
with the service provided ("the physician did not deserve il ", the patient "did nol 
recover", and "bad experience"). Conversely, 'custom' has been mentioned 
frequently, albeit the context of 'non-paying' has given a different interpretation to the 
"rTER GAAl 
PAGE 198 I TIIESIS_GP .REVISEIJ_VI7 
8. MOTIVATION: GRATITUDE OR COERCION? 
8.2. MOTIVATION CAPTURED BY QUESTIONNAIRES: SURVEY fiNDINGS REVISITED 
Table 8.5. 
concept than what we have assumed in the context of giving, an interpretation that 
contradicts the' donation' explanation of informal payments. 
Reasons for non-payment: Kecskemet study, 2001 
Q33. You told me that the services were not paid Frequency Percent (with 95%CI) for, why?* 
Paid bv the 2overnment* 9 1.6% (0.5-2.6) 
Paid by social insurance* 403 69.7% (65.9-73.5) 
Paid by private insurance* 3 0.5% (0-1.1) 
Doctor is a friend (relative, colleague**)* 48 8.3% (6.0-10.6) 
Other* 182 31.5% (27.6-35.4) 
of which: 
Because the service did not .iustify it** 47 8.1% (5.9-10.4) 
Not expected** 46 8.0% (5.7-10.2) 
No money** 37 6.4% (4.4-8.4) 
Not accepted** 10 1.7% (0.6-2.8) 
Disapprove of informal payments** 8 1.4% (0.4-2.4) 
Services are free** 7 1.2% (0.6-2.8) 
The care is in pro!?:ress** 5 0.9% (0.1-1.6) 
Paid by the employer** 5 0.9% (0.1-1.6) 
Notes: ·See Appendix 04; Multipl.: answers were allowed; N=578. "Recoded from the category of 'Other'; 
Except in two cases, the statement 'it is not customary to pay ... ' and 'I/we do not 
pay .. .' is always mentioned by respondents in connection with a specific health service 
("we do not pay the family doctor ", "we do not pay in the polyclinic ", "we do not pay 
for this service, only in hospital") or illness ("in the case offlue it is not customary", 
"small [mild] disease, we pay ifi! is big [serious] "). Taken with similar responses ("it 
was only pulmonary screening", "] went for a prescription on/y", "'we pay in other 
cases, but not this time ", "we did not call the doctor to visit at home, bill went in [to the 
surgery] ", "it was not an operation "), including qualifications related to frequency of 
utilisation ("'we rarely visit the doctor ", "] rarely go, and it happens quickly"), we have 
constructed the category 'because the service did not justify it'. 
In the other 'custom' related responses, payment was not mentioned in connection 
with the service, but with a specific provider ("it is not clIstom(llY to pay this 
physician "), suggesting that the attitude of physicians is also a 'custom-forming' factor. 
Taken with similar responses ("the physician is velY kind", "he would not accept it", 
"not 'that' type of physician", "we did not have to pay at this provider", "] get the 
same treatment [without informal payment], it is 110t expected", "they do not expect it") 
we have created the category of 'it was not expected'. 
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The existence of both service-related and provider-related 'customs' suggest that, in 
the context of informal payments, the meaning of custom is not clean-cut, insofar as it 
has a closer association with what is expected than the gratitude for the outcome of 
treatment. Seen this way, the 'custom' motive fits better with the 'fee-for-service' than 
the 'donation explanation of informal payments. 
It is worth noting that the category of 'it was not expected' is closely related to the 
category of 'doctor is a friend (relative, colleague)', insofar as there is no expectation to 
pay among relatives, friends or colleagues, and these two categories together include 
about 16% of the answers. The link between them is well illustrated with responses, 
such as "it is not expectedjrom me, because J am a health worker". 
Another finding that is incompatible with the 'donation' hypothesis is that, in 6.4% 
of cases, patients did not pay because they did not have money. If there was no pressure 
to pay, why should anyone mention this? This reason of 'non-payment', as well as the 
other two ('it was not expected' and 'the service did not justify it') suggest that there are 
cases of health care utilisation where the 'coercion' factor exists, even if it is not 
eventually manifested in actual payments. 
However interesting these findings are, the proportion of such cases is not large 
enough to question the dominance of 'non-coercive' motivating factors, which, despite 
somewhat contradictory evidence, is the common conclusion of most of the surveys 
discussed here. On the other hand, this does not exclude the possibility that the 
'coercion' factor exists in the majority of cases if surveys fail to capture motivation 
accurately. Indeed, the above findings strengthen our suspicion that quantitative 
surveys are not appropriate for this task as it is not possible to explore in sufficient 
depth each response. To shed light on this issue we used in-depth interviews and used 
this rich source of knowledge from individual cases to explore whether the motives 
suggested by the questionnaire correspond to the findings of the in-depth interviews. 
B.3. Pressures on patients to pay: the 'coercion factor' 
We analysed in-depth interviews with the 21 patients and the 31 physicians in two 
phases. First, we looked for manifestations of internal and external pressures on 
patients to pay, which we termed the 'coercion factor'. In doing so we have 
concentrated mainly on patients' interviews, but also complemented the findings with 
the perspectives and experiences of physicians. Second, we looked at the interviews 
with those 11 patients who exclusively cited 'non-coercive' reasons of giving in the 
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survey (6 citing 'gratitude', 4 stating 'it is customary', and one mentioning both), to 
identify manifestations of the 'coercion factor' in individual cases. 
It should be noted that we deliberately did not want to confront the interviewees with 
their responses in the survey. This might have suggested that there was a right or wrong 
answer for the question about motivation. However the issue came up in most of the 
interviews anyway. 
In the following sections we refer to the interviewees by a letter and a number. The 
letter 'P' stands for patient interviews, and the number corresponds to the numbering in 
Appendix Band C. The letter 'D' stands for physician interviews, but in these cases the 
numbers do not refer to any particular list of interviews, to avoid identifying 
interviewees. 
8.3.1. IDENTIFYING THE 'COERCION FACTOR': THE MANIFESTATIONS OF 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT PRESSURES 
The interviews with patients and physicians presented here provide excellent illustration 
of the point raised in chapter 3. Although the key feature of the gratitude (donation) 
explanation of informal payments is that they are given voluntarily, it is not reasonable 
to interpret coercion solely as arising where physicians expect and demand payment 
from patients. The wealth of evidence summarised below implies that coercion must 
take a much wider meaning that goes beyond explicit enforcement and incorporates 
pressures from other sources, such as the perceived failure of the health care system or 
from patients themselves, and which allows for the subtleties of everyday life. For 
instance, the decision to pay informally in the hope of receiving better care is different 
depending on whether the expectation is for 'premium' services or simply in response to 
a health care system that frequently fails to provide even a minimum standard of care. 
While we have concentrated on the 'coercion factor' in our analysis, there are other 
aspects of the phenomenon, such as the attitude of patients and physicians towards 
informal payment, or the mechanism of determining the amount of informal payments, 
that can be incompatible with the benign 'donation' explanation. The following 
sections no\v examine these issues. 
8.3.1.1. Coercion as a manifestation of distrust in the health care system 
Interviews with patients demonstrated how the act of giving does not happen in 
isolation, independent of individuals' previous experiences with the health care system 
in general, and with informal payments in particular. In many cases, these experiences, 
I'ETlK ClA"L 
P AGE 2 0 I / T II E SIS G PRE \ I S [ IJ _ V I 7 
8. MOTIVATION GRATITUDE OR COERCION' 
8.3. PRESSURES ON PATIENTS TO PAY THE 'COERCION FACTOR' 
most often involving a hospital stay, in particular operations, senous illnesses or 
deliveries, have emerged in the course of interviews even when not asked about 
directly. 
Past experiences with health care 
Although not all interviewees report negative experiences, the picture that emerges is 
far from complimentary about the Hungarian health care system. AlL but two 
respondents (P07,PI7) personally experienced deficiencies in services provided, 
ranging from poor service to inadequate cl inical standards, and from minor problems to 
serious negligence and potential malpractice. Interestingly, three respondents 
(P04,P05,P09) initially emphasised positive experiences but subsequently admitted to 
experiencing poor care as the interview progressed. One expressed a reluctance to talk 
about failings, as if he was afraid of some kind of retaliation: .. ... one can see a lot of 
things, which 1 don't want to speak about, because it isn't related [to my care] ... there 
are things, which are ... betler not to tell, you know" (54-year old man, P09). 
Deficiencies reported by interviewees include a lack of hygiene: 
"J wasn't satisfied with the whole environment, the dirt, the fug, the smell, the 
operating theatre was so filthy, that 1 contracted an iJ?feClion, a purulent 
peritonitis and the pliS was flowing out of me for half a year. " 
said a 52-year old woman (P02; similar comments P04,P08,PI5,PI9,P21). A 33-
year old woman complained: 
" ... the condition of hospitals, fhey [the walls] are nilrolls, and cockroaches are 
running on the corridor, I was sitting there and the cockroaches were running 
abollt, this is a rather disgusting experience. " (POS; also PI9) 
They reported long waiting and short treatment times: 
" ... if I go to the family doctor or the polyclinic then the doctor, fifty-thousand 
patients are sitting there, has only two minutes to see me ... Noll' it '5 not possible 
to diagnose anything in two minutes. " 
and 
.. ... I had to wait a lot, they were sending me from one building to the other ... I 
was ordered to come in early morning, becallse ),011 have to wait to be seen, I've 
wailed for two weeks, and then I had to cOllie in 8 a 'clock and I11'ent home at half 
past J inlhe afternoon." (44-year old woman, P03; also P02,P05,P12,P13,P15) 
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Respondents also cited lack of supplies, obsolete equipment, and insufficient and 
inedible food in hospitals. For instance a 54-year old man summarised his experiences 
as follows: 
" .. It's true that the service was public during the state [socialist] era, but 
everything was available from bandages to ... medicines, everything was there. 
And now one cannot be certain that all medicines in the hospitals are there. " 
(P05; also P03,P08,P09,P13,P15,P19) 
Several interviewees complained that they had to bring their own medicines to the 
hospital: 
" ... not long ago, [my mother] was taken to hospital, and then the telephone rang 
in the evening, it was the physician on night duty. Tomorrow we have to bring in 
this and that medicines, because they cannot provide it. " (29-year old woman, 
P13; also P07,Pl1,PI5,PI9,P20)49 
Other complaints related to lack of attention, insensitivity, and rude and rough 
behaviour with patients. For instance a 63-year old woman complained about her 
mother's case as follows. 
"They [the nurses] don't want to bring it [the bed-pan] in, and if they bring it in 
they keep it under the patient for hours ... it happened with my mother, she 'was 
already confined to bed, and then they left it under her for the whole morning and 
it spilt and the other patients tried to help her somehow ... " (P 14), 
or 
" ... it was 'written on my bed head board with large red leiters, the medicines I 
must not be given, and the nurse came, bro/lght the injection and 'wanted to 
administer it. I asked her 'what do YOlt 'want to give me?', and [she replied] 
... 'why does it malleI' for YOIl? Algopyrin' she said. I told her not to give the 
injection, because I'd suffocate right there ... " (54-year old woman, P05; also 
Pll,P13,P15,P16) 
Others complained about nurses and physicians smoking in the corridor (P04,P05) 
and several patients commented on the insensitive behaviour of certain physicians and 
the inadequacy of the information they provide: 
49 I have experienced this personally during an interview with a physician. When we were talking there 
was a knock on the door and a man came in and handed over a large bag of pharmaceuticals. The 
physician explained the situation to me. They asked the relatives of inpatients to look for their unused 
medicines at home and bring them in as they may be able to liS them in the hospital. 
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" ... 1 tried to ask about things, but 1 never got the answer, and we only learnt on 
the day of the operation that both of his eyes will be operated not just one ... and 
when my husband had enough courage to say that we're told that after the 
operation our child wouldn't have to wear glasses yet now we learnt that he'd 
need stronger ones, she almost threw us out of her surgery. She started to yell at 
us inarticulately that we shouldn't take this as a question of aesthetics, and 'dear 
father, you have to acquiesce that this child will wear spectacles and subject to 
mockery for the rest of his life '. Now then, 1 don't think that this is the 
appropriate way to inform a parent." (33-year old women, P08; also 
P04,P09,P10,P11,P19,P21) 
There were also examples of misdiagnosis, mistreatment and malpractice; for 
instance a 54-year old woman (P09) recalled her experience as follows: 
" ... they said 'please don't be ang'y' and they apologised that the [operation] 
wasn't successful and it has to be repeated. They did this without anaesthesia 
... and now I've double vision [diplopia], which has remained with me ever since. 
Because, when 1 was in XY, this delay, these 10 days meant a lot. Had they 
operated me there, my vision wouldn't be impaired." (P05, also 
P04,P07,P08,P10,P13,P16) 
This far from favourable picture of the health care system is reinforced by interviews 
with doctors (D08,D09,DIO,D15,D19,D21,D23,D24,D25,D26,D29,D30,D31). Apart 
from complaining about the lack of money, manifest by low salaries 
(D03 ,D04,D05,D09,D 1 O,D II,D 14,D 19 ,D20,D21 ,D23,D24,D26,D27), shortage of 
supplies (such as the aforementioned drug problems (D14,D15,D23,D25,D26» and 
inadequate instrumentation (D 1O,023,D31), respondents emphasized the insensitive, 
impersonal care, which arose from their adverse circumstances, in particular a high 
workload coupled with very low remuneration. Some described their practice as 
'conveyor-belt care' (D 13,D21 ,D29), a phrase also used by patients (P08), while 
another respondent used the term 'treadmill' (024): 
" ... One works in a dilapidated underground surgelY so that there are 50 patients 
sittillg in fronl of my door, 1 have no assistant and I'm working lIntil 6 p. m .... 1 
WOlildn't like to say that this is the fallit of doctors, nllrses or assistants. The 
organisation of the health care system doesn '( allaH' liS to treat the patiel1ts as 
humans. This is a conveyor-belt on 'which we send nllmber 2 here and number 3 
there ... " 
and continued: 
PETER GAAl 
P A G l' 2 04 I Til E SIS G PRE \' I S I: I> _ \' ) 7 
B MOTIVATION' GRATITUDE OR COERCION? 
8 J, PRESSURES ON PATIENTS TO PAY, THE 'COERCION FACTOR' 
" ... how many pal ienls are there, who're taken for examination into another 
health care institulion, and 'who 're waiting for the ambulance until 8 p. m. and are 
left out there, sitting in the corridor ... They've remained with an empty stomach, 
having gone through a painful intervention ... They're cold, because they only 
have a night-gown and a bath-gown on, and they're sitting there waiting for the 
ambulance to arrive. And nobody goes and asks 'shall I bring YOll a cup of hot 
tea or warm soup', or \I'ouldn't you like to lay down some'where and I'll try to 
find a bed' ... " (D29) 
While there is no agreement among physicians on the extent of these problems, in a 
sense the admission of what goes on is even more devastating than that ofthe patients: 
" ... The state [public] health care is rotten to the core, or to put it more nicely it's 
finished .. , despite the fact Ihat everybody is very helpful, it's not possible 10 create 
somelhingfrom nothing. " (D26; also D30) 
On the other hand, not all patients have had adverse experiences with health services 
and not all reached overall negative conclusions about the system. Unlike the seven 
interviewees who expressed, one way or another, a general dissatisfaction with the 
health care system (PO 1 ,P02,P06,P08,P09,P 15,P 18), such as: 
" ... the trllth is that the health care system is in 'frog perspective ,50, the state has 
taken its hand off of evelJ1thing. The long and the short of it, is that we mustn't be 
ill ... " (52-year old woman, P06), 
seven interviewees had favourable opinion at least about the actual episode of care, 
we wanted to explore (P04,P05,P07,P08,P09,P12,P17), for instance: 
" ... [the circumstances] are simple, but superb, so that the cleanliness is very good 
and I was very satisfied ... it 's totally different when patients complain thaI if they 
don 'I take their medicines with them, then they may not gel them ... " (59-year old 
woman, P07) 
As some interviews show, the point of reference also matters in this respect. Three 
of the respondents mentioned experiences abroad, one in Canada (P05) and one in 
Austria (P03), in each case accentuating the perception of a failing Hungarian system. 
while another experience in the UK placed the Hungarian health care system in 
favourable light in the eyes of the interviewee: 
so There is a Hungarian phrase, if the standard of something is extremely low: 'it is under the bottom of a 
frog'. The respondent probably wanted to use this phrase. 
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" ... 1 know that the situation is no way better in the west. My son was in Englund 
for two years, and in the second year he had his four-month old son with him 
... and they took him to the doctor, and the doctor didn't even look at him, only the 
nurse did something, and the doctor was just sitting somewhere, hanging ahout. 
So if I compare to this, then I say that Hungarian doctors or the services provided 
are much better. "(63-year old woman, P14) 
This case also highlights that previous experiences do not have to be one's own to 
influence one's judgment about the situation. One of the two respondents who did not 
have bad personal experiences cited several shocking examples from different sources 
including relatives: 
" ... As I say, we have ... no chronic illness in the family ... bllt, my sister-in-law, my 
husbands older sister, 'who's sujfering from a very serious problem ... rectal 
cancer ... she told me, that it's velY probable that it's been a malpractice ... so in 
these cases, even if I dOIl't have an own experience, but I hear in my 
neighbourhood that there's sllch a problem, than you really say that my God it's 
good until we've to go to the doctor ... ", 
or friends or acquaintances: 
" ... The truth is that I've heard not the best opinions abollt XY ho!>pital. 
Particularly, one of the employees told me, that 'you are crazy, lest YOll enter 
here, you cannot imagine, hall' many 'botchy' patients lay here after operations' 
and she says '1 don't recommend it to you' ", 
and the media 
" ... it was a horrible period, when 'we heard the appearance of the 'hlack angel' 
[a nurse, who killed incurable patients on her own intention] in the radio, it was 
exactly this period. It 'was indeed ji-ig/zrening, because from the radio, [we heard] 
that the case was being investigated ... " (59-year old woman, P07) 
Other possible sources include those sharing a room in the hospital (P 11) or, more 
generally, word of mouth: 
" .. .for instance there's a certain obstetrician ... he had a mother, 11'ho died ... the 
mother and the baby as well ... and it was forgotten, because it happened with 
doctor X, who's a 'big head', a very good physician, eh, it happens, But if it was 
another one, not so famous, lI'/zO hadn't yet been to America all a study trip, then 
it would be sllch a tumour that the whole town would know." (4I-year old 
woman, PII) 
PETER GAAI. 
PAGE 2061 'l'III'Sls_GI' RE\ISEI)_VI7 
MOTIVATION GRATITUDE OR COERCION' 
83. PRESSURES ON PATIENTS TO PAY THE 'COERCION FACTOR' 
Furthermore, it was conspicuous that positive experiences have frequently been 
coupled with contrasting bad ones. This suggests that virtually all contacts with health 
care providers took place within a context of general uncertainty about the care one can 
expect: 
" ... But you can hear startling things. When one is admitted to the hospital as an 
'ordinary' patient anything can happen. " (59-year old woman, P07), 
and 
"In general the experience there [in that particular hospital] is that they're 
[physicians and nurses] kind to patients, not like elsewhere. " (4 I-year old woman, 
PI2; also PI7) 
These experiences, both personal and second-hand, increase the general uncertainty 
that patients face (because of the information asymmetry between physicians and 
patients and the risk that treatment might fail even in the best circumstances). One 
physician conveyed this well by citing a media story: 
"There are large numbers of .. ,false articles that are published [in the media] 
about health care. ...A year ago there was a case on TV ... that the vigilance of 
anaesthesiologists saved the life of somebody, because an assistant was angry 
with ... the doctor .. , and ... poured something into the narcotic machine, and if 
they hadn't noticed what was there, then the palients would have died. ... And 
imagine that after this somebody will go for an operation ... he's aji'aid of the 
operation anyway, and [in addition] such things can happen. 'If it isn't 
discovered accidentally then I'll die ... .It's terrible, ... will 1 survive ... ifslIch thing 
will really happen, as we've heard on TV? ,,, (D27) 
Health care failures thus induce distrust of the health care system. As a 59-year 
woman put it: 
" ... so at home he [the patient] has to take drugs. And then there isn't [that type of 
medicine in the hospital], simply they don'I have it, or it isn't possible to buy it, or 
they have a different type, and then the patient has no trllst and has the d/'ugs 
brought in ... " 
and went on, saying that: 
" ... so anyway this obviously hasl1 't strengthened all/' faith and trust, since these 
are horrible things, that we've heard ... " (P07) 
But how do these experiences result in informal payments? 
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The connection between past experiences, distrust and informal payments 
The most obvious way is that they arise as patients seek to avoid such failings. As a 29-
year old woman recounted in connection with the illness of her mother, who was in 
hospital many times, but discharged early without recovering fully: 
"Respondent (R): ... she was discharged, for example, on Thursday and had to go 
back on Sunday, and this happened twice or three times. 
Interviewer (I): And did you complain about this? Or did yo II tly to do anything 
else to solve this problem? 
R: To be honest, I cannot complain. Is it good if I complain? 
I: I don't knolV, I'm jllst asking. 
R: So, I'd put it this way, that I cannot decide whether I'm better off([ I complain 
or if I don't. Or can it rather be solved by money? 
1: And ll"hat do you weigh in your mind in such a situation? You told me that yo II 
cannot decide ... 
R: Er, that what's better for my mllm. Because if I complained, most probably, 1 
wOllldn 'f complain to the physician, who did this to her, as maybe the sitllation 
would get even worse. "(PI3) 
If failure to pay is associated with an unsuccessful intervention, patients can easily 
make a connection. As one woman, who did not pay and whose goitre operation failed, 
said: 
" ... the truth is that I know that if I choose a doctor myself, then I can be certaill 
that he expects money. [So I didn't choose, but] I knew thaI somebody would 
operate me anyway but the operation wasn't successful. ... For instance, now ([ 1 
had to go to XY hospital and I'd need an operation, ll"hatever it is ... I'm slIre I'd 
select another doctor ... " (P 19) 
The interviews reveal that, in this respect, low salaries also matter, insofar as they 
generate a view that physicians need informal payments. It is clear that most 
respondents are aware of the low salaries of health workers (PO 1 ,P02,P03,P05,P06, 
P08,P09,PIO,P13,P14,P16,P19,P20), and although not all know the exact amounts, they 
use terms such as 'they are in need of it', 'they are dependent on it', 'they arc 
forced/compelled to accept it', 'they have no choice, but to accept it' 
(PO 1 ,P06,P 1 O,P 14,P20). Two respondents made the connection between poor 
performance and low salaries as follows: 
"Look, in health care there're loads of patients and few physicians, and they 
aren't paid enollgh ... and so, don't let me say what they're compelled to do, thlls 
if yo II don't pllt that certain thing [envelope with informal payment] there ... in my 
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opinion, there're many patients and the physicians haven't enollgh time." (47-
year old man, P20), 
and: 
"They're on night duty, and run around and they deserve more, and then [if they 
were paid enough] they'd approach things very differently right away. " (52-year 
old woman, P02; also P07), 
while another interviewee made an interesting comparison with lawyers: 51 
" ... 1 ll'ouldn't say that this applies to solicitors as well, because when we had a 
case and I saw that he read it from the computer. For i5-minliles work, dear me, 
he asked lor i5,000 lorints52. 1 cOlildn't have imagined giving graluities in 
addition. I was rather upset ... " (59-year old woman, P07) 
The first example also illustrates how this process works at a more general level, 
since the behaviour of patients is influenced not just by the failings in the system that 
are experienced, but also by previous direct or indirect experiences with informal 
payment itself (POI ,P02,P03,P07,P08,P09,PlO,PII ,PI2,P 13,P 14,PI5,P16,PI8,P19,P20, 
P21): 
" ... when 1 was pregnant, I had a rooln-mate ji-om XY She was brought to the 
hospital by the ambulance, and she had a Caesarean section ... and jllst before 
discharge, since she didn't have her 'own' obstetrician, when (he senior registrar 
said during ward-round that her stitches should be removed, each physician 
pointed al the other that this one would do it, or that one, or anolher one ... " (29-
year old woman, P13; and P14 a very similar example) 
General distrust: 'It is not possible to receive quality care without payment' 
Together these experiences can lead to extreme distrust in the system, with a belief that 
it is not possible to receive good quality care if one does not pay: 
"R: '" (0 lell the truth, doctors promise something, 'which doeslI 'I fUllction. 
I: What are YOll thinking of? 
R: This is a generalisation, it doesn't apply to everyone, bill doclors promise to 
help others but don't do il without money. There're cases where, if someone 
doesn't pay, Ihen he can die. " 
51 It is interesting to note, that in Hungary informal payments to solicitors did exist during the communist 
regime [e.g.200]. It would be an interesting further research direction to assess, what happened with 
solicitor's gratitude payments, and why. 
52 €60. 
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and she continues: 
" .. , if somebody has acquaintance they get a private room and special treatment. 
I had a private room, too, during two weeks, I cannot complain about the 
treatment either. But had I been an ordinary little woman who went there, I 
wouldn't have got this treatment." (32-year old women, PO I; also 
P02,P06,P I8,P 19,P20,P2I) 
As another patient said: 
" ... I'm not sllre that this is due to doctors, but patients who do believe that if they 
don't give they'll not receive acceptable care. " (63-year old woman, P 14), 
a view echoed by a physician: 
" ... there's a part of the population who simply cannot imagine that if's possible 
to get adequate care without payment. " (D04) 
Distrust with anxiety: 'I did everything that I could do' 
Nevertheless, there is much uncertainty about the need to pay, with the association 
between the standard of services and informal payment being not unequivocal. Just as 
the experiences \vith health care system performance are heterogeneous, so are those 
related to informal payments (PI0,PI1,PI2,PI7). Just as it is often difficult for lay 
persons to establish whether an unsatisfactory outcome was due to provider negligence 
(P09,PI3,P14,P17), it is not always easy to establish the actual impact of an informal 
payment (P I O,P 14,P20). This uncertainty seems to influence the decision by increasing 
the anxiety that is a common accompaniment of medical treatment: 
"R: .. .for instance there was somebody, who came in the same time "when I did and 
she didn't hare an arrangement with a physician that he'd operate on her. She 
was in the sallie room yet 1 experienced absolutely no difference [in terms of the 
services], and so from this experience I've drawn one or two lessons ... 
I: And may I ask you what this was? 
R: ... That gratitude payment is important only for liS. Maybe it's for m)' oll'n 
inward peace. " (53-year old woman, PI7), 
As another woman explained: 
" ... when I lI"GS here in the gynaecological department, then the facl that I knell' 
my husband had given mane), meant that I felt safe ... It's stlip id, but I did feel 
that ll'ay. I had a better stale of mind. " 
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When she compared her experiences in the state health care system with those in a 
private hospital she said: 
" ... I don't feel this anxiety there ... It's lotaliy different when I go there. " (44-year 
old woman, P03) 
Recalling chapter 4, these accounts correspond well with concept of 'psychic 
security' as one possible motive for informal payments in the TK-1985 study (but those 
researchers did not explain what they meant by it). Two interviews with physicians 
explore this issue further: 
"R: ... [informal payment is motivated by] the fear of the patient that ... if they 
don't give then no-one will pay attention to them. 
I: And 'why do you think patients fear this? 
R: In state health services, a surgical ward can be extremely overloaded and 
[even if] they work according to the professional reqllirements, ... the patient can 
still think that if I give I buy his [the doctor's] allention. And if 1 am on the 
operating-table, who knoll's that I'll survive or not, I mllst do everything in order 
to have a s/lccessflll operation. If I did everythillg and 1 die, I cannot help it ... " 
and later on: 
" ... maybe 1 will manage to get something, maybe they'll lise better equipment, 
maybe they 'II lise better thread, the patient obviolls!,v cannot kno'w this, since the 
surgeon won't discllss this lvith him, bllt this thought that I've done evelything to 
get the best service ... " (D28), 
while another physician put it this way: 
" .. .for him [the relative of the patient] to be at ease, that his relative has got 
everything that's possible, he has to pay ... 1 think this [informal payment] is sllch 
a means, 'which can help ... this 'sacrifice' ... 1 Pllt this, too, il1 that what I do for 
him [the patient]. " (D04; and D13,D19,D23) 
Thus informal payment becomes part of this 'everything', and non-payment can 
increase the natural anxiety that accompanies health care interventions inasmuch as 
patients and relati\ es failed to do everything if they did not give, even if they cannot be 
sure about what impact informal payments might have. This is a less obvious 
manifestation of the coercion that can result from distrust in the health care system, than 
the 'I have to pay, because that is the only way to receive adequate care' approach. 
Nevertheless, these views cannot be universal as otherwise everybody would pay for 
every service. The fact that they do not suggests that the decision-making is more 
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complicated, In the next section we explore the association between informal payments 
and particular services, and then look at the subtle ways by which direct coercion can be 
brought to bear by providers, 
8.3.1.2. Coercion as unclear entitlements and extra services 
The empirical literature sho\vs that informal payments are unequally distributed among 
physicians according to levels of care, specialty and, in certain cases, to types of 
service. Although one of the distinctive features of gratuities is that they are not given 
to physicians in exchange for exceptional services (i.e. payment is not service oriented), 
the fact that informal payments depend on the attributes of services does not, in itself, 
question the validity of the gratitude payment concept. There is no reason to assume, 
for instance, that the feeling of gratitude cannot increase with illness severity or 
complexity of the procedure performed. This is a possible explanation for more 
extensive informal payments in inpatient care compared to outpatient care (a finding 
confirmed by our interviews \vith physicians (004,D 16)), Similarly, patients may feel 
more intense gratitude if doctors can solve a problem that is particularly troubling 
(painful, severely limiting etc.). It appears that individuals attach diff~rent degrees of 
importance to different services (for instance because they affect sensitive or intimate 
areas), which, at least partially, can explain the differences in willingness to pay, but at 
the same time does not contradict the' donation' explanation of informal payments. For 
instance, an interviewee, talking about her experiences in private medicine, said: 
"1: Have YOll, or your/amily ever visited a private doctor with some problem? ... 
R: IlI'{!nt to the otologist once, becallse .. .1 feel m)' ears so much, if I, myself. 
touch it, it develops an inflammation immediately, and it hllrt so much I was 
afi'aid to go to the polyclinic, And so I wen! directly to a private doctor" (P II; 
also P08;P20), 
while a physician reflecting on why obstetrics and gynaecology is among the best 
paid specialties says: 
" ... eventually there's an intimacy, there's a semith'ity of women, ... and the 
expectation of the public, that healthy women cOllie here ... 10 bear a child, 
... therefore all)' mistake cannot be made, ... as there arc t1l'O lives il1\'Olved ... " 
(019; also D09) 
The interviews, however, revealed other characteristics of the distribution of 
informal payments between and within specialties, types of services and settings that are 
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incompatible with the donation hypothesis of informal payments and consequently 
require an alternative explanation. 
'Non-paying' specialties 
In chapter 4, we have noted that there are medical specialties, such radiology and other 
diagnostic fields, where informal payment is virtually non-existent. Our interviewees 
not only confirmed this (D05,D12,D13), but extended the list to traumatology (D06), 
anaesthesiology and intensive care (D03,D 17,D25,D27) neonatology (D03), dialysis 
(D04) and paediatrics (D03,D17,031). These areas provide insight into the motivation 
issue in two ways; first because of the general lack of informal payments but second 
because of what can be learned from those few cases where patients did attempt to pay. 
Paediatrics and, especially, neonatology, illustrate the unsustainability of the 
'donation' explanation. It is very unlikely that the apparent 'parsimony' of parents in 
these cases stems from lack of gratitude, especially in light of the circumstances that 
accompanies birth. This is a puzzling contradiction, as one of the physicians put it: 
"R: ... and one more strange thing, which I'm not ahle to comprehend. If there's 
a problem with a child, there's nothing given in most cases ... 
1: And why is this? 
R: ] don't know. ] myself cOllldn 't figure it oul either. Because if] think it over, 
if] had a problem, or my child had a problem ... I'd pay first for my child, and not 
for me. But strangely enough this difference exists in relation to the paediatrician 
and the obstetrician, too. Paediatricians are rarely given anything after the 
delivery. " (017) 
'Paying' and 'non-paying' services within the same speciality 
This contradiction exists not just between specialities, but within a particular specialty, 
for which our research has provided an example from traumatology: 
"] had an interesting case, a patient, who lVas brought in in a very serious 
condition,' he'd suffered several serio liS injuries. Finally, he recovered, but didn't 
give anylhing. He came back years later, and asked me to operate his crooked 
loe. Amlfor thaI operalion he paid. " (006) 
If willingness to pay really increases with the severity of the illness and the 
complexity of the required therapy, then why do injured patients pay the doctor only 
occasionally, and why is the urge much stronger in connection with even a relatively 
small elective procedure? And why is that that the few cases who do make informal 
payments to specialists in these areas are apparently motivated not by gratitude? This 
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can be inferred because they give in advance or when dissatisfied, For instance, a 
physician, in one of the aforementioned specialities, recalls her experiences with 
informal payment as follows: 
"I'd say that rather those patients give, who aren't treated the way, as we usually 
do. For instance they have to wait longer, or if I'm in a bad mood, and they can 
sense this in my voice. " (DOS, also D06; and D03,D26,D31) 
Differences regarding the same service: Home visits, choice of doctor, rank of 
physician and good work 
The most obvious case against the 'donation' explanation, is that payment for the same 
service can depend on who provides the service and where it is provided. The 
interviews confirmed the difference between home visits and treatment in the surgery in 
the primary care setting (D20,D22,P13,P14), as discussed before, but also identified as 
important the choice of doctor (D04,D16,POl,P02,P03,P06,P07,P08,P09,PII,PI2,PI4, 
PI5,P19), hislher rank and position (D17,DI8,P06,P07,PIO) and other aspects of the 
service, such as the number of patient-doctor encounters (D 17 ,P02,P 12; and P05,P 11). 
As we will see, these suggest a radically different interpretation of gratitude. 
What is common to these cases is that the difference between payment and non-
payment cannot easily be explained by the extent of gratitude, because the content of 
the service is essentially the same. For instance, why should a patient be more grateful 
to be operated on by a senior consultant and not a junior doctor, as long as the outcome 
was equally successful in both cases? 
Choosing a doctor 
It is clear that the status of the physician is something that patients do consider when 
deciding how much to give. As a 59-year old woman recalled: 
..... I found the doctor, well, not a low rank, but 1 got frightened, 1 almost fell over, 
when it turned out that the person, who was recommended to me was ... some kind 
of a director. Oh my God, they cOlild have recommended me an ordillClfJ' doctor 
for ... if you ask somebody on a private basis, then obviously something is dlle. " 
(P07; also P02,P06,P09, and D17,DI8) 
This is a good illustration of how the ability to choose a doctor is regarded as an 
'extra' or private service, which must be paid for: 
.. ... He [the physician] was very bw,y, and as 1 could see, there the others were 
'private' patients, said (0 be private, but not private in reality .. .patients belong to 
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a doctor, and they remunerate this some way or another," (63-year old female, 
PI4; also PI9 (cited previously), and P06,P08,P09,Pll,PI2,PI5) 
It seems that this is so strongly embedded in the system that doctors virtually expect 
to receive an informal payment, even if it is not paid in advance, and patients simply 
cannot imagine that it is possible to see a doctor without payment. For instance, a 46-
year old woman with a chronic illness, who would rather go to one particular doctor for 
regular check-ups but has not asked for this so far, explains her reasons for inaction as 
follows: 
HI: But do you see a possibility for asking sllch a thing? ... 
R: First, it's the question of dare, too, but in my opinion the other thing is that if I 
can afford it then it would be possible , .. If I had enough money to retutll to the 
same doctor, then I'd visit him for the monthly check-up at the ward. " (P 11; also 
P05 - did not dare to ask to stay in hospital for the weekend without paying the 
senior consultant) 
From the doctors' perspective, those patients who do not pay the doctor may 
eventually be asked to 'leave': 
" ... if somebody visits ... a popular doctor two or three times without paying, for 
the fourth time the doctor says, 'then maybe you sholiid find somebody else'. " 
(DI8) 
Yet patients may find that this interpretation of 'choice' is forced upon them: 
"R: ... I'd say, YOll know a lot of doctors almost abollt their tariff Well .. , ifyoll go 
to the hospital one day before the operation, they're [patients] asking, who do YOll 
come to, ... who is your doctor? 
[the wife of the respondent continues] They aren't asking that, but 'do YOIl have a 
doctor'? I say no. .,. Once I had a small opera! ion .. , and I was in for two days, 
three days, and I started to be browned off, and they did the morning rolll1d~' 
... well, I said, 'I'd like somebody to examine me and I'd like to get over lvith it'. 
'And who's YOllr doctor?' 'Well', I said, 'sorry bllt I don't hare a doctor' ... 'Well, 
if YOli don't have a doctor then you won't be operated.' They did the operation on 
the fourth day, .. . when I got a doctor. ... Bllt if I say to him that 'would YOll 
please', iI's obviollsly accompanied with this [rubbing her fingers] ... 
I: That means, YOIi have to pay? 
R: YOli have 10 lip. " (wife of 63-year old man, PI5) 
This is by no means a language of gratitude. Patients talk about 'hiring a doctor', or 
a 'hired doctor' (P07,PI2,PI4,P20), and physicians about 'extra services' for which 
payments are 'due' (021,024,028,D29). All these suggest an unspoken agreement 
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between patients and doctors that choice of physician is not part of the official benefit 
package. Patients who choose and then pay a doctor become 'private' patients in the 
public system (P07,P14), or as one of the physicians put it: 
" ... The other case, is when the physician thinks that s/he 's provided a service and 
in return for this, s/he expects the patient to pay. These are the 'voluntary' 
patients ... " (D24), 
while the rest remain 'ordinary', 'normal', 'publicly funded', or 'drifting': 
" ... He was a young man, and 1 asked him, ... hadn't he asked anybody, and ... he 
told me that he hadn't, he let himself drift ... " (53-year old woman, PI7) 
But why is the choice of physician so important? Why do patients think that they 
must pay if they want the doctor of their choice? Why do they think that not to do so 
means drifting in the system? And why do doctors expect that patients will pay for 
this? As a doctor put it: 
" ... 1 have a friend, who's expecting a baby, and 1 asked her whom she goes to. 
Because, ... 1 think that it's absoilitely normal that Y01l'd like to belong to 
somebody, especially in a situation like this. And she told me, that, well, nobody, 
becallse they cannot afJord it. " (D04) 
This is indeed a legitimate question, since, according to the current legal situation, 
patients are entitled to choose their doctor freely within the particular tier of the system 
[1,8]. This implies that either they are not aware of their entitlements (which is 
possible, because during the communist regime there was, at least in principle, a strict 
referral system in place with no choice for individual patients), or there is something 
more important behind the act of choice. Our interviews suggest that this is a complex 
issue, and both factors playa role. 
Obstetrics and gynaecology is the specialty where the link between the choice of the 
doctor and 'extra' services is most obvious. Because it is not possible to predict the 
exact time of the delivery, the child can arrive at any time, outside normal hours, during 
weekends, or while the doctor is on holiday. Doctors are not obliged to attend if they 
are not on duty, so if a mother insists on having a particular obstetrician to assist the 
delivery the doctor must sacrifice hislher free time, something that may be considered 
an extra service outside the public system. This forms the basis of the expectation by 
the physician that this mllst be paid for: 
" ... I'd say that it's vel)' rough on me, if 1 come for a delil'elY during the night, 
and afier that she says 'thank you, 1'1/ see you sOfl/elime', ... tlial's vel)' annoying 
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... this isn't a gratitude payment anymore, since ... I shouldn 'I be considered a fool 
that I come backfromXYjustfor this [for nothing]." (DI8; also DI6,D24) 
Yet there are other services whose 'extra' or 'private' nature is not so obvious, for 
instance a telephone call during the night about a trivial problem: 
" ... it 's lOp. m. and she says, sorry, but I haven't had stool for two days, what 
shall I do? Well, what can I say to this at home at the other end of the line ... " 
(DI9), 
or when the patient goes to the hospital for an outpatient visit, instead of going to the 
official surgery at the polyclinic: 
" ... there's a patient, looking for you, that she's the patient of x}' doctor, and she 
comes here in the hospital, and although I should be at Ihree olher places, I find 
some time to examine her ... and then she says thank you and goes away. Because 
it's quite different if she comes to the polyclinic, or another surge,y, where I'm 
there [to see outpatients] ... then I don't e:..pect her to pay. "(DI8) 
In the latter case the border between public and private is not so clear cut and the 
assessment by physicians of what should be considered 'extra' does not necessarily 
coincide with official entitlements. For instance, if the child is born during normal 
working hours then no 'extra' service has to be provided, and yet: 
" ... If I assist the delivery during work time, and I expect the money as I do at 2 
a.m. - this is a question. Because during that morning I could have sat in my 
room lvi/hout a lot of stress, and Y0lt feel, that you're entitled to it ({ Ihe stale 
doesn't provide it ... 
.. , if the patient insists to have doctor X to assist the delivery, 01' doctor X to 
operate on him/her, then ... this is his/her request, an extra service ... " (024; also 
DI6,DI8) 
Visiting a patient at home 
Home visits in primary care are also examples of 'extra' services but, because it is more 
difficult to determine the degree of entitlement, the border is even more blurred 
providing scope for individual discretion. In general, family doctors and paediatricians 
are required to visit patients at home on request if there is a clinical need. However it is 
possible to envisage circumstances in which a patient would request the doctor to call 
just because s/he does not want to go to the surgery: 
"R: ... lIsually we don't go to the family paediatrician, bllt he visits liS at home, if 
I ask him .... llhink slIch a visit costs 800forints ... 
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I: Bllt does he tell you that ... ? 
R: He tells us, ... when she got immunization ... we didn't go either, but he came, 
in the case of immunization it is 700 forints, in case of other illnesses 800 . 
... R: And does this physician have a private surgery? 
I: A 'surgery by car', I'd say, because he doesn't have a private sllrgely." (29-
year old woman, PI3) 
Working conscientiously 
While there are some 'private' services that patients are not entitled to officially, such as 
access to physicians outside normal hours, patients may choose a doctor to secure 
services, which patients are clearly entitled to, at least according to the official benefit 
package: 
"R: For instance, when I had my first pregnancy, I thought that ... the physician 
on dllty, would assist the delivery ... With the second one, however, there were 
problems during the pregnancy, then I felt that I cannot trllst [the doctor, who 
would happen to be on duty], I cannot risk ... the health of my child and mine 
because there was a problem dllring the pregnancy. 
I: Then you had to ask [choose] a doctor [in advance]? 
R: Yes, it 'was necessary." (46-year old woman, P 11) 
This suggests that 'going public', i.e. without asking a physician in advance, involves 
a perceived risk of not getting adequate care, something that should not be considered as 
'extra', above that to which one is entitled. A similar impression is gained from other 
cases where respondents justify payments because of things that should be pari of the 
standard service: 
" ... llsually the stitches are rellloved on the fifth or sixth day, (he decision [to pay] 
is based 011 how many times the doctor saw YOIl during these days ... generally (he 
more attention the doctor pays to you, the more YOll want (0 be grateful." (41-
year old woman, P 12; also P02,P09; and D 17) 
FUlther, respondents contrast the good experience with previous bad experiences. 
" ... 1 am grateflll [to a dentist] as slhe gave me an anaesthetic ... once before my 
tooth was extracted [without anaesthetic], and I felt as if l11y brain was 
extracted ... " (4G-year old woman, P 11, and two similar cases; and PI O,P 14) 
Interestingly, in two of these quotations the descriptions used the language of 
gratitude, suggesting that a lack of attention was the norm and diligence was something 
'extra' to be grateful for, albeit in a radically different sense from what the 'donation' 
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hypothesis implies. Such assessments are not at all surprising, in light of the 
performance failures discussed earlier. 
Reassessment of entitlement 
This is a good example that the definition of 'extra' when taken beyond home visits or 
choice of physician is even less straightforward. For instance, how many times should a 
patient be visited in the ward by a doctor? Or what is the minimum level of kindness 
and attention that is due? Entitlements are especially unclear to patients in a system that 
provides strikingly uneven quality of care, as a 47-year old patient put it: 
"R: ... Look, if 1 provide an extra service 1 expect extra payment for it. This is 
straightforward, this is legitimate, this is a basic thing. But if 1 don't expect the 
senior consultant to visit me in the ward, only if slhe mllst do it? Morning rounds, 
afternoon rounds, etc, etc, but do it properly, so it shouldn't be that if 1 didn't pay, 
slhe just enters the ward and ... don't even ask me, how are you ... this is 'why slhe 
is paid for ... Now then if 1 expect the senior consultant 10 come in after work 
hOllrs and provide me this and that ... a single room, special medicines .. , thell 1 
should pay for it, because it isn't part of the basic service ... 
1: ... Do YOIl know, what can somebody expect, and whal is above that ... ? 
R: Well, maybe Ihere isn't enough information, although ii's di!>p/ayed in 
hospitals, the time of the morning rOllnds, and when .. , 
[his wife interrupts him] ... Well it is, bllt not the money ... " (P20) 
On the other hand, even if entitlements were clear, patients confront the failure of the 
system to deliver these entitlements, either in their own experience or that of relatives 
and friends. They reassess what they can realistically expect from the system. As a 
result, the normal can become the 'extra' to patients, but also to doctors, who think that 
they have a legitimate basis to accept payments, because the state does not provide a 
fair salary: 
" .. .I think that primarily there are ahuses in these two areas [obstetrics and 
surgery] ... Blit surely the official salmy is an abuse ... lI'ith Illy experience ill 111'0 
speciallies, 1 take home bel1l'eell 60-70, 000 /orinls53 per month .. , " (004; also 
D09,D 1 O,D 13,D 14,D20,022,D23 ,D24,D26,D28) 
It is not surprising then that certain physicians think that they 'deserve' informal 
payments, or even they are 'entitled' to them, because they 'laboured for' them so that 
they are justified in case of any good performance (018,019,020,024,028,029). On 
the other hand this link between performance and payments establishes some sort of 
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'proportionality' in terms ofthe amount that is 'due', and this works in both direction: if 
a surprisingly high (D18,021), or a disappointingly low amount is given: 
" ... and then ... she gives 5000 forints, and ... 1 think that 1 have earned 5000 
forints over X months. 1 understand that patients don't have enough money, ... but 
they have money for a refrigerator or a colour TV" (D18) 
If the outcome of this process of reinterpretation of entitlements coincides in the 
minds of most patients and physicians then a new, unwritten set of entitlements 
emerges, which makes the time of giving immaterial since patients know that they have 
to give, and physician know that they will get it. Choice of physician and receiving 
home visits can be regarded as such new entitlements, offering a plausible explanation 
for some of the differences observed in the distribution of informal payments. For 
instance, in traumatology the circumstances do not allow the patient to choose the 
surgeon in advance, but if the traumatologist performs an elective orthopaedic 
operation, informal payments work as in other surgical specialties. The same applies to 
anaesthesiology and intensive therapy ('no choice, no obligation'), althnugh the 
situation with paediatrics is less clear in relation to choice. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of these 'pvints of crystallisation' in a 'fluid' system 
do not require that everybody agrees. For instance, some physicians noted that there is 
the so-called 'self-conscious' type of patient: 
" ... when you visit a patient in the wealthy quarter of the city, you cannot be 
certain [that you will receive informal payments], because slhe's se/j:cOI1SCiOllS, 
and sihe knOlI's that slhe's entitled to it, 'while ifyoll go to another place, ll'liere (I 
simple, elderly family lives, there you can be almost 100% sure ... Ihat you '1/ get 
something." (020; also D22,023) 
At the other extreme, there is the patient who feels that without informal payments 
the doctor does a favour for him/her: 
" ... [when I offered informal payment] almost evelY doctor said 110. And! told 
them that ... ! alii a poor \l'Omal1, but! don't 'want to ([ccept charity [treated like a 
pauper] ... " (POS) 
From the doctors' perspective, the spectrum is equally wide from those \\'ho 
categorically refuse payments to those who explicitly demand them, even specifying the 
amount required: 
53 €240-280. 
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" ... there's a child in the family, who ... needs operations frequently, and allegedly 
they have to give 60,000 forints to the professor to do the operation ... " (63-year 
old woman, P14) 
But if doctors' and patients' reinterpretation of entitlements does not coincide, 
doctors are in a position to impose their expectations on patients. 
8.3.1.3. Direct coercion: pressures from providers and other patients 
The most obvious type of coercion, which is inherently inconsistent with the gratitude 
payment concept, is when the pressure to pay comes directly from the providers. 
However, this pressure seems rarely to be as overt as in the cited example, when 
payment was demanded upfront as a prerequisite of the operation (P 14; also P06,P20), 
or when insufficient informal payment is offered and the doctor refuses it: 
" ... there was a woman, 'who was crying in the waiting room, and ... she told me 
that she put a 5,000 note in the envelope, and the senior consultant ... looked at il 
and gave it back saying 'I'm not living on wafer'." (60-year old man, P18; also 
P09 cited before, and PO 1; and D 18,D29) 
The range of more 'subtle' mechanisms used to extract informal payments is vcry 
wide, from denying or delaying care to frequent visits and enquiries about hO\v the 
patient feels, to simply being in the right place at the right time. Their applicability 
depends on the circumstances applying to each specialty (P02,P05,P06,P08,P IO,P 1 I. 
P13,P14,PI5, DI7,024,025,030). For instance, in surgical specialties it is possible to 
manipulate the order of operations so that patients who do not pay somehow find 
themselves at the end of the list: 
"I: And hall' do you think this favouritism is manifested ... ? 
R: Well, the drugs are the same obviously it's rather manifest in the 
circumstances, .. , Who 'will be the first on the list of operations, or who will be the 
last, which, you know in adrance, will be cancelled anyway ... and ... postponed to 
next day, Noll' then next day he won't be the first either, but the last again, ll'ell 
... nobody strains himself for a 'non-paying' patient, 
I: Aha, but sooner or later he'll be operated lVon 't he ... 
R: Well, sooner or later, if he's lucky, eventually he'll get on the list somehow, or 
if the penny dropped, or if ... the patients discllss it in the ward ... " (017), 
and a 63-ycar old patient recalls his experiences as follows: 
" .. .1 was in the hospital, they did an X-ray, looked at it and told me that it had to 
be operated all ... and I asked the doctor to do the opera/ion. But, then, he told me 
we have to disclIss this, il'isited him three times to discliss it, in the a/ief1loon, in 
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the morning ... and he visited me 9 p.m, and visited me another time, but he still 
hadn't operated on my arm. Well, I said to myself ... what should I do, ... it was 
emergency case, but the operation was postponed. Then next day ... I told my 
wife, please bring me 5,000 forints ... the following day my wife brought the 
money, I put the envelope into his pocket in the evening, and next morning 9 a. m. I 
was in the operating theatre. " (P 15) 
We have already discussed the significance of frequent patient-doctor encounters 
(P02,PI2,PI5,PI7,DI7), particularly if they have 'no' purpose, other than to enquire 
about the general state of health of the patient: 
" ... And while I was recovering he visited me at least three times, I went Oil! to the 
toilet and he was coming towards me, how 're you Mr. X, how do you feel Mr. X, 
and so on, well, J said to myself, I bet he's expecting money. I went to my bed, 
and half an hour he was there again. Well, what shall J do ... I had 2, 000 forints 
on me and put it into his pocket. " (63-year old man, PIS) 
In other cases hanging around the patient is a tool to make the connection between 
'delays' and their 'solutions': 
" ... and when the child was about to be discharged ... everybody else received the 
medical report. The doctor was coming and going, and 1 asked him two or three 
times, how long we have to ·wait. It'll be ready in a minute ... but eventually we 
received it sometime in the afternoon. And J felt that he was hanging arollnd 
waiting for me to pllt the envelope into his pocket" (46-year old woman about her 
son's case, PI 1), 
a phenomenon also reported in primary care: 
" ... when the treatment was over, ... the [family] doctor walked to the windoll's, 
and stayed there looking through it at the street. And J remember telling to my 
husband ... to give him/her money. The minute he gave it to the doctor, s/he left 
right away." (68-year old woman, PI~) 
Ward-rounds also provide an opportunity to make patients understand what they 
have to do: 
"I've seen such ward-rounds, when those, who didn't pay were skipped. Well, 
these are really disgusting things. " (030) 
If these signals are not enough, a private conversation in the doctors' study (which in 
Hungarian hospitals can usually be found attached to the wards) can 'help'. The 
interviews have revealed that patients attach a special significance to being invited there 
as it is associated with informal payments: 
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"I've heard abo lit a doctor who liked wondering around the corridor in visiting 
hours in a white coat with deep pockets, and once 1 was also in a sitllation, when 
.. , the doctor came to me on a Saturday morning and said that 1 could go home 
... but ... 1 had no transport, no escort and nobody was at home. And then 1 told to 
my doctor, 1 cannot go home, where shall 1 go? And s/he told me to speak with 
the senior registrar. And 1 said no, ... 1 won't take the senior registrar an 
envelope jllst because s/he gave me a smile at my bed three times a week. Jfyoll 
pay a visit then YOll have to take the envelope ... " (54-year old women, POS) 
Then there are gestures (opening the pocket) and hints (for instance about the cost of 
care, the innovation of the treatment) to draw the patients' attention to what they should 
do: 
"We 'were called in, the senior registrar made us sit down, we were qllite 
frightened. And s/he told liS, that look madam, here things lVork with thick 
envelopes ... "(52-year old woman, P06; also PIO,PI6), 
and 
" ... I'll never forget that she [the doctor] opened the pocket of her white coat, to 
[put it in] there, then. She did so, although 1 didn 'f sholl' any sign thaI I'd give 
any money to her. It 'was so obvious what she 'was after, and 1 think 1 would have 
felt so embarrassed if 1 hadn't had anything to put in there. The other side of the 
story, of course, are patients who ask after the operation, how much did you give 
.. .1 lVas astonished ... and my husband ... told me that we didn't have so milch 
money. 1 think one is pressurized from both sides, patients as well as doctors. " 
(33-year old woman, P08) 
This latter example is good illustration of the point that patients themselves can also 
be a source of coercion (P02,P04,P05,P08,Pll ,PI3,PI5,P16,018), and maybe a vehicle 
for doctors to set their 'fees'. Nonetheless, the relationship between patients and 
between patients and doctors is radically different, because of the imbalance of power 
which, as we saw, makes it especially difficult for patients to resist pressure from 
physicians: 
" ... The patient, who visits me with a bunch of flowers a week after, because J 
provided him/her detailed information [about his/her illness], is really grateful, 
because s/he was absollltely not exposed to me [not in my hands Inot at my 
mercy] ... bllt J think patients pay, because they felt obliged to do il. This is just a 
masking Ihat they'd give anyway, and they're gratejitl and so 011, certainly they'd 
give, but they feel that they have to give" (011), 
and 
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"R: ' .. but maybe if I met an ill-mannered doctor, but who works well, I gave it 
[informal payment] to him/her as well. 
I: That is, if the results show that you recovered? 
R: Yes, if the outcome is good. But, unfortunately, because one is a lillIe bit 
defenceless [exposed], one would give it even if the results aren't good, .. , if one 
has to go to hospital. " (63-year old woman, P14) 
The 'art' of eliciting informal payments 
Given that provider coercion is associated with the behaviour of doctors, there are 
certain skills that can be learnt and practiced, as one of the doctors revealed: 
", .. After a while I felt that if I drove harder I could earn more. ... when one is 
increasingly immersed in a situation, .. ' begins to feel the patterns which make it 
work .. , the Pavlov-reflex, in its real sense, when one re~ponds .. , to the smell of 
money and feels the manners, the techniques, with which gratitude payments can 
be elicited. "(D03; also DOI,D02,D04,D21,D25, D29) 
All these suggest that enforcement of informal payments can be a 'profitable 
business', ifone decides to set out on this route: 
" ... As long as you'd like to buy not just nap pies, but something else for your child 
... you'd try to find ways how to make more money, And from this point on it's the 
question of how far, given his/her own value system and norms, one will go. 
There are those, who say to the patient, madam, one visit 'will cost yOI/ 4,000 
forints. S/he's no right to say it because slhe works in a pl/blic hospital, but there 
are such persons out there. " (D29), 
but on the other hand it is very difficult not to make patients appreciate the bad 
circumstances: 
" ... it's overcrowded, enormous mass of people, YOll're sweating, lots of night 
duties. The official salmy is outrageollsly low, practically you call1lot make ends 
meet. The consequence of this is that sooner or later you get exhausted, distorted, 
and the patient-doctor relationship suffers a 101 ... " (D30), 
and once doctors accept informal payments it may not be easy the draw the line 
between what should and should not be accepted: 
" ... in the beginning I had my rliles about whom I didn't wanl to accept 1I10ney 
fro 111, Ihe elderly, the terminally ill, and so on. And after a while this circle is 
contracting somehow, ... as it's nol easy to refuse ii, because it's ... d(fJicult to pick 
and choose among patients. I rather think that there are two ends (~f the 
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spectrum. The ones who virtually never accept it, and the others who accept 
everything with no exceptions ... " (D02), 
and a justification is always at hand: 
" ... J believe that many find peace of mind in giving in advance, because they feel 
that the whole thing secured, then why should 1 deny them this feeling, after all 
they designated the money for this purpose anyway. " (D 11) 
Nevertheless, as we will see, even doctors, who categorically refuse informal 
payment, can get into a situation where they incite it, even if they have no such 
intention. 
8.3.1.4. Coercion as misinterpretation of conventional situations: A new 
understanding of gratitude 
The 'art' of eliciting informal payment can sensitise patients to perceive the signals of 
'expectation', and may create a view that doctors usually 'expect' it (P07,P08,P 10, 
P II,P IS,P 19). However, this has the potential consequence that patients misread 
behavioural 'clues' and pay even if there is no such intention by the doctor. For 
instance, we previously quoted the example of a physician in a 'non-paying' specialty 
who experienced that the rare occasions when informal payments are made tend to be 
associated with being less nice to patients, when s/he happens to have a bad day; 
reflecting on this she adds: 
"To be honest, J really Jelt bad about this afterwards, because J didn '{ have allY 
intention whatsoever to squeeze gratitude payments from the patient. " (D05) 
Given that most of these behavioural 'techniques' are in fact an integral part of a 
normal patient-doctor relationship and, as discussed previously, poor system 
performance mean that low standards are common, good performance can also give rise 
to unintentional coercion. We have already cited examples of how typical patient-
doctor encounters, especially when conveying a diligent, conscientious attitude can be 
regarded as something 'extra' to be paid for. In a context where such signs are 
perceived as suggesting an expectation to pay, doctors who have no intention to send 
such signals, but simply to do their job properly, may feel embarrassed in or even try to 
avoid behaviour which is simply doing their job properly (D22,D27): 
" ... 1 was always embarrassed by gratitllde payment, so milch, that, well, you 
know, many people ... ask me, sllch as the elderly, to check their blood pressure, to 
visit them {It home regularly, once in a month ... and J always say 110, sorry, not 
this way, but if you call me I'll visit YOIl the same day, but I dOll '( make slIch 
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agreements ... first, because this way you seal an invisible contract ... that because 
I come, they've to pay. Second, if they cannot ajJord to pay anymore, but don't 
dare to tell it ... 1 don't want to drag them into an embarrassing siluation. And I 
still say ... that what they askfor should be the job ofthefamity doctor, but I don't 
dare to do it ", 
and 
" ... it's often said that you should visit the patient on the day of the operation. 
You should see him/her professionally [for medical reasons], and not to open 
his/her bedside table - well this is incredible, this is a joke - whether there's 
anything there, bllt we must be glad that the patient is all right ... and then either 
YOli don't go to the ward, or it's so humiliating, becallse it isn't that I want money 
00.1 came here, well what did I come for?" 
In this context genuine good work is interwoven with work fuelled by expectations 
and it becomes increasingly difficult, or impossible, to distinguish the two. Ultimately, 
how the situation is understood depends on the perception of the patient: 
"I: And 'what did YOIl experience in general, ... did they accept what YOll offered? 
R: They always accepted, and of course they expect il. 
I: And can YOli tell that the doctors or nurses actually expect it, does it show? 
R: Of course. 
I: And how is this manifested? 
R: How? I cannot tell you, somehow it's written on their face. Olle or t)l'O kind 
sentences, or visiting me cOllple of times in the ward and things like this, and then 
YOll feel thaI YOll must pay, jusl because Ihe dacIaI' C({llIe to see you more Ih({/1 s/Ile 
did the old lady next to YOIl. " (52-year old woman, P02) 
Given that entitlements are unclear, the number of visits or kind words considered as 
either an 'extra' service (as discussed before, e.g. P12,P14,D05), or signals to induce 
informal payments, is down to individual interpretations by both the patient and the 
doctor. On this basis we argue for a new understanding of gratitude, which is very 
different from the one that the 'donation' explanation is built on. 
In a health care system that fails to perform adequately, good work achieves a ncw 
meaning in that either patients' expectations are exceeded or patients perceive this as a 
prompt for infonllal payments. It may not be easy to separate the two because they 
depend both on the intention of doctors and the perception of the patients, but this 
distinction is less important inasmuch as both contradict the donation explanation of 
informal payments. The essential difference between the 'I got more than I expected' 
approach to gratitude is that good performance is not valucd in itsclf as with 'genuine' 
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gratitude, but instead in comparison with the low standard of service that might have 
been received. The coercive nature of the former is further enhanced by the 'I got more, 
because the doctor would like me to pay (or would be disappointed if I did not pay)' 
approach, with which it is intertwined, indicating the subtleties of coercion in real life: 
" ... 1 give occasionally, because 1 may create afeeling in the doctor that 'did 1 do 
something wrong that s/he doesn't give me gratitude payment?', that is 's/he isn', 
satisfied with me' and I induce a feeling of remorse in him/her, although maybe 
s/he'd be glad that s/he doesn't have to be in a relationship with me that I paid 
him. So, it's a rather complicated thing, so if it's possible we've to get rid of it as 
soon as possible." (63-year old woman, P14) 
8.3.1.5. Coercion by patients 
So far the discussion on the 'coercion factor' has focussed on that patients are 
defenceless in the system where they are subject to the whim of doctors. We have 
implicitly assumed that informal payment does not serve any purpose other than a 
general expectation that doctors should do their best. However, our intervkws revealed 
that there are casts in which informal payment is a means of patients to 'control' 
docturs. In certain situations patients consider informal payments more like a 
contractual relationship (D04,D28), in which the expectations contained in the 
unwritten agreement are more clearly specified, either in terms of the immediate service 
obtained (D03,D04,P19) or the expectation that it will extend into the future 
(DOI,D02,D13,P14). 
These include situations 111 which patients want sickness leave or disability 
certificate, to keep their grandmother in hospital, or want a specific diagnostic service: 
" ... and the man comes in extending his hand fonml'd with money in it ... and he 
asks me '.I'hether I can do an ultrasound examination of his hearl. And 1 said no, 
becallse sllch cases always upset me ... 1 do think it's upsetting, if someone thinks 
that my professionaljudgement ... to refer to somebody for an examination can be 
bought like a litre ofmilk in Ihe sllpermarket. " (D03), 
or patients can pay the doctor informally to create an obligation which allows 
patients to call the doctor any time in the future: 
" ... when you take the money, then {[ctllally YOll take 011 some SOl'I of ... obligatio11, 
... a guarantee .. .for the service. ...the patient ... gives YOII the rnoney, and then 
after 111'0 months ... s/he calls YOli ... and then a sort of 'surgery' begins, that, well 
doclor, 1 need this and I need that. And il1 this case, if's velJ' difficult to say no. 
1'l1l!re H'ere these occasions, whel1 1Ielt Ill'as bought. " (002) 
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Apart from the obvious contradiction of the' donation' hypothesis, the latter example 
highlights an important aspect of the 'coercion factor' that goes beyond the actual event. 
It reinforces the point that the informal payments cannot be understood in isolation from 
past experiences and expectations for the future. 
8.3.1.6. Coercion and other circumstantial evidence 
Besides these manifestations of the 'coercion factor', there is circumstantial evidence 
not directly related to coercion and the motivation for payments, but which indirectly 
provides information about the validity of the gratitude payment concept. By mt:ans of 
the interviews we have explored four different areas: (1) the method of determining the 
sums, (2) opinions of respondents about the reasons for giving, in general, (3) attitudt:s 
towards informal payments, and (4) timing of the payment. 
This analysis revealed a wide variety of external influences on patients concerning 
how much they will give. These external influences creatt: pressure on patients 
inasmuch as the amount is not determined solely by the ability to pay, thereby 
contradicting the 'donation' explanation that enVIsages informal payments as a 
spontaneous act of gratitude. 
We have previously discussed the most explicit form of 'price-setting', i.e. when the 
doctor directly tells the patient the amount expected, or drop hints, or behaves in certain 
ways such as refusing small amounts until the patient eventually gets the message of 
how much is expected (PO 1 ,P05,P06,P09,P 18,0 18,029). Nonetheless this is not the 
only way in which doctors may contribute to 'price-setting'. Some of the doctors 
reported how they are often approached by family members enquiring about how much 
to pay (003,004,009), and one doctor was asked by patients whom slhe referred to the 
hospital (D29). 
Nevertheless, fellow-patients seem to be the most important source of information 
(POl,P02,P03,P04,P05,P07,P08,Pl O,Pll ,P12,P13,P15,PI6,P17,P19,P20,01 0,024,029, 
D31) although with some evidence that they overstate what they gave or will gi\'e 
(P03,P08,P 1O,P 16), and that they are competing, thereby pushing up 'prices' 
(P02,P04,P08,P13). Relatives and friends also playa part (POl,P09,010), creating an 
informal consensus (P02,P07,Pl1,P20), with 'price lists' or 'list of tariffs' (fees) 
occasionally hitting the local or national media (P05,P 12,P 17,016). It is not clear ho\\' 
much these pressures eventually influence the amount that the patient gives, but our 
interviews create an impression that they provide an important framework for payments. 
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The attitudes of patients towards and their beliefs about the reasons for informal 
payments also contribute to the framework within which payments take place. There 
are respondents who explicitly condemn the practice of informal payments and would 
like to see them eliminated from the system (P03,P07 ,P08,P lO,P 14,P 16). This suggests 
that there must be some form of pressure on patients to pay, as it is unlikely that 
somebody does something voluntarily that s/he disapprove of. Further, our interviews 
revealed conflicts between motivation captured by the survey, opinions revealed on in-
depth questioning of respondents, and other evidence about the motivation underlying 
the events: 
" ... my motivation is that I'm grateful and this is how] can express it and] give. 
You can really think about this, but I'm convinced that with much better salaries 
they wouldn't expect it. And it's very rare that they don't accept it. " (P07; also 
P08,P09,PIO,PI2,P13,PI4,PI5,PI7) 
This does not mean that patients are confused about their intentions but rather that 
the survey questionnaire inevitably oversimplifies the complexity of the decision to pay. 
The interviews also revealed that equating the time of making the decision to pay 
with the time of the payment can be misleading, so that the fact that the payment was 
given after the service was received does not say anything about the motivation of the 
patient. For instance, patients can prepare the 'envelope' in advance, even if they give 
it after treatment (P02,P 11), or may make the decision beforehand without knowing 
what the outcome of the medical intervention will be (P09,PI9). In certain cases the 
patient may even drop hints about the intention to pay: 
" ... there's a more subtle form, when there's a verbal hint from the patient, such 
as 'do everything what you can and] won't be lIngratefi"', or that ']'11 thank 
you '" (D04), 
although not all such hints imply a true intention to pay; this could be a strategy for 
those who do not want or cannot afford to pay, yet would like to secure the perceived 
benefits associated with informal payments: 
" ... and there are patients who say that 'I'll come and see you, doctor', and YOli 
know right away that they won't come. " (018; also 006,021 ,D25) 
8.3.2. CONCLUSIONS: GRATITUDE, CUSTOM AND THE 'COERCION FACTOR' 
So far we have explored the various manifestations of the 'coercion factor' by means of 
interviews with patients and doctors. In this section we summarise evidence relating to 
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the 'coercion factor' from the in-depth interviews in those cases where we identified 
exclusively 'non-coercive' reasons for giving in the survey used in the Kecskemet 2001 
study, but first we briefly summarise our findings about what forms the 'coercion 
factor' can take. 
The in-depth interviews revealed how past experiences with the health care system, 
or with informal payment itself, can shape the decision to pay. Experiences such as a 
lack of hygiene, inadequate supplies, provider negligence, misdiagnosis or malpractice 
can create distrust that the system will deliver acceptable care, and at its extreme they 
can lead to a view that 'it is not possible to receive adequate care without payment'. 
Nevertheless one does not have to reach this point to feel that payment is necessary. 
Even if experience of the benefits that can be obtained through informal payments is 
mixed, non-payment can increase the natural anxiety that accompanies health care 
interventions by creating a concern that 'I have not done everything', that can only be 
overcome by informal payment. 
On the other hand, payment patterns suggest that the 'coercion factor' works 
selecti vely insofar as patients do not pay for each service they utilise. Yet these patterns 
cannot be explained by the 'donation' hypothesis, especially when it comes to the 'non-
medical' content of a service, such as choice of doctor, setting, position of the doctor, 
intensity of treatment, and so on. The interviews suggest that these are part of an 
emerging consensus on new entitlements, either as a result of a lack of clarity about 
official entitlements or a failing system unable to deliver them. 
Both patients and doctors individually reassess official entitlements. Patients 
consider \\hat the system will deliver without payment, while doctors consider what can 
fairly be expected of them in return for an unsatisfactory salary, with what is beyond 
that being defined as 'extra' services for which payments are expected. If these 
reassessments coincide, at least for the majority of doctors and patients, the new 
entitlements became established, as is the case with choice of doctor. In these 
circumstances, the standard of performance that should be expected can become an 
'extra' service simply because of the contrast with the unsatisfactory performance that 
patients anticipate they will receive. 
Where the views of patients and doctors do not coincide, doctors can impose their 
expectations on patients by enforcing informal payments. We have explored the various 
means of direct coercion and concluded that their deployment can sensitise patients 
leading to the view that 'doctors generally expect informal payments'. In these 
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circumstances otherwise normal behaviour may be interpreted by patients as a prompt 
for payment. 
Given the observation that good job can be perceived as 'extra' service ('I have 
received more than I anticipated'), as well as unintentional expectation ('I have received 
more, because the doctor wants me to pay') we can identify a new, 'coercive' 
interpretation of gratitude ('I am grateful, because I was not treated negligently, and I 
have to pay the doctor, because he would be disappointed if I did not reward his/her 
performance'), which is different from how it is seen in the 'donation' hypothesis ('I am 
grateful because the doctor restored my health'). 
Although doctors are a stronger position to impose their will on patients, informal 
payments can reverse the balance of power. Patients can see informal payments as an 
invisible contract allowing them to specify the service they will receive, thus 
constraining the doctors' professional autonomy. Creating an obligation for future 
services ('I paid ('bought') the doctor so I can call him any time in the future') 
illustrates this type of coercion by patients. 
Finally, we explored some circumstantial evidence related indirectly to the 'coercion 
factor', including external pressures to determine the amount of informal payments, 
attitudes towards informal payments (negative attitudes are incompatible with the 
'donation' explanation), the discrepancy between views about motivation for informal 
payments in general and the revealed motivation in specific circumstances, and the 
discrepancy between the time of making the decision to pay and actually paying. 
In summary we have identified five main areas that manifest the 'coercion factor' 
(distrust, extra services, direct coercion by providers, misinterpretation of conventional 
situations, coercion by patients) and explored four areas of circumstantial evidence 
('price-setting', attitudes, general opinion on motivation, timing of payment). On the 
basis of these we have reviewed the interviews with patients who stated in the survey 
that they gave for 'non-coercive' reasons, to try to identify any 'coercion factors' in the 
encounters described. 
Table 8.6 summarises our findings, which show that there were at least 3 
manifestations of coercion in all 11 cases, 54 providing evidence that surveys are 
unreliable tools to capture motivation for informal payments. 
54 It must be noted, however, that we have added up the detected manifestations of the 'coercion factor' 
for the ease of presentation only. The absolute number does not indicate the strength of incompatibility 
with (or contradiction to) the gratitude payment concept. 
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MOTIVATION GRATITUDE OR COERCION' 
PRESSURE ON PflYSICIANS TO ACCEPT INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
The 'coercion factor' in informal payments of patients, who stated to pay because of 'non-coercin' 
reasons in the Kccskemet 2001 study, explored through in-depth follow-up interviews 
P07 P08 P09 PIO P1l P12 P13 PI4 PIS PI6 P17w 
Coercion as distrust 
Past experiences with health care 
Lack of hygiene, supplies, negligence + + + + + + + + + + ? 
Misdiagnosis, malpractice + + + + + 
Past experiences with informal payments + + + + + + + + + + 
Actual experience with the service 
Lack of hygiene, etc. + + + 
Misdiagnosis, malpractice + ? 
'It is not possible to have adequate care 
without payment' 
'I did everything' + 
Coercion as unclear entitlements and extra 
services 
Choice of doctor + + + + + 
Home visit + + 
Direct coercion 
By providers + + + 
By patients 
'Doctors expect informal payments' + + + + + 
Coercion as misinterpretation 
New understanding of gratitude + + 
Subtotal 5 5 5 6 4 3 4 3 5 5 2 
Circumstantial evidence 
External pressure on determining the amount + + 
Negative attitud.: + + + + + 
Coercive reasons of giving in general (or 
+ + + + 
actual cas\!) + + + + + 
Payment has been decided in ad\uI1l:c + + 
Subtotal 3 2 I 2 0 I 3 2 I 2 I 
TOTAL 8 7 6 8 4 4 7 5 6 7 3 
Note: +=ddcctcd in the interview; ?=cannot be determined for sure; *The interviewee numhers correspond with the numhering in 
Appendix 13. 
Pressure on physicians to accept informal payments 
The next step is to extend analysis of the 'coercion factor' to physicians, to explore the 
pressures to accept informal payments. Although this will not directly address the 
validity of the gratitude payment concept, it contributes to understanding the 'coercion 
factor' in two respects. 
First, acceptance of payments reinforces the view among patients that this is a 
normal thing to do: 
.... , WC /lslIally give to the family doctor, if we must cal/ him/her to visit one of liS, 
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or grandmother at home. For instance, if we cannot take her to the sllrgery, 
because she has high fever, then 1 give him 1,000 forints and s/he takes ii, and 
never says that no, or something ... and because s/he takes it so naturally, then 1 
think others do the same, because, for instance once the doctor on night duty 
came and then 1 asked him/her, how much do 1 owe you, doctor? ... Nothing and 
then 1 gave it to him/her and s/he took it. S/he [the family doctor] doesn't say 
anything, we don't ask anything, just pay. Well, probably we owe him/her that 
much." (63-year old woman, P14) 
Second, in a context where glvmg IS seen as natural, refusal to accept informal 
payment puzzles patients: 
" ... you feel, either in the eyes, or in the communication, YOll can sense some sort 
of doubt, ... then the patient gets embarrassed and you can see that sllddenly, for a 
moment s/he gets frightened, why isn't it accepted? Does s/he look like so poor, 
or so seriollsly ill, or whatever" (002), 
and they can easily misunderstand it, even if the doctor only wants to show that it is 
not necessary: 
" ... 1 almost always had a bad feeling after 1 refused to accept it, because it didn't 
convey the message that I intended to convey, .. , that YOIl call receive decent care 
withollt payment. " (004) 
Indeed, our interviews have revealed that patients can misread non-acceptance 111 
several ways. We have already discussed how refusal can be a means of stating that not 
enough money was given, and patients may attribute this meaning to it even if it was not 
intended (004). Other misinterpretations include the patient thinking s/he is terminally 
ill (002), that they are considered too poor (002,004,009), or the doctor does not 
consider the patient worthy enough (004): 
" ... There are cases where you hove to accept because the patient may feel that 
his/her money isn't valuable enough. For this, you need sOllie empathy ... not to 
hurt them." (023; also 003,004,021,024) 
Patients may even associate refusal with a low level of competence of the doctor, i.e. 
acceptance of informal payments becomes a surrogate for quality: 
" ... there's a vefY strong belief that a doctor lI'ho doesn't accept money is 
probably not so good .. , there are those, ... who ... create a (firec! relatiol1ship 
between !he quality of YOllr work, the acceptance (i iI?formal payment and the 
amolillt you accept ... if1 don 'I accept ii, or my 'price' is loll' .. for him/her means 
the qualily which s/Ize call expeclji"om me." (004) 
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Nonetheless, patients are not the only source of pressure on physicians to accept 
informal payments. Friends and relatives can be equally puzzled by non-acceptance and 
consider the doctor who has such a 'strange habit' as at least a bit 'touched': 
" .. .1 know somebody who never ever accepted it, well, slhe wasn't in need of it 
because slhe went abroad for a while and earned a lot, it was tolerated though 
[by hislher colleagues], ifslhe's so silly that's the end of it " (D27), 
and 
" .. .1 feel that my disapproval of informal payments has had an adverse effect on 
my reputation among my family. They acknowledge my integrity, that I'm an 
honest man, but something must be not quite right in my head." (003; also D04) 
Nevertheless, colleagues are not always so tolerant: 
" ... back to the colleagues ... if you're sllssed out by them that this isn't so 
important for you, they don't talk to you that 'way, or they give lip 011 YOII 
... because 1 didn't have a clue 'why was it beller to work in female wards. If 
turned alit that it's because H'omen pay more." (D04), 
and s/he eventually finds himself/herself 'preferentially' treating 'non-paying' 
patients who may be less rewarding professionally: 
" ... if it's discernible that you never accept informal payments, then aiter a while 
YOlt can experience negative effects. ...yoll 'll get (lie worst cases, 'which gives you 
little professional satisfaction. The hospitalised geriatrics, the down-and-outs, 
who need primarily nllrsing care, with whom it's very difficllit to cooperate, and 
so on. " (D02) 
These negative attitudes are even stronger where colleagues feel their 'business' is 
threatened by the 'deviant' doctor (002,005,013), ultimately forcing the person to 
leave: 
" ... J had afriend who was removed because slhe didn't accept gratitude payment 
on moral grollnds, and news spread that one didn't have to pay in that wards, and 
... slhe was an excellent ~pecialist loved very much by patients. " (005) 
Finally, we have already discussed the pressure created to accept payments by the 
inadequacy of salaries, with many of the interviewees pointing out the injustice and 
immorality of a system that sets official salaries on the expectation that informal 
payments will be made (004,009,D20,021 ,023,024,D29,D30) and then levies a tax on 
them, increasing pressure to accept (D24,D30). It can be seen how this situation will 
lead doctors to consider informal payments not as a gift but as something that is due and 
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even necessary to make ends meet. In settings where informal payment is insignificant, 
doctors must take up second jobs unless they have sufficient income from other sources, 
for instance their spouse or extended family (003,005). 
Finally, there is also the characteristic of informal payment as a mark of being a 
qualified doctor: 
" ... and actllally I didn't feel hurt, rather uplifted that I was considered to be a 
'human being', a doctor, because they gave money to me. " (003) 
Taken together, these factors create a society-wide pressure to accept informal 
payments: 
" ... this is so deeply embedded in the system and so important part of its 
functioning that I didn't see much chance to change it" (D04), 
establishing a norm in which those who do not wish to accept informal payments arc 
considered abnormal and are strongly pressurised to reconsider their decision: 
" ... then you say, that maybe there's something in your approach, well, I \I'ollldn 't 
say problem, but still, and then within certain limits, 'which are acceptable for 
you, you decide to lake it. ... Because after all, you make your job morc difficult 
[by refusing informal payments] ... " (004) 
B.S. Conclusions 
So how can we interpret our findings in relation to the 'donation' hypothesis of informal 
payments? First, although survey findings at first sight seemed to strengthen the case 
for this hypothesis, deeper analysis of the T ARKI-1996 and Kecskemet 2001 studies 
revealed similar contradictions to those found in the review of the literature reported in 
chapter 4, further strengthening our suspicion that surveys do not accurately capture the 
motivation for informal payments. 
Second, the analysis of in-depth interviews with patients and doctors provided 
insight into the many ways that coercion can be manifested in the patient-doctor 
relationship within the context of a health care system that fails to provide consistently 
adequate services. During the course of this analysis we have shown how 'nOI1-
coercive' reasons for giving often assume an interpretation that is very different from 
how they would be understood within the framework of the 'donation' explanation of 
informal payments. This suggests that there is not a general consensus on what 
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'gratitude' or 'custom' mean in this context, and although respondents to surveys select 
these options, their interpretation and that of the researcher may not correspond. 
Third, the in-depth follow-up interviews with those citing exclusively 'non-coercive' 
reasons for informal payments revealed that, in none of the episodes recounted, did 
giving correspond to 'non-coercive' motivations as implied by the 'donation' 
explanation. Although caution is needed because of the small numbers involved, it is 
significant that we were able to identify at least some manifestations of coercion in 
every single case, further strengthening the case against surveys as appropriate tools to 
capture motivation of informal payments and the suspicion that their findings are 
misleading. Fourth, the analysis of interviews with physicians provided insights into 
the difficulty of refusing informal payments. 
While all these findings suggest that informal payments take place in a context that is 
very far from the culture of gratitude envisaged by the 'donation' explanation, where it 
is virtually impossible to separate the acts of 'genuine' gratitude, if they exist at all, 
from those which are the results of coercion, we must not forget the limitations of the 
research, which have been discussed in chapter 5. Besides the general validity and 
reliability trade-off, it is important to consider how far the findings of the qualitative 
interviews apply to the country as a whole. In general, using the survey to identify 
cases offered a systematic sampling method, but it is limited by the choice of th~ study 
population. On the other hand non-responses may have been less of a problem in this 
respect, since for instance bad experiences (a cause of refusal to participate in the 
survey) are unlikely to be associated with non-coercive payment motives, and the same 
applies to respondent bias. Although n~call bias could have been a problem, inasmuch 
as the responding person had to talk about the case of another member of the household, 
in all cases the interviewees talked about their own experiences, including those 
interviewees whose children had been ill. 
Nevertheless, the private sector is a setting, where 'real' gratitude payment may 
occur and consequently may still provide some ground for the 'donation' explanation of 
" the phenomenon:-
55 We have selected a private for-profit hospital as a case study for private sector informal payments, but 
this part of the study could not be incorporated into the main text because of space constraints. 
Nevertheless, the preliminary findings, which suggest that informal payments do exist in the private 
sector and the motivation for giving thelll is Illultifaceted, are presented in Appendix I. 
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9. THE MYTH OF GRATITUDE PAYMENT: SYNTHESIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the previous two chapters we have summarised findings in two research areas, both 
related to the central theme of this thesis: the motivation underlying informal payments. 
While we have considered the implications of the evidence in relation to motivation at 
the end of each chapter, we have not yet considered these pieces of evidence together to 
assess the overall picture of this phenomenon that they present. In this concluding 
chapter we will not just summarise our findings as they apply to the research questions 
posed, but look at where they fit in relation to existing research on informal payment 
and what they say about appropriate policy responses in the context of the Hungarian 
health care system. In doing so we also outline some directions for future research, 
because an even deeper understanding of informal payments and the context in which 
they take place is a prerequisite for effective policies in this area. Nonetheless, before 
proceeding, we recall from chapter 3 the theoretical underpinnings that defined the 
overall framework of the study. We used the logic of this framework to determine the 
data to be collected and ultimately to make sense of the evidence obtained. 
9.1. Methodological results 
According to Silverman [242,p.233] a Ph.D. research can be theoretical, methodological 
and empirical. This thesis has all three elements, with a stronger emphasis on the 
theoretical and empirical aspects of informal payments. Its methodological 
contribution, that questionnaire surveys are unable adequately to assess motivation on 
their own, was less pronounced, but it still contributed to shedding light on the validity 
of the' donation' hypothesis as an explanation of this phenomenon. 
9.2. Theoretical results: the definition of informal payments and the 
theory of 'inxit' 
In chapter 3 we examined the various forms of the phenomenon descr~bed as informal 
payment and confronted its distinctive features with the definitions (illegality, 
informality, corruption) proposed so far. We concluded that none of these definitions 
incorporates characteristics that are common to all forms of informal payments and at 
the same time are applicable across countries. Instead, we suggested an alternative 
based on the key distinctive feature that they are in fact additional payments, above 
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what is stipulated in the terms of entitlement. This new definition has implications for 
both research and policy making; for the operationalisation of informal payments and 
for understanding it, since it inevitably raises the question: why do people pay more 
than they have to? 
Then, we reviewed the theoretical literature to identify answers that had been 
suggested to this question, summing up the debate as generating two contrasting 
hypotheses of informal payments: the 'donation' and the 'fee-for-service' hypotheses, 
each with very different implications for policy-making, 
In chapter 1 we used a general policy-making framework put forward by Roberts et 
a1. [53], in which they suggest that whether a particular phenomenon, such as informal 
payments is a problem ultimately depends on the objectives that the health care system 
would like to achieve, Examining the situation in Hungary, we concluded that, while 
there is no general agreement on the priorities among its objectives, at least there seems 
to be a consensus on what its objectives are, namely quality, efficiency and equity 
(equal access for equal needs). According to this approach, informal payment is not a 
problem in itself, but only ifit adversely affect quality, efficiency and equity. 
The importance of the two contrasting hypotheses of informal payments thus comes 
from their differing implications for these objectives of the Hungarian health care 
system. Compared with the 'fee-for service' hypothesis, which implies far reaching and 
generally adverse effects on both equity and efficiency, the 'donation' hypothesis is 
essentially benign, with its assumption that informal payment has no influence on the 
service delivered. Nonetheless, we have argued that this distinction matters only if the 
scale of informal payment is large enough to make a real impact. If the sums involved 
in the transactions are trivial than it is immaterial whether informal payments are 
'donations' motivated by genuine gratitude or 'fee-for-service' motivated by the desire 
to secure adequate care. 
The review of the theoretical literature has also shown that the answers provided to 
the question of 'why?' are unsatisfactory inasmuch as they concentrate solely on 
informal payments without taking into account the broader context within which they 
exist and the scope for alternative courses of action. Drawing on the 'fee-for-service' 
explanation, which considers informal payments as a reaction to unsatisfactory system 
performance, and the theory of 'exit, voice and loyalty', which considers the possible 
reactions to declining organisational performance, we argucd for an extcnsion of the 
'fee-for-service' explanation with Hirschman's 'exit' and 'voice' to encompass a new 
PETER GAAL 
PAGE ZJ8 I Tlil'SIS_GI' REVISED_ V 17 
9 THE MYTH Of GRATITUDE PAYMENT SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9 ] EMPIRICAL fINDINGS 
option whose most characteristic example is informal payments. We suggested a new 
term, internal/informal exit, abbreviated to 'inxit', to describe this option, since there 
are reactions to declining system performance that do not fit the categories of 'exit' and 
'voice', and which resemble informal payments yet are not the same, such as informal 
private practice in public institutions. On the basis of the 'inxit' theory of informal 
payments, we offered explanations not just for the emergence of the phenomenon in 
Hungary, but also in other health care systems where the reactions to unsatisfactory 
system performance differed, considering the implications of the theory for policy. 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of these predictions is fundamentally determined by 
whether the 'fee-for-service' or the 'donation' explanation of informal payments 
applies, and the key distinction between the two is what motivates giving: gratitude or 
some form of external or internal pressure. During this discussion we contrasted the 
two explanations, but that does not mean that the two motives cannot coexist in the 
same system. The question is rather which is the dominant one, and in this respect only 
evidence of 'pure' gratitude can be invoked to support the donation hypothesis. 
Furthermore, by contrasting these two hypotheses, we have simplified reality in that we 
have emphasised the potential negative efficiency and distributional impact of a 'fee-
for-service' like informal payment, while the potential of efficiency gains and a modest 
negative effect on equity cannot be excluded. This is indeed an important issue, but 
makes no difference if the benign, culturally motivated gift giving proves to b~ 
dominant. 
Thus, the policy importance of informal payments depends on (1) whether their scale 
is substantial and (2) whether they are motivated by the desire to obtain adequate care. 
In the frame of this research we aimed to address both issues, but in the case of 
motivation, we looked at a wider range of evidence, including the impact on equity of 
informal payments, as well as directly exploring motivation itself. 
9.3. Empirical findings 
The empirical part of the study was justified by the fact that there are still powerful 
interest groups advocating the benign gratitude payment concept. They have had a 
profound impact on official policies ever since informal payments reached the policy 
agenda, as revealed by the conflicting evidence in the review of the existing empirical 
literature. Concerning the scale of informal payments we found a difference of an order 
of magnitude amorig survey findings and between survey findings and expert estimates. 
Evidence on the issue of motivation identified similar conflicts, including contradictions 
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between findings of different surveys and inconsistencies between stated motivations 
and circumstances of giving within particular surveys. When we reviewed empirical 
findings on motivation, we assumed that the responses 'I was grateful' and 'it is 
customary to give' obtained from questionnaire surveys were the operationalisation of 
the gratitude motive as understood by the 'donation' explanation ('I am grateful, 
because the doctor restored my health', and 'I am grateful, because the doctor restored 
my health, and it is customary to express your gratitude by paying the doctor'). While 
we raised the issue that the 'option' of custom can be interpreted differently, for thc 
purpose of this research we categorised it, together with 'gratitude' as a 'non-coercive' 
reason for giving, as opposed to all other motives, which involve some sort of pressure 
to pay. 
9.3.1. THE FIRST MYTH: 'INFORMAL PAYMENT IS A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING' 
Table 9.1. 
On the basis of the collation and critical methodological review of official statistics and 
other survey findings, we estimated the overall magnitude of informal payments to be 
about 1.5-4.5% of total expenditures on health in 2001, which suggests that altogether it 
is not a substantial source of health care financing. Although there are still differences 
between estimates from various sources, by subjecting the findings to a detailed 
methodological critique it was possible to bring survey estimates closer to each other. 
Research questions, hypotheses and findings of the study: Overall magnitude and distribution 
Main objectives, research areas and Hypotheses Findings 
questions ('Donation') 
To establish the magnitude and 
distribution of informal payments 
QI. What is the overall amount of • HUF 16.2-49.9 billion in 2001 
informal payment in a year? • 1.5-4.5% of total health expenditures 
in 2001 
Q2. How is it distributed among health indifferent • In average 75-230% of net salary of 
workers, especially physicians? family doctors 
• In average 60-185% of net salary of 
spec ial ists 
Nonetheless, our analysis has shown that this relatively small overall amount can 
make a difference if it is distributed unevenly among health workers. On the basis of 
survey findings on the distribution of informal payments, we estimated that an average a 
family doctor earns at least 75% of their net official salary from informal payments, 
while for a specialrst (in a 'paying' specialty) this is at least 60%, although in both cases 
the additional income may be up to double their salary (Table 9.1). 
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Our conclusion thus is that the policy importance of informal payments is not 
established primarily by the overall amount involved, but rather because they are 
unequally distributed among health workers. Thus, the general opinion that the overall 
amount of informal payments 'must' be substantial is a myth rather than a fact. 
9.3.2. THE SECOND MYTH: 'INFORMAL PAYMENTS ARE THE MANIFESTATION 
OF GENUINE GRATITUDE' 
Table 9.2. 
Given that the sums involved in the transaction have proved to be substantial at least in 
relation to the income of individual doctors, it does matter why people give. Thus, in 
chapters 7 and 8 we examined the motivation of giving with a focus on the validity of 
the gratitude payment concept. Table 9.2 summarises our findings in the two main 
research areas, the impact on equity of informal payments and the coercion to give. The 
assessment of the impact on equity of informal payments directly informs us about the 
policy importance of the phenomenon, but for ease of presentation we also organised 
these findings around the question of motivation. 
Research questions, hypotheses and findings of the study: Equity, private sector, motivation 
Main objectives, research areas and Hypotheses Findings Assessmcnt* 
questions ('Donation') 
To establish the impact on equity of 
informal payments 
Q3. Does it influence access to care? No • Not tirst contact -t I-
• Differential access in 
tcrms of service quality 
Q4. Does it influence the distribution Yes, but • Yes, payment is probably -
of cost burd..:n of care? payment is the not function of ability to 
function of pay, among those, who 
ability to pay pay 
To establish the main motivation of 
participants 
Q5. What is the principal motivation Gratitude • Gratitude and custom is +/-
of the actors? dominant 
• Internal inconsistellcy 
• Custom is interpreted 
differently 
Q6. Does the stated motivation fit in Yes • No -
the circumstances of payment? 
Notes: ··+'=evidcnce supports the 'donation' hypothesis; '-'=cvidcncc is against the 'donation' hypothesis; '+/-'=C\ idcncc is 
mixed; 
As can be seen, the overall picture IS not unequivocal in that not all evidence 
contradicts the 'donation' hypothesis. In particular, we see that informal payments are 
not a major barrier to access to services and that according to the two surveys the 
majority of such payments are motivated by 'non-coercive' reasons (gratitude, cLlstom 
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or the combination of the two). On the other hand none of these findings refute the 
'fee-for-service' hypothesis in themselves (for instance if physicians price discriminate 
according to patients' ability to pay), and there is further evidence in these areas to 
contradict the 'donation' hypothesis, most importantly the discrepancy between the 
motivation stated by respondents in the survey and the situation in which informal 
payments took place when explored through in-depth follow-up interviews. 
First, the finding that informal payment is not necessary to obtain contact with the 
health care provider does not mean that there is no difference between 'paying' and 
'non-paying' patients in terms of the quality of the service provided. In the secondary 
analysis of the T ARKI-1996 survey we found significant associations between informal 
payments and the attention family doctors pay to hospitalised patients as well as the 
likelihood of receiving requested or unsolicited home visits, although whether these are 
causal associations requires further investigation. Further, the in-depth interviews have 
identified many ways that 'non-paying' patients may receive inferior care, for instance 
by physicians delaying interventions or paying no attention to them. While we have not 
analysed in detail the mechanisms involved, there is evidence fwm the interviews of 
how sophisticated techniques have been developed by doctors to differentiate bet ween 
'paying' and 'non-paying' patients over a prolonged period of time, using for instance 
one's signature on the discharge note. 
Second, although the majority of n:spondents did opt for 'non-coercive' reasons of 
giving in the TARKI-1996 and the Kecskemet 2001 studies, more detailed analysis 
revealed internal inconsistencies among responses to various questions in both surveys. 
For instance, in the TARKI survey, respondents said to be motivated by gratitude felt 
pressure from doctors to pay, while in the Kecskemet survey, respondents usel1 savings 
and gifts from others to cover informal payments. Further, the analysis of the reasons 
for non-payment in the Kecskemet 2001 study revealed that custom is often interpreted 
differently than might be implied by the 'donation' explanation of informal payments. 
Either it is directly related to the service ('it is not customary to pay for this particular 
service'), or to the 'non-enforcing, non-expecting' style of the individual doctor ('it is 
not customary to pay to this pat1icular doctor'). 
Third, the most important evidence against the 'donation' explanation of informal 
payments is that when we explored the situation and the circumstances of giving in 
those cases in which respondents cited exclusively 'non-coercive' reasons of giving, we 
identified pressures on patients to give, either exerted directly by the doctor or indirectly 
by the unsatisfactory performance of the health care systcm (which together wc called 
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the 'coercion factor'). This suggests that surveys cannot accurately capture the 
motivation for informal payments, not primarily because respondents give biased 
answers, but because in practice the feeling of gratitude is inextricably intertwined with 
coercIOn. The interviews have provided an insight into how the provision of 
conscientious, high quality care can be interpreted as implying an expectation to give or 
as something 'extra' which must be paid for, in a system where patients generally 
anticipate substandard care. This new understanding of gratitude is different from the 
gratitude concept of the 'donation' hypothesis, insofar as the gratitude arises because of 
the avoidance of anticipated bad care rather than being 'genuine' gratitude. 
In summary, the evidence presented in this thesis draws a mixed picture of informal 
payments in Hungary compared, for instance, with countries such as Georgia, where 
informal payments constitute the most important source of health care financing, and 
where informal payments are often overtly demanded by providers as a prerequisite to 
access care. This research has shown that such coercion by providers is not necessary 
for patients to feel obliged to give. First, there are more subtle forms of expectation, 
whose manifestations are gestures, hints and other aspects of the behaviour of the 
doctor, which sensitise patients to attribute certain meanings to common situations, 
reading them differently so that patients may perceive these pressures even if doctors 
have no such intentions. Second, failing system performance can also become a source 
of pressure to pay, even if providers do not want to elicit informal payments. In a 
system that provides uneven quality of care, the discrepancy between rhetoric and 
reality makes sub-standard care the normal, something that patients can anticipate 
receiving, so that good performance is regarded as something 'extra' that one must pay 
for out-of-pocket. It seems that these more subtle forms of coercion do not make 
informal payments a prerequisite to access care, but 'non-paying' patients can loose out 
in terms of the quality of care they receive and this becomes the background against 
which the health care system functions. In these circumstances the motivation for 
informal payments can rather be thought of as multi-layered, with gratitude playing a 
part, but with internal and external pressures on patients intertwined. Consequently, the 
evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the case for the donation hypothesis is 
weak. 
Nevertheless, we have to take into account the limitations of the research, discussed 
in chapter 5 before we can make a more robust statement with clear implications for 
policy-making. The most important issue is the external validity of findings, which has 
been affected by the choice of study popUlation, selection bias, non-responses, small 
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sample size and indirectly by respondent and recall bias. These are probably more 
marked concerning the equity impact of informal payments, which we rather consider a 
first exploration of the topic in Hungary, especially as it was not possible to analyse the 
impact of informal payments on the quality of services in sufficient detail. While on the 
basis of the findings of our research it is possible to draw a picture of informal 
payments for health care in Hungary and consider its implications for policy making, 
further research is needed to verify the findings of the qualitative interviews, possibly in 
a nationally representative survey and in qualitative interviews, including other 
interesting target groups, for instance with mixed 'coercive' and 'non-coercive' motives 
for payment. 
9.4. Implications for policy-making 
The most important implication of this study is that there is empirically grounded 
justification to consider informal payment as a problem and to do something about it. 
Yet one can argue that even a strong case for the economic explanation of informal 
payments is not enough to consider informal payments a problem, as it is still possible 
that their beneficial impact on system performance outweighs the negative 
consequences. Indeed, in chaptcr 3, we have discussed the possibility that informal 
payments improve the efficiency of the health care system if they alleviate shortages by 
influencing resource allocation at the macro level, while it may not have a strong impact 
on equity, if physicians price discriminate between patients r,ccording to thcir ability to 
pay. This is a key question, whose answer is complex. First, the claim that informal 
payment improves health system performance has to be backed up by evidence (an 
important area for future research). Second, it has to be demonstrated that there are no 
alternative options that have even more beneficial effects. Third, even if informal 
payments prove to be a powerful alternative to formal cost-sharing arrangements, policy 
makers have generally no discretion over the 'rules of the game'. For instance. policy 
makers can not guarantee that all providers price discriminate, and that they will 
continue to price discriminate, even if there is evidence that providers, by and large, 
currently do so. Consequently, a weak case for the donation hypothesis does provide a 
justification to act, while the balance of the positive and negative effects of informal 
payments should be considered in deciding on the appropriate pace of changes and 
measures to be implemented. 
While in the theoretical part of the thesis we have discussed the policy options that 
have been suggested so far, further research is needed to decide on what the best way is 
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to tackle this problem. In any case, a successful intervention has to consider the 
political complexities of the current system and the resistance that attempts to eliminate 
informal payments will inevitably evoke. There are beneficiaries of the status quo, 
some of whom would be worse off under any possible alternative to the current system. 
It may not be a coincidence that the myth of gratitude is so strongly favoured by, for 
instance, a certain part of the medical profession, and the gratitude motive provided 
justification for policy-makers to levy income tax on informal payments and to avoid 
raising the salaries of physicians to a reasonable level. Further, the success of 
interventions designed to eliminate informal payments depends on the knowledge we 
have about how the current system works. In this respect it is not enough to understand 
informal payments, but it is equally important to gain deeper insight, for instance, into 
the mechanism of 'exit' and 'voice'. In chapter 3, we used the theory of 'inxit' to 
provide recommendations for action. We argued that creating the conditions for a 
flourishing private sector as an alternative to public services is unlikely to benefit the 
public system, that entitlements should be reassessed for which the current unwritten 
entitlements (e.g. choice of doctor) established by informal payments provide a starting 
point and the opportunity to incorporate additional private financing, but any 
hypotheses derived from the explanatory framework require further empirical 
verification. While the objective of the empirical part of this thesis was to answer the 
underlying question of whether anything should be done about informal payment, the 
qualitative part of the study provided an indication what to do about it. However, given 
the limitations of qualitative interviewing discussed in chapter 5, the following points 
should rather be considered as a starting point for further research. 
There are two implications of the economic explanation. First, taxing informal 
payments is not an appropriate policy, even if it had been possible to design and 
implement a better taxation policy on the basis of evidence related to the scale of 
informal payments. Second, successful policies have to tackle shortage in the health 
sector, since unrealistic regulations are seen as illegitimate by both patients and doctors. 
Enforcing non-payment and non-acceptance can only be a complementary measure, as 
it makes sense only if the available resources are in line with what the system promises 
to deliver. This can be achieved either by curtailing the generous benefit package 
and/or incorporating additional funds by formalizing informal payments as co-
payments. It is not unreasonable to think that the private insurance market will expand 
if there are sizable co-payments and exclusions from the benefit package, as has been 
the case in Slovenia. Freeing up resources within the existing le\'el of expenditures can 
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also be envisaged if the technical efficiency of the system can be improved. As we have 
argued in chapter 3, moving from the dilution of services to explicit waiting lists is 
another possibility, but it is unlikely to be the best choice if we aim to keep the majority 
of quality-conscious consumers within the public system. 
Mapping informal payments can help to design a co-payment system that is most 
likely be accepted by the population (e.g. free choice of doctor, home visits). While 
formalizing payments can be seen as a way to restrict unnecessary use and thus free up 
resources within existing level of expenditures, it cannot be assumed that the existence 
of formal out-of-pocket payments will prevent patients from paying additional sums. 
Indeed, payment is likely to continue unless patients have no concern that the system 
will fail to deliver effective care without such additional incentives. The interviews 
have confirmed the importance of distrust in the genesis of informal payments. This 
distrust is most probably sustained by direct and indirect bad experiences with the 
performance of the health care system, thus, we argue, that attempts to eliminate 
informal payments must involve concerted action to rebuild the lost social capital (trust) 
in health care. The key issue is to ensure a uniformly good quality of care, but in this 
respect it is important also to use funds to raise the salaries of health workers. This 
should be linked to innovative methods of accountability that promote transparency, 
while local initiatives, which build on partnership and participation, could re-establish 
the trust-based relationship between the lay public and physicians and thus provide a 
different set of expectations for their future encounters. 
Nevertheless, these points, especially the central role of distrust in informal 
payments, need further empirical verification possibly in a nationally representative 
survey. We must know more about informal payments, as in many respects this 
research has prepared the ground for future research. 
9.5. Implications for research: an extended research agenda 
One starting point for future research is the agenda we outlined in chapter 4. In the 
frame of this research we have not addressed all the main topics and questions 
suggested there. For instance, one research topic that is almost unexplored so far is the 
comparative analysis of health care systems where informal payments do or do not 
exist. In terms of direct policy-relevance, however, I would suggest concentrating on 
exploration of private sector informal payments and the 'exit' and 'voice' mechanisms 
in health care. These options certainly could play a role in eliminating informal 
payments, but, as we have discllssed in chapter 3, there are potential risks involved in 
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finding the optimal balance, as we would not wish to end up in a situation in which 
patients suffer more. 
As we have discussed before, the actual impact of informal payments on efficiency 
and equity is also important for policy making, as this has implications for the 
appropriate measures and the time frame for eliminating them. Focussing on the 
motivation issue, we have only indirectly established their impact on efficiency, while 
the equity of informal payments could not be explored in detail because of the 
limitations of the study design. In this respect one of the crucial issues to be researched 
is provider behaviour, which has been explored only in qualitative interviews in this 
thesis. For instance, price discrimination is a possibility, which may enrich the positive 
aspects of the fee-for-service explanation. The interviews have indicated that the 
question of the extent to which physicians can influence the actual amount of informal 
payments, or can refuse payments that have been offered, is by no means 
straightforward and merits further attention. 
An extended analysis of our in-depth interviews is one practical starting point for 
future research, as they yielded valuable data on private sector informal payments and 
about 'voice' and 'exit'. The study of current reform initiatives and local pilot projects, 
such as the managed care pilot project, is another possibility. Even now the knowledge 
available is limited, with many unexplored areas, yet the topic is attracting increasing 
interest at both national and international level. 
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A. THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN 
HUNGARY 
The aim of Appendix A is to place informal payment in the context of the Hungarian 
health care system and in particular, the changes that have taken place in the past 15 
years. 
A.1. Health and the health care system in transition: where is 
Hungary now? 
The first section of Appendix A briefly summarises the economic, social and political 
context, which has already been introduced in chapter 1. Next the health status of the 
Hungarian population is described, with an assessment of trends in the post-war period. 
The final section outlines the CUlTent organisational structure of the system, introducing 
the systems of financing, service delivery and governance in more details on the basis of 
the documentary analysis of statutes and analysis of official statistics. 56 
A.1.1. Economic, social and political context 
In chapter 1, the economic, social and political context of the Hungarian health care 
system was briefly discussed. Table A 1.1 provides a summary of the most important 
elements to serve as a reference point for the follo\ving discllssion of the organizational 
structure, and recent reforms of the Hungarian health care system. 
As mentioned previously, the Republic of Hungary has been a liberal democracy, 
operating a market economy since the collapse of the communist dictatorship in 1990. 
General and local elections take place every four years, when political parties compete 
for the leadership of the three levels of public administration: national (central) 
government, county governments and settlement governments (municipalities). 
Election rules has selected 4-6 parties, which are able to collect sufficient number of 
votes to send members of parliament to the National Assembly. Since 1990 voters 
always punished the governing parties, enabling the opposition to form coalition 
governments [167]. 
The transition from a centrally planned command economy to a market economy is 
generally viewed as having been successful. The economic recession in the first half of 
the 1990s led to imposition of a strict fiscal policy and the country has experienced fast 
and steady economic growth since 1997 (See Table 1.2. and Figure 1.4). Nevertheless, 
the transition period took its toll. In 1999 real wages were still only 85% of their 1989 
level, whilst the income gap between the poorest and the wealthiest 10% of the 
population rose from an 3.5 fold difference in 1970 to a 5.5 fold difference in 1999 [27; 
28]. 
56 For a more extended discussion of the Hungarian health care system see the Health Care Systems in 
Transition series of the European Observatory on Health Care Systems (Gatti et al. [II] and Gm'll: Ilcalth 
Care System in Transition: Hungary. Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems [29]). 
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A. THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN HUNGARY 
A.I.I ECONOMIC. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Table Al.l. 
A low birth rate means that the population is simultaneously shrinking and aging. 
The share of the elderly, aged 65 or over, in the population increased by 52% between 
1960 and 1980, and by another 11 % between 1990 and 2000, while the total fertility 
rate has been below 2 since 1980, and has decreased further since 1991 (see Table 1.1. 
and Figure 1.2). 
The political, economic and demographic transition together with the legacy of the 
state-socialist health care system have all been shaping the health of the Hungarian 
population since the collapse of the communist regime. 
Country background information, 2000 
Political system Liberal democracy 
Parliament Unicameral (386 seats) 
Election cyclc 4 years 
Elcctoral system majority and proportional 
Ruling party Coalition led by the Hungarian Socialist Party (2002-) 
Public administration 3 levels: central government 
county local governments 
municipalities (settlement local governmcnts) 
Economic system Market economy 
GOP per capita 4,621 USD 
GOP growth rate 5.2% 
Annual inflation (Consumer Price 14.3% 
Index) 
Unempluymcnt 8.7% 
~ulation 10.1 millions, ageing 
Population change -3.8 per 1,000 inhabitants 
Ageing index 82.5% 
Language Hungarian 
Largest ethnic minority Gyps\' (estimated 5%) 
Rcligion Catholic (64%) 
Life expectancy at birth 67.1 years (male); 75.6 years (female) 
Mortalitv 13.5 per 1,000 inhabitants 
Infant mortality 9.2 per 1,000 live births 
Maternal mortality 10.2 per 100,000 live births 
Comlllunicable diseases mortality 0.5'% of all deaths 
Cardiovascular mortality 51 % of all deaths 
SOllrce: [12l 
A.1.2. HEALTH STATUS OF THE POPULATION 
In the period since the end of the Second World War the health status of the Hungarian 
population has passed through four main phases (see Figure 2.1). The first period, until 
the end of the 1960s, saw a major improvement that brought lik expectancy to a level 
comparable with the more developed Western European countries. The early efforts in 
public health, including widespread immunization programmes, undertaken by the 
communist regime, coupled with improvements in the socio-economic situation 
successfully brought communicable diseases under control, with a substantial increase 
in life expectancy for both sexes [158]. These changes took the health of the Hungarian 
people through the first phase of the health transition, with non-communicable diseases 
achieving greater prominence during the 1970s. Yet while life expectancy continuously 
improved in Western European countries during the 1980s, it stagnated in Hungary, and 
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Table A1.2. 
rising adult mortality would have actually caused it to decline had it not been 
counterbalanced by continuing improvements in infant mortality (Table A 1.2). This 
second period, from the beginning of the 1970s till the end of the 1980s, was 
characterized by an increasing health gap between Hungary and Western Europe. A 
similar pattern was seen in other Central and Eastern European (later referred to as 
CEE) countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, although Hungary did rather 
worse than its neighbours [283]. 
The fall of the communist regime brought about a third period, which was 
characterised by a marked decline in health status, further widening the gap between 
Hungary and the countries of the European Union (EU). Life expectancy at birth 
decreased by more than a year between 1988 and 1993, whilst it steadily increased in 
the EU as a whole. In addition, the gap widened in relation to the Czech Republic and 
Poland, where the effect of the transition period was less marked, and recovery had 
begun much faster. Nevertheless, a late recovery started in 1994, and since than a 
steady improvement in life expectancy has occurred, which at least ensured that the gap 
between Hungary and its neighbours has not increased. 
However life expectancy at birth in Hungary remains among the lowest in Europe. 
In 1998 it was 70.7 years, almost 8 years lower than the EU average, 3 years lower than 
the European average, 1.6 years lower than the CEE average and 4 and 2.4 years lower 
than in the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively [107]. The high mortality among 
middle-aged men is the single most important factor explaining this gap. In 1993, 16 
out of 1000 men between the age of 40-59 years died, a rate twice as high as in 1970. 
Male life expectancy at birth was almost 2 years longer in 1970 than in 1993 [20; 31 J. 
Trends in mortality-based indicators, 1949-2000 (selected years) 
1949 1970 1980 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
J\I11le life expecl:lllcy al 59.3 66.3 65.5 birth (wars) 65.4 65.1 65.0 64.6 64.5 
Female life elpeclanc), HI 63.4 72.1 72.7 73.8 73.7 73.8 73.7 738 birth b'cars) 
Infant mortality 91.0 35.9 23.2 15.7 14.8 15.6 14.1 12.5 per 1,000 live births 
Maternal morlnlity 1.57 0.42 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.19 per 1,000 live births 
Crude death rate 11.4 11.6 13.6 per 1,000 population 
13.7 14.1 14.0 14.4 14.6 
Mortality of 40-59 year-old 10.0 8.4 12.5 ... 14.3 ... 15.6 16.0 
mnles per 1,000 popUlation 
SDI{, all ages, pcr 100,000' 
all causes ... 1252 1302 1230 1262 1252 1284 1296 
external causes 97 114 liS 121 118 119 112 
suicidt: and sdf-intlicled 35 44 40 38 37 37 34 injuries ... 
cardioVllscular diseases ... 690 683 625 M5 638 640 647 
ischacillic heart disease ... 248 229 235 240 244 250 261 
cerebrovascular diseases ... 185 218 172 177 174 172 170 
JIIalignlllll neoplasms 216 2ol0 260 267 271 279 278 
canccr of lung, bronchi, 32 45 57 61 62 64 66 lrachea ... 
digestive system diseases ... 45 63 80 82 83 99 109 
chn'llic liver diseases and 13 27 50 51 55 68 79 
cirrlll)sis ... 
Note: *SDR = age-standardized dealh rate 
Sowce: Ill, 2{), 19; 18: 30; 31; 16; 32; 15, 33; f.I; 3-1, 12J, *1107] 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
64.8 65.3 66.1 664 66.1 66.3 67.1 
74.2 74.5 74.7 75.1 75.2 75.1 75.6 
11.5 10.7 10.9 9.9 9.7 8.4 9.2 
0.10 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.10 
14.3 14.2 14.0 117 13.9 14.2 13.5 
15.9 15.4 14.2 15.2 14.2 14.3 13.1 
1257 1233 1205 1174 1183 1193 1124 
108 102 97 92 93 92 85 
34 31 31 29 30 31 30 
614 604 602 579 586 588 548 
250 250l 257 252 256 254 23H 
161 162 163 152 154 153 14<) 
--
280 nl 284 2S4 284 285 27<) 
66 66 68 68 69 68 67 
III 108 91 90 95 93 90 
81 80 63 63 67 67 63 
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The immediate causes of death that account for the gap with the West are common to 
other countries in transition: cardiovascular diseases and external causes, among which 
suicide is a particular problem (see Table Al.2). In addition, however, Hungary is 
characterised by especially high levels of lung cancer and, like its neighbours, Slovenia 
and Romania, cirrhosis [107]. 
How can we explain these grim figures? Clearly, the answer will lie in an 
understanding of the broad determinants of health. There has long been concern about 
the Hungarian lifestyle, especially smoking, alcohol consumption, and the traditional, 
but unhealthy Hungarian diet [107]. For instance, the death rate from causes directly 
attributable to alcohol is much higher than the CEE average, itself much higher than that 
in the EU. 
But why do Hungarians display such self-destructive tendencies? Kopp [108] 
offered an interesting explanation of this phenomenon. Analyzing the social and 
psychological determinants of health, she found that social support and social cohesion 
are important contributors to good health, but they had been eroded in many ways 
throughout the past 30 years. Inequalities in income have risen substantially, partly as a 
result of the liberalization policy that characterized the "goulash" communism, where 
reform began earlier in Hungary than in other CEE countries. At the same time, 
traditional channels of social support have gradually been disappearing. She found that 
low income does not in itself lead to ill-health, but is mediated by depression, so that 
people who feel their situation poor and hopeless are more likely to become ill and turn 
to alcoholism and suicid~. 
Nevertheless, health services do play some part in population health. Although 
during the communist regime everybody, in principle, had access to the service he or 
she needed, the appropriateness and the overall quality of service were questionable. 
The state-socialist system was unable to respond adequately to the health transition 
experienced by the population, and the allocation of resources was subject to political 
influence. Hence inequalities in service provision arose in terms of both geographical 
locations and specialties [109; 39; 40]. 
Concerns about health in Hungary are not just that the country lags behind the EU 
and other CEE countries at similar level of economic development, but that there are 
persisting geographical and social inequalities in health. For instance, the gap in life 
expectancy at birth between counties with the highest and lowest levels was 6.7 years 
for men and 4.3 years for women in 2000 [110]. The difference is partly attributable to 
the presence of disadvantaged population groups, especially the Roma minority, whose 
concentration is greatest in the three northern counties of Heves, Nognld and Borsod-
Aballj-Zemplen [284]. Unemployment is much higher in the Roma population than 
among ethnic Hungarians and many live in slum conditions without running water and 
sewerage. Their health is substantially worse than that of their ethnic Hungarian 
neighbours [111]. 
In summary, the health status of the Hungarian population is among the worst in 
Europe. Hungary has to face both the challenges of an aging population and a high rate 
of premature death, in particular due to cardiovascular diseases, malignant neoplasms, 
chronic liver diseases and suicide. Inequalities in health, and in particular the problems 
faced by the Roma minority, raise further concerns. Hence, the challenges facing the 
Hungarian health care system are especially complex, a situation that is partly 
attributable to the failures of the system itself. 
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A.1.3. OVERVIEW OF THE HUNGARIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The evolution of the Hungarian health care system in the 20th century can roughly be 
divided into three main periods. Before the Second World War both the financing and 
the delivery of health services were characterised by a public private mix, with health 
insurance gaining ground rapidly and increasing state involvement in the Bismarckian 
model [66; 153]. This development was disrupted at the end of the Second World War, 
when the integrated state-socialist model of health care systems was established over a 
short transition period of five years. The 1949 Hungarian Constitution declared health 
to be a fundamental right for which the state was held responsible [285]. Throughout 
the communist period this meant that the state assumed exclusive responsibility for both 
the financing and delivery of health services. The Ministry of Health funded and 
delivered the whole spectrum of health services including hospitals, polyclinics and the 
district doctor services that were established in 1952 [156]. Although private practice 
by physicians was not totally banned, it was only permitted on a part time basis 
[157,39(2)b]. 
The need for radical health care reforms became increasingly apparent in the 1980s, 
coinciding with signs of incipient collapse of the centralised economic and political 
system. The widening gap in health status between Hungary and Western European 
countries called for profound change and the softening political climate opened the way 
for reform, which began in the last years of the communist regime. Major health care 
reform has been on the policy agenda ever since. 
The current structure of the Hungarian health care system represents a considerable 
departure from the former, highly centralized, state-socialist model. Since 1989 the 
system has become more pluralist with responsibilities divided between various players, 
while the previous hierarchical relationships have partly been replaced by contractual 
relationships and quasi-public arrangements (Figure 2.2). 
In contrast to the Semashko system, the new model is based on contracts, in which 
purchasing and service delivery are separated, although the current Hungarian health 
care system is still predominantly publicly financed and provided. Health services arc 
financed chiefly from compulsory social insurance for recurrent costs, and from taxation 
for capital costs. Within the framework of the social insurance system the statutory 
health insurance scheme is a distinct entity. Contributions are held in an earmarked 
budget, the so-called Health Insurance Fund (later referred to as HIF), \\ hich is 
administered by the National Health Insurance Fund Administration (later referred to as 
NHIFA) [117; 118]. The NHIFA is the single most important monopsonistic purchaser 
in the system. However the rules within which it acts, such as contribution levels, its 
operating budget, and methods of provider payment, are made by the National 
Assembly, the national government and within that the Ministry of Health, Social and 
Family Affairs (later referred to as MOH). [119,19; 2,34,35; 120-122] 
Local governments are the main service providers in the system, owning most health 
care facilities, including primary care surgeries, polyclinics and hospitals r 43, 107( 1 )c; 
129]. While local governments are responsible for making health services available for 
the local population, they are allowed to contract out service delivery to private 
providers. Nevertheless, the private sector is small except for primary care, whereas 
most family doctors work as independent entrepreneurs, although their surgeries and 
equipment arc owned and made available for them by local governments (a scheme 
1'1 T I: R G A A I. 
I' A G [ 2 7 I I T II lSI S _ G I' R I· \. I S Ie I> _ \' I 7 
A, THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN HUNGARY 
A 1.\ ECONOMIC. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
known as 'functional privatisation'). Service providers, whether public or private, have 
to contract with the NHIFA to become eligible for HIF funding [2,30-33,36-38; 131,13-
25]. 
The national government is the dominant regulator of health services, exercises 
statutory supervision over the HIF and controls the NHIFA [133-135; 121], covers the 
deficit of the HIF [119,3(2)], pays premiums in respect of non-contributing groups 
[119,39(1),16(I)b-o; 123], provides capital funds [125], finances and delivers public 
health services and provides most tertiary care services, mainly through the MOH [1]. 
The government also finances health education, research and development, and co-
payments that would otherwise be paid by the poor [136-138]. 
In the next sections, health care financing, delivery and governance are reviewed in 
more detail. 
A.1.3.1.Health care finance and expenditures 
This section aims to give additional insight into the flow of funds through the system: 
revenue collection, budget setting, financial resource allocation and payment. Trends in 
public and private sources and health care expenditures are also reviewed with a brief 
discussion of available data and their limitations. One important source of concern 
about the validity of published figures relates to estimates of the scale of informal 
payment, which is a topic of this thesis and addressed in greater depth in chapter 7. In 
this section health care expenditures and sources of finance are calculated using the best 
available estimates on informal payment. 
As it has already been mentioned, public sources of health care finance consist of 
revenues from general and local taxation, but more importantly from contributions to 
the statutory health insurance scheme. The revenue of the HIF comes from health 
insurance contributions [119,24] and from the so-called 'hypothecated health care tax' 
[123]. The health insurance contribution is paid partly by the employcr and partly by 
the employee in the form of a proportional payroll tax, whilst the hypothecated health 
care tax has two components: a lump sum tax and a proportional tax, levied on those 
types of income which are not subject to social insurance contributions, for instance 
certain dividends or fringe benefits. The statutory health insurance scheme provides 
almost universal and comprehensive coverage, with few exclusions and no or little co-
payment, except for pharmaceuticals, medical aids and prostheses [2, 18(4-6),21,23]. 
Private sources of health care financing, though, are almost exclusively out-of-pocket, 
since the private health insurance market is insignificant [124]. 
Main system of finance and coverage 
As a general rule the HIP covers only the recurrent costs of services. The owners of 
health care facilities, mainly local governments, are responsible for maintenance 
according to Act CLIV of 1997 on Health (the principle of 'maintenance obligation') 
[1,155(2)]. They are obliged to cover the capital costs of services (depreciation and 
investment), which usually come from general and local taxation. In addition to locally 
co\1ected revenues, central government offers substantial help via conditional and 
matching grants [125]. 
Act LXXX of 1997 all 1110se Entitled for the Services of Social InSlIJ'lIIlCC! and Private 
Pensions (lnd the FlInding of these Services determines the rules of participation in the 
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statutory health insurance scheme, and entitlement to in-kind and cash benefits. 
Membership in the health insurance scheme is compulsory for everybody; opting out is 
not permitted. The population is divided into three groups: (1) employees and 
entrepreneurs, (2) those who are covered, but do not have to contribute, including the 
dependants of group one and certain special groups - for instance pensioners, those who 
are on maternity leave, conscripts, the 'socially indigent' - and their dependants, (3) all 
other residents holding a personal identification card [119,2(1 ),5, 11 ,39]. All three 
groups are entitled to health services, but only groups one and three have to pay health 
insurance contribution. As a result population coverage is virtually universal with less 
than 1 % not covered. For instance, foreigners, who work in Hungary for a prolonged 
period are not obliged to participate, but may do so, if they wish. The homeless and 
unregistered workers may not be covered, if they do not register at the local government 
as socially indigent [138,54]. Health services are provided on the basis of a unique 
personal identification number, but there is currently no system in operation by 
providers to check whether contributions have actually been paid [286,21-27]. 
The health insurance contribution is split between employer and employee [119,18]. 
The proportional contribution is universal and determined annually by the National 
Assembly. In 2001, social insurance contribution was 42% of the gross salary from 
which 14% went to health. Employers paid 11 %, whilst employees paid 3% of their 
gross salary [119,19]. There was initially an upper ceiling for the employee 
contribution, but it was abolished by the government as of 1 January 2001 [119,24(2); 
181,153(1 )]. Special rules apply to the self-employed, who must pay contributions 
according to the nationally determined minimum wage, and to small farmers, who can 
choose to pay only 11 % of the actual minimum wage, but they are not entitled to cash 
benefits [119,29,39(2)]. By paying the full 14% contribution, they can get full 
coverage, including cash benefits [119,34(3)]. 
Provisions for non-contributing groups are shared between the HIF and the 
government. Those who are on sickness and disability benefits should be covered from 
the Fund, while the government transfers the revenue from the 'hypothecated health 
care tax' to the Fund to compensate for the rest of group two, as mentioned before 
[119,3 9( 1 )]. This new hypothecated tax was introduced in 1996 as a lump sum tax, 
which has to be paid in addition to the social insurance contribution as of 1 January 
1997 [175; 287]. In 2002, it was HUF 4,50057 per month [123,9]. Later it was 
complemented with a proportional 11% tax, which has been levied since 1 January 1999 
on those types of income previously exempt from social insurance contributions [123]. 
As a result, the employer and employee health insurance contribution and the 
'hypothecated health care tax' now constitute the two major revenue sources of the HIF. 
The chronic problem facing the HIF is that it has been in deficit since its inception 
[288-295]. Successive governments over the past 10 years have targeted the funding of 
the statutory health insurance system, and only minor modifications have been 
implemented in the almost comprehensive and universal benefit package. 
The provision of universal and comprehensive coverage was the founding principle 
of the previous, state-socialist health care system. Health services were free-of-charge 
except for very small co-payments for medicines, medical aids and prostheses 
[252,25(1 )]. In the early years of the transition from the tax funded integrated system to 
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the social insurance funded model more emphasis was put on structural reform than 
setting priorities in terms of health care benefits. In parallel with the establishment of 
statutory health insurance, a negative list of free services was defined in amendments to 
Act II of 1975 on Social Insurance, which has not been modified substantially since then 
[296,4-5; 297]. 
Act LXXXIII of 1997 and related decrees define health services, which are (a) free-of-
charge, (b) covered partially (co-payment has to be paid), or (c) excluded from statutory 
health insurance coverage. The starting point of the Act is that all health services are 
fully covered and exclusions are stipulated. Co-payment is required for medicines, 
medical aids and prosthesis, balneotherapy [2,21], dental prosthesis, treatment in 
sanatoria, long-term chronic care (HUF 400 per day58) and some higher quality 'hotel' 
services for inpatient care, such as en-suite single rooms and other modern 
conveniences. Co-payment is applied if certain rules are not observed: (l) if specialist 
services are obtained without a referral from authorized medical doctors, except in the 
case of emergency, (2) if patients choose to go to a provider other than the one they 
were referred to, (3) if patients want to have more services than the doctor prescribed 
[2,23; 3]. Between 1996 and 2001 co-payment also had to be paid for tooth-preserving 
dental treatments, but this has recently been abolished [168; 169; 2,23(b); 298; 299]. 
Special rules apply to a few services, such as infertility treatments, where the number of 
cycles is limited [300]. The costs of medical examinations for certificates required for 
driving and firearms are not covered, and the Act explicitly excludes treatments for 
aesthetic or recreational purposes and those not proven to be effective in improving 
health [2,18(4-6)]. These include services not included in the International 
Classification of Medical Interventions as well as cosmetic surgery, massage, abortion 
or sterilization without medical indication, and prostate specific antigen test in general 
screening [4]. Some other health services, like high-cost, high-technology interventions 
and patient transport have also been excluded, but are covered from the central 
government budget [2,18(5); 1,142(2)]. 
Complementary sources of finance 
Private sources are almost exclusively out-of-pocket payments for informal payment 
and for services, which are either partially or fully excluded from cover by the statutory 
health insurance scheme, since private for-profit and non-profit health insurance has not 
yet become well established. As well as the cases of co-payments and exclusions listed 
previously, patients pay the full price for services that are obtained from a private 
provider who has no contract with the NHIF A [2,9]. 
The market for private for-profit and not-for-profit health insurance is small, and 
consequently an insignificant source of health care financing. Voluntary health 
insurance was non-existent under the previous regime. Act XCVI of 1993 on Voluntary 
Mutual Insurance Funds created the legal framework for non-profit insurance plans, 
according to the model of the 'mutualite' movement. Although the government 
subsidizes the purchase of health insurance from voluntary mutual funds by means of a 
30% tax rebate, up to a certain limit [301,35(2)], so far few voluntary funds have been 
established. In 1998 there were approximately 30,000 members in less than 30 funds 
57 €18. I EUR is approximately 250 HUF. 
58 €1.6. 
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with a total revenue of HUF 600 million59 [124]. In exchange for a 'membership fee', 
the existing plans are allowed to offer services not covered, or not fully covered by the 
HIF [164,51(1)]. Only a small portion of the 'membership fee' is a real health insurance 
premium, paid into a common fund, or risk pool. The larger share of contributions goes 
to individual accounts and can be used by the account holder only, so that they are, de 
facto, medical savings accounts [164,51(5)]. 
Private for-profit health insurance is even more limited. Some companies offer 
insurance at the upper end of the market, mainly cash benefit schemes for certain 
illnesses [302; 303]. There are new attempts to extend the private health insurance 
market by offering in-kind benefits in the form of higher quality hotel services, but there 
is no published evidence about the extent of demand for these plans. 
Budget setting, financial resource allocation and provider payment 
Figure Al.l presents an overview of the flow of funds in the Hungarian health care 
system, from households, patients and firms to individual providers. 
The health care budget is made up of three components: (a) the HIF, derived mainly 
from social insurance contributions and from the hypothecated health care tax, (b) the 
central government budget derived from general taxes, and (c) local government 
budgets that come from local taxes, from the central government on a capitation basis 
and via conditional and matching grants for investment. Most key budget setting 
decisions are made at national level by the government. 
A key principle of resource allocation is the separation of capital and recurrent costs. 
The main source of recurrent financing is the HIF, while the owners of health care 
facilities, mainly local governments, are responsible for capital costs, according to the 
principle of maintenance obligation [2,35(2); 1,155(2)]. The HIF is divided into over 
twenty budget lines (sub-budgets) according to service types. For example family 
doctor services, dialysis and acute inpatient care, all have their own sub-budgets, which 
are unified at the national level, i.e. not devolved to the counties [e.g.126,Annex 1]. 
Another key resource allocation principle is the protection of the HIF from cost 
explosion. A national budget ceiling is set for most sub-budgets, and various payment 
methods are used to ensure that the budget is not exceeded: capitation, global budgets or 
a point system, when health care providers are reimbursed on the basis of services 
produced [2,34; 127,22-30; 120]. Nonetheless, the sub-budgets of pharmaceuticals and 
medical aids and prosthesis were exceptions and overspending in these sub-budgets was 
one of the main causes of the deficit of the HIF [see for instance 304,Annex 2]. 
Reallocation of funds bel ween sub-budgets was not permitted until 1999, when the 
Minister of Health was granted the right to compensate overspending in these non-
capped sub-budgets from other sub-budgets of th~ HIF [126,5(3); 305; 306; 307,Anncx 
5]. 
Health service providers are paid from the sub-budgets of the HIF by various 
methods: outpatient specialist services are paid on a fee for service basis, using a points 
system (points for procedures), acute inpatient care is reimbursed using diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs), and chronic care by patient days [2,34; 127,22-30; 120; 122]. 
59 E2.5 million. 
PJ:TlR G AA l. 
PAGE 275 / TllfSIS GI' RI VISEI)_ V 17 
A . 
A . I . I . 
Figure ALl. 
Til E HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN II UNGARY 
ECONOM I C, SOC I AL AND POLITICA L CON T EXT 
Flow of funds in the Hungarian health care system 
PATIENTS 
R ETAILERS 
The points system works as follows: each procedure (in outpatient specialist care) or 
case (in acute inpatient care) is assigned a certain number of points on the bas is of its 
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complexity and use of resources (the so-called 'German points' for procedures and DRG 
points for hospital cases). Providers calculate their monthly sum of points on the basis 
of procedures performed and cases discharged and report it to the NHIF A. Points are 
added nationally and the monetary value of one point is calculated by dividing the 
predetermined sub-budget by the total number of points [308,20(10)]. Payment is made 
according to the points collected multiplied by the calculated national monetary value of 
one point (the so-called 'national base fee'). The 'national base fee' has been fixed for 
a year in advance since the second quarter of 1999 for the DRG payment system 
[120,38(3)] and since the middle of 2000 for outpatient specialist services [309,16(4)]. 
Recalculation of the national base fee applies only if performance increases so much 
that it cannot be compensated from the reserve put away at the beginning of the year for 
this purpose [120,38(3-6)]. 
In addition to the main system of payment methods, special rules apply to certain 
services. For instance, a few high-cost medical interventions, such as kidney and bone 
marrow transplantation, are reimbursed on a case basis [309, 44; 122,Annex 8]. Other 
high-technology therapies, like hearth, lung, liver and pancreas transplantation are also 
paid for on a case basis, but from the central government budget [2,18(5)g; 1, 142(2)d; 
4,Annex(1)]. There are certain services, such as public health and emergency 
ambulance services, which are both financed and delivered by the central government, 
i.e. financing and service provision have remained integrated [1, 142(2)a-c,e-g]. 
Service providers contract with the NHIF A to be eligible for reimbursement. The 
contract defines provider capacities in terms of outpatient specialist consultation hours, 
and acute and chronic hospital beds [2,31; 131,19]. Until 2001, contracted capacities 
were legally determined for each county and speciality, according to a formula based on 
local health needs (on the basis of certain socio-economic indicators), while the so-
called 'county consensus committees' agreed on the contracted capacities of each health 
care provider [139]. In 2001, the 1996 Capacity Act was repealed, and the actual status 
quo became the basis of future contracting [310; 311]. The law has allowed greater 
flexibility for local governments to restructure capacities, but capacity increases have 
remained the prerogative of the Ministers of Health and Finance [310,3(2)]. The 
quantity and quality of outputs are not stipulated in the contract, except for a few high 
cost, high technology interventions, like various organ transplantations, for which the 
yearly number of procedures is set in advance [120,44(2)]. The NHIFA is not allowed 
to exercise selective contracting, but has the right to monitor the contract, mainly to 
control the validity of providers' performance reports [2,36-38]. 
In the state-socialist health care system all physicians were salaried public 
employees, and private practice was allowed only on a part-time basis [157]. Public 
employment with salaries has remained the dominant form of medical practice 
throughout the years of health care reform, with the only exception being family 
doctors, most of whom contract with both the NHIF A and the local governments and 
are paid on a capitation basis [46; 120,11(1),12(2)]. In contrast, most specialists are 
public employees, with nationally agreed pay scales [128]. The salary is determined by 
qualifications and years of experience. Until the end of 2002, when the new 
government instituted a 50% pay rise [312], the average salary in the health sector was 
lower than in most other sectors of the economy [30; 18; 17;31; 16;32; 15;33; 14;34]. 
In 2000, health care workers were the fifth lowest paid among the full-time employees 
of the 14 main sectors of the Hungarian economy [12,4.12,p. 90]. The situation was 
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even worse when compared with the average salary of workers with higher education 
qualifications. The health sector ranked as the second worst paid among the other main 
sectors [12,4.16,p.96]. 
Trends in sources of financing and health care expenditure 
In 2000, Hungary spent 6.3% of its GDP on health care, 82.6% of which came from 
public sources according to international and national statistics. International sources 
suggest a somewhat higher figure of 6.8% for health care expenditures, and lower share 
of public expenditure of73.5% (Table A1.3. and A1.4). This variation is attributable to 
two factors: (1) the divergent estimates of informal payment, and (2) the difference in 
estimates of tax-financed services and capital expenditures. For instance Orosz et al. 
[112] estimated informal payment as 0.6% of GDP between 1989 and 1996, which 
alone made up 7-11 % of total health expenditures. At the same time estimates from the 
regular household budget survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) 
were between 0.06% and 0.11 % of GDP [260; 253; 76; 261; 254; 255]. Estimates of 
the sources of entirely tax-funded services and tax-funded capital expenditures are the 
other main reason for conflicting data on health expenditures. For instance, the 
estimates by Orosz et al. [112] range from 0.9% to 1.4% of the GDP, between 1991 and 
1996, and for the same period OECD figures are between 1.1 % and 1.8% [114]. The 
lowest difference in a particular year is 0.1 % of GDP, while the highest is 0.4%. Apart 
from these uncertainties, statistics for HIF and private pharmaceutical expenditures are 
believed to be accurate. Tables A 1.3 and A 1.4 have been put together primarily on the 
basis of these data, complemented with the best available estimates from international 
sources, but the corresponding figures extracted from the WHO Health for All Database 
and OEeD Health Data, along with the estimates of Orosz et al. are also shown [116; 
107; 113-115; 112]. 
Main sources of finance (%) in the Hungarian health care system, 1989-2000 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20110 
Public 91.1 91.7 92.5 91.1 90.5 90.9 88.8 88.4 87.8 87.7 85.7 82.6 
statutory health insurance 0.0 78.5 75.7 73.8 71.8 71.2 70.3 73.6 75.1 75.1 72.9 69.9 
taxes 91.1 13.2 16.7 17.3 18.7 19.7 18.6 14.8 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.7 
Private 8.9 8.3 7.5 8.9 9.5 9.1 11.2 11.6 12.2 12.3 14.3 17.4 
out-of-pocket 8.9 8.3 7.5 8.9 9.5 9.1 11.2 11.6 12.2 12.3 14.3 17.4 
private insurance - ... ... . ... ... ... ... .. . .. . ... .. . 
Other (external sources) ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... ... ... . . ... 
Public" 
WHO [107] 100.0 100.0 80.8 79.1 79.4 80.0 76.2 76.5 75.3 76.5 75.0 73.5 
DECO [115] ... ... 90.1 88.3 87.0 86.7 84.0 81.9 80.0 82.4 . .. . .. 
WB[112] 86.0 85.7 87.7 88.2 87.0 86.7 83.3 82.7 - - - -
I)rivate" 
WHO[107] 0.0 0.0 19.2 20.9 20.6 20.0 23.8 23.5 2,u 23.5 25.0 26.5 
DECO [115] ... ... 9.9 11.7 13.0 13.3 16.0 18.1 20.0 17.6 .., ... 
WB (112) 14.0 14.3 12.3 11.8 13.0 13.3 16.7 17.3 - - - -
Note: Estimates for the public and private share of health care expenditures trom the WilD lIealth for All Database for 1989 and 
1990 are certainly not valid, since informal payment and co·payment for pharmaceuticals did exist in the state-socialist 
health care system. 
SOl/rce: Calclliatedfrom NHiFA dataJor statll/ory health insllrance [288-295}. IICSO and Ministry oj Welfare dataJor primte Ollt-
oj-pocket payments [260; 253; 76; 261; 313-315; 25./; 316; 255; 317; 256; 173; 268; 257; 318; 27; 35; 12; 319-321}. 
Oros:: et al [112} and DECO [IN}) estimates Jar uuJllnded services and capital expendltllres. and WI/O Regional Office 
for Europe. !leallhJor All Database [I07} Jar trends oj total exp,'ndltllres in the last three years. * 11'110 Regional Office 
for Ellrope, flealthJor All Database [I07}. DECO Ilealtlr Data [/l5}. Oros; et al. [1/ 2} 
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Figure Al.2. 
The only conspicuous trend in Table A1.3 is the increase in private sources in the 
period of health care reform. Between 1992 and 2000, the share of private sources 
almost doubled. Nevertheless, public financing, and, within that, statutory health 
insurance has always been dominant. Although the share of statutory health insurance 
decreased by 11 % between 1990, when social insurance financing began to operate, and 
2000, these trends should be interpreted cautiously, Apart from the divergent estimates 
for informal payment and general tax sources, mentioned before, the separation between 
the HIF and national government sources is not watertight. The national government is 
obliged to cover the deficit incurred by the HIF, and it is debatable whether the 
hypothecated health care tax is a tax or statutory health insurance contribution, For the 
sake of simplicity, Table A 1.3 makes the assumption that all expenditures of the NHIF A 
can be considered statutory health insurance. Moreover, it should be noted that reform 
measures could change the share of financial sources and the structure of health 
expenditures without any effect on overall spending. For instance, emergency 
ambulance and high cost high-technology services were transferred from the HIF to 
national government financing in 1998 [2,18(5)c,g; 1, I 42(2)a,d], and it is expected that 
depreciation costs will be integrated into HIF financing during the current government 
[322]. 
Comparison of health care expenditures as % of GDP, 1985-2000 
340102 Total health expenditure as % of GDP 
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Source: [I07} 
As far as overall health care expenditures are concerned, Hungary spent more on 
health care in 1999 than the average for CEE countries by all measures of total health 
care expenditure, but less than a number of other countries in the region with similar 
level of economic development, like Slovenia and the Czech Republic, even using the 
higher estimates of the WHO Health for All Database (Figures A 1.2 and A \.3). This 
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Figure AI.3. 
suggests that the country could afford to spend more, especially in the light of the 
healthy macroeconomic indicators of recent years, but does not do so. Looking at the 
trends in health care expenditures (Table A 1.4, Figures A 1.2. and A 1.3), we can gain 
insight into how the country has arrived at the current level of health spending, which, 
in real terms, is still only at 77% of the 1990 level. Nineteen-ninety was the only year 
of the past decade when health care spending increased by more than 10% in real terms. 
Comparison of health care expenditures in PPP USD per capita, 1988-2000 
992701 Total health expenditure in PPP$ per capita 
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These figures suggest that successive Hungarian governments during the transition 
period have implemented a very effective cost containment policy, which ensured that 
health care spending would not upset the fiscal balance. But it is important to 
distinguish between two periods. Between 1990 and 1994 Hungary experienced a 
serious economic recession, and although health care spending was decreasing until 
1993, the share of health services in GDP was actually increasing. That is, health 
services had a larger slice of the shrinking cake. Since 1994, however, GDP has been 
growing continuously, while health care expenditures have been decreasing or 
stagnating, not just in real terms, but also as a share of GOP (Table A 1.4). Thus, the 
economic stabilization policies, implemented by the government in 1995 and 1996, 
have in fact been continued by the next government, at least as far as the health sector is 
concerned. It has not yet been allowed to enjoy the fruits of economic growth. 
The cost containment policies of successive governments have been implemented 
effectively, but containing overall health care costs does not necessarily imply more 
efficient resource allocation. While, in general, it is difficult to determine the efficient 
level of overall health care spending, there are certain benchmarks, such as health 
expenditures of countries with simi lar levels of economic development. On this basis it 
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seems that Hungary might spend more on health care, provided of course that the 
preferences of the Hungarian population in this respect do not differ much from those in 
neighbouring countries (see Figures A1.2 and A1.3 for comparison with the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia). 
Trends in health care expenditures in Hungary, 1989-2000 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Share of GDP (%) 
WHO[116] 5.2 6.1 7.3 7.8 7.8 8.2 7.6 7.2 6.9 6.8 - -
WHO (107) 5.2 6.1 7.2 7.7 7.7 8.2 7.5 7.1 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 
OECO [113) ". 6.1 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.3 7.1 6.7 6.5 - - -
OECO[114) 
." ". 6.8 7.2 7.4 7.9 7.1 6.8 6.4 ". - -
OECO[115] ". ". 7.1 7.7 7.7 8.3 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.8 ... ". 
WB[(12) 5.7 6.3 7.3 7.6 7.7 8.3 7.8 7.5 
-
- - -
Share of GDP (%)* 5.4 6.1 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.7 7.0 6.6 6.3 6.3 63 6.3 
Value in current prices (billion 93 128 
IIUF)* 178 216 268 354 403 464 542 639 717 821 
Real "alue applying health care 92.1 100 97.1 76.6 76.9 84.5 74.1 67.4 66.S 67.4 68.2 710 denator (1990 = 100)* 
Value in current prices (billion 90 128 
IIUF)** 178 222 276 358 421 490 581 686 775 889 
Value PPPS per capita·· 325 510 539 601 623 686 678 663 672 717 767 830 
Real "alue applying health care 88.9 100 97.1 783 78.9 
denator (1990 - 100)"" 85.1 76.2 70.8 71.0 72.1 73.4 76.6 
Change per year (%) •• - 12.5 -2.9 -19.3 0.7 7.8 -\0.5 -7.1 0.3 1.6 1.8 4.3 
Public as share of total 
expenditure on health care (%) 
WIIO [116; 107) 100 100 80.8 79.1 79.4 80.0 76.2 76.5 75.3 76.5 75.0 73.5 
DECO [113) ." ." 91.9 71.1 71.1 69.8 69.3 69.1 - - -
OECD [1(4) ". 95.6 94.4 91.9 92.4 88.7 86.8 85.9 ". - -
OECD [liS) ". ". 90.1 88.3 87.0 86.7 84.0 81.9 80.0 82.4 ". ". 
WB (112) 86.0 85.7 87.7 88.2 87.0 86.7 83.3 82.7 - - - -
Puhlic as share of total 91.1 92.5 91.\ 90.5 90.9 88.8 86.4 87.8 87.7 85.7 82.6 
expcnditure on heallh cnrc (%)"* ". 
SOllree: WHO Regional o.[fice for ElIrop~, lIealth for All Database [1/6; 107J, OEeD /fealth Data [1/3; 1/5]. OECD [I UJ, 
Oros= et ai, [112}. ·Calcillatedfrolll NfJlFA datafor statl/lory health insurance [288-295J, Ill/Ilgarian Central Statistical 
Office data for primte olll-of-pockel payments (I, 9, 18, 19, 20, 27,28, 29,30, 31), flCSO and Ministry of Welji:lre do/afar 
primte ollt-of-pocketpayments [260; 253; 76; 261; 313-315; 25-1; 316; 255; 317; 256: 173; 268; 257; 318; 27; 35; JJ. 
319-32Ij, Oros= el al [1l2J and OECD [Il-lj) estimates for tm: jImded st!r\'ices alld capital expendi/llres, alld 11'1/0 
Regional Office for Europe, Heal/hfor All Database {lOlJ for trends ojlo/a/ e.\j!l!llClillires ill the /asttlllw years. • "WI/O 
Regional Offieefor Europe Healthfar All Database [107J 
More importantly, however, cost containment, in itself, does not ensure efficient 
resource allocation within the health sector. For instance, if pntients are treated in 
hospitals for a condition that could be treated equally effectively, but more cheaply, in 
the outpatient specialist or primary care setting, resources arc wasted. It is difficult to 
assess these kinds of inefficiencies from aggregate spending data, but the expenditures 
of the HIF could be used as a crude proxy for this. The trends of expenditures by 
categories show that financial resource allocation among the various types of health care 
services has not changed substantially (Table A 1.5). Primary, secondary and tertiary 
care services exhibit a fairly constant share between 1993 and 2000, except for minor 
changes, which can partly be attributed to known changes in the envelope of HIF 
financing. Within inpatient care, the share of expenditure for acute and chronic care has 
remained stable, despite government intentions to expand long term care and to reduce 
acute inpatient provision [37; 38]. Nevertheless this analysis is limited by the fact that 
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HIF expenditures are only a partial measure of resource use since only recurrent costs of 
services are covered by the NHIF A. Capital expenditures are financed directly from the 
national and local government budget. The latter is difficult to estimate, since there are 
no official statistics published in Hungary that bring together national and local 
government expenditures on health. 
Expenditures of the Health Insurance Fund, 1990-2000 
Expenditure category 1990* 1991* 1992* 1993 199" 1995 1996 19')7 1998 1999 2000 
Total expenditure on health care 99.8 134.5 159.7 192.5 251.9 287.0 341.6 407.4 479.8 523.2 573.4 (current prices billion IIUF) 
Administration (%)" 2.9 3.2 2.2 2.9 4.2 3.9 4.5 4J 4.4 3.7 3.0 
In-kind benefits (%) 97.1 96.8 97.8 97.1 95.8 96.1 95.5 95.7 95.6 96.3 97.0 
In-kind benefits 96.9 130.2 156 186,9 241.4 275.7 326.1 389.9 458.5 SO·t.! 556.0 (current prices billion In:F) 
Curative & preventive services (%) 70.4 68.5 71.8 70.4 70.2 69.3 68.9 68.7 65.2 67.2 67.6 
Medicines (%) 26.7 28.2 25.2 26.5 25.8 25.7 26.2 25.9 29.6 27.7 27.1 
Medical aids (%) 1.8 2.1 2J 2.5 3.0 3.9 3.7 4.3 4J 4.1 4.1 
Balneotherapy (%)'" ... ... ... .. . OJ 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Travelling subsidy (%) 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 OJ 0.5 0.6 
Other in-kind benefits (%)'" ... ... ... ... 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 OJ 0.2 0.2 
Curative and preHnthe sen'ices 6S.3 89.2 112.1 131.6 169.4 191.0 224.8 268.0 299.1 33S.9 376.1 (currcnt prices billion III IF) 
Primary Can: (%) ... ... ... ... 18,5 16,6 15.9 15.7 16,0 15,4 14,7 
family doctor s~rvices (%) ... ... ... ... 11,6 10,6 11,1 10,7 11,0 10,4 9,7 
d~ntal care, MCH, other (%) ... 6,S 5,9 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,0 
Out-patient specialist care ('Yo) ... ... ... .. . 15,2 17,5 IS,S 15,6 16,0 15,9 15,9 
Dialysis (%) ... ... ... 1,51 I,l)l) 2,42 2,53 2,50 2,5S 2,70 
CT,MRI(%) ... ... - - 2,07 2,02 2,08 1,91 1,88 
Home clfe (%) ... ... ... ... - - 0,01 0,18 0,33 0,33 0,34 
In-patient services ... ... ... ... 57,1 58,6 59,4 58,6 61,S 62~2 59,0 
acute care (%) ... ... ... ... 49,3 50,7 51,6 50.5 53.3 53,8 50,8 
special (%) ... ... 1,5 1,8 1,7 2.1 1,9 2.1 2,1 
chronic care (%) ... 6,3 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.3 6.3 6,1 
Other (%) ... ... .. . ... 7,7 5,4 4.3 5,4 1.5 1.5 5,4 
TotlllllclIlth Insurance Fund 
cxpcnditure • • 252.0 303.6 359.9 405.2 463.6 549.2 629.4 698.0 79"1.4 
(currcnt priccs billion 11l:~') 
Cash bendits (%) • • 36.6 36.6 30.0 29.2 26.3 25.8 23.8 25.0 27.8 
Deficit of the Health Insurance fund 
• • 8.6 8.5 5.0 5.5 9.4 10.2 113 6.8 8.0 (%) 
Note: 'Expcnditures of the Social Insurance Fund; cannot be separated in 1990 and 1991. "Only operational expenses i1H:ludcd . 
••• Betwcen 1990 and 1993 included in curative and preventive services. 
Source: A'IfIFA {2SS.295} 
A.1.3.2.Service delivery 
Health care delivery in Hungary is based on the constitutional obligation of the state to 
make health services available for all citizens [22,70/D(l-2), 18, 35(1 )g]. The delivery 
system is organized on the basis of the principle of 'territorial supply obligation', with 
provision by local governments, distributed according to geographical areas and levels 
of care [43,8(4),70(b); 129,132(1); 139; 1,152-153; 310], The basic principle is that 
municipalities are responsible for providing primary care and county governments to 
provide specialist care for their resident population [the principle of 'principal division 
of tasks', 43,8(4),70(b)]. In addition to the 'principal division of tasks', municipalities 
arc allowed to provide specialist in- and outpatient care if the majority of the users of 
the health care institution concerned are residents of the municipality concerned and if 
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they are willing and able to do so, which the county government must accept according 
to the principle of Isubsidiarity' [43,69(2-6)]. 
In practice catchment populations of health care providers in the frame of the 
territorial supply obligation vary with different levels of care, types of services and the 
level of specialisation of the institution (the so-called 'progressivity level') 
[1,75(3),76,92(1)]. For instance, some municipal hospitals provide secondary care for 
not just the inhabitants of the municipality concerned, but also for the neighbouring 
population, or some large county hospitals provide tertiary care for the population of 
two or more counties. 
However, to understand fully how the delivery system operates in Hungary, two 
other distinctions have to be made. First, the principle of territorial supply obligation 
does not include any obligation for local government to actually deliver health services. 
They are allowed to contract out service delivery to private providers, which is in fact 
the dominant form of production for family doctors services [130]. In contrast, the 
principle of territorial supply obligation does imply another responsibility, the so-called 
'maintenance obligation', which rests with the owners of health care facilities [1,155(2)]. 
The owners of those facilities, whether private or public, that provide services under 
territorial supply obligation, are required to find sufficient capital funds to maintain the 
assets in good condition. This principle is especially relevant in those cases where a 
local government contracts Ollt service provision to a private provider, who delivers the 
services in a facility that is still owned by local government. This scheme is referred to 
as 'functional privatization', which is the most common model 111 primary care 
[35, 16.5,p.3 70]. 
Since 1990, local governments have been responsible for the provision of the 
majority of health services, and they have been delivering the bulk of specialist care too, 
as the ownership of most hospitals and polyclinics was transferred to local governments 
in 1990 [43,107(1)c]. The scope of provision, in terms of primary, secondary and 
tertiary care, is defined by Act CLIV of 1997 on Health and Act XXXIV of 2001 r 1,75-
92; 310]. There are, however, some services that are the responsibility of national 
government, including for instance public health, emergency ambulance services and 
blood supply [1,35-74,94-96,223-227,142(2)], and the government still owns a limited 
number of health care providers (e.g. national institutes of health, university medical 
schools, sectorial services, sanatoria) [e,g.132]. 
Primary health care 
Within primary care. local governments must ensure availability of (a) family physician 
and family paediatrician services (together referred to as family doctor services), (b) 
dental care, (c) out of surgery hours services (d) mother and child health nursc sen'ices 
(MCH), and (e) school health services [1,152(1)]. 
Local governments have the right to designate the primary care districts for family 
doctor services within their territory [1,152(2)], providing they have more than 1200 
adults (for family physician services) and 600 children under 14 years, (for family 
paediatrician services) [120,8(2-3)]. Primary care districts must cover the entire 
territory of the municipality, and serve as the basis of the territorial supply obligation, 
This does not mean, however, that residcnts have to register with the provider in the 
primary care district, where they live. Since 1992 people have been allowed free choice 
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of family doctor, with the only restriction that they can change once a year [161,2]. 
Doctors are also able to refuse to accept new applicants, except those who live in their 
primary care district [323,13/B(3)]. 
Municipalities can also decide whether to deliver family doctor services themselves 
or contract it out to private providers. Consequently family doctors have four options 
for employment. First, the municipality can employ family doctors on a monthly salary. 
Second, under the functional privatization scheme, family doctors, as private providers, 
contract with the municipality to provide services for the population of a primary care 
district, but work in a surgery using equipment owned by local government. The family 
doctor is then paid an adjusted capitation fee directly from the HIF to cover recurrent 
expenses, while the municipality remains responsible for capital costs, according to the 
principle of 'maintenance obligation'. Third, family doctors can work as independent 
private providers with no municipal contract and no territorial supply obligation, if 
patients choose them, but they are only entitled to capitation payment from the HIF, if 
they have minimum of 200 registered persons on their list [120,9(1 )a]. Fourth, 
employment options were \videned in 2001, with the introduction of the so-called 
'freelance' physician status, which removes doctors from public employment 
regulations, but does not make them self-employed private entrepreneurs [130]. It must 
be noted, however, that this option is open to specialists as well. In 2000, there were 
5,159 family physicians and 1,570 family paediatricians in Hungary, which made the 
average practice size 1,943, and 952 respectively [12,9.5,9.6]. 
Beyond family doctor services, municipai ities are also obliged to provide district 
mother and child health services (MCH) and school health services. The District MCH 
Service, which dates back to the communist regime, is staffed by highly qualified MCH 
nurses, trained to college level. They provide preventive care and health education for 
expectant and recently delivered mothers and childrel' under 16 in geographic areas 
determined by local governments and together with medical doctors they provide 
preventive health services in nurseries and schools for toddlers and pupils, between the 
age of 3 and 18 [324; 325]. 
In general, patients need a referral from a family physician to utilize specialist care 
[2,13(a),18(l)]. The exceptions are dermatology, ear, nose and throat diseases, 
obstetrics and gynaecology, general surgery, traumatology, ophthalmology, oncology, 
urology and psychiatric outpatient care, including dispensaries [131,2,3-5]. Gate-
keeping is not effective because there is no incentive in the system to avoid unnecessary 
referrals [12,9.5; 35,3.2]. 
Specialist outpatient and inpatient care 
The pro\'ision of secondary and tertiary care is shared between municipalities, county 
governments, national government and, to a minor extent, private providers. According 
to the aforementioned principal division of tasks between county and municipal 
governments, only county governments are responsible for the provision of secondary 
and tertiary care for the local population [43,70(b)]. In practice, however, 
municipalities also provide specialist care, on the basis of the principle of 'subsidiarity' 
[43,69(2-6)]. 
By and large, municipalities own independent, multi-speciality ambulatory 
institutions (,polyclinics', which provide outpatient specialist care), single-specialty 
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ambulatory institutions ('dispensaries', which provide outpatient care for chronic 
diseases), and multi-specialist municipal hospitals (which provide secondary acute and 
chronic, inpatient and outpatient care). Hospitals may provide ambulatory care on the 
premises, or in a separate polyclinic that is organisationally integrated into the hospital. 
County governments own large, multi-specialty county hospitals, which provide 
secondary and tertiary, acute and chronic, inpatient and outpatient care. 
The national government also owns some hospitals providing acute and chronic, 
inpatient and outpatient care. These are divided between various ministries. The 
Ministries of Defence, of Internal Affairs, of Transport, Communication and Water 
Management, and of Justice all have special sectoral services, which are largely 
integrated into the main system of financing and service delivery [e.g.326; 327; 328]. 
For instance, the Ministry of Transport maintains the Railway Health Service, which is 
open to all those who are insured, with the proviso that employees and pensioners of the 
Hungarian State Railways are given priority [327,3(2)]. The Ministry of Education 
owns universities, which have medical faculties within which single-speciality clinical 
departments provide both secondary and tertiary care [136,116]. The Ministry of Health 
has single specialty providers, the so-called 'national institutes of health', which 
typically provide highly specialized tertiary care only, but also owns so-called 'state 
hospitals l , which are mainly sanatoria, providing medical rehabilitation [132]. 
The territorial supply obligation applies to all public (and contracted private) 
providers, but the size of the catchment area depends on the type of care provided, and 
the number of people affected, not on the institution. In general, secondary outpatient 
services have the smallest catchment area, but still larger than primary care districts, and 
highly specialized tertiary care services, which are provided to patients suffering from 
rare diseases, have the largest catchment area, in some cases the whole country 
[129,132(1); 139; 1,92(1),152(3); 310]. 
A small private sector is also involved in the provision of specialist care, but usually 
with no contract with the NHIF A, so those using it must pay out-of-pocket. The only 
exceptions so far have been hospitals owned by churches or charities, but these are 
treated similarly to public providers in relation to the territorial supply obligation and 
consequently entitled to public funding [35,8.2; 329], and private for-profit provides of 
certain special sen'ices, where there is a lack of public capacity, such as renal dialysis 
and magnetic resonance imaging. 
According to the aforementioned provider typology, outpatient specialist services are 
provided by polyclinics, dispensaries, municipal hospitals, county hospitals, clinical 
departments of universities, national institutes, health care institutions of other 
ministries and of few private owners. Independent polyclinics employ specialist 
medical doctors, who work exclusively in outpatient care, while dispensaries were 
established by the communist regime to provide chronic outpatient care for pulmonary 
diseases, skin and sexually transmitted diseases, alcohol and drug addicts and 
psychiatric disorders. In addition to care for the chronically ill, dispensaries implement 
screening programmes, for example for hypertension, diabetes, cancer and kidney 
diseases. In 1999 there were 162 pulmonary, 122 dermato-venercal, 139 psychiatric 
and 136 addiction dispensaries [318,5]. 
In 2000, inpatient care in Hungary was provided in 178 hospitals, with 83,430 beds 
[12,9.9]. These hospitals, by and large, provide in patient care at three levels: (a) 
municipal (local) level, (b) county level ancl (c) regional or national level. This 
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indicates the level of specialization of the hospital, the so-called 'progressivity' level, 
which, in general, coincides with the hospital catchment area. However, hospitals that 
provide care in more than one medical specialty, can have different progressivity levels 
for different specialities and consequently different catchment areas. Moreover, a 
hospital can have different catchment areas for the same specialization. For instance, 
clinical departments of university medical faculties have a local catchment area for 
secondary care, and national catchment area for tertiary care services within the same 
medical speciality. 
The utilisation principle of the health care delivery system (the so-called 
'progressivity principle') is that patients must receive care at a provider with the lowest 
possible level of progressivity that can provide adequate treatment, and must be 
transferred to hospitals with higher levels of progressivity only if the problem cannot be 
solved in the health care institution with lower progressivity level [1,75(3),76]. Where a 
patient ends up in the hospital system, in principle, depends on the frequency of the 
disease, the severity or complexity of the case, and the cost and complexity of the 
available and required therapy, 
Municipal hospitals usually offer main specialities, such as internal medicine, 
obstetrics and gynaecology and surgery [330,1 (2)b-ba]. They have the lowest level of 
progressivity and the smallest catchment area. County hospitals constitute the next 
level of inpatient care [330,1 (2)b-bb]. They usually cover the whole spectrum of 
secondary care, providing additional specializations, like haematology, immunology, 
cardiology and psychiatry for the population of an entire county, For the basic 
specialities county hospitals usually haw a local catchment area with the lowest level of 
progressivity and accept more severe or complex cases from municipal hospitals as the 
second level of progressivity with a catchment area being a whole county. They may 
also provide tertiary care, like open heart surgery, for the population of a region 
(comprising more than one county). Finally, clinical departments of university medical 
faculties and national institutes provide care of the highest level of progressivity \"/ith 
the catchment area of the whole country, but as it has been mentioned before, university 
clinical departments also have local catchment areas [330,1 (2)b-bb]. 
In 2000, university clinical departments had 9.5% of the total number of beds, 
national institutes had 7.2%, local governments had 76.7% (with 14.9% in the capital), 
the health care institutions of Railway Health Service had 1,9%, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence had 2.7%, while 2% were privately owned by 
churches and charities [12,9.11; 35,8.2]. 
Public health services 
The central institution of public hygiene, occupational health, communicable disease 
control and health promotion is the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service 
of the Ministry of Health, or NPHMOS for short [331,1(1-3),2-5; 1,151]. The 
NPHMOS is organized on a regional basis with central (national) organs, county offices 
and local (municipal) offices [331,7-8; 332,1-2]. 
The NPHMOS is responsible for the control, coordination, supervision and delivery 
of public health services, but services are delivered in cooperation with other agencies 
[331 ,2(4),4( 4)d,5(l); 332]. For instance, the NPHMOS coordinates the compulsory 
immunization program and supplies the vaccines, while family physicians and 
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paediatricians, and the school health service vaccinate the children [325,Annex 2(3,a), 
Annex 3(5); 333,4(2),5(7-8),15,16(I)a-b,16(2)a,16(3)a). The district MCH service 
provides pre- and postnatal care, prevention and health education, while it is 
coordinated and supervised by senior MCH nurses of the NPHMOS [324; 332,4(3)], 
The NPHMOS also carries out a number of health administration duties, such as 
registration and professional supervision of health care providers [331,6; 334; 148; 
335]. 
Social care and social assistance 
Social care organisation adheres to the same principles as health care [138]. In general, 
the poor and the disabled are eligible for social assistance and social care, including 
cash and in-kind benefits. The two main health care related in-kind benefits for the poor 
are the pharmaceutical co-payment exemption and the eligibility for health care for 
socially indigent people, who otherwise would be excluded from statutory health 
insurance, such as the long term unemployed, unregistered workers and the homeless 
[138,49-54; 336; 337]. In kind benefits for the disabled include primary social care, 
which is provided in the home of the disabled person (catering, domestic help and 
family help) [138,59-65], and specialist social care, which is provided by institutions for 
the elderly, the physically and mentally handicapped, drug addicts and the homeless in 
the form of long-term residential care, rehabilitation, day care or transitory (short-term) 
institutional care [138,66-85/C]. There has been a chronic shortage of institutional 
places with around 20 persons on waiting lists per 10,000 population since 1993 
[12,8.23]. 
Human resources 
Hungary had 3.6 medical doctors per 1,000 population in 1999, \vhich is in the top third 
of countries of the WHO European Region. In contrast, the number of nurses was 3.7 
per 1,000, which was among the lowest. Thus, the ratio of doctors to nurses is 
especially far out of line with other countries [107). Furthermore, average figures hide 
geographical inequalities, as well as inequalities in terms of specialities. Ignoring 
counties with medical universities, the average number of practicing physicians was the 
lowest in Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg county with 2.2 per 1000 population, and the highest 
in Vas county with 3.1 in 1999 [318,16.9]. From the 33,308 available medical posts in 
the public sector, 9.3% were unfilled in 1999, which implies not just regional 
differences, but differences between specialities. For instance, there was a shortage of 
public health doctors with 19% of the available posts unfilled, but also in inpatient care, 
where the corresponding figure was 13%. In contrast 99% of family physician and 
family paediatrician primary care districts were filled in 1999 [318,16.6]. 
The training of health care professionals takes place within a well established 
institutional framework, which provides courses at secondary, post-secondary and 
higher education levels. The first higher education qualification is free of charge for 
Hungarian citizens, but the number of publicly funded students admitted is regulated by 
quotas [137]. 
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Pharmaceuticals 
The vast majority of the pharmaceutical industry has already been privatised from 
production to retail sales, trading has been liberalized and the whole supply chain is 
comprehensively regulated [338; 339; 183; 340; 341; 142]. The registration and 
licensing system is operated by the National Institute of Pharmacy of the MOH [143]. 
Licensed pharmaceutical products have to be on the national drug list to be eligible for 
insurance subsidy [131,7-10]. Annual price negotiations between pharmaceutical 
companies, wholesalers, retailers and the representatives of the government (MOH, 
Ministry of Finance, NHIF A) determine the national drug list, and approve the 
consumer price, price margins and the extent of subsidy for each product [131,10/ A; 
342]. A more restricted list of pharmaceuticals is also established for products that can 
be prescribed without co-payment [337]. Patients require a valid prescription from an 
authorized physician to purchase the medicine at the subsidized price [340]. Prescribing 
is monitored by the county branches ofNHIFA [2,36( 4),37( 4-6),38]. 
A.1.3.3.Governance, planning and regulation 
Despite early decentralisation measures, national government has retained a central role 
in resource allocation decisions within the health sector. Between 1993 and 1998, the 
purchasing organisation, the NHIF A was controlled by a quasi public body, the Health 
Insurance Self Government, which comprised representatives of employees and 
employers, with extensive veto rights on budgetary decisions [343-345]. Later the 
government saw the Health Insurance Self Government as a potential threat to cost 
containment efforts and curtailed these rights [176; 177] and finally it was abolished all 
together [133]. Since then all aspects of the purchasing function have been centralised, 
including revenue collection, budget setting, financial resource allocation, contracting 
and payment, but these tools have rarely been used so far beyond broad cost 
containment efforts, for options such as selective purchasing [119,19; 2,34,35; 120-
122]. Capacity has been addressed through the contracting process [139], although 
responsibility for planning local health needs has remained with local governments [43; 
129]. As of 1 January 2002, local governments have enjoyed somewhat more flexibility 
to decide on service provision, since the national government has repealed the 1996 
Capacity Act [310]. Local governments still have the obligation to provide capacities at 
the level in 2001, but they are allowed to decrease and restructure facilities according to 
local priorities, if these decisions are approved by the county chief medical officer of 
the NPHMOS [310,2,4]. They can even expand local health care provision, but any 
extension must be approved by the Minister of Health and the Minister of Finance 
[310,3(2)]. 
Nevertheless, the national government does not directly ddennine the inputs or 
outputs of the health sector (the formal central planning system of the previous regime 
was abolished), but does influence them through its regulatory function. 
Regulations apply to all aspects of the production process. Health care inputs, 
including human resources [140; 141], pharmaceuticals, medical devices and health care 
facilities fall under registration and licensing systems [142-148] and price regulations 
apply to publicly employed health workers, pharmaceuticals and medical aids and 
prosthesis. The minimum salary of public employees is set according to a national pay 
scale [128], whilst pharmaceutical price regulations include the wholesale and retail 
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price margins, as well as the consumer price, but these regulations does not apply to 
pharmaceuticals purchased by health care providers [184; 183; 346]. The number of 
health personnel is controlled by determining the number of students financed from the 
government budget [137], and by regulation of the recognition of foreign diplomas 
[136,105-109; 141,6(1)]. Since 2000 the number of primary care practices is also 
regulated through the institution of the Ipractice right' [185; 347]. The practice right was 
granted to all practising family doctors with territorial supply obligation, and it can be 
sold to newcomers by existing practitioners who choose to stop practising. An 
incoming family doctor must purchase a right to establish a practice. The behaviour of 
health care workers is also regulated, including rights and duties and ethical 
considerations [157; 166; 165; 1,125-140]. 
Providers must obtain a licence to practice from the NPHMOS, which maintains a 
registration database [334; 148]. Before issuing the licence to any provider, medical 
officers inspect the facilities and ascertain whether the minimal building, hygienic 
requirements, personnel and material standards are fulfilled, set by Decree No. 2111998. 
(VJ 3.) NJU of the Minister of Welfare [348; 349; 330]. Specific rules apply to a number 
of services, such as family doctor services [347], home care [350], patient transfer 
[351], emergency ambulance services [352], human fertility treatment [353], 
sterilization procedures [354] and organ transplantation [355]. The provision of non-
conventional medical treatment is also regulated including its scope, educational, 
infrastructure and administration requirements [356]. All health care providers arc 
obliged to take out liability insurance [1,108(2)]. These minimum standards are 
monitored by the NPHMOS, but the system of professional supervision includes quality 
control of services as well [335]. 
Patient rights are regulated extensively in the 1997 Health Act, which has established 
institutions for the safeguarding of these rights and resolving disputes, namely the 
patient rights representative and the arbitration [1,6-25,28-34; 149-151]. 
A.1.4. SUMMARY 
The Hungarian health care system was transformed from an integrated model into a 
contract system, in which purchasers and providers are separated. The system is 
contract based in which purchasing and service delivery, as well as responsibility for 
service provision and service delivery are separated. Despite large scale 
decentralization measures and privatization efforts, the Hungarian health care system is 
still predominantly publicly financed and provided. In the current setting, the single, 
most important monopsonistic purchaser, the NHIF A contracts with health care 
providers, owned mainly by local governments. Providers are reimbursed chiefly on the 
basis of outputs produced. 
A.2. Evolution of the Hungarian health care system 
This section provides background information on informal payments from a historical 
perspective. It traces the evolution of the Hungarian health care system from the pre-
war period through the crisis of the state-socialist system to the stage of health care 
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reform that was initiated in the last years of the communist dictatorship,6o and it closes 
with a brief account of the history of informal payment, exploring successive 
government policies and the academic perspectives that have been brought to bear on it. 
As we have briefly discussed in chapter 1, the twentieth century was a particularly 
stormy period in Hungarian history. After the First World War Hungary lost two thirds 
of its territory and one third of its population, and the Second World War resulted in a 
loss of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the end of the 1980s has witnessed the collapse of the 
communist regime in the CEE region and given hope that Hungary will be able to catch 
up with the established market economies of Western Europe. The serious legacy left 
by the previous regime, however, has proved a hard challenge to face, especially in the 
case of the health sector. Reform efforts that aimed to overcome the failures of the 
Semashko system, proved ineffective in eliminating informal payments. 
A.2.1. HISTORICAL ROOTS: THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM BEFORE WORLD 
WAR II 
Before the Second World War the Hungarian health care system was characterised by a 
mix of public and private sectors both in terms of financing and service delivery [49; 
153; 152]. The role of insurance, both the Bismarck-type social insurance and private 
insurance, was increasing dynamically [152,pp.31,37]. Physicians could be in private 
practice or be employees of public or private insurance companies or hospitals, but 
frequently they combined these options [49,pp.36-37; 154; 73]. 
Adam [50; 49,pp.19-61] gives a detailed description of the situation of physicians in 
the pre-war period, from which the following points emerge. Before the emergence of 
health insurance, medical practice was typically private and patients paid the fee out-of-
pocket, which was subject to negotiation between the patient and the physician. 
Physicians usually charged patients according to their perceived ability to pay, and the 
poor, who held a certificate from the authorities, could utilise so-called 'free surgeries', 
where they did not have to pay at all. Price setting in private practice and 'free 
surgeries', ho\vever, became a source of continuous debate within the medical 
profession to ensure 'fair' competition between individual providers. The National 
Physician Association, which was founded in 1897, and later the National Medical 
Chamber, enacted in 1936, argued that under-charging to attract patients was unethical 
because physicians who started price competition actually sacrificed part of the 
producer surplus to maximise their own income at the expense of others. Hence, during 
this period a compulsory minimum fee was set [49,pp.27-28,50-51,53]. In a similar 
fashion, 'free surgeries' were seen as a marketing tool to attract patients to private 
practice, so 'free surgeries' were subject to strict regulations that sought tn ensure that 
physicians, as well as patients \vho otherwise would have been able to pay for the 
service, could not benefit from them. For instance, physicians were banned from 
attending patients without a certificate of poverty except in emergencies, they were not 
allO\ved to undertake charitable collections, and the name of the physician(s) could not 
be displayed in the surgery [49,pp.44-47,51-52]. Adam [49,pp.49-50] argued that the 
pre-war period was characterised by an increasing number of physicians hut a limited 
60 For a morc extended discussion of health care reform in Hungary, see the Ilcalth Care Systems in 
Transition series of the European Observatory on Health Care Systems (Ga,ll el al. [II] and Gaul: Health 
Care System in Transition: Hungary. Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems [29]). 
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capacity of the population to pay, which sharpened competition between individual 
providers. Thus, the various physicians' organisations acted to protect private practice 
and to prevent 'unfair' competition ('fair', as mentioned before, in this respect virtually 
meant price discrimination to maximise income from private practice). Nevertheless, 
even patients who were considered solvent sometimes were reluctant to pay the 
negotiated fee, delayed payments or even did not pay at all [49,p.44]. Adam [49,pp.59-
60] found that during this period physicians circulated so-called 'black lists', which 
contained the names of notorious non-paying patients, who were not attended except in 
emergencies. These black lists re-emerged after the Second World War, during the 
period that preceded the establishment of the state-socialist health care system [49,p.75]. 
The situation was further complicated by the rapid growth of health insurance [50; 
49; 152]. By the 1930s, approximately one third of the population was insured 
[152,p.39]. Both public and private insurance companies employed physicians who 
attended insured patients. Of course, the medical profession had increasingly seen 
health insurance as a new source of 'unfair' competition. First, health insurance 
deprived private practice of an increasing number of solvent patients, and second 
insurance companies had a considerable market power to buy the labour of doctors at a 
depressed price [49,pp.34-43]. Not surprisingly, the National Physician Association 
fought against the so-called 'bound doctor system', which as Biro argued [cited in 
49,pp.38-39], was not good either for the patient or the doctor: 
" ... the patients, because they cannot choose their physician, the physicians, who 
do not work for insurance companies, because they have almost no private 
practice ... and those, who work for the insllrance companies, because worrying 
for their 'dry' bread, tolerate that insurance companies exploiting their labour 
without remorse, in exchange for humiliatingly low salaries". 
They argued that health insurance should have been open to those who were really 
unable to pay for care [49,p.38]. However, if solvent patients were included, patients 
should be allowed to choose their doctor freely and physicians should be allowed to 
negotiate additional fees, which was in fact the case concerning private health insurance 
[50,p.64; 49,pp.78-79]. "The fight between illness insurance companies and 0111' 
medical profession is almost as old as these institlltions are themselves" Mihalkovics, 
the chief secretary of the National Physicians Association said in his speech at a 
congress in 1932 [cited in 49,p.40]. But "Evel)'thing depends on that whether the 
socialized medical doctor [physicians working for insurance companies] receives in 
exchange/or her work, what she is entitled to" [7; cited in 49,pp.10-11]. 
Adam [49,pp.56-61] reached the conclusion that the pre-war history of the Hungarian 
health care system revolved around these issues, but there was not a single reference to 
informal payment, or even tipping in health services. Nevertheless, the evolution of the 
health sector in this period raised interesting dilemmas that are relevant to the 
discussion of the causes of informal payment. Most notably, the debate between 
insurance companies and physicians on the appropriate level of payment resembles the 
continuous debate between the government and the union of health workers about low 
salaries during the communist dictatorship (this issue was explored in the discussion on 
informal payment in chapter 4). 
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A.2.2. THE STATE-SOCIALIST HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND ITS CRISIS 
After World War II the earlier development of the system was disrupted by the forced 
introduction of the state-socialist 'Semashko' model [153]. After a relatively short 
transition period between 1945 and 1949, the communist party (at that time called the 
Hungarian Workers Party) took exclusive power backed by Soviet weapons. The state 
assumed responsibility for health insurance, nationalised the provider institutions and 
medical doctors became state employees [155; 156]. While private financing was 
limited to out-of-pocket payments as private health insurance was eradicated, private 
medical practice was not totally forbidden. All physicians had to have a full-time public 
employment, but they were allowed to have part-time private practice after official 
working hours [157,39(2)b]. Population coverage was increased in large increments. In 
1949 41 %, in 1957 62%, in 1960 85%, and in 1965 97% of the population was covered 
[197; 50]. Finally Act II of 1972 on Health declared access to health care as a right 
linked to citizenship [252,25(1); 357,354(2); 358]. The system promised 
comprehensive, high quality care free of charge to each citizen, but an increasing gap 
had developed between rhetoric and reality [40; 39; 153]. 
As has been discussed before, the early Shemasko system had provided substantial 
improvement in the health status of the population through the control of infectious 
diseases. Nonetheless it was unable to respond adequately to the revolution in medical 
technology and the health transition of the population, when non-communicable 
diseases began to dominate mortality [158; 40]. Despite its ambitious objectives, in the 
communist regime health services were regarded as an unproductive sector of the 
economy, with low priority in resource allocation decisions [70]. Health workers, 
especially physicians, were kept on a low salary, which became a source of ongoing 
policy debate [50; 49; 8; 67]. Historical line item budgeting and salaries did not reward 
better performance and conveyed no incentive for efficient utilization of resources [52]. 
Moreover, managers of health care provider institutions were predominantly physicians, 
who saw management positions as an opportunity to favour their own specialities by 
influencing resource allocation inside their institutions, while they kept on practising. 
The paradox of the state-socialist health care system was that not only was the 
government unaccountable and unresponsive to the public, but the highly centralised 
government lost control in ways that exposed resource allocation to political influence 
(109; 39; 153]. As Orosz [39] put it, the system was highly centralised to keep strong 
control, but in fact it lost control over the actual processes. 
The Semashko system reacted to the changing needs by the inflation of input targets, 
which led to the development of excess capacities, whilst patients wanted not more, but 
better care. As Bordas [52] put it, the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s created a 
shortage of quality not quantity. Tensions were further aggravated by the influence of 
politics on the budget setting process, which created regional inequalities in service 
provision, as well as inequalities in terms of medical specialities [40; 159; 71; 153; 39]. 
Generally speaking, these were manifested in unequal standards of care, rather than 
access to care per se. Moreover, as Adam [50] pointed out, the initial tipping of health 
workers, which emerged in the 19505, became widespread during this period, and 
gained legitimacy in the system as gratitude payment. 
As a result of these processes, a crisis had gradually developed, but as part of a wider 
crisis of the 'state-socialist' economic and political system [39]. The crisis was 
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Figure A2.1. 
characterized by excess capacity, deteriorating service quality and widespread informal 
payment, a mixture of waste and shortages, and inefficiency and unequal access [39 ; 52; 
153]. The latter could have been particularly embarrassing for the regime, which 
promised comprehensive health care for all citizens, free of charge at the point of use. 
Moreover, the expanded capacity had quickly been absorbed by increas ing utilization 
with inadequate treatment, which in turn induced further ex tension of service provision. 
Szalai [40] hypothesised a vicious circle in the state-sociali st hea lth care system, which 
was getting increasingly difficult to break (Figure A2.1). The mounting tensions in the 
system called for reforms, which, in Hungary, began in the second hal f of the 1980s, the 
so-called reform communist era. 
The crisis of the Semashko system in Hungary 
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A.2.3. THE BEGINNING OF HEALTH CARE REFORM61 
Table A2.1. 
Health care reforms in Hungary began in the last years of the communist regime, in the 
mid 1980s, when the continuously deepening recession of the economy and the 
increasing pressure from the emerging political opposition allowed a reform-oriented, 
liberal faction of the communist party to take control of government and formulate 
policies for the reform of the health care system. The reform communists, in the same 
way as later freely elected governments, have sought answers to the problems of the 
state-socialist health care system within a context characterized by poor performance of 
the economy and massive political, economic and social transition, which the collapse 
of the communist system initiated (Table A2.1). Health sector reform was motivated by 
a number of factors. 
First was the widening gap between the health status of Hungarian population and 
the countries of Western Europe. Second, there was a general distrust of central 
government. The central government budget was seen as a black hole, which 
swallowed people's money with little evidence that it was spent wisely. Third, the over-
centralised health care delivery system was seen inefficient and unable to respond to the 
population's changing needs. The oversized hospital sector absorbed the majority of the 
health care budget, and care was at an unnecessary high level and at a cost that was 
increasingly thought unaffordable. The management of health care institutions was 
considered unable to provide services efficiently, because of central control, perverse 
incentives embedded in the payment system, and inadequate managerial capacity, with 
directors of health care institutions mostly medical doctors, who continued to practise. 
Fourth, resource allocation was subject to political influence, and as a result 
geographical inequalities arose, as well as inequalities between specialities. Fifth, the 
majority of health care workers were getting increasingly dissatisfied with the slowly 
deteriorating working conditions, and their decreasing professional prestige and low 
salaries. 
The legacy of the Semashko system in Hungary 
The population in need The supply side 
• One of the worst health status in Europe; • Professional and regional inequalities in the 
• Changing and in some areas growing needs of provision of health care; 
the society further enhanced by the impact of • Inefficient system, where shortage and waste 
transition process itself; were prevailing at the same time; 
• Dissatisfied patients. • Dissatisfied health workers. 
SO/lrce: Summarised on the basis ofS=alai rIO}. Oros: [39}. Bordas [52} alld Alltal [I 53} 
The early reform objectives followed from these problems of the inherited system 
[36; 37]. Policy makers wanted to increase the efficiency of the system by ensuring 
secure funding for health care, structural reorganization, with considerable 
decentralization, aligning incentives, and increased competition with wider consllmer 
choice. Policy makers also wanted to decrease inequalities by improving resource 
allocation, and to increase the quality of care but at a cost that was affordable. Within 
the wider context of health, policy makers envisaged a substantial role for health 
61 This section is being published by the European Observatory on Health Care Systcms, in the serics of 
Hcalth Care Systems in Transition country profiles (Gaill P: Health Care Systcms in Transition: II ungary 
[29]). 
P[Tl~ UAAL 
PAGl 294 I TIILSls_G I' Kf. VISLIJ_ V 17 
A THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN HUNGARY 
A 2. EVOLUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
promotion to change the health culture of the population, including enhancing health 
related lifestyles. 
A.2.4. THE PHASES AND PERIODS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 
Table A2.2. 
In the first phase of the reform, until 1994 (i.e. during the period of the first freely 
elected government of prime minister Antall), most reform measures were implemented 
as originally devised during the reform communist period, with considerable 
decentralization (see summary Table A2.2). All this happened in the context of the 
transformation of the economy, which was characterized by a deep economic recession. 
Although GDP began to recover in 1994, the state budget deficit prompted restrictive 
measures. The second phase of the reform was overwhelmed by the economic 
stabilization efforts of the government of 1994-1998 (i.e. the Horn government), and the 
goal of cost-containment began to dominate health care policy. Despite the favourable 
economic climate characterized by impressive and stable economic growth, cost-
containment has remained the main policy objective throughout the period of the 
government of 1998-2002 (i.e. the Orban government). 
Phases and periods of health care reform in Hungary 
Phase Period Short description 
I. Establishment of the contract model of 1987-1994 Decentralisation 
the Hunl!arian health care system 
I. The reform communist era 1987-1990 Blu~int for health care reform 
2. The ANT ALL government 1990-1994 Implemented as planned: the 
purchaser-provider ~Iit is in operation 
II. The cost containment era 1994-2002(?) Recentralisation on the <!.£.cnda 
3. The HORN government 1994-1998 The beginning of the cost containment 
era: sacrificing health expenditures on 
the altar of cconomic stabilisation 
4. The ORBAN government 1998-2002 Scarching for the way forward in the 
context of continued cost containmcnt: 
the debate on insurance com-.£.etition 
III. The end of cost containment(?) ? 
5. The MEDGYESSY government 2002-
The reform measures implemented so far reflect the disparity between objectives 
pursued before and after 1994. Before 1994, health sector reform was characterized by 
decentralization, with the aim of moving away from a failed and distrusted centralized 
model of integrated health services, and by the end of 1994 the new contract model of 
health services, in which the purchaser and provider was separated, was operating. It 
was thought that command and control mechanisms had failed, hence emphasis was put 
on incentives, such as new payment methods, to produce the necessary structural 
changes without direct government intervention. After 1994, cost-containment became 
the utmost priority of government policy, so determining the direction of further 
reforms. The HIF was increasingly seen as a potential threat to fiscal balance, and 
efforts were made to restore government control over health care spending and allow 
direct intervention in the system. This period was characterized not only by fiscal 
restrictions, but direct government interventions in the delivery system. Nevertheless, 
the contract model remained unchanged. 
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The following sections provide a more detailed discussion about the reform process 
of the past fifteen years, using election cycles, starting with the period before the first 
free elections in 1990 [41]. Although reform objectives divide health care reform into 
two distinct phases, within these, each governmental period has its own peculiarities, 
which distinguish one from the other. 
A.2.4.1.The blueprint for health care reform: the reform communist era (second 
half of the 1980s) 
During the second half of the 1980s (reform communist era), under the pressure created 
by the failures of the Semashko system, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
established the so-called 'Reform Secretariat' in 1988, which produced policy proposals 
on the basis of international experiences [36]. 
The Reform Secretariat considered options from a number of countries. It looked to 
the USA for the DRG payment method and the concept of Health Maintenance 
Organizations, which integrated financing and provision; to Germany for autonomous 
quasi-public owners, a strong ambulatory care system, output based payment of 
ambulatory care providers, and the three member management (consensus management) 
of health care institutions; to the Scandinavian countries for health centres, and to 
England for capitation payment of family physicians [41]. 
The Ministry launched a number of pilot projects, including the adaptation of the 
American DRG based hospital payment system. In 1987, the Information Centre for 
Health Care (lCHC, GYOGYINFOK) was set up, which was responsible for the DRG 
project, and has been the key player in the design and administration of provider 
payment methods ever since [359-361]. 
The proposals of the Reform Secretariat outlined the principles of the new health 
care system [36; 41]. A key element was that sources of health care financing should be 
separated from the central government budget, so that revenues could not be used for 
other purposes. Another key principle was the so-called 'sector neutrality', that is health 
care financing should not discriminate against private providers. There were intentions 
to merge polyclinics with inpatient facilities or primary care to make the delivery 
system 'two-pillar' instead of the three pillars of primary care, polyclinics, and hospitals 
of the state-socialist health care system. In primary care a family physician treating the 
whole family, from young to old, was envisaged, and it was planned to amalgamate 
district paediatricians and adult district physicians system into one service. 
The reform communist government successfully implemented some early changes. 
In 1989 the system was switched from tax-based financing to compulsory social 
insurance [42]. In 1990, the budget of the health service was transferred to the newly 
established Social Insurance Fund (SIF) [362]. This was later referred to as the 'fund 
exchange', since at the same time the budget for child benefits was transferred from the 
SIF to the central government budget [41]. Since the SIF was meant to cover the 
recurrent costs of services, funds for capital costs remained in the central government 
budget. Finally, in 1989, private health care provision was legalized [44; 45]. 
A.2.4.2.1mplemented as planned: the period of the Antal! Government (1990-1994) 
The Antall government continued the major structural reforms, according to the 
previous plans. The head of the Reform Secretariat became state secretary in thc nc\\' 
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government, which allowed a degree of continuity in health sector reform. Some 
technocrats, who were working on pilot projects, remained in office, which also 
provided some stability. 
The 1990 Local Government Act created the provider side of the new contract model 
[26; 43]. The ownership of primary care surgeries, polyclinics and hospitals was 
devolved from national to local government along with the responsibility to ensure the 
supply of health care services to the local population, the so-called Iterritorial supply 
obligation l [43,107(l)c,8(4),70(b); 129,132(1)]. The new owners became responsible 
for maintenance and investment costs, but central government established the system of 
'earmarked and target subsidies' to support local governments with conditional and 
matching grants [125]. 
As part of the reform of public health and the modernization of health system 
administration, the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service (NPHMOS) was 
established as a state agency in 1991 [331; 332]. The NPHMOS was built on the State 
Supervision of Public Hygiene and Infectious Diseases (SPHID) of the communist 
regime and managed to preserve its effective infectious diseas~s surveillance, 
immunization and public hygiene functions. The government envisaged a wider role in 
public health and health promotion, but the Service was constrained by available human 
resources [331,1(1),3-5]. In addition the Service was assigned the task of professional 
supervision and coordination of the delivery of health care [331,6, 15( 4); 335; 348]. 
The financing system was developed further after a debate on whether to move 
towards a single- or multi-insurance model [363]. A single-insurance model was 
accepted, leaving open the option of competition between insurance schemes in the 
future [363,10]. It was decided that the SIF would be divided into a health and a 
pension fund, and that both funds would have quasi-public supervision consisting of the 
representatives of employers and employees [363,12; 343]. Consequently, in 1992, the 
social insurance contribution was split into a health insurance and pension insurance 
contribution [296,19(103)], the SIF was divided into the Health Insurance Fund and the 
Pension Insurance Fund [47], and was made self-governing, after the election of trade 
union representatives in 1993 [344; 345]. Immediately after the establishment of the 
Health Insurance Self Government, the administration of the former SIr was also 
divided into two, and the NHIF A was put under the direct control of the Self 
Government [118]. 
Policies to strengthen primary care were implemented gradually. In 1991 the 
National Institute of Family Medicine was established to coordinate policies to improve 
professional standards in primary care [160]. In 1992 district physicians were renamed 
'family physicians', postgraduate training for general practitioners was made 
compulsory, and undergraduate training in family medicine for medical students was 
introduced with new departments in medical universities l161; 162]. People were 
allowed to choose their family physicians [161], and the system of capitation payment 
with contracting of family doctor services was introduced [46]. Family doctors were 
encouraged to become private and contract with local government, with surgeries and 
equipment still owned by the local government, known as 'functional privatization'. The 
original plan to abolish district paediatrician ser\'ice was not, however, implemented 
[162]. 
New payment systems for other services were also introduced. Output based 
payment methods, the FFS points (points for procedures), the HOGs (Homogenolls 
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Disease Groups, the Hungarian version of DRGs) and patient days were coupled with 
the cost-containment mechanism of capping the sub-budgets of the HIF [47; 163; 122]. 
This proved to be a very effective tool for cost-containment under successive 
governments. No real change happened, however, in the remuneration of the health 
workforce. The act of public employment guaranteed a minimum salary, and although 
no upper ceiling was determined, salaries remained low in comparison to other sectors 
[128; 17; 23,4.12,4.16]. 
At the end of 1993, parliament created a legal framework for the establishment of 
non-profit health insurance on a complementary basis [164], and in 1994 the Hungarian 
Medical Chamber and the Hungarian Chamber of Pharmacists began to operate on a 
self-regulatory basis, with compulsory membership for practising doctors and 
pharmacists [165; 166]. 
The government was less cautious concerning the pharmaceutical sector. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesaler and retailers were mostly privatized and the 
pharmaceutical market was liberalised. It is not surprising, therefore, that rising drug 
expenditures became one of the most important causes of the HIF's deficit, which 
continuously puzzled successive governments [e.g.304,Annex 2]. 
By the end of the first period of government, the foundations of the new model of the 
Hungarian health care system had been laid down. There was a single monopsonistic 
purchaser, the NHIF A, that contracted with service providcrs, mainly in the public but 
also in a growing private sector with family doctor scrvices and pharmacies. The 
supervision of the HIF and the control of the purchaser were delegated to thc quasi-
public Health Insurance Self Government, but many purchasing decisions were made by 
the national government and the National Assembly, such as budgct setting, financial 
resource allocation and the choice of payment methods. The transition of the economy 
was \vell under way, and began to show signs of recovery in 1994. Health workers, 
however, perhaps with thc exception of family doctors, did not feel much improvcment 
in their working conditions, especially in their salary [16]. In 1994, the successor of the 
communist party was voted back to power, and for more than a year, nothing significant 
happened in health sector reform [167]. 
A.2.4.3.The beginning of cost containment: the period of the Horn government 
(1994-1998) 
The first significant measure of the new government in June 1995 was not favourable 
for the health sector. The government had anticipated an economic crisis as GOP 
growth slow'cd down and inflation started to rise again coupled \\'ith a substantial state 
budget deficit (see Table 1.2. and Figure 1.3. in Chapter 1). In this setting the health 
sector \ms seen as a potential threat to fiscal balance, and reform measurcs aimed to 
achieve the new priority objective of cost-containment. The first economic stabilization 
package, the so-called 'Bokros package' (named after the minister of 1inance), was 
introduced in the middle of 1995 and targeted the welfare provisions of the state, 
including health services [168; 169]. On the financing side, the health care budget was 
cut in two consecutive years [170; 171], and in 1997 rcached its lowest level in real 
terms since 1990 (see Table A 1.4 in Appendix A. I). Dental services were excluded 
from HIF coverage, subsidies on spa treatment were rcmoved, and co-paymcnt for 
patient transport was introduced [168,80,92; 169], but shifting costs to patients was 
somewhat counterbalanced insofar as the government offered tax rebatcs for the 
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purchase of voluntary non-profit health insurance [301,35(2)]. In addition, 
responsibility for occupational health services was shifted to the employers [172]. The 
government had also decided to tackle directly the problem of the oversized hospital 
sector, and assigned the Minister of Welfare to determine the capacities the NHIFA 
must contract for, in the framework of the territorial supply obligation [170,10(2)]. As a 
result, approximately 9,000 beds were removed from the system [35,1.5; 173,8.1], 
although the process of decision making was later found unconstitutional in relation to 
the rights of local governments and because of the method of decision-making [364]. 
Seeing the sharp drop in the utilization of the public dental services, the government 
decided to reintroduce tooth preserving dental services into the benefit package, with 
some co-payment [171; 365], but this was just a short pause before the next restrictive 
package. This time the government targeted the revenue side of statutory health 
insurance and reviewed the scope for continuing to reduce the size of the deliyery 
system. 
Given an adverse ruling on the constitutional right of the Minister of Welfare to 
directly intervene into the delivery system [364], Act LXlII oj 1996 devised a need 
based formula to determine specialist health care capacities. It is not surprising that the 
formula called for cuts in hospital beds in most counties, but the decision about which 
institution should have given up how many beds, was left to the so-called 'collnty 
consensus committees' [139,8-9]. It was a wise decision inasmuch as the political 
unpopularity of hospital closures did not directly fall on the government, but at the same 
time the government lost the opportunity to achieve really significant savings. In fact, 
few institutions were closed, partly because it was easier to get agreement for everybody 
to give up a small number of beds than to close a whole institution, but also because of 
the political resistance of local communities [33,9.10]. Finally, approximately 9,000 
further beds were removed from the system between 1996 and 1997 [35,1.5; 173,8.1]. 
Another implicit rationalization measure was the introduction of the so-called 'minimum 
standards' defining a health care institution. By defining minimum standards of 
personnel, equipment and buildings it was expected that certain substandard health care 
facilities could eventually be closed down [348]. However, as politicians expected that 
it might cause mass closures, the deadlines by which health care providers had to meet 
the requirements was extended twice [349; 330]. 
The revenue strategy comprised three elements: (a) widening of the social insurance 
contribution base, (b) decreasing employers' health insurance contribution rates, and (c) 
the introduction of a lump sum tax, the 'hypothecated health care tax' [174,10; 175]. All 
these measures aimed to increase the revenue of the HIF by mitigating the evasion of 
social insurance contributions. Since the establishment of the SIF, underreporting of 
income and payment in anears had been widespread, but the social insurance 
contribution was high, at 54% of gross salary, including 23.5% as th~ health insurance 
contribution [296,19; 366,103(1-2),103/A-B; 119,19(1),19(3),24]. It is interesting to 
note that the government deliberately introduced a new hypothecated tax rather than 
determining a fixed minimum level of social insurance contribution. The Constitutional 
Court ruled that several measures in the first economic stabilization package were 
unconstitutional on the basis that, in an insurance relationship, the parties could not 
frecly modify the terms of the agreement, while there were no such restrictions for tax 
funded services [367]. Moreover, some analysts viewed this measure as the first step 
towards the recentralization of the HIF [41]. And indeed, the other main thrust of 
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measures was to target the Health Insurance Self Government and the output based 
payment methods of service providers. 
During the new cost-containment era, the government considered the extensive rights 
of the Self Government on budgetary decisions as a potential threat to the proposed 
budget cuts and so it curtailed these rights in 1996 [176; 177]. In addition, the 
government weakened the bodies by restructuring them in 1997 [178). The number of 
representatives was decreased and members were no longer elected, but delegated, 
which was later found to be unconstitutional [368). This decision, however, had lost its 
significance given that shortly after, the next (Orban) government abolished the 
autonomy of the social insurance funds altogether [133]. 
The government was not satisfied with the new payment methods either, and after a 
long debate, introduced a fixed element into the payment system [369; 370,10(3 )/20(8)]. 
Hospitals received 20% of their budget in advance regardless of their actual 
performance, which was seen as the first step in the restoration of line item budgeting 
[41]. On the other hand the long transition of the ORG payment scheme to achieve a 
nationally uniform base rate (instead of the institution specific base rates of the 
transition period) was ordered to be speeded up in 1996, and by March 1998 the rate 
was not just uniform, but it was fixed in advance [370,15(3),24(6»). 
The last significant legislative package of the Horn era came in the form of new laws 
for social insurance [119], statutory health insurance [2] and health [1]. Apart from 
some neVi institutions, like the National Health Council, or the hospital supervisory 
councils, these acts did not establish new reform principles or any significant change in 
the structure of the health care system. The significance of Act CLIVon Health was the 
declaration of patient rights, which had not previously been regulated comprehensively 
[1,6-25]. The Act also established patients' right representatives and arbitration for 
resolying disputes between patients and health care providers [1,28-34]. 
The Horn government implemented a strict cost-containment policy, which resulted 
in a significant cut in the health care budget. By the end of 1997 health care 
expenditures were almost 30% lower in real terms than in 1990 while, in the same year 
the GOP increased by 4.6% (see Table A 1.4. in Appendix A 1 and Table 1.2. in Chapter 
1). Having been preoccupied by economic stabilization, little time remained for 
thinking about the future of the health care system. Nevertheless, within the framework 
of a World Bank loan, the Ministry of Welfare launched a regional modernization 
project and, in 1998, the Ministry of Finance prepared a proposal, which envisaged 
financing reform by introducing competition between insurance funds [179]. This was 
intended as a joint proposal with the Ministry of Welfare, but the leadership of the 
ministry were against insurance competition. Even if a consensus had been reached, the 
government had no time left to put the idea into practice, since the 1998 elections 
brought the opposition parties into power [167]. Interestingly, the strongest opposition 
party had taken up the idea of competition, and the debate continued during the first 
year of the new government. 
A.2.4.4.Searching for the way forward in the context of continued cost 
containment: the period of the Orban government (1998-2002) 
The government of Prime Minister Orban essentially continued the cost-containment 
policy of the Horn government, \vhile political battles took place in the background 
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around competing policy proposals about the desirable direction of further health care 
reform. The government ceased the World Bank supported regional modernization 
project, instead launching a pilot project based on the fundholding model and managed 
care experiments (the so-called Icare-managing pilot'). However, overall, the Orban 
government failed to produce tangible improvements in health sector performance. 
One of the first measures of the new government was to abolish the autonomy of the 
social insurance funds, thereby taking full control over the HIF, and the NHIFA [133]. 
The control of the NHIF A was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office [134], which 
was strengthened, following a chancellery model [371]. 
The changes resulted in an interesting political set up, in which three different actors 
embarked on health policy making. The first, the Secretariat for the Supervision of the 
Social Insurance Funds of the Prime Minister's Office, proposed a model of competing 
health insurance funds. The second, the Department of Strategic Analysis of the Prime 
Minister's Office rejected the idea of insurance competition, as did the third one, the 
MOH, with the latter two proposing development of the purchasing function. The battle 
went on for more than a year, when finally the Prime Minister dropped the plan for 
insurance competition and shifted the supervision and control of the NHIFA to the 
Ministry of Finance [135]. The MOH regained its primacy in health policy making, and 
instead of financing reform, the policy focus was shifted to the delivery system, but 
within a context characterized by persistent efforts of the government to contain overall 
health expenditure. 
Throughout the whole period, the government targeted both the revenue and the 
expenditure side of the HIF. The key element of the latter was the pharmaceutical sub-
budget of the HIF, which seemed uncontainable. In order to overcome the problem of 
contribution evasion, the government extended and increased the hypothecated health 
care tax [123], and decreased substantially the health insurance contribution from 18 to 
14% [180]. The expenditure side was more problematic, since there was no way to cap 
the pharmaceutical budget as had been done with other budget lines of the HIF. 
Nevertheless, the government kept a close eye on the pharmaceutical budget by 
requiring overspending to be approved in advance, and allowing the Minister of Health 
to vire between sub-budgets of the HIF or from the budget of the MOB 
[126,4(1)d,5(3)]. With the same law, the government shifted responsibility for 
collection of contributions to the Tax Office, abolished the partial fixed clement in the 
payment system and initiated the 'care managing pilot' [126,24-31,19,16]. 
The essence of the so-called 'care managing pilot' is that health care providers have 
the opportunity to take responsibility for the whole spectrum of care of a popUlation of 
up to 200,000 inhabitants [126,16; 120,50]. The NHIF A sets up a so-called 'virtual 
budget', which is the number of persons in the managed care pilot multiplied by an 
adjusted capitation fee. During the year the actual costs incurred by the patients of the 
managed care pilot concerned are summarized, and if actual costs are smalkr than the 
'virtual budget', the difference is paid to the 'care-organizer' health care institution. 
Savings can be used for remuneration purposes. The great advantage of this pilot 
programme is that it does not change how the system operates, and if anything goes 
wrong, the care-organizing responsibility can be withdrawn without any risk of people 
remaining without adequate care. The first pilots were launched in 1999, and currently 
there arc five 'care-organizing' institutions (hospitals, polyclinics and groups of family 
doctors), the largest of which is the Misszi6 not for profit corporation at Vercsegylulz. 
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After the rejection of health insurance competition and the launching of the 'care 
managing' pilot, the first delivery side reform measure of the MOH came in the 
beginning of 2000, when the 'practice right' was introduced with the original objective 
to create a market for family doctor practices [185; 186]. The government offered 
subsidized loans for family doctors to help them buy their surgery and equipment from 
local government [186]. During the second half of 2000, however, nothing significant 
happened, as far as reform of the delivery system was concerned, but the government 
continued its battle against rising pharmaceutical expenditures. The Social Insurance 
Price and Subsidy Committee was established [342], and negotiated a long term 
agreement with the representatives of the pharmaceutical industry to secure a price 
increase below inflation level over a three year period [372]. Further measures included 
the revision of the subsidy system, and the decrease of wholesale and retail price 
margins of expensive medicines, both of which were implemented in 2001 [182-184]. 
As a revenue side measure, the upper ceiling of the employee health insurance 
contribution was abolished [181]. 
In the beginning of 2001 a new minister of health was appointed, who managed to 
retrieve the supervision of the HIF from the Ministry of Finance [121]. The 1996 
Capacity Act was repealed [310], and a 10-year public health action programme was 
elaborated with the goal of increasing life expectancy of men and women, to 70 and 78 
years, respectively [373]. The implementation of the programme has begun, 
coordinated by a project unit in the NPHMOS and it seems that it will continue during 
the current government. The reform of the delivery system continued with 
establishment of the 'freelance' physician status, and encouragement of the 
corporatization of public providers [130]. These measures, however, were only a late 
attempt to demonstrate that the government had a clear vision about health care reform. 
It was not realistic to expect any tangible results by the end of the electoral cycle, and 
the 2002 general elections brought the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of 
Free Democrats back to power [167]. Indeed, the whole period was characterized by an 
uncertainty about the desired direction of future health care reform. The only exception 
was cost containment, which was implemented with great determination, despite fast 
and stable economic gro\\1h (see Table A 1.4. in Appendix A.l). On the other hand 
uncertainty implied cautious and hence not irreversible changes, which left open most 
of the 'pathways' for health care reform. 
A.2.4.S. The plans and first measures of the Medgyessy government (2002-) 
The new coalition is in a difficult position regarding health care reform. First, they have 
a small majority in the National Assembly, a new situation in the post-communist 
history of the country, and any disagreement between the coalition parties could 
threaten the stability of government [167; 23,31.6). Second, the coalition pat1ies have 
opposing views on the future direction of health care reform. The Alliance of Free 
Democrats is convinced that insurance competition is the way forward, while the 
stronger coalition partner does not agree with this [374; 375]. Third, the health care 
system is generally viewed to be in a bad shape, and decisions on what to do cannot 
long be delayed without risking a crisis [376-379]. Fourth, although economic growth 
is still dynamic, especially compared to the unfavourable situation in the world 
economy, it slowed in 2002, and the delivery of election promises created a deficit in 
the state budget [380; 312]. Fifth, the country is on the threshold of EU accession and 
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expects to join in 2004. It is dubious whether one and a half years will be enough to 
alleviate the tensions within the health sector to the point that the challenges of the 
internal market will not pose a great threat to the viability of the system. 
The government programme has reflected the ambiguous situation within the 
coalition. Although the Hungarian Socialist Party was awarded the MOH, plans for 
health sector reform are a mixture of everything from regionalization to a more liberal 
privatization policy, from medical savings accounts, through strategic purchasing to the 
extension of the 'care managing pilot'. Even the possibility of insurance competition has 
been left open [322]. A key element in the government programme is the consolidation 
of the health sector, but it is not clear what the system will look like. It may, however, 
be beneficial if this lack of a clear direction implies a willingness to draw on careful 
assessment of evidence. 
A promising first step by the new government was to introduce a long awaited 
substantial pay rise for the health care workforce [312]. Averaging 50%, this seems to 
be sufficient to at least stop the exodus of health workers, but may not be enough if EU 
accession makes it easier to take a job in wealthier Western European countries. On the 
other hand the first signs of a worsening economic climate question whether it will be 
possible to sustain these improved conditions. 
The autumn of 2002 has seen structural reform enter into policy formulation. The 
prime minister has appointed a governmental commissioner, who has set up 12 
committees that are to prepare proposals concerning various areas of health care reform. 
The government has already suspended some of the restrictions on the privatization of 
delivery organizations and more liberal regulations are expected to replace the existing 
one [312; 381], but the new vision on the health care system is not yet known. 
The effect of the new legislation at the end of 200 1 and the first measures of the new 
government, especially the 50% pay rise, on informal payment has yet to be seen, but as 
indicated by the response of the former minister of health to a parliamentary question, 
expectations are high that these measures will ultimately eliminate informal payment 
from the system. Nevertheless, it is conspicuous from the above summary of health 
care reform in Hungary that there have been no attempts to tackle the problem directly 
[50; 67]. 
A.2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Hungarian health care reforms in the 1990s have sought answers to the crisis of the 
state-socialist health care system, in the context of massive political, social and 
economic changes. Health policy-makers envisaged a smaller, but more efticient health 
sector, which would provide high quality services for everybody at an affordable cost. 
Early structural reforms have established the new contract model of health services and 
introduced incentives for efficiency via output based provider payment methods. 
Nevertheless, further reform efforts were overwhelmed by strict cost-containment 
policies, which were characterized by centralization and direct government 
interventions. 
The most important challenges the Hungarian health care system faces arc the 
disappointing health status of the Hungarian people, and the continuous financial 
pressure, despite the fast and stable economic growth of the past 5 years. After 15 years 
"!'TER GAAL 
"AGE 303 I TIII:SIS_GI' RI'\'ISEIl \,17 
A. THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REfORMS IN HUNGARY 
A 2 EVOLUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
of continuous reform, the health sector is still struggling with the legacy of the state-
socialist system, which informal payment has remained integral part of. 
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Characteristics of the sample 
Tables Bland B2 describe the basic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
the 15 patients interviewed personally in Kecskemet, and Table B3 the composition of 
the physician sample, which includes all the 31 medical doctors interviewed either in 
Kecskemet, the private hospital, or Budapest, in order to avoid the identification of the 
interview subjects. 
Characteristics of the patient sample in Kecsl<emct 
# Sex Age Family Education Occupation Remarks 
status 
7 ~ 59 married higher education pensioner ( I csh 1020c) 
8 ~ 33 married higher education on maternity leave about th e case of 4-year 
old son (I csh253c) 
9 0 53 married primary sci (~employed (2csh483kc) 
10 ~ 68 married secondary vocational pensioner (2csh64c) 
11 ~ 46 married secondary vocational employee, pri vate ( I csh782c) 
12 ~ 41 married primary un employed (2csh988c) 
13 ~ 29 married secondary high on maternity leave about the case of I-year 
school old son ( lcssz I52c) 
14 ~ 63 married higher education pensioncr (3cssz236c) 
15 0 63 married primary pensioncr together with hi s wife 
( lcssz35c) 
16 ~ 28 marr ied hi gher education employee, private ( Icssz66p) 
17 ~ 53 married secondary high houscwife ( I hsz349c) 
school 
18 <5 60 married secondary vocational pensioner (vu203 p) 
19 ~ 45-59 married n.a. n.a. (any7 13I c) 
20 <5 47 married secondary vocational employee, pri vate together with hi s wife 
(ch279cp) 
21 0 28 single secondary vocati onal self-employed together wi th her (i'iend + 
(e I1 85p) 
Notes : n.a.=not avail able 
Characteristics of the patient sample ill Kecsl{C IIH~ t (summary) 
Sex Age 
F 1\I 20-.... 45-59 60+ primary 
II 4 5 6 4 3 
Notes: l\ 'l=maic, F=fcmalc 
Education 
secondary higher 
7 4 
Occupation 
active inactive unemployed 
5 8 I 
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Characteristics of the physician sample 
Attribute 
Gender female 
male 
Age 25 - 35 years 
36 - 45 years 
46 - 60 years 
over 60 years 
Specialty / primary care 
level of care internal medicine 
surgery, traumatology 
obstetrics-gynaecology 
anaesthesiology 
psychiatry, neurology 
paediatrics 
Number of Physicians 
12 
19 
8 
13 
9 
I 
3 
8 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
'small' clinical specialty (ophthalmology, 2 
urology, orthopaedics, rheumatology, etc.) 
diagnostic (laboratory medicine, radiology, 4 
etc.) 
Interview format for patients 
POSSIBLE l\IAP\ STRllCTURE 
Introduction (research, consent) 
1 
Disease episode 
! 
Giving informal payments 
1 
Accepting informal payments 
1 
Impact of informal payments on services 
1 
Attitudes towards informal payments 
and options to change the situation 
SPECIFIC TOPICS AND ISSllES 
Actual disease episode, health care utilised, 
choic~ of institution and physician, 
satisfaction with services, previous 
experiences, satisfaction with the system in 
general 
Determining the amount, when to give? 
how?, etc. 
Accepted?, refused?, previous experiences 
with refusals 
Did it influence the service? in which 
aspects'l, acceptability 
Opinion in general, should it be abolished?, 
can it be abolished?, how? 
Total 
31 
21 
31 
27 
31 
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Interview format for physicians 
POSSIBLE !\lAIN STRUCTURE 
Introduction (research, consent) 
SI'ECIFIC TOPICS AND ISSlJES 
! 
Work experience 
Specialty, previous workplaces, current 
-0:::::::=::--_ ....... position, work experiences 
1 
The status of the health care system 
Status orthe health care system and within 
that health workers, perceived problems 
1 
Giving and accepting informal payments 
Experiences with informal payments, 
memorable cases, who gives?, when?, 
how?, causes of informal payments, 
acceptance in general, refusals; should 
anything be done about it? 
1 
Options to change the situation .-::=:::..---, Possibility to change the situution, individual and system kvel 
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CASE STUDY 
C.1. 
Table Cl. 
C.2. 
Characteristics of the patient sample 
Table Cl describes the basic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 6 
patients interviewed in the frame of the case studies (3 patients of the private hospital 
and 3 in Kecskemet). 
Characteristics of the patient sample (case studies) 
14 Sex 
Age Family Remarks 
status 
<25 25-49 50-64 65+ 
1 <:;> x marri ed ( I ph3128c) 
2 <:;> x married together with her husband ( I ph4114c) 
3 0 x married together with her husband ( I ph2365c) T 
4 )? x married ( lph7132c3 7) 
5 <:;> x married (2ph27c3 15) 
6 <:;> x married mother about son's case (2ph689p47) 
Interview format for physicians 
POS S IBL E M A l i\' STR UCTU RE SP EC I F IC TOPICS AN)) I SSUES 
Introduction (research, consent) 
l 
Work experience 
1 
...-J Specia lty, previous workplaces, posit ion in 
.-::.-----==-__ , - TELKI, comparison of work exp~riences, 
reasons for change, factors innuencing the 
decision 
The status of th e health care system 
1 
Informal payments for health care, 
patients in TELKI 
1 
Status of the health cart: system and within 
that health workers, perceived problems 
Informal paymt:nts in TELK I, number of 
cases, frequency of attempts, specia l 
charactt:ristics of patil!llts in gt:ncral and 
who attempted to pay, mcmorable cascs, 
causes of informal paYlllents 
Options to change the situation ~ __ Possibility to change the situati on, 
individual and system k ve l 
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Study population 
The population of larger towns, which are designated as the centres of counties in 
Hungary, ranged between 35 and 200 thousand in 2001 except for the capital, Budapest 
which had a population of almost 2 millions [23]. For the purpose of the study, the 
town of Kecskemet, the seat of Bacs-Kiskun county was selected. The county is located 
in the Southern central part of the country, between the rivers Duna (Danube) and Tisza. 
As part of the larger geographic region of the Great Plain, the county is low lying. It is 
the most Western county of the statistical-planning region of the Southern Great Plain. 
The county town of Kecskemet is located near to the northern border of Bacs-Kiskun 
county, being halfway between Budapest, the capital , and Szeged, the seat of Csongrad 
county. With a population of 105,000, Kecskemet is the glh largest among the 19 
county towns [23]. The public administrative borders of the town delimit 3.5%0 of the 
territory of the country. It has a densely populated urban core, and a surrounding area 
of small farms and 8 villages: Katonatelep, Barbas, Kisfai, Matko, Kadafalva, 
Hetenyegyhaza, Talfaja, Mentelek. The Ministry of Defense has a military airport, a 
military camp and a hospital (the so-called 'air-hospital') at Kecskemet. 
Area and population of Kccsl\cmet, the subrcgion, county, region and the country, 2001 
Kecskemct Kccskemct Il:Ics-Kiskun Southern Grellt Country 
Subregion County I'lain Region 
Area (km1)* 321 1,458 8,420 18,3 14 93 ,030 
Population 105.138 167,482 546.753 1.377,21 9 10,195 ,513 
Population as % of the next 62.8 30.6 39.7 13.5 -
largcstterrilorial unit 
!\len (% ) 47.0 47.7 47.7 47. 7 47.7 
WOllien (%) 53.0 52 .3 52 .3 52.3 52.3 
0·", years old (% ) 17.3 16.8 
15-39 years old (%) 36.0 35.0 
40-59 years old ( "!o ) 26.8 28.0 
60+ (%) 19.9 20,2 
Source: "Regional Statistical Yearbook, 1999 [382} ,' Preliminary Dala o/CenslIs, 2001 [28-1} 
Population indicators of Kecskemet, the subregion, county, region and the country, 1999 
Kecskemct Kecskclilct U:lcs-Ki skun Southern Grellt Co untry 
Subregion County Plain Region 
Population 105,606 162,853 532,465 1,34 1,835 10,0-13 ,224 
Mcn ( % ) 47.7 47.9 47 .7 
WOlllen (%) 52.3 52.1 52.3 
0·1" years old (%) 17.6 17.1 17 .1 
15-39 years old (%) 34.8 34 .3 35 .3 
40-59 \'Cars old (%) 27.5 27.9 27.9 
60+ (% ) 17.9 20,1 20.7 19,7 
Un birth per 1.000 10.0 10.0 9.4 9.1 9.4 
Mortality per 1.000 11.3 12.3 15.0 IS .2 14.2 
\'ict migration pl'r 1.000 2.7 2.2 0.4 -0.5 -
SOl/rce: Regiol/al SlCItistical Yearbook, 1999 [382} 
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Households of Kecskemet, Bacs-Kiskun county and the country as a whole, 2001 
Kecskemet Bacs-Kiskun county Country 
l'iumber of households 40,149 208,163 3,837,048 
Size of households 100% 100% 100% 
Average size 2.51 2.57 2.60 
I person (%) 26.1 26.1 25.6 
2 persons (%) 30.8 28.7 28.5 
3 persons (%) 18.9 19.4 20.0 
4 persons (%) 17.2 
23.2 16.9 5 persons (%) 4.8 6.1 
6+ persons (%) 2.0 2.6 3.0 
Family structure \00% 100% 100% 
One-family (%) 68.5 68.8 68.4 
couple 57.5 58.5 57.8 
single parent 11.0 10.3 10.6 
Two-family (%) 2.2 2.4 3.1 
Three+ family (%) 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Onc-person (%) 26.1 26.1 25.6 
Other type (%) 3.1 2.6 2.8 
Economic activity 100% 100% 100% 
I employed person (%) 33.6 30.7 
2 employed person (%) 24.7 22.9 
3+ employed person (%) 5.5 5.8 
No employed person 36.2 40.7 
unemployed 2.8 4.2 
inactive 32.7 35.4 
dependant only 0.5 0.9 
Source: Preliminary Data o/Census 2001 
Economic indicators of Kecskemct, the subregion, county, region and the country, 1999 
Kecskemet Kecskemet B:lcs-Kiskun Southern Great Country 
subregion county I'lain region 
GDP per capita ('000 HUF) 717 768 1,005 
Gross taxable income per 288,619 228,577 243,249 308,575 
person (IIUF) 
Income tax per person 62,106 44,272 47,7X0 69,421 
(lWF) 
l'ncmplo\'ment (%) 5.6 10.1 10.5 9.6 
l\umber of businesses per 100 86 70 70 80 
1,000 population 
Persons exempt from health 42 52 51 47 
care co-payments per 1,000 
Source: Regional Statistical Yearbook, 1999 [3S2} 
Selected health care indicators of Kecskemct, the subregion, county, region and country, 1999 
KccskemCt Kccskemet B:lcs-Kiskun Southern Grellt COllntry 
subregion county !'Illin region 
Population per family doctor 1,447 1,480 1,493 1,497 1,490 
and family paediatrician 
Outpatient specialist contacts 16.0 12.2 16.5 14.6 
per 1.000 popula tion 
Hospital beds 1,561 3.770 10.185 83.992 
Bed OCCUpHnU (%) 77.8 75.4 77.6 770 
ALOS (dan) 8.3 83 8.6 9.2 
SOllret:. Regional Statistical rea/'book, 1999 [382} 
The town is the natural centre of surrounding settlements, with an inner circle of four 
villages, and an outer circle of two small towns and eleven villages. This group of 
settlements, the agglomeration of Kecskcmet is one of the 10 small regions of the I3acs-
Kiskun county, serving statistical and planning purposes, referred to as the Kccskcmet 
I'rTFH GA~l 
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subregion. Tables D 1, D2, D3, D4 and D5 presents some selected demographic, social, 
economic and health care indicators in comparison with the country as a whole. 
0.1.1. HEALTH CARE SUPPLY IN KECSKEMET 
The provision of health services is shared between the municipality and the county 
government according to the original division of tasks set by the Local Government Act 
[43]. That is, the municipality provides only primary care, while the county government 
provides all secondary and tertiary care services. 
Kecskemet had 65 primary care districts/units, 43 of which were family physician 
and 22 were family paediatrician practices, in 2001 [383]. Thirty-three family 
physicians and 19 family paediatricians worked as private entrepreneurs in 200 I, i.e. 
80% of all family doctors. In addition there were 6 family doctors, 2 physicians and 4 
paediatricians, who worked without local government contract, i.e. without territorial 
supply obligation, and 5 of the family doctors ran totally private surgery, but only on a 
part time basis. There were 28 publicly employed dentists, who provided dental 
primary care in the frame of statutory health insurance in 200 I, 12 of them had a part 
time private surgery. Altogether 97 private dentists were working in Kecskemet in 
2001, including the aforementioned 12. 
Public primary care included 38 mother and child health nurse service (MCH) units 
with publicly employed MCH nurses, who provided pre- and perinatal care in 35, and 
youth care in 3 units. School health services were provided by 3 medical doctors, all of 
them being private entrepreneurs in 2001. 
The county government owns the 1196-bed county hospital, which provides 
secondary and tertiary care services for the population of the entire county in general 
surgery, traumatology, orthopaedics, neurotraumatology, internal medicine, neurology, 
ob-gyn, psychiatry, rheumatology and rehabilitation, paediatrics with perinatal intensive 
care, urology, ophthalmology, ENT, intensive care, pathology, computerised 
tomography, MRI, dialysis and oncology. Dialysis services are provided by a private 
company that has a contract with NHIF A. In 200 I two-hundred and forty-eight beds 
were for chronic care, the rest were for acute care. All public outpatient specialist 
services are provided at the county hospitals, i.e. the municipality does not have 
independent polyclinics or dispensaries. Inpatient and outpatient specialist services are 
also provided at another 181-bed hospital, the so-called 'air-hospital', which is owned 
by the Ministry of Defence. Beds are shared between internal medicine. general 
surgery, traumatology, neurology, ophthalmology, rheumatology and intensive care. 
All of these beds were for acute care in 2001. In addition there is a special department 
in the hospital dedicated to aviation medicine. 
There are four other municipal hospitals in the county, within a short driving distance 
from Kecskemet at Kiskunfelegyhftza, Kiskunhalas, Kalocsa, Baja. I\10reover, 
Budapest and Szeged, with university medical facuities, are also under an hour's drive 
from KecskenH~t. 
Private health care providers are limited to part time surgeries, except for dental care 
and family doctor's services, the latter in the frame of 'functional privatization'. 
Altogether there were 232 registered private providers in Kecskemet in 200 I, excluding 
pri vale primary care surgeries and dental care providers [383]. 
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0.1.2. GENERAL COMPARISON OF KECSKEMET AND THE COUNTRY 
Table D6.1. 
Table D6.2. 
The population of Kecskemet and the whole country are compared using the 
preliminary data of the 2001 Census [284].62 Tables D6.1-D6.5 represents differences 
between the age, sex, marital status, education, economic activity and occupation 
composition of the population (or relevant population subgroups) of Kecskemet, and the 
country. The difference between the share of a particular population subgroup in 
Kecskemet and in the country is expressed with the former as percentage of the latter. 
That is, 100% means no difference, a figure over 100% means that the share of the 
population subgroup is larger in Kecskemet than in the country and vice versa. Since 
the preliminary census data are based only on a sample of counting districts, the 
sampling error has to be taken into account when data are interpreted. Unfortunately, 
information on sampling error for the data on the population and households of 
Kecskemet has not been published, so the following comparison presents only a rough 
impression of possible differences. Their statistical significance cannot be determined 
from the available data. 
The data show that Kecskemet has a slightly younger population than the country. 
This difference is more marked in the female population. Among those aged 15 and 
over, there are more single women, and fewer couples, and there is a substantial excess 
in the share of divorced persons in Kecskemet. 
Population sex, age difference, 2001 (Kecskemet/country) 
Sex Tolal Age 0-14 Age 15-39 Age 40-59 Age 60+ Children and Children Elderly Elderly per 
years years years (old years elderly 100 
(child) (young adult) (elderly) per 100 adults children 
adult) 
l\Iale 98.4% 101.9% 101.7% 94.3% 103.8% 104.4% 101.9% 1053% 101.8% 
Female 101.4% 103.2% 104.4% 97.5% 94.7% 96.9'Yo 102.0% 93.5% 91.7% 
Tolal 102.5% 102.9% 96.0% 98.4% 100.4% 102.6% 98.6% 96.0% 
SOllrce: Popllla/ioll CellslIs. 2001 [28-1J 
Population marital status difference (among 15+),2001 (Kecskemct/country) 
Gender Tolal Single 
Agc group (}'cars) Couple Widow Ilhorccd 
l\Iale 98.5% 102.1% 97.4% 86.9% 116.7% 
Female 101.3% 114.2% 94.3% 85,6% 124.4% 
Total 107.1% 95.7% 86.6% 121.5% 
Female agcd 
15-49 103.3% 109.7% 88.2% 82.2% 131.8% 
50+ 95.7% 131.4% 103.2% 89.5% 114.1% 
The popUlation of Kecskemet is better educated than that of the country as a whole, 
which is especially discernible in higher education, where the excess is almost 50%. It 
is also more active economically, with less unemployment. Among the employed 
population, white-collar managerial occupations are over-represented compared to the 
62 The statistics have been computed on the basis of a representative sample of counting districts, so they 
are not the final results. The estimation of sampling error for the national data can be downloaded from 
the web-site of the CenslIs (http://www.nepszamlalas2001.hu). 
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Table D6.3. 
Table D6.4. 
Table D6.5. 
country, which is line with educational differences. Among blue-collar occupations, 
there is excess employed in services, coupled with an under-representation of 
agriculture, industry. 
In summary, there are certain differences between the population of Kecskemet and 
the population of country. The most marked differences (over 35%) are the share of 
people with higher education, the share of unemployed and the share of blue-collar 
workers in agriculture (shaded grey in Tables D6.1-D.6.S). 
Population education difference, 2001 (KecskemWcountry) 
Age Year (Class) Completed 
Group 
(years) Elemcn- Elcmcn- Elemen- Sccondary Secondlll")' Higher cdu- utleast 8 at le:lst 12 
tary «6) tary (6-7) tary (8) (9-11) (12-15) cation (1-7) elelllentary secondary 
7+ 103.9% 81.5% 93.2% 83.9% 106.6% I ~ '14,3.0% 101.6% 119.4% 
15+ 94 .6% 73.6% 94.3% 84.4% 107.3% l<~t'~I~j.~% 102.5% 120.2% 
18+ 94.9% 73 .3% 89.7% 86.0% 107.9% .. ""- 141}% 102.5% 120.9% 
25+ 94.5% 73.8% 89.5% 87.7% 107.1 % :' 147.7% 102.9% 121.6% 
.... 
Population economic activity differences, 2001 (KecskemCt/country) 
Age Group Total Active Inactive 
(years) Together Employed Uncmployed Together Inactive Dl'pelHlant 
Earner 
15--29 101.8% 96.3% 101.4% 66.7% 103.9% 8-1 .8% 11 0.2% 
30-39 106.3% 105.9% 111.0% 59.9'Vo 78.7% 79.0% 77.4% 
40-59 96.5% 109.2% 111.2% 86.1% 82.4% 81.1 % 96.3% 
60-7.J 102.0% 140.2% 
ff 
, 147.1% /' :~· 3.5% 98.4% 98.9% 57.4% 
75+ 91.6% 120.8% 124.3% 
" 
47.5% 99.8% 98.6% 187.7% 
Total 105.6% 109.5% 71.6% 94.7% 90.6% 108.8% 
Population occupation differences, 2001 (Kecskemct/country) 
Sex Total Occupation 
i\lanager, white Other white Service Agriculture Industry, Other 
collar collar Construction 
i\ lalc 98 .2% 117.9% 78 .5% 107.7% 68.9% 86.1% 155.7% 
Female 102.2% 113.9% 96.9% 113.3% .... . v,.33 ,8'y. 82.2% 94.0% 
Total 116.1% 93 .5% 11 1.2% I .J~ ,,) 9.1% 84.4% 126.1% 
0.1.3. COMPARISON OF HOUSEHOLDS OF KECSKEMET AND THE COUNTRY 
In Table D7, the same method of comparison is applied to households. Two and threc+ 
family households are underrepresented in Kecskemet, but these together make lip less 
than 4% of all households (see Table D3). In the case of other household types, the 
difference is within 10%. Larger households are under, while 2-person households are 
over-represented compared to the country. 
In line with the lower rate of unemployment, families and households with 
unemployed person are under-represented, as are households with only dependants 
although the latter are less than 1 % of all households in the country (sec Table 03). 
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Table D7. 
Furthermore, households in Kecskemet live in dwellings more li kely to have modern 
conveniences [284]. 
Differences between the households of Kecskemct and of the whole country, 2001 
Houschold Pcrsons per 100 households I:u III ily 
Structure of households 
One-family 100.2% 97.8% 
Couple 99.5% 97.8% 
Single parent with child 103.8% 98.2% 
Two-family Irr.:, ;f '. 72.0% 96.2% 
3+ families , ,=t~~ 55.2% 114.3% 
Family household total 98.8% 96.7% 
One-person 102 .2% 100.0% 
Other 109.5% 97 .4'Y. 
Non-fa mily household total 102.9% 100.3% 
Total 96.6% 
Age composition 
Only young (40-) 101.5% 9-1 .2% 
Only middle aged (40-59) 107.1% 96.5% 
Only elderly (60+) 102.8% 103. 1% 
Young and middle aged 102.7% 97.5% 
Young and elderl y 
" 
69.7% ,~§ 88.~ 
Middle aged and elderly 83.5% 96.7% 
.. " 
All age groups 
-' 
.. ,. 81.6% 96.0% 
Tota l 96.6% 
Size of households 
I person 102 .2% 
-
2 persons 108 .1% 103 .1% 
3 persons 9.t.7% 94 .9% 
4 persons 101.8% 10·1.1 % 
5 persons 
-
80.0% 9 1.9% 
~ 
6+ persons I' < . 69.2% it: , 72.5% 
[rollomir ac tivity 
I employed person 109.6% 101.2% 
2 employed persons 107.8% 109.2% 
3+ employed person 9.t .9% 106.0% 
No employed person 
unemployed . Ct' .. 67.0% ~1~ 55.4% ~ 
inactive earner 92 .5% 93 .9% 
only dependant 57.9% 115.4% 
. .. 
Source: Population CenslIs. 2001 [28./J 
In summary, the households of Kecskemet have a similar structure and composition 
to the country as a who le, but households with two or more families , and larger 
households with 5 persons or more are under-represented, while 2-person households 
are over-represented in Kecskemet, which leads to a slightly smaller average household 
size compared to the country. Poorer households with unemployed and dependants only 
a~e also under-represented. 
Unfortunately, other important household attributes, such as health status, household 
income, expenditures and the ownership of consumer durables arc not ava il able in the 
published official statistics for Kecskcmet. The report of the annua l household budget 
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survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office is broken down only to the regional 
level. As can be seen from the available data in Tables D2 and D4, the Southern Great 
Plain region is not a good proxy for the town of Keeskemet. Thus the assessment of 
comparability of the households Kecskemet and of the country is only partial. 
The comparability of health care utilization data merits separate discussion. 
Although health care utilization data are available for Kecskemet as far as specialist 
inpatient and outpatient care are concerned, these cannot be compared meaningfully 
with national data (see Table DS). Health care providers in Kecskemet serve a far larger 
population than the inhabitants of the town. Moreover, Kecskemet is located halfway 
between Budapest and Szeged, both of which have even more extensive health care 
supply, including universities with medical faculties. Unfortunately there are no official 
statistics available from which health care utilization data could be assessed according 
to place of residence. 
0.2. Sampling frame and method 
Table D8. 
A household sample was requested from the Central PopUlation Registration and 
Electoral Office. The Office manages a database of residents in Hungary, each of 
whom has a personal identification number. The personal data set includes the personal 
identification number, name, maiden name, mother's and father's name, date of birth and 
address. The Office \vill create random population and household samples for research 
purposes, after assessing the conformity of the research with the requirements of the 
Data Protection Act, as well as the institution that is responsible for the project. 
The household sample was created in two steps. First, all residential addresses are 
included in a database (the household database). Second a random sample is made from 
this household database, according to the required sample size. This two-step process 
ensures that each residential address has an equal chance to be in the sample. The 
sampling method provides a representative sample of the households in a given area, 
except for those households living at the same residential address. These households 
have a smaller chance to get into the sample, since in these cases two (or more) 
households are represented with only one address in the sampling frame. The 
magnitude of this sampling bias can be assessed using the housing data of the 200 I 
Census as the difference between the number of households and the number of 
inhabited dwellings [284]. Table D8 shows these data for Kecskcmct and the country. 
Assessment of the proportion of households living in the same accommodation 
K('cskclII~t Countr) KccskclIICt/Clluntry (%) 
l'iulllber of households 43,409 4.309.627 
Difference between households Rnd inhnbited dwellinl1s 4.322 631.543 
Percentage of non-sharing households 80.1%+ 7U.7%+ IIJJ% 
Percentage of households share accommodation <19.9% <2'lJ'!-o 
The percentage of households who live under the same roof cannot be determined 
exactly from the available data, since it is possible that more than two households share 
the same accommodation. Hence, the percentage of non-sharing households in Table 
D8 is the minimum possible, assuming that there are only two-household sharers. 
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Nevertheless, there was no other sampling frame available that would have eliminated 
this bias. 
After the Central Population Registration and Electoral Office provided the sample 
addresses, the corresponding telephone numbers were identified, using the available 
electronic telephone directories (CD, internet), and the public directory enquiry service. 
In certain cases, it became necessary to identify the names first, because of the 
inaccuracies of the available directories. 
The obvious advantage of the sampling method was that it included those households 
who did not have a telephone, and offered the possibility of using face-to-face 
interviews in households with no (public) telephone line. In the data collection phase of 
the research, face-to-face interviews proved to be very time-consuming and had to be 
dropped due to budget constraints.63 
Alternative sampling frames were considered but were discarded early on because of 
other possible sampling biases. Public telephone directories as sampling frames have 
the disadvantage that they do not necessary list each domestic telephone number only 
once. For instance, it can happen that both partners in a couple appear in the directory 
with the same number. This suggests that without the possibility of filtering the public 
telephone directory, single person households have less chance to get into the sample, 
introducing a sampling bias.64 hi principle this bias could be avoided by using the 
number ranges of domestic telephone lines, having the additional advantage of 
including secret telephone numbers, which otherwise would be unreachable. 
Unfortunately, the Hungarian telephone company, MATAv considers this information a 
commercial secret, so it is not available for research (personal communication). 
0.3. Sample size and characteristics of the sample 
The Central Population Registration and Electoral 0 ffice provided 1,500 residential 
addresses in Kecskemet. As the first step, the telephone numbers (and addresses 
without telephone) were determined, which yielded 1,092 numbers. From these 930 
numbers were answered, and 113 persons declined to participate in the survey, a 87.8% 
response rate. Interviewers were asked to record the gender of the persons who refused 
to answer, and to enquire about the cause of rejection. Table 09.0 provides a 
breakdown of the causes. In most cases the respondents did not give any further 
explanation, but there were cases where refusal was directly related to the topic: (a) the 
person worked in the health sector, (b) the person utilized health care and had bad 
expenences. 
Nine questionnaires are incomplete, because the respondent refused to answer in the 
middle of the interview. These were included in the analysis. The rest of the 
questionnairl.!s are complete, except for certain sensitive questions, such as the income 
of the household. 
63 The work of three interviewers over a two-day period yielded only 10 interviews. 
M It has to be noted, that this phenomenon might reduce the sampling bias concerning households, which 
share accommodation, insofar as double listing represents these households. However this is just a 
theoretical remark, since there is no possibility to link sharing households to telephone numbers. 
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Reasons for non-responses 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
no reason 39 34.5 34.5 34.5 
health problem, bad opinion \0 8.8 8.8 43.4 
0( mistrust 19 16.8 16.8 60.2 
!. does not use services 4 3.5 3.5 63.7 is: 
not enou~h time 24 21.2 21.2 85.0 
health worker 5 4.4 4.4 89.4 
other 12 10.6 10.6 100.0 
Total 113 100.0 100.0 
The characteristics of the sample are assessed on the basis of household attributes, 
which are available for the study population, the households of Kecskemct and the 
country as a whole. The results are shown in Table D9.1-D9.4. 
Structure of households in the sample, and differences between the household sample and 
households of Kecskemet and the country 
Structure of households Freq % Valid % 2 SE 
Sample/ SE (fur Sample / SE (for 
coulltry 95%CI) ~ecskelllN 95%CI) 
One·family 110.7% 4.4% 110.5% 4.4%, 
Couple 554 67.8 68.1 3.3 117.9~0 3.2% 118.5% 3.2% 
Single parent with child 62 7.6 7.6 1.9 71.7% 17.5% 69.1% 16.9% 
Two·family 20 2.4 2.5 1.1 80.6% 35.3% 111.9% 49.0% 
::! 3+ families 
0.0% 0.0% 
.. Family household total 109.2% ~ 
4.0% 110.5% 4.1% 
One-person liS 14.4 14.5 2.5 56.7% 9.7% 55.5'% 9.4% 
Other 59 7.2 7.3 1.8 261.6% 65.4% 238.9% 59.7% 
I\on.family household 76.8% 10.2% 74.7% 9.9% 
total 
Total 813 99.5 100 
I\lissing (System) 4 0.5 
Total 817 100 
SOllrce: Comparison is based on POPlllation Censlls, 2001 data [28-1J 
Economic activity of households in the sample, and differences between the household sample and 
households of KecskemCt and the country 
Economic Activity Freq % 
Valid 2 SE Sample / SE (for Sample / SI-: (for % country 95%CI) ~ecskcmct 95'110 el) 
I employed person 251 30.7 31 3.25 100.9% 10.6% 92.1% 9.7% 
2 employed persoll 327 40 40.4 3.45 176.2% 15.0% 163.4% 13.9% 
3+ employed persoll 94 11.5 11.6 2.25 198.4% 3S.5% 209.0% 40.6% 
::! No em)lloyed persoll 
'i 19 2.3 2.3 1.05 54.1% 2U% ~ with unemployed SO.S% 37.0% 
with inactive persoll 113 13& 14 2.44 39.6% 6.9% 42.8% 7.5% 
with dependants only 6 0.7 0.7 0.59 7S.I% 6S.3% 134.7% 112.11% 
Total 810 99.1 100 
I\lissing (System) 7 0.9 
Total 817 100 
Source: Comparison is based 011 Populatioll Cellslls, 2001 data [28-1/ 
In general the household sample has considerable differences both in comparison 
with the study population and the country. There are only few characteristics for which 
PlTER GAAI. 
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Table D9.3. 
Table D9.4. 
the difference is not significant (with 95%CI). In most cases, the differences are not 
larger for the country than for Kecskemet. Moreover there are certain characteristics for 
which the sample better represents the country than the study population. 
Concerning the structure of households, couples are over-, while single-person 
households are under-represented in the sample. The comparison of other categories 
may be less meaningful, since there could be differences in the classification criteria 
applied. There is a deficit of one- and two-person households in the sample coupled 
with an excess of larger households with 3 persons or over, which results in a significant 
difference in terms of average household size. Sample households are more active 
economically and households with inactive earners are underrepresented in the sample. 
This phenomenon cannot be explained by the better employment indicators of 
Kecskemet compared to the country, since the difference is similar or slightly larger for 
the study population, too. 
One possible and obvious explanation is that differences between the household 
sample and the study population are attributable to the possession of domestic telephone 
line, but this should be confirmed by other studies using telephone interviewing. 
Size of households in the sample, differences between the household sample and households of 
Kecskemet and the country 
Size of Households Freq % Valid 2 SE Sample I SE (for 95% SlImple I SI-: (for 95% 
0/. counlry el) Kecskemct el) 
1 person 117 14.3 14.3 2.45 55.9% 9.6% 54.7% 9.4% 
2 persons 175 21.4 21.4 2.87 75.2% 10.1% 69.5% 9.3% 
3 persons 207 25.3 25.3 3.04 126.6% 15.2% 133.6% 16.1% 
::! 4 persons 225 27.5 27.5 3.12 162.3% 18.4% 159.5% 18.1% -; 
;, 
71 8.7 8.7 1.97 143.6% 32.5% 179.4% 5 persons 40.7% 
6+ persons 22 2.7 2.7 1.13 91.4% 38.4% 1J2.0% 55.4% 
Tolal 817 100 100 116.5% 3.5% 120.6% 3.6% 
SOllrce: Comparison is based on Pop Illation Censlls, 2001 data [28-1J 
Differences between average household size (Mean) in the household sample and households of 
Kecskemet and the country 
AHragc household size Vlliid !\Iissing I\lean ± 2 SE Sample I SE (for Salllple I SE (fur 
counlry 95%CI) Kccskcmcl 95% el) 
N 817 0 
!\lea n 3.03 2.94-3.12 116.5% 3.5% 120.6% 3.6% 
SId. Error of !\lean 0.045 
SOllrce: Comparison is based on POPlllation Censlls. 2001 data [28-1J 
There were no data available for the income distribution of the households and the 
possession of certain consumer durables in the study population, so the household 
sample is compared only to the country for these variables. Table D9.5 shows the 
income distribution by decile. In order to make the comparison possible, the survey 
data had to be complemented and recalculated, since 42.5% of the respondents refused 
to answer the question about their net monthly household income. The response rate 
was much higher, 88.9%, when the interviewed person was asked to select from 
predefined ranges, so the information from the two questions was put together by 
assigning the mean of the range to those households, which refused to tell the exact 
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Table D9.5. 
Table D9.6. 
amount. In this wayan acceptable level of 11.1 % non-response rate was achieved, but 
this imputation has to be taken into account, when the results are interpreted. 
As can be seen in Table D9.5, both the average yearly per capita net income overall 
and by income deciles were significantly different in the household sample from the 
households of the country (with 95%CI). However, the nature of this difference has 
changed since the original assessment was made using the 1999 household budget 
survey data of the HCSO. At that time, the two lowest income deciles corresponded 
with the country average and from the 3rd to 10th decile, the difference was not just 
significant, but increasing, which suggested that wealthier households were 
overrepresented in the sample. However, as new data have emerged for 2000 and 2001, 
the highest income decile seems to correspond with the country average, while the 
lowest decile and the average have become significantly different. This suggests that 
rather the poorer segments of the population are overrepresented in the sample, which is 
not at all bad for assessment of the equity impact of informal payments. 
Income distribution according to income deciles in the sample compared to the country as a whole 
(average yearly per capita income in '000 HUF) 
SAMPLE 
Total 01 02 03 04 2001 
05 06 07 08 09 10 
I Valid 726 73 73 73 72 73 72 73 72 73 72 
l'i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I Missing 91 0 
I\lean 436 144 221 267 300 339 392 448 501 630 1.126 
SE or Mean 12 5 l.5 3 1 2 3 5 35 6.5 71 
I\lean + 2SE 460 154 224 273 301 343 398 458 508 643 1,268 
I\lean - 2SE 412 134 218 261 299 335 386 438 494 617 984 
Median 360 150 225 268 300 336 400 450 492 600 900 
Modc 300 150 225 240 300 360 360 450 480 600 900 
COVl'iTHP 
1999 374 148 218 259 292 322 355 392 441 513 802 
2000 425 167 938 
2001 506 195 1,099 
SOllrce: ·Comparisoll is based olllhe allllllal household blldgel sllrvey dala /27; 262; 263} 
Consumer durables per 100 households in the sample compared to the country as a whole 
SAMPLE 
Car Weekend Colour TV VCI{ !\Iobile Personal I'rid~e Dishwllsher 2001 house phone {'ompuler 
I Valid 794 797 799 795 795 795 79S 735 
N I I\lissing 23 20 18 22 22 22 19 82 
Mean 0.690 0.062 1.040 0.690 0.720 0.340 1060 0.080 
Siandard Error 0.021 0.009 0.013 (SE) or Mean 0.018 0.027 0.017 0.011 DOll 
Pcr 100 households 69 6 104 69 72 34 106 8 
+ 2SE 73 8 107 73 77 37 108 10 
- 2SE 65 4 101 65 67 31 104 6 
COlll'iTl{P 
1999 41 7 104 49 13 11 85 2 
2001 44 7 115 51 52 18 R4 Il.a. 
Source: ·Comparison is based onlhe allllilal household blldget slIrwy data [27; 263} 
In contrast, as far as the possession of consumer durables is concerned, the sample 
households seem to be richer (even in the light of new evidence on these items), insofar 
as the possession of items such as mobile phones, personal computers and cars arc good 
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indicators of the economic situation of households. Nonetheless these two findings 
does not necessary contradict each other, as we have no information on the distribution 
of these good nationally. Further, we have to take into account that questions on 
income are among the most sensitive topics, which suggests that there could be 
problems in terms of data validity and reliability. 
0.3.1. AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION OF RESPONDING PERSONS 
Table 010. 
Table D 10 provides a description of the age and sex composition of those persons who 
were interviewed on behalf of the households. As it can be seen, women are 
overrepresented in each age category except for the under 19s. This age category, 
however, has only very few cases, 1.1 % of the whole sample. Consequently women are 
overrepresented in the sample, which is probably not problematic given that usually 
women are responsible for managing the budget of the household. 
Age and gender distribution of responding persons 
The gender of responding persons 
Total 
female male 
under 19 4 44.4% 5 55.6% 9 1.1% 0.7% 2.0% 
" 
288 69.1% 129 30.9% 417 51.4% Q 
~ 19-45 51.6% 50.8% QJ 
-to: 193 72.0% 75 28.0% 268 330% 
'" 46-59 QJ 34.6% 29.5% ~ 
..( 
over 59 73 61.9% 45 38.1% 118 14.5% 13.1% 17.7% 
558 68.7% 254 31.3% 812 IOO.O~;, Total 100.0% 100.0% 
0.3.1. OVERVIEW OF HEALTH CARE UTILISATION AND OUT-OF-POCKET 
PAYMENTS 
Another possible source of comparison is related to the topic of the survey. We have 
national data both on health care utilisation and out-of-pocket payments. Figure Dl 
provides a general overview of findings concerning health care utilization and out-of-
pocket payments, while Figure D2 utilisation according to level of care. 
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General overview or health care utilization and out-or-pocket payments 
Households answered the phone 930 
Interviewed? I NO ! 
Cases of health problem YES: households interviewed 
113 (12.2%) 
957 817 (87.8%) 
1 
J 580 1 1 
Disease? NO: non disease utilization r ~ 100 (17.2%) 144 (15.0%) 'I 
YES: disease episodes I 531 (91.2%) 1 
813 (85.0%) I 
I NO: self care ---\28 (5.3%)l 
36 (4.4%) Any treatment? 
YES: disease utilization 1 516 (97.2%) 
777 (95.6%) I 
! , 1 
567 (97.8%) 
Health Care Utilization: 921 (96.2%) ~ I NO 270 (29.3%) 130 (22.4%) 1 
Any payment or gift? 
'I YES: only gift 20 (2.2%) 20 (3.5%) 1 
YES: Payment 627 (68.1 %) 1 419 (73.9%)1 
1 ~ Payment & gift 34 (3.7%) 30 (5.3%) 1 
Informal payment 104 (11.3%) I 1 96 (16.9%) V 1 
Nonetheless, health care utilization of the sample is generally incomparable with 
national level data, since the questionnaire has yielded aggregate data that, for instance, 
considers repeated attendance at the same provider as one episode of utilization. The 
only exception, where this may be less of a problem in terms of comparability, is 
inpatient care. Table D 1 0.1, which compares hospital utilization per household per 4 
months, shows similar figures, but there is still a significantly lower number of inpatient 
cases in the sample than in the country. However, apart from the readmission problem, 
comparison is limited by first, the aforementioned time lag between the date of the 
survey and the latest available year of the country data, and second, health care related 
refusals mentioned before. 
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Health care utilization according to levels of care 
CAS E S OF HEALTH PROBLEM HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED 
957 
Disease? NO: non disease utilisation 
144 (15.0%) 
YES: disease episodes 
813 (85.0%) 
NO: self care 
Any treatment? 36 (4.4%) 
YES: disease utilisation 
777 (95.6%) 
~ 
" 
Health Care Utilisation 921 (96.2%) 
H Primary care 531 (68.3%) 1 
-( Outpatient specialist care 236 (30.4%)1 
-{ Inpatient care 119 (15.3%) 1 
-( Emergency care 28 (3.6%) 
-{ Diagnostic services 125 (16.1%) 
H Dental care 84 (10.8%) 
Other cases 19 (2.4%)] 
Comparison of health care utilisation data 
COUNTRY, 1999 
CASES per )'car pcr household per 4 months 
Hospital discharges 2,556,000 0.68 0.226 
Emergency cases 2,995,440 0.80 
Dental care 7,583,000 2.01 
Outpaticnt specialist care I 53,977,9.f8 40.89 
cnses 
I'rimury care 68,845,886 18.28 
/liumber of households 3,766,109 
817 
I 
I 580 (71.0%) 
'I 
I ~ 100 (17.2%) 1 
I 531 (91.2%) ~ 
I 
1 28 (5.3%) 1 
/ 516 (97.2%) 1 
I 567 (97.8%) ~ 
'I 
1 375 (66.1%) r 
1 200 (35.3%) ~ 
'I 108 (19.0~o) ~ 
'/ 26 (4.6%) ~ 
'I 85 (15.0%) ~ 
I 76 (13.4%) ~ 
'I 16 (2.8%) ~ 
S;\I\II'LE,2001 
pcr household per" months ±2SE 
0.44 0.160 0.129,0.191 
0.10 
0.31 
1.33 
\.95 
817 
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Compared to the 2001 household expenditure data of the HCSO, Ollr survey found 
less out-of-pocket payments in all categories, however, the difference is significant 
(with 95% CI) only in terms of pharmaceuticals, and consequently the overall amollnt of 
out-of-pocket payments. It must be noted, however, that our survey took place in the 
first half of 2001, thus it measured household health expenditures partly in the last 
quarter of 2000. Unfortunately, the HCSO do not provide any breakdown of health care 
expenditures according to the type of service or the type of provider, hence the 
investigation of the source of the discrepancy is limited to general household variables 
only. Furthermore, the HCSO has implemented important methodological changes in 
2001, which has to be taken into account, when the data are interpreted. 
Table DI0.2. Comparison of per capita out-of-pocket health care expenditures for 4 months (HUF) 
SAMPLE Pharmaceuticals Informal payment Tohtl out-of-pocket 
2001 payment 
N Valid 817 814 814 
Missing 0 3 3 
Mean 1,688 426 3,408 
Std. Error of Mean 177 78 323 
Mean + 2SE 2,043 581 4,053 
Mean - 2SE 1,334 270 2,763 
COUNTRY 
2000 2,778 309 4,575 
2001 4,504 567 5,692 
SOI/ree: ·Comparison is based on the an1J/wl hOl/sehold bl/dget SlIrVt')' data [262; 263} 
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0.4. The survey questionnaire 
The questionnaire had two parts: one which had to be filled In for each responding 
households (base questionnaire), and one, which had to be filled in for each disease 
episode, or for each non-disease health care utilisation (insert questionnaire). 
Here we provide a translation of both questionnaires and their accompanying 
instructions. 
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~ SE~ElWEI; EG~ETEM EGESZSEGUGYI MENEDZSERKEPZO KOZPONT BASE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Central and Eastern European Health Net 
Out-of-pocket payments for health care in 
Hungary 
NAME OF INTERVIEWER: 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRE: 
DATE OF COMPLETION: TIME: 
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 
ANSWERED: 
1. yes 
2. refused to answer (sex: male/female) 
CAUSE OF REJECTION: 
NOTES: 
MAKE NOTES ON THOSE INTERESTING THINGS CONCERNING TIlE SUBJECT OF STUDY, 
WHICH COMES UP DURING THE INTERVIEW, BUT CANNOT BE RECORDED IN TIlE 
QUESTIONNAIRE. 
I'ET~R GAAI. 
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1. How old are you (LAST BIRTHDAY)? 
2. Gender? 
1. Female 
2. Male 
3. Do any other families live in the same accommodation, which manage a 
separate household (holding a separate budget)? 
1. Yes, HOW MANY? D I 
2. No ~ 
IF THERE ARE MORE THAN ONE FAMILY, WHO LIVE TOGETHER AND MANAGE A 
SEPARATE HOUSEHOLD (HOLD A SEPARATE BUDGET), THEN FILL IN SEPARATE BASE 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EACH OF THEM. 
ASK WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SPEAK WITII ONE MEMBER OF EACH OF TilE 
OTHER FAMILIES. 
4. How many of you live in one household including you? 
5. In the previous FOUR month were you, or somebody living with you in the 
same household ill, or utilised health care for reasons other than illness, for 
instance pregnancy, screening, etc? 
1. Yes 
2. No ______________ ~~IL __ G_o __ to_;_~_lc_s_ti_on __ ~ 
6. In the previous FOUR months ... 
... how many of you were ill? 
... and how many times? 
... How many of you utilised health services for reasons other than illness? 
... and how many times all together? 
IF THERE WERE MORE THAN ONE PERSON ILL IN TilE HOUSEHOLD (OR UTILISED 
HEALTH SERVICES FOR REASONS OTHER THAN ILLNESS), THEN FILL Il'i SEPARATE 
INSERT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EACH PATIENT, AND IF ONE PATIENT WAS ILL l\lORE 
THAN ONCE, THEN FOR EACH ILLNESS EPISODE (OR EPISODE OF UTILISATION). 
IN CASE OF MORE THAN ONE PATIENT, DISEASE, OR UTILISATION EPISODE START WITII 
TilE FIRST PATIENTS' FIRST EPISODE AND GO ON ALIKE! 
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34. What is your opinion about health services provided by the state? 
1. Excellent 
2. Good 
3. Acceptable 
4. Unacceptably bad 
5. No opinion 
34.1 What is your opinion about paying health services directly, out-of-pockct (for 
instance co-payment in hospitals as in the case of medicines)? 
1. Definitely negative 
2. Negative 
3. Indifferent 
4. Supportive, because health workers are insufficiently paid 
5. Supportive for other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
35. Do you think that co-payments should be introduced for health sel"Vices that arc 
currently free-of charge? 
I. Yes, because we are paying gratuities anyway, so it would just be more 
transparent 
2. Yes, for other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
3. No, because today the majority of the population does not pay anything and 
could not afford to pay anyway 
4. No, for other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
5. I do not know 
36. If you could pay a monthly fee for receiving pharmaceuticals free of charge, how 
much (maximum) would you be willing to pay? 
36.1 
1. 
2. I already pay, the amount paid by YOU 
The amount paid by your EMPLOYER ________ _ 
3. No answer 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
If you could pay a monthly fee that in case you are ill, gratitude payment is paid 
instead of you how much (maximum) would you be willing to pay? (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS OK) 
1. Ft 
2. Nothing, because we do not give gratitude payment 
3. Nothing, because we have no money 
4. Nothing, because we hardly lise health services 
5. Nothing, because we go to private doctor only 
6. Nothing, for other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
7. No answer 
8. Yes, but only if I could give it directly to the doctor: _____ _ Ft 
PETER (jAAI. 
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37. Please provide us with the following information about you and the other 
members of your household. 
IF THE RESPONDENT MENTIONED A PERSON, WHO DIED DURING TREATMENT, PLEASE 
TRY TO HAVE DATA ABOUT THIS PERSON AS WELL, INDICATE BESIDE THE CODE FOR 
GENDER WITH AN H (FOR INSTANCE 2 H) 
respon- person person person person person person person 
dent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sex 
Age 
Marital Status 
Education 
Occupation (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS OK) 
Sector (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS OK) 
IF YOU FILLED IN AN INSERT 
QUESTIO~NAIRE RELATED 
TO TIllS PERSON, PLEASE 
RECORD ITS NUMBER HERE! 
CODING scheme: 
Sex Age Marital status Education 
Female 0-5 years I Married 1 incomplete elementary 
Male 2 6-18 years 2 Partner 2 elementary (8 classes) 2 
19-45 years 3 Widowed 3 secondary vocational 3 
Died II 46-59 years 4 Divorced 4 A levels examination 4 
60 or over < 5 Single 5 postsecondary vocational 5 
higher education 6 
no education 7 
Occupation Not Small private Big private Public Other 
employee <50 >=50 
employees employees Sector 
Employee, part time 2 3 4 Industry 
Employee, full time 5 6 7 8 Agriculture 2 
Employee, not registered 9 10 II 12 Comlllerce 3 
Self employed 13 Financial sector 4 
Pensioner 14 Service industry 5 
Student/pupil IS Health care, publ ic 6 
Housewife 16 7 llealth care, private 
Unemployed 17 IF YOU CHOOSE OTHER Education 8 
Child before school age 18 PLEASE SPECIFY IT 
Other dcpendant 19 
Othcr 20 
Other public 9 
Other pri vatc to 
i'tTI'R (jAAl 
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THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Now, I will ask you a few questions about the income of your household. Of course 
answers continue to be voluntary 
38. How would you describe the income of your household? 
1. Substantially better than average 
2. Slightly better than average 
3. Average 
4. Slightly below average 
5. Substantially below average 
6. I do not have an opinion 
39. How much is the estimated net income of the members of your household 
together? Ft 
IF THE RESPONDENTS DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER, ASK HER/HIM WHETIIER liE WOULD 
RATHER PUT IT IN THE INCOME CATEGORIES BELOW! 
1. over 350 thousand 
2. 200.001 - 350.000 
3. 100.001-200.000 
4. 50.000 - 100.000 
5. below 50 thousand 
40. Docs your household own .... ? 
Yes, only Yes, two or No 
one more 
1. flat or house 1 2 3 
2. weekend house 1 2 3 
3. car - CEE brand 1 2 3 
4. car - West brand) I 2 3 
5. colour TV I 2 3 
6. video recorder I 2 3 
7. mobile phone 1 2 3 
8. personal computer I 2 3 
9. refrigerator 1 2 3 
10. dish washer 1 2 3 
\Ve are very grateful for your participation! 
END OF QUESTIONING: 
I' E T I: R (j A A I. 
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~ SE~ElWEI~ EG~ETEM EGESZSEGUGYI MENEDZSERKEPZO KOZPONT 
Central and Eastern European 
Health Net 
INSERT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Out-of-pocket payments for health care in 
Hungary 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE HAS TO BE FILLED IN FOR EACH EPISODE OF ILLNESS, OR 
UTILISATION OF HEALTH CARE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN ILLNESS! 
NUMBER OF BASE QUESTIONNAIRE / NUMBER OF EPISODE: 
NOTES: 
MAKE NOTES ON THOSE INTERESTING THII\GS CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF STUDY, 
WHICH COMES UP DURING THE INTERVIEW, BUT CA:-.INOT BE RECORDED IN TilE 
QUESTlO:-.lNAIRE 
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D 4 THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
6.1 What was the health problem?.-======;--_________ _ 
I ~I '-_G_o_t_O_q_;_c_s_t_iO_"--I 
If not illness, what was the reason of health care utilisatio:.:n.:..:?:.......:========::--
I I Go to quos,;on ~--------------------------~~. 15 
7. Did this illness prevent (the person) from continuing his/hcr normal 
activities? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. If yes, for how long was the ill person unable to continue normal nctivities? 
1. less than one week 
2. 7-14 days 
3. 14 days - 1 month 
4. 1-3 month 
5. more than 3 month 
9. In Your opinion how serious wns this illness? 
1. not serious 
2. average 
3. serious 
4. life-threatening 
10. For the treatment of this illness, did the person receive nny formul carc'! 
1. No 
2. Yes _____ ~.I Go to ~;.stion 
11. If no formal treatment was sought what were the reasons'! (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS OK) 
1. It was not serious illness 
2. Afraid / ashamed to go 
3. Not enough money 
4. Denied access to care 
5. Required services not availahle in ollr village/region 
6. It served no purpose as treatment is ineffective for this illness 
7. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
I' a: T E R (j A" l. 
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D 4. THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
12. If purchased medicines, how much did you spend all together? 
... or other remedies? 
... what were these remedies? 
... How much did you spend for travel in connection with these? 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
Go to the next episode of illness, or utilisation with starting a new insert questionnaire, 
OR to question 34 on the base questionnaire 
13. How long did the person wait before seeking care? 
1. looked immediately for a doctor as symptoms noticed 
----- Go to question 
2. this is a chronic illness 15 
3. few hOllrs 
4. less than one week 
5. one week or more 
14. If treatment was delayed, what were the reasons? (M UL TIPLE ANSWERS OK) 
1. It was not serio liS illness 
2. Afraid/ashamed to go 
3. Not enough money 
4. Health facility is far from where we live 
5. thought there was no effective treatment for this illness 
6. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
I'[T[R GAAl 
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15. Please specify the health services, which were received in connection with this 
episode 
IF YOU ARE NOT SURE ABOUT CODING, PLEASE MAKE NOTES ABOUT WHAT 
THE RESPONDENT SAID IN THE COLOUMN 'REMARK' 
Type of 
care 
(primary, outpatient 
specialist, inpatient, etc.) 
Provide'rl 
Provider4 
ProviderS 
Provider6 
Provider7 
Provider8 
CODING scheme: 
Type of service / levels of care 
primary care 
outpatient specialist care 2 
inpatient care 3 
emergency (ambulance, out-or-surgery hours 
service) 4 
laboratory and other di agnostic service 5 
dental care 6 
other 7 
Type of 
provider 
(public /private) 
Type of 
provision 
(NHIFA financed 
/pri vate) 
Type of provider 
(owner) 
public 
private 2 
do not know 3 
Remarks 
Type of provision 
(who financed?) 
NlllrA I 
private 2 
do not know 3 
(PLEASE SPECIFY IN TilE TADLE ADO\'[, IN 
COLO :'lIN 'HEi\IARJ.:S') 
PETE~ GAAL 
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16. Why did the person choose that particular provider'! (MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
OK) 
IF THERE WERE MORE THAN ONE PROVIDER UTILISED, TAKE TilE CODE OF TilE 
PROVIDER FROM QUESTION 15, AND ASK EACH PROVIDER SEPARATELY 
Code from question 15: \ 
I. Closest 
2. Only available for this 
type of care 
3. Good opinion about 
particular physician 
working there 
4. Good reputation of 
the facility 
5. Previous experience 
6. It was less expensive 
(for private providers) 
7. Was referred there 
8. His/her family doctor 
9. Others recommended 
10. Other (SPECIFY): 
Provider Provider Provider 
123 
17. Was the treatment successfully completed'! 
Provider 
4 
Provider Provider' 
5 6 
.1. 
I. Yes 
2. No, it is still going on 
3. No, the patient died 
4.No 
----------j:~1 Go to 1~cstion 
18. How was the treatment interrupted? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS OK) 
I. did not buy all the drugs that the doctor prescribed 
2. bought the medicines, but then did not take them 
3. family doctor referred the person to a specialist, but did not follow lip 
4. family doctor/specialist advised the person to go to a hospital, but did not g 
5. doctor said to come back, but the person did not 
6. did not follow the diet the doctor prescribed 
7. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 
P E TER GAAL 
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19. If the treatment was interrupted what were the reasons? (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS OK) 
1. Not enough money 
2. Afraid/ashamed to see doctor/go to hospital 
3. Required services not available where we live 
4. It serves no purpose, treatment is ineffective/inappropriate for this illness 
5. Got better the other day 
6. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY): 
20. Was the person satisfied with the medical care received? 
1. Yes 
"I Go 10 ;; .. liOO 1 
2. No 
With which provider? (RECORD TilE CODE(S) OF TilE PROVIDER(S) HERE) 
20.1 What was the reason of dissatisfaction? (USE THE CODE OF TilE PROVIDER, IF 
MORE THAN ONE) 
20.2 Was anything done about this problem? 
1. Yes, went to another, public, provider 
2. Yes, went to another, private, provider 
3. Yes, complained 
4.No 
5. Other (SPECIFY): 
20.3 If complained, where? (USE THE CODE OF THE PROVIDEIl., IF "lORE TIIAN ONE) 
('ETEI{ (/AAL 
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0 . 4 . THE SURV EY QUES TI ONNA IR E 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
21. Was any payment in cash or in kind, any contribution or any gift made for the 
medical care received? 
1. Yes, money 
-I 
Go to question 
25 2. Yes, but not money ---------------~ 
3. No 
-I 
Go to qu es tion 
33 
22. How much was paid according to the following categories? 
IF THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE PROVID ER UTILISED, TAKE TilE CODE OF Til E 
PROVIDER FROM QUESTION 15, AND ASK EAC HllROVIDER SE PARATELY 
IF THE SAME PROVIDER WAS UTILISED MORE THAN ONCE, TIIEN ASK FOR ALL TilE 
EXPENSES IN THE PAST FOUR MONTH AND PUT DOWN TilE SU M 01· TIIESE PAYM ENTS 
IN THE RELEVANT CELL 
Provider Provider Provider Provider Provider Provider 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Code from question 15: 
~ ."-
Admission 
Consultation 
Pharmaceutical s 
Surgery 
Nurses and other 
support staff 
Patient transfer 
T ransportation 
Food 
Other (SPECIFY): 
22.1 If private services were utilised, was anything given to the physicians or other 
health worI{crs above (in addition to) the official fee? 
1. No 
2 . Yes, but was not accepted 
3. Yes, and it was accepted (APPROXIM ATELY 1I0W MUCH?) : Ft 
If only priva te sCI-viccs were utilised (for insta ncc only bought m cdicine) continllc with 
question 24 
I' ETE It GAAL 
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I. 
2. 
3. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
23. When was the payment made in relation to the services? (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS OK) 
IF THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE PROVIDER UTILISED, TAKE TilE CODE OF TilE 
PROVIDER FROM QUESTION 15, AND ASK EACH PROVIDER SEPARATELY 
LEAVE OUT PRIVATE SERVICES 
Provider Provider Provider Pr'ovider Pr'ovider PI'ovidel' 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Code from question 15: ':~ ~ . '" ~ ~~ ~~.: .. .:....L 
before treatment 
during treatment (if 
more than one visit) 
after treatment 
24. "Vas anything given (except for money) to the physician or other health 
workers? 
l. Yes 
2. No I 
Go to question 
--------------------------------~. 27 
25. Please specify what was given? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS OK) 
1. Did a favour (SPECIFY) 
2. Flower 
3. Alcoholic drink 
4. Sweets 
5. Other (SPECIFY) 
26. Please assess the money equivalent of these, according to the sel'vice in 
connection which they were given 
IF THERE WAS MORE Til AN ONE PROVIDER UTILISED, TAKE TilE CODE OF THE 
PROVIDER FRO;\I QUESTION 15, AND ASK EACH PROVIDER SEPARATELY 
Provider Provider 
1 2 
Code from question 15: ' . >: "i, .', .. c:!J. 
Adm iss ion 
Consultation 
Surgery 
Nurses and other 
support staff 
Other (SPECIFY) 
Total 
Provider 
3 
.\ 
Pr'ovidcr PrO\lider Provider 
4 5 6 
.U:J. 
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If utilised free services and gave money or gift then continue with question 27 ... 
... otherwise go to question 31! 
27. Why were the additional contribution made? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS OK) 
1. was grateful 
2. it is customary 
3. it was forced 
4. expedite treatment 
5. obtain more attention from doctor 
6. obtain more attention from nurse 
7. obtain better quality medicines 
8. establish good relationship with physician for future treatment 
9. extra hotel services (single room, TV in room, better food, etc) 
10. physician provided sick leave certificate 
11. physician provided disability certificate 
12. other (SPECIFY): 
28. Do you feel that the payment was forced at the medical facility'? 
1. Yes 
2.No 
3. Uncertain 
29. If utilised free services, did it occur that patient (or relatives) had to provide 
part of the services during trcatmcnt? 
30. 
1. Yes 
2. No I 
Go to 'I"c.tion 
------------------------------~~. 31 
Ifycs, what were these, and approximately how much did they cost'? 
1. Pharmaceuticals: 
2. Patient supervision, nursing: 
3. Other (SPECIFY) 
1-, 
Ft 
Ft 
I'I'TER GAAI. 
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I v, o o 4 ANNEXES FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 31. How much did you spend altogether in connection with this episode of care? 
Ft 
32. How were the funds, used to pay for treatment, obtained? 
Yes No 
1. From cash revenue 1 2 
2. Household savings 1 2 
3. Sale offamily assets Uewellery, house, car, etc.) 1 2 
4. Gift form a person outside the household 1 2 
5. Loan from a bank or person outside the household 1 2 
6. Other (SPECIFY): 1 2 
If utilised free services a!ld did not give money or gift thcn continuc with qucstion 33 
othenvisc 
go to the next episode of illness, or utilisation with starting a ncw insert questionnaire, 
OR to question 34 on the base questionnaire! 
33. You told me that the services were not paid for, why? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
OK) 
1. Paid by the government 
2. paid by social insurance 
3. paid by private insurance 
4. doctor is a friend 
5. other (SPECIFY): 
Go to the next episode of illness, or utilisation with starting a new insert questionnaire, 
OR to question 34 on the base questionnaire! 
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D ANNEXES FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
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~ SEMt;'ELWEI; EG~ETEM EGESZSEGUGYI MENEDZSERKEPZO KOZPONT INSTRUCTIONS for interviewers for filling in the questionnaire for 
out-of-pocket payments for health care in Hungary Central and Eastern European 
Health Net 
General instructions 
1 
2. 
3. 
The questionnaire has to be filled using telephone interviews for all persons living in the 
same household. If possible start questioning after 6 pm, because it is more probable that 
you will find the head of the household (or other competent person) at home then. 
Please note the questions, where MULTIPLE ANSWERS are acceptable. 
After dialling the number, and the phone is answered provide a brief introduction into the 
project, and try to speak to the head of the household or other competent person. 
In connection with the introduction of the project, you should mention the following points: 
• introduction, person and organisation (Semmelweis University, l1SMTC, Blldapest) 
• sorry for bothering the persall unknowingly, we have selected the plume nllmbers 
randomly 
• the objective of the research is to assess out-ofpocket payments for heallh care 
• the research is implemented in an international collaboration inelliding five academic 
instilutions and four cOllntries 
• participation is entirely voluntary 
• the information obtained during the research will be hal1dled strict~v cOIifidenlially, and 
the participants anonymity will be preserved 
• we would like to lise the results to contribute 10 the improvelllent of the performance oj 
the health care system 
Ask the person: 
• whether he or she would be willing to participale 
• whether he or she lives there and would be able to provide il1jormaliOil 011 household 
issues; ifnol call he or she send somebody, who would (for illslallce a child liis or lie/' 
parenls) 
• whether he or she would be able tv spend approximalely 15-25 minules to (Ins \I 'a Ihe 
questions 
• if yes is it suitable 110W, or call him or her al a more convenienllimC' 
4. Please make notes on if the respondent did not understand the qucstion, had comments 
which did not fit in the questionnaire, or answers, which did not fit in the predcfined 
answers, etc. 
5. If the respondent refused to participate, try to ask him or her about the reasons, and record 
the answer on the front page of the base questionnaire 
6. If the phone were not answered, record the datc and timc of unsuccessful attempts on the 
cover page of the base questionnaire . 
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Instructions for specific questions 
Question 15 
• At this question the most important is to identify the pure private services (private 
provider paid out-of-pocket). Generally the people know this. 
• If the respondent is not sure whether he or she utilised publicly (NHIFA) financed 
services, then ask whether his or her social insurance identification card was 
requested at the provider. 
• All state/local government owned health care provider are public. 
• The category of public provider - private provision (financing) include those 
services that are not financed by the NHIFA, but provided by public providers as 
well (for instance laser vision correction surgery), and private practice in public 
institutions. In this latter category the distinguishing feature is that the patient pays a 
predetermined fee, set by the physician. 
• In primary care entrepreneur family doctors count private, even if the surgery is 
owned by the local government. 
Questions on money paid, gifts and in kind contribution given, 11lwl1)'S consider 
expenses for the LAST FOUR MONTH, which precedes the interview. 
Question 22 
• If the patient concerned utilised the same provider more than once during the past 
four month, then ask for the sum of all the expenses in the past FOUR MONTI I. 
Question 23 
• This question, of course, does not apply to 'pure' privatc services. 
Question 26 
• If the patient concerned utilised the same provider more than once during the past 
four month, then ask for the sum of all the expenses in the past FOUR MONTH. 
Question 27-30 
• These questions, of course, do not apply to 'pure' private services. 
Question 34 
• If the answer to this question is not consistent with expericnces of actual episodes of 
illness then make notes on what the respondent complains about. 
PETER GAAl 
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ANNEXES fOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
FORMAL OUT-Of-POCKET PAYMENTS IN HUNGARY AND THE OPERATIONALISATION Of INFORMAL PAYMENT 
Formal out-of-pocket payments in Hungary and the 
operationalisation of informal payment 
Formal and informal payments have been separated during the analytical phase of the 
study, using the knowledge on formal co-payments (Table D 11), the data obtained on 
health care providers, and on the payment for various service categories. 
Formal out-or-pocket payments in the Hungarian health care system in the first half or 2001 
Item Amount Who determines the i{emllrks 
amount? 
Pharmaceuticals o 50 70, 90, 100%, or fixed orice negotiations pricc subsidy 
Medical aids and prosthesis (including dental 50,70,85, 100% or fixed price suhsidy 
prostheses) 
Balneotheraoy 85 or 100% nrice suhsidy 
Treatment in sanatorium (rehabilitation) oer diem Ilovernmcnt co-payment· 
Tooth preserYing dental care cost of materials (filling); can he provider co-payment" 
10% higher for those not attending 
regular check UP 
Above standard hotel services 
room oer diem provider co-payment 
meal difference between the cost of providcr co-paymcnt 
standard meals and what is 
required 
Utilization of more services, than what is diffcrence between the cost of provider cll-payment 
ordered by the doctor materials of the required service 
and what was medically indicated, 
including extra patient davs 
Inappropriate utilization of services: (I) (2) government, providcr co-paymcnt 
without referral (I) can increase the 
at other provider, where the patient has been amount up to 30% 
referred to (2) 
outpatient special ist care 2000 HUF 1500 BUF 
acute inpatient care admission 4000 HUF 4000 flUF 
until the 31st day 1000 I-IUF/day 800 HUF/day 
after the 31 st day 500 HUF/day 400 HUF/dav 
chronic inpatient care admission 4000 HUF 40001lUF 
until the 31 st day 6001-lUF/day 500 HUF/dav 
after the 31 st day 400 HUF/day 400 HUF/dav 
long term care admission 4000 HUF 4000llUF 
for the duration of stav 1000 HUF/day 400 HUF/day 
Chronic long term care accordin!!. to referral 400 HUF/day.·. j!ovcfIlment co-paymcnt 
Medical certificate for driving license 800-8000 IIUF government full cost 
MediclIl certificate for shot !!.un license 3000-9000 IllJF governmcnt full cost 
Blood alcohol test 3500 HUF govcrnment full cost 
Medical certificate for forensic purposes 2000 flUF governmcnt full Cllst 
Detoxifyin!!. 5000 flUF j!ovcrnment full cost 
Transport of drunk people 60011UF/km go\'crnmelll full cost 
Other excluded sen-ices. like cosmetic surgery prices varies provider price 
Sen'ices which are utilized at a provider with no price varies provider price 
"'III FA contract 
Notes: ·Currently there arc no rules in elTeet, which would determine the extent of co-payment •• Abolishcd. us of I N(lvemh,r, 
2001. "'Bcfore 1998 it was determined on the basis of the minimulll pension, lind greater tlcxibilit), was allowed tll 
providers, to deviate from the centrally set co-payment 
Sources:[2; J 31; 3 J 
We have applied the following rules: 
• Given that during the period of data collection, a substantial co-payment had to be 
paid for public dental services, all dental payments were considered formal. 
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• The same applied for the category of pharmaceutical expenditures. 
• Expenditures on food were considered formal, except for publicly financed inpatient 
care, but the single case of this kind was recategorized as in kind contribution. 
• The category of 'other expenses' was recoded according to the additional 
information, the respondent gave on the nature of the expense. The rest of other 
expenses with publicly financed service were considered informal. 
• All other categories were considered informal if the service (provider) was said to be 
publicly financed. 
• Because of the existence of conditional formal co-payments, the expenditures on 
admission were intended to be considered on a case by case basis, but given that 
there was only one case of this kind, and the respondent did not want to tell the 
amount, the categorization of payment on admissions did not cause any problem. 
It has to be noted, that the above operationalisation of informal payment is not 
perfect. First, it is possible that patient paid the dentists informally. but because it is up 
to providers to decide on the amount of co-payment, and because of the lack of 
information on how many and what kind of treatments were made, it is not possible to 
separate formal and informal. This might led to an underestimation of the amount of 
informal payment. Second, it is not certain that respondents have made a clear 
distinction between payment and in kind contribution in cases when in kind contribution 
has had to be bought, for instance pharmaceuticals and meals. Also it is possible that 
the respondents' perception of entitlement for services is not exactly the same as it is 
defined by the law. For instance bringing in meals to hospitals is quite common in 
Hungary, but there could be patients who do not realize that this is an in kind 
contribution.65 These factors could lead to the underestimation of in kind contribution 
or double counting, but since there have been only few cases of in kind contribution, 
double counting seems to be a negligible problem. 
65 Also, these arc not 'typical', 'common sense' health care expenditures. 
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E. THE HISTORY OF INFORMAL PAYMENT: POLICY MAKING AND 
ACADEMIC DEBATES 
On the basis of historical documents Adam [50; 49; 8] gives a detailed account of the 
history of informal payment in the Hungarian health care system. The following points 
are a brief summary of his findings. Other authors, such as Szab6 [194; 72], Balazs 
[236; 237; 154; 73] and Antal [153] have also written on this topic, especially Balazs, 
who discussed extensively the history of remuneration of physicians. Where relevant 
Adam's historical analysis is complemented or confronted with comments from them, 
but the theories of the origin and causes of informal payment will be elaborated in 
chapter 4. 
E.1. The origins of informal payment in the Hungarian health care 
system 
According to Adam [50; 49,pp.56-61], informal payment was an unknown phenomenon 
before World War II. He argued that the spreading of informal payment as a problem 
was first mentioned in the autumn of 1948 and it subsequently occupied a key po ition 
in the health policy agenda. Balazs [73] somewhat challenged this view, referring to a 
quotation from 1942 about illegal private practice in hospitals. He argued that informal 
payment had emerged when the publicly employed physician used equipment and 
supplies of the hospital for private surgery and received a fee for the service from 
patients, as if he was a private practitioner. Nevertheless, Adam [49,pp.57-58,61,79] 
pointed out that before 1942 private practice in hospitals was not at all illegal, and there 
were only a few posts in public service, such as chief medical officers, that had 
prohibitions on private practice. Moreover, senior consultants in hospitals paid a certain 
percentage of the fee they earned from private practice into a so-called 'pay box' ('petty 
cash'), from which other contributors were compensated for their work. New graduates, 
the so-called 'unpaid trainees' lived solely from this income, but Adam [49,p.57] argued 
that these payments were informal (illegal), insofar as they were not admitted to, to 
avoid paying tax. 
Balazs [154,pp.27-28] also argued that during the 1930s, exercising their market 
power to press down physicians ' fee, insurance companies were as important as the 
state in the development of a situation that later led to the emergence of informal 
payment. But because it took time, this situation only unfolded fully during the 
communist regime. This argument certainly has some validity but we should not forget 
that, in this period, the physicians' fee was negotiable even if the patient had private 
insurance [50]. 
Nevertheless, Balazs was not the only one who thought that it was misleading to link 
informal payment to the communist regime. Writers on medical ethics, such as Szab6 
[72] saw informal payment as part of the culture of Hungarian society, and argued that 
it was impossible to forbid people to give gifts. In contrast, Adam pointed Ollt that in-
kind contributions from peasants in villages and rural areas should not be confused with 
informal payment, since peasants were usually short of cash so it was Illllch simpler for 
them to pay in kind to settle a legitimate bill. The regulation of the National Medical 
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E 2 THE POLICY OF GRATITUDE PAYMENT 
Chamber on medical practice and minimum fees in 1939 said that "contributions in 
kind must be valued according to the market price on the day it is due" [49,pp.57-58]. 
E.2. The policy of gratitude payment 
Adam [50] argued, that the initial 'tipping' of health workers was emerged in the 1950s, 
and although informal payment had never been approved officially during this statc-
socialist period, government actions created an ambiguous situation [49,pp.62-213]. 
First, informal payment was included in the calculation of physicians' salaries. This 
measure meant that those specialities that were regarded as 'non-paying' (i.e. where 
informal payment was rare or non-existent) received somewhat higher salaries than the 
'paying' ones. The "compensation" policy began as early as 1950 [49,p.82j. Second, 
gratitude payment was separated from other types of informal payment, such as selling 
of beds or cheating with sickness benefits. Gratitude payment was defined as 
voluntarily given by patients, after treatment, as an expression of gratitude, but not in 
exchange for exceptional services. In the fight against gratitude paymcnt, legal 
penalties were rejected by the communist party [50,p.65]. Third, according to the 
policy of 'separate treatment', all subsequent laws and regulations were designed so that 
they did not sanction the acceptance of gratitude payment. In summary, Adam 
concluded, that as a result of the blurred wording of relevant laws, and the rd lIctance of 
ofticials to declare its unacceptability, the belief that gratitude paymcnt was legal 
became widespread both among doctors and patients. As he put it, i.I "phOIl/OIll law" 
was born [49,p.197]. It is not surprising, he argued, that none of thc four oflicial 
campaigns against gratitude payment proved to be successful [49,pp.98-D3,144-
148,171-182,232-233] and that the number of proceedings associated with any type of 
informal payment rapidly decreased over time. Between 1958 and 1962 a total of 373 
cases were reported and the corresponding figure between 1980 and 1984 was 29 
[49,pp.139,194-196]. Finally, in 1988, just before the political changes, the government 
decided to tax gratitude payment [187; 188,17(7); 8,pp.58-91]. 
E.3. Informal payment and the reform era 
Since then, no further direct governmental intervention has been proposed to tackle thc 
issue. National health policies in the new reform era are remarkably consistent in how 
they view informal payments [189]. The phenomenon is undesirable, but its elimination 
can be envisaged only in the long term, with the exclusive use of indirect measures [37; 
38,p.190]. 
Nevertheless 1998 seemed to bring about noticeable changes in policy making when 
the minister of health of the new government seriously challenged informal payment in 
his first speeches. He set up a committee from leading experts of the tield, including 
Balazs, Adam, Bondar, Bordas and T6th, to propose a solution to the prohlem. This 
initiative, however, had no visible effect on policy making. The report of the so-called 
'Gratitude Payment Committee' was eventually published [384], and policy returned to 
its previous track. The reasons why these experts were unahle to influence policy 
making has not yet been analysed, but it would be unfair to blame it all on short-sighted 
and self interested politicians. The academic debate about the role and nature of 
informal payment has long been contentious, and the waves of debate characterised by 
much polemic. 
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E.4. Academic debates and scientific research 
In Hungary scientific research on informal payment dates back to the 19705, initially 
with the aim of supporting official policies. The findings of the first empirical research 
studies were published in Nepegeszsegiigy [Public Health], the official journal of the 
MOH [e.g.77; 78; 82; 190; 80]. These papers were accompanied by articles on medical 
ethics, which echoed the official policy of separating the corrupt and non-corrupt forms 
of informal payment on the basis of the cultural origin of the phenomenon [e.g.191; 
192-194]. These arguments characterised theoretical discussion during the 1970s, but 
the issue was at least on the research agenda. 
In parallel with the softening political climate in the 19805. a second wave of 
academic debates on the columns of two sociological journals, Val6scig [Reality] and 
Tarsadalmi Szemle [Social Review], enriched the discussion with approaches that 
explicitly criticised the system, emphasising the social, economic and legal aspects of 
informal payment [85; 195; 65; 196; 70; 66; 197].66 
The intensive debates received a new push at the beginning of the 1990s when 
expectations of reforms were articulated [e.g.202; 64; 71; and subsequent discussion in 
Replika 63; 9; 52; 69; 203; 153], but the nature of informal payment remained 
contentious with confronting views on the desirable policy measures to address the 
phenomenon [e.g.39; and 63; vs.68; or 52; vs.69]. 
Finally, the establishment of the 'Gratitude Payment Committee' initiated a new surge 
of public debate between 1998 and 2000, and gave a new push to scientific research of 
the phenomenon, but positions remained as diverse and contradictory as before [214].67 
The early studies have generated some empirical evidence concerning the scali: of 
informal payment and the motivation of patients and doctors, but these are often 
inconclusive and contradictory, too. More importantly, some of its main characteristics. 
such as the impact of informal paymcnt on health servicl.:s, thcir nature, causes and 
roles, the potential obstruction to the reform and the policy options that might tackle the 
problem remain relatively un-researched. The lack of empirical evidence is 
undoubtedly a source of debates around the issue and it is not surprising that these 
debates had little influence on policy-making. Although Balazs [211] rather 
sarcastically concluded that the history of informal payment in health policy consisted 
of lack of knowledge combined with inappropriate measures, the reluctance of 
politicians to act more explicitly in a rather blurred situation characterised by 
insufficient and inconclusive evidence, and contrasting expert opinions. docs not sl.:em 
to be irrational. Indeed, this thesis aims to take one step back to try to clari fy the 
situation from theory to empirical evidence. 
66 For empirical research in this period sec for instance Banluky ct al. l198] Antnl [199; 159], Szab6 [83]. 
Ekes [200], Dobossy ct al. [79], Hungarian Central Statistical Office [20 I]. 
67 After more than a decade, this research was the first of its kind, which had informal payment in its 
foclls. 
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F. THE DEFINITION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
So far we have talked about informal payment without discussing what precisely 
informal payment is. This appendix aims to make up for this shortage drawing on not 
just the Hungarian, but the broader, international literature. Unfortunately, there is no 
generally accepted definition of informal payments [96], so it is necessary to look at the 
issue in more depth. 
The international literature contains at least as much controversy as seen in the 
debates in Hungary. It seems that the conceptualisation of informal payments is 
influenced by the specificities of the countries that the researchers draw their 
experiences from. Even the terms used to denote the phenomenon vary greatl y: 
gratuities or gratitude payments [67], envelope payments [204], under-the-counter 
payments [74] , unofficial payments [103], under-the-table payments [101] to name but a 
few. The proposed terms and definitions, which emphasize for instance 'illegality' and 
'corruption' as the distinctive feature of informal payment, may accurately refl ect the 
situation within a country, or a particular set of countries, but not applicable ac ros all 
countries. More importantly, however, they refl ect certa in assumption on the nature of 
the phenomenon (why patients give, is it good or bad), which are not nece my true in 
all cases and consequently may mislead policy-makers. This is not to say that the 
characteristics implied by these terms are not part of the phenomenon. Indeed informal 
payments have shown to be heterogeneous with many faces, from sweet and fl owers to 
"brick payments", from small tips to enormous amount for a si ngle operation [104; 96; 
101; 95]. But behind these seemingly diverse images, we argue, it is possible to find a 
common defining criterion which fulfil s three requirements. First, that it i 
scientifically neutral, i.e. it remains free from any judgments and as umptions 
concerning the reasons for and desirability of the phenomenon. Second it is consistent, 
i.e. it is able to separate informal payments from other (,formal') payments, so that the 
same phenomenon is consistently included or excluded across all countri s and within a 
part icular country over time. Third, that it is broad enough to capture the diversity of 
the phenomenon, i.e. it includes all observed variants of informal payments. 
This appendix reviews the variolls forms of informal payment reported from various 
countries, examines definitions proposed so far, and sllggests an alternati ve definition, 
which advocates that entitlements to health services, determined by laws and 
regulations, should be the key defining criteria to delimit informal payments in each 
country. Then we discuss the boundaries of informal payment implied by our definiti on 
and the implications for the current study and for research on the phenomenon in 
general. 
F.1. Images of informal payment: a theme with va riations 
In Hungary the most common image of informal payments for health care is that of 
physicians being paid by patients ,\'ho utilise health services that should be free of 
charge in the public system. For instance, Balazs [189] defined the phenomenon as an 
informal purchase, whereby patients in fac t buy a service from the publicly employed 
phys ician. This definition , however, does not only assume that informal payment is 
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paid in exchange for a service (or a better service), which is debated, but restricts the 
richness of the phenomenon in two respects. First, it limits the discussion to monetary 
transfers, so disregarding in-kind transactions. Second, it reduces the scope of possible 
actors to patients and physicians, excluding other actors such as other health workers or 
provider institutions. Whilst this definition may reflect the dominant form of informal 
payments in Hungary, there is considerable evidence to suggest that it is certainly not 
applicable to many other countries [96]. 
Moreover, even Hungarian researchers argued against restricting informal payments 
to monetary transfers, overlooking goods and services as media of transaction [85; 9]. 
These lin-kind' informal payments range from tangible gifts, such as sweets or alcoholic 
drinks, but also more expensive items such as works of art or jewellery, to services 
provided by the patients or their relatives, and political favours, which Buda called the 
"darkestform of informal payment" [9]. In many former socialist countries [104], barter 
had special relevance during the communist regime, when chronic shortages 
characterized several sectors of the centrally planned economy. As Petschnig [85] put 
it: "in these cases the variolls jobs, which are laking place at diflerent locations and 
different times, are in fact exchanged. Shortages such as hricklayers and car 
mechanics, are closely coupled with medicine." Beside these "direct natllral 
exchanges", she also distinguished another form of barter, "indirect natllral exchange", 
whereby physicians were provided a (future) political quid pro quo, such as promotion, 
withdrawal of charges, and judicial proceedings stopped [85; 9]. 
International experiences not only strengthen the case for induding in-kind paymcnts 
as an important form of informal payments, but also establish anoth~r in-kind variant of 
the phenomenon. These are goods and services, which should be part of the service, but 
which pati~nts must provide for themselves, induding meals, hcdding, dean laundry, 
medical supplies, pharmaceuticals and even diagnostic tests [102; 96; 104; 103 j. A lack 
of nursing services may also be compensated for by work of relatives of patients [101]. 
The other shortcoming of Balazs's definition is that it fails to account for those 
informal payments that involve actors other than patients ancl physicians. Possible 
participants in such transactions include not just individuals, but also institutions, not 
just patients (users of the services), but their relatives and not just the doctor, but other 
health workers as well. Buda [9] for example noted how in llungary "corporations, 
institutions often supported a particlilar ho.spilal: they helped to pllrchase important 
medical equipment; nOH'adays they pay mone:y into the f()ll11datioll [charity] set lip hy 
the hospital... This is (was) informal payment wilh a vengeance." In Poland Shahriari et 
al [104,pp.4,11,18,21] found that the most 'popular' form of additional payments by 
patients was the so-called "brick payment". Patients and relatives were invited to buy a 
token brick for a certain sum, by which means they supported the health can.: institution. 
In the study by Shahriari et al [104,p.18], all episodes of hospitalisation involved 
purchase of such a 'brick'. Furthermore, the World Health Report 2000 refers to 
"informal charging" a widespread phenomenon, \vhereby health care providers set fces 
for services that should be provided free of charge [58,p.xv]. 
In addition to the method of payment (what is given?) and the participants in the 
transactions (by whom, to whom?), many researchers have described other forms of 
informal payment on the basis of other dimensions, sllch as the timing and location of 
the transaction (when and where?), and the motivation of the actors (why'?) [10); 102; 
96; 104 J. For instance Shahriari et al. [1 04,pp.l 0, 18] n:ported so-called "at/mlle£' 
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Table Fl. 
payments", which were made by patients to specialists in their private surgery, not for 
the private visit, but to gain subsequent admission to a public hospital that was 
otherwise free of charge. Another classic example is the so-called "gratuities" or 
"gratitude payments", defined as patients thanking physicians for their services entirely 
voluntarily after the treatment, a phenomenon often thought to have deep cultural roots 
[67; 96,pp.3,10; 104,pp.4,10,17,21]. Others have looked at the size of the payment as a 
means to separate tips, which are usually a small amount of money compared to the 
actual cost of the service [50]. 
Images of informal payment 
Informal Advance Brick Tip In kind Grntuity 
charging payment payment contribution 
.-
Who gives? 
-
individuals (patients, relatives) x x x x x x 
institutions (businesses, 
governmental organisations) 
To whom? 
individuals (physicians, nurses, x x x x 
administrators) 
health care institutions x x x 
What? 
money x x x x x 
in kind: non-medical items and x 
services (e.g. sweets, spirits, 
flowers, favours) 
in kind: health service related x 
items and services (e.g. 
bedding, meals, drugs, nursing) 
How much? 
small amounts ? ? ? x ? ? 
large amounts ? ? ? ? ? 
When? 
before the service ? x ? x 
during the service ? ? x 
after the service ? ? x x 
Whcre? 
--
on site x x x x x 
not on site x 
Why? 
to obtain the desired x ? ? x 
care/service, enforced 
to obtain the desired ? ? 
care/service, voluntary 
gratitude (voluntary) ? ? x 
These examples clearly illustrate the considerable diversity of the phenollll.:non, 
showing how it is far from straightforward to develop a comprehensivc typology of 
informal payments. Ensor [95] acknowledges this diversity by dcfining informal 
payments on the basis of the three functions they serve. Table F I sllmmarises the 
dimensions discussed before, and places some of the aforementioned examples into the 
framework. 
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F.2. 
Table F2. 
However, some of the dimensions used to distinguish between different forms of 
informal payment may be questionable. For instance many researchers have noted the 
difficulty in interpreting 'before' and 'after' in health care [85; 49; 9; 74; 96]. Buda [9] 
argued that, most obviously, the concept is untenable is primary care, where the 
relationship between doctor and patient is usually long-lasting, whilst McKee and 
Chenet [385] have drawn attention to the challenges involved in defining single 
episodes of care in relation to the growing amount of chronic diseases that require 
continuous treatment. Another example is gratitude as a motivation factor. Researchers 
have pointed out the difficulty of separating gratuities from other forms of informal 
payment [96; 104], whilst others debated even the validity of the gratitude payment 
concept [85; 67]. We shall return to this issue later. 
But what is the key defining feature that delimits the boundaries of a phenomcnon 
with so many different images? What is the common featurc of advance payments and 
brick payments, of clean bedding, drugs or meals provided by relatives of the patient 
and a bottle of whisky, or a half-pig given to the doctor? To answer this question we 
first examine some of the definitions of informal payment proposed so far, and point out 
the shortcomings of the distinctive characteristics these definitions imply. 
Definitions of informal payment 
There are few attempts in the literature to formulate a precise definition of informal 
payments, because the exact nature of informal payment is often taken for granted. 
Table F2 provides an overview of the definitions available in the literature. We have 
highlighted the distinctive characteristics that each definition uses to separate informal 
payments from other, related phenomena. 
Proposed definitions of informal payment 
Source (country) 
Adam,I989 
[67,Hungaryl 
Balazs, 1996 
[I89,HungarYi 
Chawla, 2000 
[cited in 
104,Polandl 
Thompson, 2000 
[1021 
Lewis, 2000 [961 
Ensor, 2004 (951 
Definition Distinctive 
eh II rllcteristics 
"A gratuity may be defincd as a financial or other material benefit, voluntary 
given to the doctor voluntarily by a patient or his or her relatives 
after treatment has been terminated." 
" ... medical gratitude paymellt is an informal money transaction informal purchase: 
between the doctor and the patient, in the course of which the patient public 
I purchase a health service from the publiclv emplovcd doctor." 
" .. . payments, in cash or in kind, made by patients. or others on illegality; public 
behalf of the patients, to an individual or institutional public health 
care provider directly or to any person arranging for provision of 
health care from such Pllblic health care providers. for health services 
received or expected to be received, that the recipients of these 
payments arc not authorized to receive under existing laws of the 
land, including the Constitution of Poland. 1997. and the Ilcalth 
Insurance Act, 1997, or under the rules of business orthe health 
facility." 
"In/ormal paymellts can be described as payments made by not sanctioned hy the 
individuals to siale health workers or institutions but which are not authorities: public 
sanctioned by the authorities". ( state) 
"Ill/ormal paymellts can be defined as (I) payments to individual unoflicial. corruption 
and institutional providers, in kind or in cash, that arc made outside 
oOicial payment channels and (2) purchases that are meant to be 
covered by the health care system ... [n elrect informal paymcnts are 
a form of corruption." 
"Illformal paymmts fall into threc categories: cost contributions. various functions: 
including supplies and salaries, misuse of market position and contribution, 
payments for additional services." corruption. purchase 
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Each of these definitions has certain shortcomings. Some of them include the 
author's own interpretation of the phenomenon, for instance disputed assumptions on 
why people give [see 67; 189; 96; 95]. Others focus on a particular form of informal 
payment within countries, not on the entire phenomenon [see 67; 189]. Although Ensor 
[95] tries to overcome this problem by defining informal payments by their different 
functions in different settings, but still, none of these definitions consistently 
incorporate all observed variants of informal payment across different countries. We 
argue that none of the distinctive features implied by these definitions arc able to 
provide a consistent basis to discriminate between informal payments and other 
phenomena. 
To unfold this argument first we need to clarify the meaning of certain concepts, for 
which we draw on the wider literature on the informal economy. Voluntary or 
compulsory, formal or informal, legal or illegal, official or unoftichll arc concepts that 
somehow are all connected to the presence and activities of the state [230 j. but these 
terms are not defined precisely and consequently their usage is a source of confusion. 
For instance Shahriari et al. [104,p.1O] argued that the definition of Chawla (2000) 
implies that informal and illegal payments are the same, whilst there are certain forms 
of informal payment that are not illegal but are nonetheless unreported, This 
terminological confusion is not specific to the health sector, but characterises in general 
the study of the 'informal' or 'hidden' economy [230; 386]. 
F.2.1. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'INFORMAL' AND 'ILLEGAL'? 
One of the few things on which writers on the 'informal' or 'hidden' economy agree is 
that the literature is fraught with terminological and conceptual confusion [230; 386], 
There are several terms that have been coined to describe the whole phenomenon or its 
various components, ranging from the hidden or underground economy to various 
shades of economies (black, gray etc.). As Harding and Jenkins [230] point out, the 
only common element in the description of informal economic activities seems to be 
that such activities are not registered by the state. On the basis of this observation, we 
draw the first distinction according to the nature and the scope of public registration. 
An economic activity is 'informal' if it is, according to Ferman and Berndt [387; cited in 
230], not registered by the economic measurement techniques of society, or as Lewis 
[96,p.8] put it, unaudited and unreported. 
The second distinction, which separates 'legal' and Iillegal', is linked to another 
activity of the state: regulation. Researchers such as Dallago [386] remind us that the 
state does not just record economic activity, but also influences it by s~tting rules that 
should be complied with. 
Dallago [386,pp.XV-XXI,3-17] distinguishes four different parts of the economy 
(regular, informal, irregular and criminal) based on two dimensions: the purpose of the 
activity (more specifically the goods or services concerned), and the means of achieving 
that purpose, The irregular economy encompasses those economic activities whose 
goal is permitted, but the rules set by the state are deliberately infringed in the pursuit of 
that goal. As Dallago [386,p.XIX] puts it: ..... the irregular economy di.\pl{/ys (/ 
discrepancy betll'een economic goals - which are permitted - and the '/'lIle-hreaking' 
inst1'llmenls and means llsed to achieve them." In the case of the criminal economy 
neither thc aims nor the means are legal. Thus, for example the production of iron bars 
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employing unregistered workers is considered irregular, whilst trading illicit drugs is 
criminal. 
For our purpose, the key distinction is between 'informal' and 'illegal'. There arc 
certain economic activities that are informal, i.e. not registered by the state, but not 
illegal in that they do not contravene the established laws and regulations, for instance 
production for self-consumption and barter. Informality and illegality do not necessary 
coincide, with informal payments for health care offering a good example [104]. 
F.2.2. INFORMAL PAYMENT=ILLEGAL PAYMENT? 
Using these definitions and distinctions we argue that neither informality nor illegality 
are sufficient criteria to embrace all observed forms of informal payments. The legal 
assessment of the various forms of the phenomenon differs not just between countries, 
but even within a particular country over time. For instance, informal payments paid to 
physicians and other health workers ("envelope payments'') may be illegal in Polund 
[Chawla, 2000 cited in 104], but since 1989 they must be reported in tax returns in 
Hungary [8]. Furthermore, Hungary offers a good example of how the legality of 
informal payments changed over time. In his historical analysis, Adam [49,pp.83,93-
95] shows how all forms of informal payments made to doctors became illegal once 
physicians became civil servants during the nationalisation process implemented by the 
communist regime in the 1950s. In 1979, however, this situation changed, and only 
those doctors who were authorised to make clinical decisions autonomously (enjoyed 
the so-called 'right of disposition') were prohibited from accepting informal payments 
[49,pp.183-189] . 
Another complication is that the 'de jure' situation does not always coincide with the 
'de facto' one. Regulations may not be implemented or enforced by the government, or 
most members of society may not comply with them so that enforcement is impossible. 
Thus illegality does not al\vays imply illegitimacy, with the history of informal 
payments in Hungary again offering a good illustration. Ad{ml [66; 49] argued that, 
during the communist regime, the statements of policy makers created an ambiguous 
situation concerning informal payments, which made patients and doctors believe that 
ex post 'thank you' payments (gratuities) were not prohibited although, formally, they 
were illegal. This policy allowed the regime to shift part of the cost burden of care to 
patients and so compensate for the inadequacy of public finance. Moreover, policy 
makers not only condoned an illegal practice, but attempted to adjust subsequent 
legislation in a way that tolerated gratitude payment, although, as A<.hlm [67 J argued, 
the criminal law was not changed and informal payments remained illegal throughout 
this period. In addition, the policy of "banned in principle, bill permilled in praclice" 
had legal consequences, since Hungarian laws precluded punishment if the person acted 
in the belief that the action was not harmful to the society [67; 49,pp.213-214]. The 
discrepancy between the 'de jure' and 'de facto' situation, so common in many 
transitional countries, highlights the limitations of the "nol sal/ctioned hy tlzt! 
authorities" criterion adopted by Thompson and Witter [102] to define informal 
payments. If "sanctioned" means permitted 'de jure' then this criterion is only a 
different phrasing of illegality. If "sanctioned" means 'de t~lcto', then the same 
phenomenon may be classified as informal payments in one country and not in another, 
depending on the attitude of policy makers and effectiveness of cnforcclllent. It should, 
however, be noted that Thompson and Witter acknowledge this problem and coin a nl'\\, 
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term, "q1lasi formal payments", covering those payments that are illegal but tolerated by 
policy makers. 
F.2.3. IS INFORMAL PAYMENT REALLY INFORMAL? 
Informality is not a good defining criterion either. There are certain payments, not 
registered by the state, but excluded by researchers from the phenomenon. For instance, 
voluntary purchases from private providers are not, in essence, informal payments 
[96,p.l], even if these are informal in the sense that they are not accounted for by the 
provider to avoid paying tax. Conversely, there are certain informal payments that are 
not informal in the sense that they are reported and registered. For instance, the 
declaration of informal payments in the tax returns of health workers in Ilungary 
virtually makes informal payments formal. Another good example is the 
aforementioned advance payments, reported by Shahriari et al. [104] in Poland. If the 
private practitioner reports these payments to the tax authorities as part of his or her 
income, they become 'formar, although advance payments are informal in that they arc 
paid to gain admission to a public hospital that levies no formal charges. Neither do 
brick payments and other payments to charities and foundations established by health 
care institutions fulfil the informality criterion if these funds are establ ishcd ancl 
managed according to the legal framework effective in the country concerned. Certain 
in-kind contributions, such as food or pharmaceuticals, may also be formal i r purchased 
by the patients or their relatives, although these should have been supplied by the health 
care provider itself. 
The above examples clearly illustrate the point that neither illegality nM informality 
are distinctive characteristics of the phenomenon, consequently they do not provide 
criteria that will describe all varieties of informal payments observed by researchers. 
Even the same form of informal payment would tit into any categories of Dallago's 
model, from the formal to the criminal economy, depending on the attitudes and policies 
of the authorities of different countries. 
One could argue, however, that if not all forms of informal payments are informal in 
the sense that they are unreported and unaudited, the usage of the term 'informal 
payment' creates confusion. We acknO\vledge this problem, but recognise that there is 
an emerging consensus in favour of this approach amongst researchers [97; 205; 102; 
104; 93; 95]. In fact, the major advantage of the term linformal payment' is that it is 
neutral: it does not imply any preconception concerning the 'morality' (desirability) of 
the phenomenon. The term lunoflicial' could be an alternative, insol~lr as it is also 
neutral, but it would give rise to the same potential confusions. Is 'unofficial' simply a 
rephrasing of informality or illegality, or is it a different concept? Unfortunatdy, the 
authors did not clarify the exact meaning of unofficial in their puhlications [9(); lOll. 
F.2.4. ENFORCED BY CORRUPT PUBLIC SERVANTS? 
Finally, we should discuss the identification of informal payments with corruptinn. The 
detailed discussion of corruption is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the suggestion 
that corruption should be the defining characteristic of informal payments merits 
attention because Le\vis [96] and Shahriari et al [104] imply that it is a separate concept 
that can be differentiated from illegality and informality. 
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In her definition, Lewis does not provide an explanation what "oJJicial payment 
channels" mean, but she argues that informal payments created "an informal market for 
health care within the confines of the public health care service network", and "in e.tlect 
are aform of corruption" [96,p.l]. She reinforces this view of informal payments when 
she raises the problem of distinguishing between informal payments and gratitude 
payments, emphasising the importance of whether payment is discretionary or required. 
The same point was put forward by Shahriari et al. [104,p.lO], who argued that the 
distinction between formal and informal payments was not clear cut, in part because 
"the line between a voluntary gift and a coercive payment is hard to draw". This 
approach suggests that payments should be considered informal, if there is some degree 
of coercion from the provider side, which they exercise to further their own interests at 
the expense of the public interest. As Lewis [96,p.4] argued "inj(Jrmal paYlllents ... 
provide a means by which corrllpt public servants can ensure or maximize their incollle, 
evade taxes, and effectively 'beat the system"', and consequently "are a/uI'1II (!lsystelllic 
corruption". 
If we adopt 'pursuing one's private interests at the expense of public interest' as a 
working definition of corruption, it is not difticult to show how it is different fi'om 
illegality. If rules are not detailed or straightforward, clear cases of corruption may not 
be illegal. In contrast, illegality does not indicate corruption when the rules are ignored 
or bypassed in the public interest. Moreover, the general public may not be aware of 
certain regulations or, as has been mentioned before, disregard them, if the rules set by 
the state do not coincide with the norms of society. According to these considerations 
informal payments would in fact be 'corrupt payments', which benefit a few physicians 
and patients, leaving the rest worse-off, regardless of the actual informality or illegality 
of the phenomenon. We are talking about both providers and users, as, contrary to the 
position taken by Lewis [96], there is no reason to assume that only providers can have 
corrupt intentions. 
Nonetheless, we argue that equating informal payments with corruption is inadequate 
to incorporate all observed forms of the phenomenon, even if we set aside the gratitude 
payment debate, and for now assume that gratuities arc not true informal payments. 
There are a number of examples of informal payments that are diflicult to fit into the 
framework of corruption, for instance in-kind contributions. Even Shahriari et al 
[1 04,p.l 0] acknowledge that "Ihere is a difFerence befll'ecll paYlJlellls .fi'OIll u'llich 
providers direclly benefit. and those thaI rejlccI ... the dire financial sitll"tiol1 (~I Ihe 
inslill/lion", and refer to the example of bringing one's own clean linen and food during 
hospital stays. Nonetheless one can argue in defence of the corruption ddinition in that 
cost-shifting to patients, in the form of inadequate medical supplies and other support 
services, could well be an income maximising strategy on the part of health care 
providers, inasmuch as the 'savings' realised this way can be channelled to tlK: 
remuneration of health care workers. Examples from many developing anel transitional 
countries [96; 103], however, identify a more fundamental problem with the corruption 
framework. For instance Lewis [96,p.5] cites Georgia, Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation, where salaries of health workers have not only plummeted, but non-
payment is also common. In these circumstances the alternative to informal charging is 
leaving one's job, which would result in the tntal collapse of the system. Given the 
alternative, it is difficult to argue that 'no service' is more in the public inlL'n:st than a 
system that delivers services, even if users have to pay. This is especially so if' the 
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benefits spill over to the poor, if health care providers price-discriminate according to 
their patients' ability to pay. We argue that stigmatising patients and health workers as 
corrupt in these extreme circumstances does not help policy-makers, but rather diverts 
attention from the heart of the problem. Whilst Lewis [96,pA] argues that "corrupt 
public servants" effectively "beat the system", it is the system (the government) that 'has 
beaten first'. Patients and doctors simply adapted to the rules of the game. 
This is not to say that corruption is not part of the phenomenon, but that it is not the 
distinctive characteristic of informal payments. In a system where insufficient funding 
undermines the legitimacy of regulations set by the government, the interpretation by 
individual patients and service providers about what is acceptable and what is not can 
vary considerably. Indeed, there are certain informal payments whose corrupt nature 
would be difficult to deny. Thompson and Witter [102,p.179] reported that, in the 
former Soviet Union, different terms were used to differentiate physicians being paid 
informally for what they were "supposed to do" as opposed to what they were "not 
supposed to do". In Hungary, Buda [9,pp.83-84] argued that official discllssions were 
dominated by the gratitude payment concept, but primary care wus the obvious example 
where gratitude payment was blatantly interconnected with corruption. lIe argucd that 
in primary care, the patient-doctor relationship was continuous and informal payments 
were often made for example to obtain medical certificates for sickness leave, or referral 
to certain specialists or hospitals. As he put it, informal payments made to general 
practitioners were "the 'socialist'skeletun that cOl/ld not be hidden ill the cup/ward" 
[9,p.84]. 
Acknowledging the importance of this issue, we argue that the role of coercion 
versus 'thanksgiving', corruption or legitimacy is central to the understanding of thl! 
nature of the phenomenon, and its impact on system pcrformance, hut these criteria, 
along with illegality and informality, are not adequate to formulate a coherent and 
measurable definition of informal payment. Then what is the characteristic that is 
common to all forms of informal payments described so far? 
F.2.5. ENTITLEMENTS: AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
We argue that the regulatory activity of the state plays an important part in the 
definition of informal payments, but not that they determine legality or illegality. 
Regulations are important insofar as they determine what services patients should 
receive in exchange for what, a concept that we call 'entitlement'. We argue that all 
forms of informal payments involve some form of direr! contrihution by patients or 
their households in addition to what is formally required, i.c. what the terms of 
entitlement determine. 'Contribution' refers to any form of payment, in cash or in-kind. 
which is made in addition to anything required legally, while 'direct' means that this 
contribution is borne directly by the patients or their households as opposed to third 
parties, such as private health insurance, compulsory social insurance and taxation.('~ 
Informal payments are a subset of out-of-pocket contributions, the distinguishing 
63 Eventually, all health care costs are borne by houscholds, insofar as prepaid private insurance 
premiullls, soci~1 insurance contributions and taxes also come from households, but there is a significllnt 
difference in terms of economic incidence, i.c. how thc costs of health services are distributed among 
various population groups, pllrticularly betwccn the sick llnd the healthy. All forms of out-of-pocket 
pllymcnts fall directly on thc sick, whilst prepaid schemcs spread the cost burden of IKaith care to indlilk 
the healthy. 
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characteristic being that formal out-of-pocket payments are stipulated in the terms of 
entitlements, whilst informal payments are made in addition to them. 
Hence, the distinctive characteristic of informal payments is this 'superfluous' 
characteristic of the contribution, whether utilisation is free of charge or a direct 
contribution set out in the terms of health care entitlements. This approach implies that, 
from the perspective of definition of informal payments, it is immaterial whether a 
particular form of informal payment is legal or registered (formal) in a particular 
country. What shifts a direct payment from the category of informal payments to the 
category of other direct payments, or vice versa, is any change in the existing 
entitlements to health services. 
Accordingly, informal payment for health care can be defined more precisdy as: 
'a direct contribution, which is made in addition to any contribution determined by 
the terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or those acting on behalf of 
patients, to health care providers for services which the patients are cnti tIed to'. 
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Again, we stress that the distinctive feature of informal payment is that it is 
additional to the legally defined terms of entitlement, which describes thosc services 
that can be utilized by patients, what these services comprise and how much out-of-
pocket payment has to be paid. It must be noted, however, that legally defincd docs not 
necessarily mean that entitlements to health services are regulated in detail by law. 
Entitlements can be defined by several actors in the health care system and not just the 
government. For instance in the private sector, private providers or insurance 
companies are allowed to define what patients get in exchange for what. even if there 
are certain restrictions imposed on them by centrally determined regulations. It is also 
possible in a public system that providers are allowed to collect co-payments from users 
of services. According to the definition proposed here, the reference point for 
determining whether a direct contribution is a formal or informal payment is the formal 
terms of entitlement, regardless of who sets them. 
The advantage of this definition is that it consistently encompasses ,III described 
forms of informal payments, such as envelope, advance and brick paymcnts, gi fts, or the 
in kind provision of drugs, nursing or meals during inpatient care, and docs nut attempt 
to explain why patients give and whether informal payments are good or bad. 
It is important to note, however, that the boundaries of informal payments set hy this 
definition imply a number of inclusions and exclusions. We have aln:ady mentioned 
voluntary purchases from private providers, which are not accounted for by the provider 
to avoid paying tax. In accordance with Lewis [96], these are excluded by our 
definition, too. In the subsequent sections, we explore exclusions and in<.:iusiol1s in 
more detail. 
F.2.6. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? 
Most of the definitions listed in Table F2 see informal payments as exclusive to the 
public sector; payments to public providers only. Balazs l211] went C\'CI1 further by 
arguing that it was conceptual absurdity to talk about informal payments in a purdy 
private setting. Why would patients pay more out of their pocket than the price that the 
private practitioner charges? 
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In contrast, our definition does not exclude informal payments in the private sector. 
In principle, it is possible that patients pay more to a private provider than the 
predetermined fee, even if there is no obvious reason why they would do so. We argue, 
however, that this depends on how one explains informal payments. If the gratitude 
payment concept is valid and it is a norm embedded in the culture of the society to make 
gifts to health care providers to thank them for being cured, it would be illogical to 
claim that patients are only grateful to public and not private providers. Indeed, 
informal payments in the private sector are a neglected, but theoretically possible 
option, whose empirical study would yield important evidence concerning the validity 
of the gratitude payment concept. Moreover, fee setting in the private sector can be 
subject to regulatory restrictions imposed by the state, which may also generate 
informal payments. 
A sharp separation of the public and the private sector docs not accurately rdkct the 
findings of studies that report increasingly blurred boundaries between the two sectors, 
not just in terms of informal payments, but concerning the development of the private 
sector in general [104,p.4]. The collapse of the communist regime in the countries of 
the former Soviet bloc opened the way for the development of a private sector, but in 
many ways this development was interlinked with the public sector rather than 
separated from it. In most of these countries the 'skeleton' of the Scmashku system 
remained in place, but the flesh on the bones, the muscles, which move the system an: 
rather a delicate mixture of public and private than a 'clean' public 'tisSUI.!'. Advance 
payments are a good example, whereby a separate part-time private practice is lIsed to 
'sell ' public services provided by the same physician in the public institution. Part time 
private practice can also take place in public institutions, but not necessary illegally. 
For instance, in Poland so-called "medical foundations" have been established, which 
hire the facilities, equipment and even the personnel from the public provider to offer 
services privately, with the designated working hours being the only difference between 
the public and the private service [104]. However, whether any speci fie services an: 
offered in 'normal' working hours, and should thus be provided for free, or whether 
they are regularly offered and directly paid for as part of physicians' intra-mural private 
activity in extra-time, is increasingly difficult to determine. Public employment also 
provides opportunities to recruit, or sometimes even to force patients into private 
practice [I 04,pp.13,21; 103]. These practices do not only underpin the argument that 
informal payments can cross the line between the public and the private sector, hut offer 
examples of phenomena that are not informal payments, according to not just our, but 
any proposed definition, although they are closely related to them. 
F.2.7. INFORMAL PAYMENT AND INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Our definition does exclude a number of informal activities that arc not informal 
payments; nonetheless they can have similar implications as informal payment itscl ron 
policy making. For instance, illegal private practice in public institutions or forcing 
patients to go to private practice do not fit the criteria of informal payments, if patients 
do not pay more than physicians ask for. A wide range of reluted provider activities 
have been reported by McPake et al. [98] in Uganda, from pi! rering of drug suppl ies and 
misuse of formal revenues to rarely showing up during ofticial working hours. On the 
patients' side, using social connections may be an example, which, beside cush and in-
1'1 II. R (; A A 1 
I' A (J I' J ~ 7 I Till' SIS _ (; I' M I' ,. I S I' II _ \' 1 7 
F. THE DEFINITION OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
F.2 DEFINITIONS OF INFORMAL PAYMENT 
kind payments, Shahriari et al [104,p.24] categorise as "other means to ensure access to 
quality care". 
The recognition that informal payment is part of a wider category of 'informal 
economic activities' is important for understanding the nature and boundaries of the 
phenomenon, especially why people give. We shall revisit this issue, when the theories 
of informal payment are discussed. 
F.2.8. GRATUITIES: VOLUNTARY GIFTS? 
Our definition deliberately ignores the motivation of the actors and the timing of the 
transaction, and therefore it does not exclude gratuities. However, as has bcen 
mentioned before, the differentiation between voluntary contributions by pati~nts as 
opposed to those enforced by the provider, and betwecn ex ante and ex post payments, 
is a recurring theme in debates on the phenomenon not just amongst res~archers but also 
policy makers, giving rise to the idea that gratuities are not informal payments in the 
strict sense, or at least that they should be treated separately [66; 50; 67; 96; 104]. 
Indeed, a culturally determined 'thanksgiving' that has no adverse effect on equity and 
efficiency, but may improve provider responsiveness, and as suggest~d by Shahriari ct 
a1. [1 04,p.4], has markedly different implications for policy making than a payment that 
is enforced where, if there is non payment, access is denied. It is doubtful, though, 
whether gratuities really exist in a 'pure' form, or whether it is possible to separate them 
from informal payments. 
F.2.8.1 Before and after 
The difficulty of interpreting 'before' and 'after' in health care has already been pointed 
out [85; 49; 9; 74], whilst the examples of advance payments, bartcr and political 
favours have illustrated that the phenomenon is not constrained by tim~ and space [85; 
9; 104,p.18]. In Hungary, Petschnig [85] explicitly denied the validity of tlK' concept of 
gratitude payments. As she put it: "gratitude paymenl is a fce 10 ohtain personal gains 
even if paid after the service." Buda [9] went further by arguing that the gratitude 
payment concept served ideological purposes, justifying the ofticial policy of virtual 
approval, which had many beneficiaries including the government. It kept a potcntially 
powerful group (physicians) silent and it eased the financial pressure on the health care 
system by shifting some of the financial burden implicitly to patients. 
F.2.8.2 The phases of financial hardship and images of informal payment 
We argue that the conceptual confusion around this issue is partly attributable to that the 
state-socialist past of former communist countries being largely ignored. Whilst the 
available cross-country comparative analyses stress the causal link between the hardship 
caused by insufficient financial resources and informal payments, they consider 
gratuities as a pre-transition cultural tradition in these countries [96; 102]. The 
recognition that similar, but perhaps weaker and less visibk fOI'l:cS worked during the 
communist period helps us to refine the overall conclusion of Lewis that the collapse of 
the communist regime led to the rapid exacerbation of the problem in most countries of 
the region, and why Slovenia and the Czech Republic may be exceptions [96,pp.l,3,5 J. 
If we take the idea of insufficient funding as a starting point in ollr analysis, a simple 
model can be drawn up which relates the scale of lack of resources to the various forms 
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Table F3. 
of informal payments observed (Table F3). Phases of Idecompensation' range from 
sufficient funding with no informal payments at one extreme to the other where 
virtually no funding is available so that even salaries are unpaid and providers openly 
charge patients. Of course these schematic phases can and do overlap in reality. 
There are two basic assumptions in this model. First, that there is a clear ranking in 
Icost savingl methods in line with the extent of under funding. It ranges from reductions 
that do not have immediate effect on the supply of services, such as investment costs 
and some element of salaries, to reductions that make it impossible to maintain services 
even in the short run, such as resources to pay for essential supplies and a basic lcvel of 
salaries. Second, that there is a ranking of legitimacy, in other words what type of 
informal payments are seen as acceptable by providers in relation to the extent of 
funding inadequacy. The more desperate the situation is, the less providers are 
disturbed about using coercion. We argue that different types of informal paYlllcnt arc 
means of compensation for inadequate funding. The appearance of a new form of 
informal payments may be the first sign that the system is decompensating and moving 
to another phase. 
Hypothesised association between the extent of funding insufficicncy and thc forms of inforlllul 
payment 
Gifts, Cash payment In-kind Cllsh pllymcnt to 
tips to staff, bartcr con t ribution institutional 
providcrs 
Adcquatc funding, but x 
uniform provision 
Investment costs (training, x 
equipment, building) 
Salaries-}: low x 
Medical supplies, x 
ancillary services 
.. 
Salarics-2: arrears, non- x 
payment 
The examples cited by Lewis [96], in one of the most comprehensive cross-country 
comparison of informal payments so far, seem to fit well in this framework. Lewis 
[96,pp.3,5] argues that informal payments have been reported from all countries of CEE 
and the FSU, with the exception of Slovenia and Czech Republic, where health care 
salaries kept pace with inflation and remained above the national average. However, 
other sources suggest that informal payments did exist in the Czech Republic during the 
communist period, as in other former communist countries [218]. Whilst total, and 
within them publicly funded health care expenditures were more homogenous among 
communist countries, levels of health care spending are now extremely diwrse (Table 
F4). Health care spending has increased in Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland and declined in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan, leaving Slovcnia and 
the Czech Republic by far the highest spenders on health care in the n:gion. 
Furthermore, within the high spending group a large gap has developed het\veen these 
first two countries and Hungary, and a less marked, but still noticeable gap remained 
between Poland and Hungary. In Table F4, 1991 is used as a proxy for the communist 
period, because of the limitations of data availability in previous years. It is likely that 
the divergence would be even more marked if more appropriate data were availabll.!. 
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Table F4. 
For instance in Hungary the establishment of social insurance funding in 1990, brought 
about a substantial increase in health care expenditures. While in 1989 purchasing-
power adjusted per capita health expenditures were US$325, the corresponding figure 
for 1990 was US$51O [107]. To provide another example, in 1994, PPP-adjustcd public 
per capita health expenditures were US$9 in Ukraine and US$65 in Kazakhstan. 
Health care expenditures in selected countries (in PPP US$) 
1991 1999 
COUNTRY 
Public Total Public Total 
Slovenia 311 311 1058 1230 
.---- -----------
Czech Republic 485 539 899 9!U 
Hungary 436 501 575 767 
Poland 224 296 402 535 
Russia ... 383 . .. 1(J'/ 
Ukraine ... 171 . .. In7 
Georgia ... 165 . .. 105 
Kazakhstan 195 198 104 
Source: [I07} 
These trends correspond well with the forms of informal payments observed in these 
countries. There are no or few informal payments in the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
[96,pp.5-6], whilst informal charging is commonplace in Georgia and Ukraine, where 
non-payment of salaries is common [96,p.5]. In the Russian Federation salaries arc 
often in arrears and informal payments are estimated as 56% of total health care 
expenditure [96,pp.5,19]. Hungary and Poland lie somewhere in the middle with low 
salaries among the health workforce compared to other sectors of the economy, and 
cash payments, mainly to medical doctors, as the dominant form of informal payments 
[67; 204]. There is, however, a difference between the two countries. In-kind 
contributions (lack of medical supplies) have been reported from Poland, but not from 
Hungary [104]. 
F.2.8.3 The 'coercion factor', trust and the social capital of health care 
Another source of conceptual confusion concerning gratuities is what differentiates 
voluntary payments from payments that are enforced. We argue that coercion should be 
given a wider interpretation, which goes beyond the narrow provider focus implied by 
Lewis [96] and Shahriari et ai. [I 04,p.21]. The desire of patients to get bettcr carc than 
they expect the system will deliver is in itself a reflection of pressure for paymcnt, even 
if providers do not, subtly or otherwise, demand (enforce) informal payments. 
The distrust of patients in the ability of the system to deliver adequate services, in 
terms of quality and timing, \-vithout paying, does not necessarily have to come from the 
patients' own experiences. It may reflect a society-wide dissatisfaction with public 
services, which makes people suspicious about what they can expect to reccin:. For 
instance Lewis [96,p.18] reported that a survey in the Russian Federation found that a 
quarter of the respondents used private care, because "they lacked cOI!/hlcIICC ill the 
professional qualifications of pl/blic employee physicians." In health care, matters are 
complicated further in that patientsl ability to judge the clinical quality of services is 
limited by the information asymmetry between patients and physicians. Consequently it 
is possible that patients may perceive a problem to exist evell if the system ddivers 
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adequate service, implying that trust is very difficult to build up again, once it has been 
lost. 
Ensor and Witter [103] put forward a plausible hypothesis concerning the success of 
financial risk sharing schemes in low income countries, where the informal sector is 
large and initiatives must build on voluntary participation. They argue that the 
sustainability of local financing initiatives is insufficiently explained by the peculiarities 
of individual behaviour in voluntary health insurance markets, such as adverse 
selection, observed in wealthier countries. At least equally important is the challenge to 
policy makers from what they call "an understandable distrust of official schemes", as 
"individuals may ask the question: if I put my money into this insurance fund, will it still 
be there when Ifall ill and need it?" They argue that in these circumstances the success 
of community financing depends on how much the local initiative is able to win support 
from the members of the community, by involving people and developing shared 
values, a key tenet of social capital theories. If building this social capital is successful, 
people seem willing to pay more than the benefits they anticipate. 
We suggest extending this argument to service provision. If social capital is eroded 
by a long-term discrepancy between what has been promised and what is delivered, 
patients rightly ask the question: 'If I use public services, will I receive the care that I 
need?'. \Ve argue that this distrust (or loss of social capital) prcssurises patients to pay 
'voluntarily', at least as much as direct pressure by providers. It is this 'coercion' that 
distinguishes other forms of informal payments from gratitude payments. Moreover, 
the concept of distrust suggests that informal payments cannot successfully be 
eliminated in the absence of measures aimed at restoring social capital. Indeed, the lack 
of social capital can be invoked as a plausible factor in explaining the extent of informal 
payments in CEE and FSU countries. Informal payments and informal economic 
activities may be considered part of a more general distrust in government, contributing 
to a degree of disintegration of society. This is akin to what Ensor and Witter call a 
"culture of individualism", characterised by the expansion of the informal scctor. 
However, the extent to which social capital was lost has varied, reflecting differences in 
pathways of transition. Some countries were able to achieve stability and subsequently 
improve their situation, whilst others were trapped in a vicious downward cycle. 
Expansion of the informal sector led to shrinkage of government revenues, which led to 
a deterioration in public services, leading to an increasing illegitimacy of government 
established regulations in the eyes of both providers, who were not paid, and users of 
services, who did not get \vhat they wanted. This further eroded the trust in the public 
system for two reasons. First, negative views among users of services were reinforced, 
and second, providers considered it increasingly legitimate to manipulate the services 
for their own benefit. These factors contributed to the further expansion of the informal 
sector and a decline in public revenues and so on. 
F.2.8.4 Gifts? Coercion by users 
In addition to coercion, another issue requiring clarification in respect of gratuities is 
what constitutes a gift, in terms of what is given and why it is given? The gratitude 
payment concept assumes that, as Szabo [72] put it, there is a part of a physician's work 
that it is "1'101 possible 10 pay for". If this is true, then cash payments macle to health 
workers seem to be incompatible with the concept of a gift. Moreover, it suggests that 
gift giving is a unilateral process, so that gifts are not given in exchange for something. 
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If gifts are given openly so that the receiver knows who the giver is, then it is very 
difficult to exclude reciprocity and the creation of an obligation in the relationship. This 
makes it difficult to distinguish true gratuities from other forms of informal payments 
based on real or perceived exchanges. Indeed, researchers often overlook how patients 
may seek to create obligations by giving, to offset the power of the physician. As Field 
[388; cited in 102] put it, informal payments "constilute a countervailing power at the 
disposal of the patient to exert some control over the physician". One can only be 
absolutely sure that a Ipure' gift has been given if the giver does not reveal her identity, 
which has echoes of the biblical injunction to: "Take care not to perform righteous 
deeds in order that people may see them ... When YOlt give alms, do not blow trumpet 
before you, as the hypocrites do ... to win the praise of others ... But when you give alms. 
do not let your left hand know what your right is doing ... /I [389,Mt.6, 1-4]. This is 
certainly not typical of gratitude payments in health care. 
Nonetheless, the validity of the gratitude payment concept remains a qucstion that 
should be explored by empirical research. It is rarely sufficient to conclude whether a 
gift was given voluntarily or was (in its wider sense) coerced from knowledge of what is 
given, when and to whom. Empirical research on this issue should address the 
motivation of actors, which remains a key distinguishing characteristic of It rue' 
gratuities. 
F.4. Implications for research: operationalisation of informal 
payment 
Whilst the above conceptualisation of informal payment provides a starting point for its 
study even in an international context, it is not obvious how to put the definition into 
practice. The difficulty of operationalisation relates to the problems of obtaining 
appropriate data that will permit separation of formal and informal payments, as well as 
of the various forms of the phenomenon. 
The sources of data on informal payments are ultimatc1y the participants of the 
transactions, including patients, households and individual and institutional providers. 
Lewis [96,p.l 0] argues that, in countries where informal payments are illegal, providers 
are reluctant to admit or discuss informal payments. If the illegality of the phenomenon 
is clear this probably applies equally to patients. Nonetheless providers have a good 
reason to deny informal payments even in countries where they are not illegal, if 
providers conceal their income from informal payments to avoid paying tax. This 
suggests that patients and households are generally better sources of information, which 
may explain why published quantitative studies have so far almost exclusively targeted 
the user side [96,pp.11-13; 102]. 
The complexity of the task of separating formal and informal payments rcOeds the 
difficulty in assessing whether entitlemcnts arc clear to the various actors, and to what 
extent formal and informal payments coexist in the same system, in particular for the 
same service. There are two possible ways to operationalise informal payments. First, 
patients can be asked directly to distinguish formal and informal payments. Second, it 
is possible to ask respondents how much they spent (contributed) according to difTerent 
type of services and different type of providers, and then researchers have to 'distill out' 
informal payments on the basis of total out-of-pocket payments reported and of the 
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knowledge of existing formal direct payments determined by the laws and regulations in 
the health care system under study. 
If entitlements, including the level of co-payments, are laid down centrally and apply 
equally to all health care providers, the indirect method can work well, since the 
identification of informal payments is not different for different providers and does not 
rely on patients' own interpretation. Moreover, if questions do not directly address 
informal payments it may be possible to obtain a better response, given the sensitive 
nature of the topic. Conversely, as systems increasingly decentralize decisions about 
terms of entitlement, researchers increasingly rely on patients to separate the formal 
from the informal, since it is increasingly difficult to distinguish informal payment 
when formal co-payments are widespread and individual providers arc allowed to set 
them freely, or at least within broad limits. However, if patients are asked directly, 
there is a risk that the individuals' perception of what constitutes an informal payment 
does not coincide with the above proposed conceptualization. For instance, in llungary, 
the most widely used term to denote the phenomenon is gratitude payment but this has 
always been a source of confusion [67; 9]. One group of patients may consider only 
'true' gratitude payments, while others include payments for better care. Furthermore, 
the direct method assumes that patients know what they are entitled to, but evidence has 
shown that patients are often confused about their health entitlements, especially if there 
are frequent changes in the health care system [96,p.16; 102; I 04,p.1 0]. Patients may 
not be aware of co-payments introduced for previously free services, or muy 11llt 
question charges, even if services remained free of charge. 
Further difficulties arise when it comes to the separation of the various forms of 
informal payments. The distinction between in-kind contributions and cash payments is 
not straightforward as certain in-kind contributions, such as pharmaceuticals, may need 
to be paid for, even if ultimately they are provided in-kind. More importantly, as 
discussed before, gratitude payments are not easy to distinguish, and quantitative 
methods alone may be insufficient to capture the motivation of the actors. As Lewis 
[96,p.14] argues, qualitative methods are important to explore motivation, which is 
difficult to assess in surveys. 
F .5. Conclusions 
Reviewing the varieties of informal payment reported from various countries, we ha\'c 
concluded that none of the proposed definitions provides a consistl!nt critl!rion to 
separate informal payments from other direct contributions. The alternative ddinition, 
suggested here, identifies informal payment as a direct contribution that is in addition to 
what has been defined by the terms of entitlement, and this 'additional' nature of 
informal payment is the distinctive characteristic that separates 'informal' from other 
'formal' out-of-pocket payments. We have argued that this definition provides a 
consistent boundary that is able to incorporate the various forms of informal payments 
described so far, across countries and within countries over time, as opposed to other 
criteria such as informality, illegality and corruption, which are prone to inconsistcnt 
categorisation and may imply value judgements and unverified assumptions conccrning 
the nature of the phenomenon. 
The proposed definition delimits the boundaries of the phenomenon, which implks 
certain inclusions and exclusions. It excludes fees that are not reported by the private 
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provider to avoid paying tax, whilst it does not exclude the possibility of informal 
payments in the private sector. It excludes certain informal economic activities, such as 
coercing patients to use private practice, or undertaking illegal private practice in public 
institutions, but it includes gratuities, gifts and donations. However, both create certain 
ambiguities. One can argue that giving is an accepted social activity, whose 
implications differ from payments coerced and consequently should 110t be included. In 
contrast, the excluded informal economic activities are similar to informal payments in 
their implications for policy making. Here we have argued that policy making should 
take a wider focus that includes all informal economic activities, only one form of 
which is informal payment. On the other hand, we acknowledge that voluntary 
donations and coerced payments have different implications, but these should rather be 
seen as different explanations than different forms of informal payment and require 
verification by empirical research. In any case, coercion should be given a wider 
interpretation both on the providers' and the users' side. 
Discussing the implications of the definition on the current study and on empirical 
research in general we have concluded that the operationalisation of informal payments 
is a complex task. Both the direct and the indirect methods of separating formal and 
informal payments are prone to miscategorization. There seems no unambiguously 
ideal way to operationalise the concept of informal payments, as important aspects of 
formality or informality, legality or illegality, terms of entitlement and the existence of 
formal out-of-pocket payments vary between countries. 
Nonetheless, conceptualisation in a way that makes it possible to incorporate the 
findings of existing empirical studies is the first step towards understanding informal 
payments and so providing an empirical basis for new effective policies to tackle the 
phenomenon. The proposed new definition emphasises the additional contribution 
above what the user is required to make. This raises the question of 'why people give 
more than is required?' Is informal payment the product of a tradition of 'giving thanks' 
or culture of 'gifts'? Is it because people are unaware of what they are entitled to? Or is 
it because the health care system is not able to deliver what has been promised? The 
answers to these questions are crucial for policy makers, not only because they 
determine what should and may be done about informal payments, but also whether it is 
necessary to do anything at all. The next chapter addresses exactly these isslIes in more 
detail, invoking the concepts of gratitude payment and coercion raised in this chapter. 
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Table Gl. 
The causes of informal payment in the Hungarian health care system have been subject 
to intensive debates ever since it became a legitimate topic of scientific research. The 
various explanations and causal factors, which are presented in Table G 1 in thrce main 
categories: legal-ethical, social-cultural, and economic, were put forward in two major 
waves.
69 
Causes of the emergence of informal payment in the Hungarian health care system 
Casual factor Source 
SOCIAL-CULTURAL 
Gratitude, tipping [194; 2071 
Development of people's attitudes lagged behind [208] 
LEGAL-ETHICAL 
Low morale of the medical profession (individualistic/petty [ 192] 
bourgeois approach) 
Voluntarism of the 1950's (community-centred approach) [390 ' 1951 
Lack of control and accountability [66; 50; 49 ; 651 
ECONOMIC 
Demand-side factors 
Freeness - infinite demand [85] 
Freeness - excess demand [202] 
Restriction of consumer sovereignty - decreased purchasing power PO; 109] 
Sudden increase in demand for health care [49] 
Restriction of consumer sovereignty - the lack of free choice of [70; 196; 109; 71] 
provider, lack of trust, fear and anxiety 
Supply-side factors 
Macroeconomic policy did not prefer the health sector [70 ' 202; 40; 52] 
Inappropriate payment methods of providers (institutions and [52] 
physicians) 
Low salary of physicians (health workers) [391 ;208 ; 70;66; 50;49J 
During the 1970s the theoretical discussion was dominated by the social-cultural and 
ethical explanations of informal payment. These theories provided scientific 
underpinnings for the official policy, which did not acknowledge that inrormul 
payments had anything to do with the construct and operation of the Semashko system 
itself. During the 1980s, however, the regime had increasingly permitted the 
publication of critical views, whieh introduced the legal and economic explanations into 
the dispute _ These causal factors explicitly linked informal payments to the failures of 
the health care system, or openly criticised the official policy of 'no direct action'. 
G.1. Social-cultural explanations of informal payments 
According to Adam [50; 49] the origins of informal payment in the Hungarian health 
care system can be traced back to the end of the 1940s, when the new state-socialist 
69 Table 4.1 presents the hypothes ised casual factors with their most prominent advocates, although it 
Illust be noted that most commentators see informal payment as a phenomenon with Illultiple causes. 
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model was established (chapter 2). During this period the official policy of the 
communist party gradually took shape, separating 'tipping' from corrupt practices, such 
as selling beds, and cheating with sickness benefits. While the former was tolerated, the 
latter should have been eradicated by means of administrative (legal) measures. 
Early theoretical discussions reflected this duality, introducing ethical and social-
cultural explanations of informal payment. Toleration of informal payment was 
justified by social-cultural factors, namely the custom of tipping and the gratitude 
motive, as Szabo [72,p.285] put it: "We must accept that tipping and presentation 
existed in the past and will be with us in the future for a long time, too. It is impossible 
to forbid people to give gifts ". The proponents of this 'gift giving' or 'gratitude payment' 
approach argued that the work of physicians has a part, which "cannot be paid for 
[sic] ". Healing traditionally leads to a sense of gratitude, and recovered patients 
express this in the form of gifts. This is part of national culture, rooted in ancient 
traditions of votive offerings [72,pp.61-68; 203]. More recent writers, such as Kornai 
[207,p.l05] also emphasized the historical origin of informal payment, regarding 
informal payment as a special form oftipping.70 Whilst some argued for making a clear 
distinction between tipping and gift giving, since the habit oftipping had developed in a 
traditional master-servant relationship [50], whether informal payment is considered a 
gratitude payment or a tip, it is thought to be part of the culture of the society and 
consequently its origin predates the establishment of the state-socialist health care 
system. 
The cultural dimension of the phenomenon was further elaborated by Magyar, who 
interpreted informal payment within the concept of social evolution. He argued that 
people were unable adapt to the achievements of the communist regime so their attitude 
to free access "lagged behind" in the earlier feudal-capitalist society [208,p.140]. 
Unlike the gratitude payment concept, this argument was rarely used to underpin 
official party policy, but common to all three approaches is that they explain informal 
payment in social-cultural terms and imply that it is very difficult to change. This 
clearly differs from the legal-ethical and economic explanations, which offer the 
prospect of achievable solutions in the short term. 
G.2. Legal-ethical explanations of informal payment 
The essence of the legal-ethical explanation is that informal payment is a moral issue, 
with clear legal consequences. The earliest approach emphasized the low morals of the 
medical profession, in which they not just accepted informal payments, but actively 
extract them from the patients. As Lukats [192] put it, physicians were ''philistine (pelly 
bourgeois)" and individualistic by nature, i.e. they selfishly worked for themselves 
(rather than the community). This argument was an important element of the early 
attitude of the communist party, which, according to Adam [49:,p.86], regarded the 
medical profession as a "counterrevolutionary gang", and justified the harsh treatment 
of physicians when it came to the determination of salaries. 
70 Other authors, such Balazs, also questioned the direct link between informal payment and the 
communist regime. Nevertheless, Balazs [73] was discussing illegal practice in public hospitals as a pre-
communist phenomenon, not informal payment per se. 
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Nevertheless, the ethical approach was later used to justify the acceptance of 
informal payment along with the concept of gratitude. Writers on medical ethics 
distinguished the various circumstances in which the acceptance of informal payment 
was not immoral, most obviously if it was given without prompting, by grateful 
patients, and even certain cases, when there was a perceived obligation to accept [193; 
194]. The ethical approach coupled with the cultural explanation of the gratitude 
motive has persisted ever since and it is still the dominant view among the 
representatives of the medical profession [86]. 
Of course, the possibility that low moral standards among Hungarian physicians 
might explain informal payment was fiercely denied by the profession and was also 
rejected by many later theorists [391; 390: 212; 85; 66], some of whom rejected the 
relevance of the ethical approach altogether. The critique of the ethical perspectivc 
came from three directions, all of which expressed some criticism of the regime. 
Levendel argued that the cause of informal payment was not the individualism of 
physicians, but the "voluntarism" of the 1950s. The regime expected people to work for 
the sake of the community and not for themselves (i.e. to accept a poor salary) and the 
rejection of this view led to the emergence of informal payment [390; 195]. 
In contrast, Adam and Blasszauer emphasized lack of control and accountability, 
thereby pushing the ethical discussion into the realm of law. Although Blasszauer [65] 
did not explicitly question the distinction between gratitude paymcnt and more 
obviously corrupt practices, he pointed out the failure to use legal sanctions in even the 
most extreme cases of informal payment. Adam [66; 49,p.76] extended this argument 
by explicitly denying that the various forms of informal payment could meaningfully be 
separated in practice and emphasized the legal ambiguity surrounding the problem as 
the main cause of informal payment. On the basis of comparison with other health care 
systems, he concluded that the only unique feature of the Hungarian system was the 
official toleration of informal payment, even though it had never been legally permitted 
[66]. He argued that the authorities deliberately failed to enforcc the law in order to 
avoid paying physicians an adequate salary. It was this official disregard of the law that 
made informal payment widespread. 
Finally, Petschnig [85] also criticized the ethical approach to the problem and 
introduced a third group of casual factors into the discussion, which tried to explain the 
emergence of informal payment according to economic principles. 
G.3. Economic explanations of informal payment 
The common feature of both the social-cultural and the legal-ethical explanations is that 
they do not necessarily imply any problem with the health care system itself. Petschnig 
[85] challenged this view by identifying shortage as the principal cause of informal 
payment. Obviously the regime did not want to admit this and sought to exclude an 
economic interpretation for decades. Although the medical profession had argued that 
their low salaries were a key factor from the beginning of the communist period, this 
was not seen as being linked to poor health system performance. As Weil put it: "There 
is no higher morale than Ihe socialist ethics. We must implement this among 
physicians ... We have been talking abo lit a 101, thaI lipping is thriving among health 
workers ... The calise is the same: Ihe salary of physicians is so 10 lV, Ihat it cannot 
enslIre an adeqllate living standard" [1948 cited in 49,p.76]. Nevertheless, Pctschnig 
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[85] denied the role of low salaries in the genesis of informal payment on the grounds 
that acceptance is secondary to giving, and that patients did not know how much doctors 
earned. Instead, with her famous assertion "Freeness makes ill!", she argued that free 
access to health services, with the implied infinite demand leading to an artificial 
shortage was responsible for the problem. 
While shortage is central to all economic theories of informal payment, Petschnig's 
idea of "infinite demand" was later criticised by many researchers [70; 202]. Galasi and 
Kertesi [202] argued that the demand for health services was not just constrained by 
user charges, but associated costs of utilization, such as the pain and discomfort of 
interventions and costs of obtaining information, travel, and lost time. On the other 
hand, Petshnig's idea of artificial shortage, which is essentially an argument for demand 
side moral hazard, again does not imply a problem in the supply of health services. As 
a response to Petschnig's article Kuti [70] introduced the supply side arguments into the 
economic debate. Criticising the concept of infinite demand, she argued that demand 
could be satisfied if the development of the health care sector had been given priority, 
but "/he socialist planned economy did no/ favour health care investments". Citing 
Marschall she saw two reasons for the 'unfavourable investment policy'. First, health 
care was regarded as an "unproductive" sector of the economy and second, it was 
financed from the central government budget. 
The inadequate supply argument was subsequently supported by other writers, 
including Adam [49], Szalai [40], Galasi and Kertesi [202]. Bordas [52]. Adam 
[49,pp.83-85] elaborated this argument by pointing to the sudden increase in the 
demand for health care as the immediate cause of inadequate supply. He argued that, 
during the establishment of the state-socialist health care system, the population covered 
increased rapidly, in large increments that were not followed by corresponding 
increases in capacity. 
Kuti [70] also saw two other sources of shortage. First, she pointed out that the 
regime defined wages and salaries of people in the context of '~rreeness" of health 
services, so decreasing the purchasing power of patients (consumers), while it failed to 
provide what they really wanted. Patients had been deprived of consumer sovereignty, 
including free choice of doctor and institution. She argued that trust between physicians 
and patients was a key ingredient of effective treatment and it was unlikely to develop if 
patients are denied choice. Indeed, she argued, the function of informal payment was 
partly to create the opportunity of free choice of physician and health care institution, 
The restriction of consumer sovereignty argument and, within it, lack of free choice of 
provider, were advocated by others, such as B6c [196]. Losonczi [109] and Antal [71] 
extended the argument by identifying the defencelessness of the patients and the anxiety 
accompanying medical interventions as key motivating factors in giving informal 
payment. Antal [71] argued that ''fear has an important role in the period of 
preparation for giving birth... hence variolls rllmOllrs ... have a pecliliar (demand 
induceJ) role, since for the time being only gratitude payment is able to defend them 
against these fears ... ", and later on that "mothers try to alleviate their oVeI"H'helming 
defencelessness with money ... ". In contrast, Galasi and Kcrtesi [202] questioned 
whether the consumer sovereignty argument had any relevance to the emergence of 
informal payment. They accepted the importance of trust, insofar as information 
asymmetry between patients and physicians made health care an experience or credence 
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good, but rejected the special emphasis on free choice other than it was part of 
consumers' unsatisfied wants. 
Beside the consumer sovereignty argument, the second innovation in Kuti's 
explanation was that she rejected Petschnig's view that low salaries were only of 
secondary importance in the genesis of informal payment. Kuti [70] argued that low 
salaries alone could have led to the emergence of the phenomenon inasmuch as they 
induced shortage. First, what Kuti called the "honest" physician's behaviour meant that 
physicians had to work overtime or take up second or third part-time jobs to make ends 
meet, so that the quality of their work declined, often creating an impression of 
carelessness to patients. Second, what she called "immoral behaviour" meant that 
some physicians organised the provision of services to encourage, elicit or even force 
payment. Galasi and Kertesi [202] challenged this latter proposition on the grounds that 
physician could not demand informal payments unless the idea had taken roots and 
become a routine feature of the system. Instead they argued that excess demand and 
insufficient resources together created a disequilibrium that the system could not 
resolve. 
Finally, Bordas [52] extended the supply side explanation even further. He argued 
that, regardless of the actual level of physician salaries, salaries and line item budgets 
were inappropriate payment mechanisms since they did not provide any incentives to 
increase productivity. 
G.4. Summary of various explanations 
In summary, the various theories concerning the causes of informal payment can be 
classified into three main groups, each of which has markedly different implications for 
policy responses. The cultural explanation assumes a never ending struggle with few or 
no effective tools in the hand of policy makers, whilst the economic and legal-ethical 
explanations offer feasible responses within a reasonable time period, even if the 
implied policy measures are different. 
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H. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INFORMAL PAYMENTS IN 
HUNGARY 
H.1. Summary table 
Table HI provides a detailed description of empirical research in Hungary between 
1969 and 2001. The table does not list empirical research, which is associated with the 
generation of official statistics, such as the household budget surveys (HBS) of the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO). 
There are three recent research studies, which partially addressed the topic of 
informal payments and are not listed either (the Ministry of Health's national health 
survey in 2001 and a survey which targeted exclusively the Roma population in 2002-
2003, and a survey of the Social Research Informatics Centre (T.A.RKI), in 2002-2003) 
but these did not generate differing new evidence, which would change the conclusion 
of chapter 4 on existing empirical evidence. 
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Table HI. 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INFORMAL PAYMENTS IN HUNGARY 
SUMMARY TABLE 
Empirical research on informal payment in Hungary 
# Research Unit of analysis (Study) Population (Source) lobservation 
1 OTKI* 1969 (June) Household I? District VI, VII & VIII of 
[77] Budapest 
2 DOTE* 1970? individual medical doctors of the 
[82] medical doctor university 
3 OTKI* 1970 individual OTKI patients 
[226] patient (aged over 14) 
4 OTKI* 1972-73 individual all hospital pat icnts agcd 16-
[78; 227] patient 75 between 11711972-
31/311973, excluding less 
than 5-day stays 
5 County-Hospital- individual Eger County Hospital 
Eger-1973 (first half) patient patients (excluding 
[80] psychiatry, neonatology) 
6 DOTE* 1973 individual Debrecen factory of 
[190] Hungarian Roller-Bearing 
Works 
7 ELTE* 1973 individual medical doctors in Hungary 
[198] medical doctor 
8 OTKI* 1981 individual Hospital (national); 
[81, preliminary report; patient Polyclinic, Occupational 
228] and Primary care (Budapest 
VIII & N6grad County) 
-- -
Sample size 
(Response rate) 
4591?(?) 
130 
1300(43.3%) 
71 R 1?(2 rounds, 
1st round only 
50%) 
4,396 19,R9R 
(44.4%) 
1,046 
14,300(24.3%) 
461 
/500(92.2%) 
? I?(?) 
1.606 
13,000(53.6%) 
Sampling Method of data Main topics 
(frame) collection** Remarks 
random (?) survey, face to face • Expectation & satisfaction with OP service; 
interview (-) private sector utilisation; out of pocket 
payments (amounts, motivation) 
• qualitative responses incl. 
? (?) survey, postal • Satisfaction with the present position; salary & 
questionnaire (-) workload; advantages of university posts; 
reward system; gratitude payments & gifts; 
moonlighting; position in the social hierarchy 
• qualitative responses incl. 
all patients with survey, face to face • Hospital admission (why?, how?); satisfaction 
at least 3 -day interview (-) with the hospital; relationship with the doctor, I 
stays in a 3- nurse, other patients; satisfaction with hospital . 
week period infrastructure I 
random survey, postal • Previous hospitalisations; experiences of latest I 
(medical questionnaire (+) hospital stay (information; staff; hotel service; 
records) leisure time; visits); informal payment (money I 
" gift; doctors" nurses" cleaners), motivation; 
continuation of care after discharge 
all patients survey, self- • Patient satisfaction; informal payment 
between completion 
• III-designed study & questionnaire 
30/4/1973 - questionnaire with on 
• Qualitative responses incl. 1/311973 site collection (I) 
stratified survey, self- • Patient satisfaction; private sector utilisation; 
random (?) completion informal payments (motivation) 
questionnaire with on 
site collection (I) 
? (?) survey, face to face • Including opinion on gratitude payment 
interview (I) 
mixed survey, postal • Patient satisfaction; private sector utilisation; 
(previous study; questionnaires (-) Informal payments (motivation); Need for 
utilisation lists change 
ofa day) • 4 questionnaires 
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# Research Unit of analysis (Study) Population Sample size (Source) lobservation (Response rate) 
9 OTKI*. KSH 1984 individual general population of 20,103 
[201} Ihousehold Hungary 120,204(99.5%) 
(in 7,398 
households) 
10 TK* 1985 individual general population of I,OOO/?(?) 
[79] Hungary 
II MTA SZKI* 1983 individual patients with arteriosclerosis 41+58=99 
[199] patient obliterans (patients 
discharged from two 
hospitals in Hungary) 
12 Adam (50; 49; 67( period early medieval period - 1984 -
documents 
13 SZEKI* 1983-84 individual hospital doctors of Budapest 100 (?) ?/(?) 
[83] medical doctors 
14 GKI* 1986 Household I? private households of 13,500 
(December) Hungary /16,000(84.4%) 
[200] 
15 MTA SZKI* 1988 primipara lived in 6 settlements in Pest 294/? (?) 
[71; 217] county, expected first child 
in 1988 
16 T ARKI* 1992 (May) individual practising physicians of 1,0001?(?) 
[229} medical doctor Hungary 
17 SZGTI* 1992 household private households of 2,000 /?('1) 
[223J Hungary 
18 SZGTI* 1994 Household I? private households of 5,0001?(?) 
[75] Hungary 
- -
Sampling Method of data Main topics 
(frame) collection" Remarks 
random survey, face to face • Health status & health care utilisation; sickness 
(KSH ELAR interview (+) benefit; satisfaction with health workers and 
sample) services; informal payment 
random survey, face to face • Radio listening and TV watching habits; health 
panel interview (+); and services (problems, satisfaction); informal 
content analysis of payment (motivation, willingness to pay, etc.) 
popular media 
? (medical in-depth interviews • Access to services, patients' routes in the 
records) system 
-
historical analysis • The history of informal payments 
? (?) in-depth interviews • Salaries, wages; informal payment; income 
from private practice 
random survey, face to face • household expenditures on tip, under-the-
(KSHELARM interview (+) counter payment, unregistered work (tax 
sample) evasion), gratitude payment 
? survey, face to face • health status, preparation for delivery, 
interview (-) and psychological status, health services utilization 
follow up interviews (including private practice, informal payments) 
stratified survey, face to face • General condition in the workplace, salaries; 
random (7) interview (+) knowledge about health care reform; opinion 
about health policy actors, health care reform 
and social insurance 
survey, face to face • Hidden economy; household expenditures on 
interview (+) tip, gratitude payment, unregistered purchases 
(purchase wlo invoice) 
random survey, face to face • Health status &medicine consumption; extra 
? interview (+) expenses of illness; association between life-
style and health status; expenses on prevention; 
knowledge and opinion on social insurance 
~-
~ _____ ~ ___ L--- _~_~ ________ .. __ ___ __ __ 
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# Research Unit of analysis (Study) Population Sample size Sampling Method of data Main topics (Source) lobservation (Response rate) (frame) collection·· Remarks 
19 SOTE· 1995 individual j!eneral population (aged 12,640 /?(7) random survey, face to face • Market research of health insurance; health 
[224] over 16) (KSH) interview (+) status and health care utilisation; quality oflife; 
life style; attitudes (lack of hostility); social 
support; life objectives; coping; work 
competence; mass media 
20 TARKI* 1996 individuals practising GPs of Hungary 1,351 17(7) • Basic features of family doctor system; praxis 
[216] general population 1,500/?(7) stratified survey, face to face income and financial management; status and 
ambulatory patients (PC) 1,008/?(?) random interview (+) position of nurses and health visitors; free (NHIFA, choice of doctor; opinions on primary care; 
paramedical workers (PC) 1,367/?(?) Central patient movement in the system 
local government officials 47/?(?) Registering and 
semi-structured 
special ists (dermatology, 272 Election Office) interview 
ENT, internal medicine) /296(91.9%) 
21 KSII-1997 households private households of 2,682 stratified survey, face to face • Hidden economy; household expenditures on 
[225] Hungary 12,879(93.2%) random interview (+) tip, gratitude payment, unregistered purchases ! 
(KSH ELAR) (purchase wlo invoice) I 
22 TARKI* 1998 (\999) individuals general population of 1,392/?(?) stratified survey, face to face • informal payments: attitudes, extent, "prices", I 
[214] Hungary random interviews overall magnitude, socio-economic 
practising physicians 1,006/7(7) ? determinants, timing, enforcement by 
(internal medicine, surgery. providers, connections, referral 
paediatrics, psychiatry & 
neurology) 
.-
--
Notes: *OOTE = Debreceni Orvostudomanyi Egyetem, Marxista-Leninista Intezet [Debrecen University of Medicine, Department of Marxism-Leninism]; ELTE = EOvtOs LOTllnd Tudomanyegyetem 
BO!cseszettudomanyi Kar, Szociol6gia Intezet {Eotv6s Lorand University of Sciences, Faculty of Humanities. Department of Sociology]; GKI = Gazdasagkutat6 Intezet {Economic Research Institute]: 
KSH = KOzponti Statisztikai Hivatal [Hungarian Central Statistical Omce]: MTA SZKI = Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia Szociologiai Kutat6 [ntezet {Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Sociological 
Research Institute]; OTKI = Orvostovabbkepzo Intezet, Eges7segOgyi Szervezesi Tanszek [Institute of Medical Doctors' Further Training, Department of Health Care Organisation]; SOTE = 
Semmelweis Orvostudomanyi Egyctem, Magatartastudomanyi Intezet [Semmelweis University of Medicine, Institute of Behavioural SCiences]: SZGTI = Szakszervezetek Gazdasag- es 
Tarsadalomkutat6 Intezete [Economy and Social Research Institute of Trade Unions]: SZEKI = Szakszervezetek Elmeleti Kutat6 Intezete [Theoretical Research Institute of Trade Unions]; TARKI = 
Tfusadalomkutatasi es Informatikai EgyesOles, Social Research Informatics Center (SRIC): TK = Tomegkommunikaci6s Kutat6kOzpont [Mass-media Research Institute] 
.. + = questionnaire available; - = questionnaire not available; I = partly included in the puhlication 
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1.1 . SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
I. PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
As discussed previously, the 'donation' explanation for informal payment is based on 
the assumption that by giving money patients would like to express their gratitude for 
having been cured. If this is so, than there is no reason to believe that they would not do 
the same in the 'pure' private sector, even though they already have to pay out-of-
pocket for the services they obtain. Consequently if informal payments existed in the 
private sector this would support the 'donation' hypothesis. In this case study we 
explore this phenomenon first by establishing whether informal payments do exist in the 
private sector, and second by trying to gain insight into the motivation for such 
payments using in-depth interviews with doctors and patients. 
1.1. Summary of the case 
Although we did not expect the phenomenon to occur frequently, and indeed this was 
one of the reasons why we chose a private hospital (the only one in Hungary) rather 
than a polyclinic, we did not preclude the possibility that it would exist. 
Altogether, six patients were identified and interviewed. 
The physician sample was selected in cooperation with the hospital's management. 
Eleven physicians were selected and agreed to participate, but it was only possible to 
conduct 9 interviews. 
The framework for interviewing patients was the same as that used with patients in 
the public sector in the research reported in the main thesis. However, the interviews 
with physicians were different in two respects. First, as most of them had decided to 
give up their public sector employment we wanted to explore this decision to gain 
insight into the 'exit' issue. Further, asking about the employment history of 
respondents offered the opportunity to contrast their work experiences in the public and 
the private sector. Second, as we have pointed out before, we put greater emphasis on 
exploring actual cases of informal payments. 
The TELKI private hospital is a new building approximately 10 kilometres from the 
outskirts of Budapest that began to operate in the autumn of 1998. The hospital has 100 
beds in two-bedded rooms and provides a limited number of in- and outpatient services, 
in the main specialties. The conditions in the hospital are excellent. The rooms are 
equipped with colour TV, telephone, en-suite bathroom; the second bed in each room is 
for relatives to sleep in. Of course the prices are also distinctive and it is not surprising 
that about half of the patients who choose TELKI are foreigners. 
The hospital employs doctors either on a part-time or a full-time basis, but full-time 
doctors, the so-called 'staff-doctors' are given one day off each week to work in the 
public sector. The TELKI private hospital operates a strict policy of not accepting 
informal payments, with the exception of in-kind gifts, such as flowers , chocolate, and 
alcoholic drinks. Violation by doctors is punishable by dismissal. 
. The interviews with doctors in the TELKI hospital revealed that informal payments 
do exist in the private sector - a finding confirmed by our Kecskemet study - although 
the frequency seems to be much lower than in the public sector. All but one of the 
doctors, have encountered a few patients who attempted to pay in addition to the official 
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1 1. SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
fees although it was not possible to tell the exact proportion patients who did so, 
because no records are kept and data on patient turnover are considered commercially 
confidential. Furthermore, the extent to which interviewees were willing to discuss this 
issue varied, suggesting a degree of sensitivity. However it was clear that attempts to 
pay are much less frequent in TELKI than in the public sector. 
Some interviewees also compared their experiences in TELKI with those in their 
public sector practice, noting an apparent difference in the frequency of attempts, at 
least concerning 'gifts' of money. In contrast, one of the doctors stated that there was 
no difference in non-monetary gifts (which are allowed in TELKI). 
What is behind private sector informal payments? While we have assumed that the 
existence of this phenomenon supports the 'donation' explanation for informal 
payments, interviews with doctors and patients reveal that this is a more complex issue, 
where gratitude is but one factor in what is a far from straightforward process. 
In the analysis of the 'coercion' factor, we have argued that confusion about 
entitlements can contribute to the development of a view that certain services are 
considered 'extra' and so must be paid for. On the one hand, doctors in TELKI 
emphasized that patients have adequate information about the prices and the method of 
settling the bill, and consequently they are aware that they do not have to pay the doctor 
separately. On the other hand, the interviews revealed that one way in which people 
attempt to pay is not by the patient offering money directly, such as putting an envelope 
on the table, hiding it in a gift, or flashing a wad of notes, all of which do happen, but 
rather that they enquire about, whether they have to pay. This seeming discrepancy 
may indicate that patients project their public sector experiences into the private sector. 
The entire public system is influenced by this contradiction between rhetoric and reality 
so it is possible that some of patients remain uncertain about whether the introduction 
they are given to the payment process is just lip-service and the harsh reality is that 
doctors do expect additional money, or whether it does reflect confusion about how to 
settle the bill. While they double-check, their reactions suggest that the attempts to pay 
have nothing to do with gratitude. 
This explanation is further supported by evidence that previous experiences with 
Hungarian health services do matter. Doctors noted that foreigners rarely attempt to 
pay, except those who have been living in Hungary for a longer period of time. 
According to some doctors, the ability of patients to pay also matters. As one of the 
doctors noted, the patients who choose TELKI are much better off than the staff, and 
can easily afford a payment, while another pointed out that some patients were the 
middle class, especially those who had bad experiences in the public sector and while 
they could afford TELKI, the total sum did matter. In this context informal payment 
could be considered unnecessary extra expenditure. On the other hand there could be a 
motivation to give, even in these circumstances, reflecting previolls experiences with 
the services provided by public providers and the severity of the illness. 
Maybe these are cases that are the closest to the gratitude payment concept, as 
understood by the 'donation' hypothesis, suggesting that 'genuine' gratitude can be a 
motive for informal payments in the private sector. 
Nevertheless, this assessment is based exclusively on the perspectives of doctors. 
Therefore, to get further, albeit very limited, insight into this issue, we draw on the 
interviews with the two patients identified as making private sector informal payments. 
1'1:1 I'R ( 
J> A G l' 3 7 ~ IT" r SIS _ (j I' . R I' \' I S 
PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
I I. SUMMARY Of THE CASE 
We found four patients who stated that they had made private sector informal 
payments: one from TELKI and three from the Kecskemet survey, although of the 
latter, only one was a true case of private sector informal payments. Thus, only two 
patients could be interviewed but both extended the scope of the alternative explanation 
of 'non-coercive' reasons for giving: (1) the 'custom' aspect of motivation and the 
'reflex' approach, and (2) the 'gratitude' aspect of motivation with the 'I am grateful 
because 1 have received unsatisfactory care so far' approach. These cases have also 
provided insight into how the blurred boundaries between the public and private sector 
can influence informal payments. 
A key conclusion that could be drawn from these two interviews is that the 
motivation for such payments is complex and multifaceted, supporting the contention 
that survey questionnaires inevitably oversimplify the reality. This further reinforces of 
our findings that surveys are not appropriate tools to capture motivation and their results 
can be misleading. Overall it seems that most examples of what are a relatively few 
cases of private sector informal payments fit better with a 'coercive' interpretative 
framework, but the motivation of patients needs to be explored in a more systematic 
manner in future research. The case study method is by no means appropriate to draw 
general conclusions, especially with so few cases involved, and we have to take into 
account the limitations of human memory and perceptions, especially if one has to form 
an opinion on the motives of others. 
1'1' I LII. GAAL 
I' A G [ 3 7 6 I TilE SIS _ G" II. r \' I SI D 
1. PUBLICATIONS. CONFERENCE PRESE N TATIONS AND WORK ING DOCUM ENTS RELATED TO TH E THESIS 
1.1 , P UBLIC ATIO NS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
J. PUBLICATIONS, CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND 
WORKING DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE THESIS 
J.1. Publications and conference presentations 
J.1.1. THE DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS 
• Gaal, P, Rekassy, B, Healy, J (1999): Health Care Systems in Transition: Hungary. 
Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems 
• Gaal, P (2002): Chapter 19: Hungary in Fried, BJ, Gaydos, LM (ed.): World Health 
Systems: Challenges and Perspectives. Chicago, Illinois: Health Administration 
Press, Washington, D.C: AUPHA Press, pp.329-342 
• Gaal, P, Evetovits, T (2002): The Purchasing Function in the Hungarian Health Care 
System. Case study prepared for the European Observatory on Health Care Systems' 
purchasing study 
Forthcoming: 
• Gaal, P: Health Care Systems in Transition: Hungary. Brussels: European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
J.1.2. HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS 
• GaaI, P (2000): E11ekek es nez6pontok az egeszsegUgyben [Values and views in 
health sector reform] Keynote speech, Symposium on Health Economics and Values 
in Health Care, 22/09/2000. Budapest: Health Services Management Training 
Centre, Semmelweis University, Astrazeneca Kft. 
• GaaI, P (2001): Egeszsegpolitika: Az egeszsegUgyi rendszer menedzsmentjenek 
alapismeretei [Health Policy: The Foundations of the Management of Health Care 
Systems] Budapest: ,Health Services Management Training Centre, Semmelweis 
University 
• Evetovits, T, Gaal, P (2002): A felreerthet6seg karos az egeszsegre [Ambiguity is 
Bad for Your Health]. Egeszsegiigyi Menedzsment 4 (5): 28-33. 
• Evetovits T, Gaal P (2003): Mennyire hatekony a kaltseghatekony? Hogyan lett egy 
elemzesi m6dszer neveb6l anal16 hatekonysag fogalom [How efficient is a cost-
effective therapy? How has a technique for economic evaluation become an 
individual efficiency concept] Egeszsegugyi Menedzsment 5 (2): 74-81. 
J.1.3. INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
• Gaal, P (1997): Under-the-table Payment and Health Care Reforms in Hungary 
• Gaal, P (1998) : The Myth of Gratitude: Informal Payments and Health Care 
, Reforms in Hungary 
• Gaal, P (1999): Informal Payment in the Hungarian Health Services. Case studies 
prepared for the Observatory funding study. Mossialos, E, Dixon, A, Figueras, J, 
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Kutzin, J (2001): Funding Health Care: Options in Europe, European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems; comments 
Accepted for publication: 
• Gaal, P, McKee, M: Fee-for-service or donation: Theories of informal payments for 
health care (Social Science and Medicine) 
• GaM, P, McKee, M: Informal payments for health care and the theory of inxit 
(International Journal of Health Planning and Management) 
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J.2. List of working documents 
J.2.1. BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
• Description of the Hungarian health care system 
• History of informal payment in Hungary 
J.2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
• Theoretical and general literature 
• Empirical literature including major findings and the translation of questionnaires 
• International experiences 
J.2.3. METHODOLOGICAL EXPERIENCES 
J.2.4. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE 
• 2 researchers and 1 physician 
J.2.S. PRACTICAL INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
• sampling frames 
• survey compal1les 
• useful addresses and contact persons 
J.2.S. EMPIRICAL MATERIALS PROCESSED 
• transcripts of in-depth interviews (TELKI, Kecskemet, Budapest) 
• survey database 
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• database of health care providers 
• transcripts of interviews (Misszi6 case study) 
• documents related to 'exit' and 'voice' 
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